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Preface	 ﾠ
Pursuant	 ﾠto	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ13(3)	 ﾠof	 ﾠCouncil	 ﾠDecision	 ﾠ2010/427/EU	 ﾠof	 ﾠ26	 ﾠJuly	 ﾠ2010	 ﾠestablishing	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
organisation	 ﾠand	 ﾠfunctioning	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠExternal	 ﾠAction	 ﾠService,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠHigh	 ﾠ
Representative	 ﾠis	 ﾠheld	 ﾠto	 ﾠprovide	 ﾠa	 ﾠreview	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠorganisation	 ﾠand	 ﾠfunctioning	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠby	 ﾠ
mid-ﾭ‐2013.	 ﾠThis	 ﾠreview	 ﾠwill	 ﾠcover,	 ﾠinter	 ﾠalia,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠimplementation	 ﾠof	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ6(6),	 ﾠ(8)	 ﾠand	 ﾠ(11),	 ﾠ
so	 ﾠas	 ﾠto	 ﾠensure	 ﾠan	 ﾠadequate	 ﾠgeographical	 ﾠand	 ﾠgender	 ﾠbalance	 ﾠand	 ﾠa	 ﾠmeaningful	 ﾠpresence	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
nationals	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠall	 ﾠmember	 ﾠstates	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS.	 ﾠIf	 ﾠnecessary,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠreview	 ﾠwill	 ﾠbe	 ﾠaccompanied	 ﾠ
by	 ﾠappropriate	 ﾠproposals	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrevision	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ2010	 ﾠCouncil	 ﾠDecision	 ﾠ(e.g.,	 ﾠsuggestions	 ﾠfor	 ﾠ
additional	 ﾠspecific	 ﾠmeasures	 ﾠto	 ﾠcorrect	 ﾠpossible	 ﾠimbalances	 ﾠof	 ﾠstaffing).	 ﾠIn	 ﾠthat	 ﾠcase,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
Council	 ﾠwill,	 ﾠin	 ﾠaccordance	 ﾠwith	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ27(3)	 ﾠTEU,	 ﾠrevise	 ﾠthe	 ﾠDecision	 ﾠin	 ﾠlight	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠreview	 ﾠ
by	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbeginning	 ﾠof	 ﾠ2014.	 ﾠ
This	 ﾠshort	 ﾠand	 ﾠuser-ﾭ‐friendly	 ﾠlegal	 ﾠcommentary	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ2010	 ﾠCouncil	 ﾠDecision	 ﾠis	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfirst	 ﾠof	 ﾠits	 ﾠ
kind	 ﾠand	 ﾠis	 ﾠintended	 ﾠto	 ﾠinform	 ﾠthose	 ﾠinvolved	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠreview	 ﾠprocess	 ﾠand	 ﾠto	 ﾠserve	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
reference	 ﾠdocument	 ﾠfor	 ﾠpractitioners	 ﾠand	 ﾠanalysts	 ﾠdealing	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS.	 ﾠThis	 ﾠcommentary	 ﾠ
is	 ﾠnot	 ﾠan	 ﾠelaborate	 ﾠdoctrinal	 ﾠpiece,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠrather	 ﾠa	 ﾠtextual	 ﾠand	 ﾠcontextual	 ﾠanalysis	 ﾠof	 ﾠeach	 ﾠ
article,	 ﾠthat	 ﾠtakes	 ﾠaccount	 ﾠof	 ﾠi)	 ﾠother	 ﾠrelevant	 ﾠlegal	 ﾠprovisions	 ﾠ(primary,	 ﾠsecondary,	 ﾠ
international),	 ﾠii)	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprocess	 ﾠleading	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠadoption	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ2010	 ﾠCouncil	 ﾠDecision	 ﾠ(i.e.	 ﾠ
travauxpréparatoires),	 ﾠiii)	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpreamble	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCouncil	 ﾠDecision,	 ﾠand	 ﾠiv)	 ﾠinsofar	 ﾠas	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠ
possible	 ﾠat	 ﾠthis	 ﾠstage,	 ﾠearly	 ﾠimplementation.	 ﾠWherever	 ﾠrelevant,	 ﾠcross-ﾭ‐references	 ﾠto	 ﾠother	 ﾠ
provisions	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠCouncil	 ﾠDecision	 ﾠhave	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠmade	 ﾠso	 ﾠas	 ﾠto	 ﾠtie	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdifferent	 ﾠ
commentaries	 ﾠand	 ﾠensure	 ﾠoverall	 ﾠconsistency.	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠcommentary	 ﾠhas	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠproduced	 ﾠby	 ﾠan	 ﾠindependent,	 ﾠmultinational	 ﾠand	 ﾠmultidisciplinary	 ﾠ
team	 ﾠof	 ﾠscholars	 ﾠbrought	 ﾠtogether	 ﾠby	 ﾠSwedish	 ﾠInstitute	 ﾠfor	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠPolicy	 ﾠStudies	 ﾠ(SIEPS),	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠUniversity	 ﾠInstitute	 ﾠ(EUI)	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCentre	 ﾠof	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠPolicy	 ﾠStudies	 ﾠ(CEPS)	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠframework	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠso-ﾭ‐called	 ﾠ‘European	 ﾠExternal	 ﾠAction	 ﾠService	 ﾠ2.0’	 ﾠproject.	 ﾠThis	 ﾠresearch	 ﾠ
project	 ﾠis	 ﾠcarried	 ﾠout	 ﾠin	 ﾠassociation	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠAmsterdam	 ﾠCentre	 ﾠfor	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠLaw	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
Governance	 ﾠ(ACELG),	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCentre	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠLaw	 ﾠof	 ﾠEU	 ﾠExternal	 ﾠRelations	 ﾠ(CLEER),	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠ
Institute	 ﾠof	 ﾠPublic	 ﾠAdministration	 ﾠ(EIPA),	 ﾠthe	 ﾠLeuven	 ﾠCentre	 ﾠfor	 ﾠGlobal	 ﾠGovernance	 ﾠStudies,	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠthe	 ﾠUniversity	 ﾠof	 ﾠCopenhagen.	 ﾠ
To	 ﾠserve	 ﾠthe	 ﾠulterior	 ﾠaims	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠproject,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠresearch	 ﾠteam	 ﾠwill,	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠupcoming	 ﾠmonths,	 ﾠ
collect	 ﾠviews	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠdifferent	 ﾠstakeholders	 ﾠabout	 ﾠproblems	 ﾠfaced	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠimplementation	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
EEAS	 ﾠCouncil	 ﾠDecision	 ﾠand	 ﾠchallenges	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠorganisation	 ﾠand	 ﾠfunctioning	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠ
particular,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠproject	 ﾠteam	 ﾠwill	 ﾠassess	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠthere	 ﾠis	 ﾠenough	 ﾠinterpretative	 ﾠroom	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
current	 ﾠCouncil	 ﾠDecision	 ﾠto	 ﾠaccommodate	 ﾠchanges	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠorganisation	 ﾠand	 ﾠfunctioning	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠà	 ﾠdroit	 ﾠconstant’.	 ﾠIf	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmargins	 ﾠof	 ﾠappreciation	 ﾠappear	 ﾠtoo	 ﾠrestricted,	 ﾠthen	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
project	 ﾠwill	 ﾠoffer	 ﾠrecommendations	 ﾠas	 ﾠto	 ﾠhow	 ﾠto	 ﾠamend	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ2010	 ﾠCouncil	 ﾠDecision	 ﾠin	 ﾠorder	 ﾠ
to	 ﾠimprove	 ﾠthe	 ﾠorganisation	 ﾠand	 ﾠfunctioning	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠresearch	 ﾠoutputs	 ﾠof	 ﾠthis	 ﾠnext	 ﾠ
phase	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠproject	 ﾠwill	 ﾠtake	 ﾠthe	 ﾠform	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠpolicy	 ﾠbriefing	 ﾠwith	 ﾠrecommendations,	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠ
published	 ﾠat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠend	 ﾠof	 ﾠJune	 ﾠ2013.	 ﾠA	 ﾠmore	 ﾠelaborate	 ﾠacademic	 ﾠbooklet,	 ﾠcompiling	 ﾠall	 ﾠpapers	 ﾠ
produced	 ﾠduring	 ﾠthe	 ﾠproject,	 ﾠwill	 ﾠappear	 ﾠthisautumn.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠproducts	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠ2.0	 ﾠproject	 ﾠ
will	 ﾠbe	 ﾠpublished	 ﾠthrough	 ﾠthe	 ﾠregular	 ﾠchannels	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠresearch	 ﾠcentres	 ﾠinvolved	 ﾠin	 ﾠthis	 ﾠ
collaborative	 ﾠframework.	 ﾠ
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 ﾠ
List	 ﾠof	 ﾠterms	 ﾠand	 ﾠabbreviations	 ﾠ
AFCO	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ Constitutional	 ﾠAffairs	 ﾠCommittee	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠParliament	 ﾠ
AFET	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ Foreign	 ﾠAffairs	 ﾠCommittee	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠParliament	 ﾠ
CCA	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ ConsultativeCommittee	 ﾠon	 ﾠAppointments	 ﾠ
CEOS	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ Conditions	 ﾠof	 ﾠEmployment	 ﾠof	 ﾠOther	 ﾠServants	 ﾠ
CFSP	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ Common	 ﾠForeign	 ﾠand	 ﾠSecurity	 ﾠPolicy	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
CMPD	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ Crisis	 ﾠManagement	 ﾠand	 ﾠPlanning	 ﾠDirectorate	 ﾠ
COREPER	 ﾠ Committee	 ﾠof	 ﾠPermanent	 ﾠRepresentatives	 ﾠ
CPCC	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ Civilian	 ﾠPlanning	 ﾠand	 ﾠConduct	 ﾠCapability	 ﾠ
DCI	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ Development	 ﾠCooperation	 ﾠInstrument	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
EEAS	 ﾠDecision	 ﾠ Council	 ﾠDecision	 ﾠ2010/427/EU	 ﾠestablishing	 ﾠthe	 ﾠorganisation	 ﾠand	 ﾠfunctioning	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠExternal	 ﾠAction	 ﾠService	 ﾠ
EDF	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ European	 ﾠDevelopment	 ﾠFund	 ﾠ
EIDHR	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ European	 ﾠInstrument	 ﾠfor	 ﾠDemocracy	 ﾠand	 ﾠHuman	 ﾠRights	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
ENPI	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ European	 ﾠNeighbourhood	 ﾠand	 ﾠPartnership	 ﾠInstrument	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
EUMS	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ European	 ﾠUnion	 ﾠMember	 ﾠStates	 ﾠ
FAC	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ Foreign	 ﾠAffairs	 ﾠCouncil	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
FPI	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ Foreign	 ﾠPolicy	 ﾠInstruments	 ﾠService	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
ICI	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ Instrument	 ﾠfor	 ﾠCooperation	 ﾠwith	 ﾠIndustrialised	 ﾠCountries	 ﾠ
NSCI	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ Instrument	 ﾠfor	 ﾠNuclear	 ﾠSafety	 ﾠCooperation	 ﾠ
nyr	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ not	 ﾠyet	 ﾠreported	 ﾠ
PSC	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ Political	 ﾠand	 ﾠSecurity	 ﾠCommittee	 ﾠ
Quadrilogue	 ﾠ Meeting	 ﾠinvolving	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCouncil,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠHigh	 ﾠRepresentative,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠ
Parliament	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠCommission	 ﾠ
SNE	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ Seconded	 ﾠnational	 ﾠexpert	 ﾠ
TEU	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ Treaty	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠUnion	 ﾠ
TFEU	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ Treaty	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠFunctioning	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠUnion	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 6	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
ARTICLE	 ﾠ1	 ﾠ
Nature	 ﾠand	 ﾠScope	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
1.	 ﾠThis	 ﾠDecision	 ﾠestablishes	 ﾠthe	 ﾠorganisation	 ﾠand	 ﾠfunctioning	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠExternal	 ﾠAction	 ﾠService	 ﾠ
(‘EEAS’).	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
2.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠEEAS,	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠhas	 ﾠits	 ﾠheadquarters	 ﾠin	 ﾠBrussels,	 ﾠshall	 ﾠbe	 ﾠa	 ﾠfunctionally	 ﾠautonomous	 ﾠbody	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
European	 ﾠUnion,	 ﾠseparate	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠGeneral	 ﾠSecretariat	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCouncil	 ﾠand	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCommission	 ﾠwith	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠlegal	 ﾠcapacity	 ﾠnecessary	 ﾠto	 ﾠperform	 ﾠits	 ﾠtasks	 ﾠand	 ﾠattain	 ﾠits	 ﾠobjectives.	 ﾠ
3.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠshall	 ﾠbe	 ﾠplaced	 ﾠunder	 ﾠthe	 ﾠauthority	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠHigh	 ﾠRepresentative	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠUnion	 ﾠfor	 ﾠForeign	 ﾠ
Affairs	 ﾠand	 ﾠSecurity	 ﾠPolicy	 ﾠ(‘High	 ﾠRepresentative’).	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
4.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠshall	 ﾠbe	 ﾠmade	 ﾠup	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠcentral	 ﾠadministration	 ﾠand	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠUnion	 ﾠDelegations	 ﾠto	 ﾠthird	 ﾠ
countries	 ﾠand	 ﾠto	 ﾠinternational	 ﾠorganisations.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
Article	 ﾠ1	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCouncil	 ﾠDecision	 ﾠestablishing	 ﾠthe	 ﾠorganisation	 ﾠand	 ﾠfunctioning	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
European	 ﾠExternal	 ﾠAction	 ﾠService	 ﾠ(hereinafter	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ“EEAS	 ﾠDecision”)
1	 ﾠis	 ﾠentitled	 ﾠ
“nature	 ﾠand	 ﾠscope”.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠprovision	 ﾠnot	 ﾠonly	 ﾠsets	 ﾠout	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnature	 ﾠand	 ﾠscope	 ﾠof	 ﾠaction	 ﾠ




1.	 ﾠNature	 ﾠand	 ﾠscope	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠDecision	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
  The	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠDecision	 ﾠwas	 ﾠadopted	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCouncil	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbasis	 ﾠof	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ27(3)	 ﾠTEU,
2	 ﾠ
which	 ﾠis	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsole	 ﾠprovision	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠTEU	 ﾠand	 ﾠTFEU	 ﾠthat	 ﾠdeals	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS.
3	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ
27(3)	 ﾠTEU	 ﾠcontains	 ﾠthree	 ﾠsubstantive	 ﾠelements	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠService:	 ﾠits	 ﾠname,	 ﾠits	 ﾠbasic	 ﾠ
composition	 ﾠ(“shall	 ﾠcomprise	 ﾠofficials	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠrelevant	 ﾠdepartments	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠGeneral	 ﾠ
Secretariat	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCouncil	 ﾠand	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCommission	 ﾠas	 ﾠwell	 ﾠas	 ﾠstaff	 ﾠseconded	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠ
national	 ﾠdiplomatic	 ﾠservices	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠMember	 ﾠStates”)	 ﾠand,	 ﾠalbeit	 ﾠin	 ﾠbroadly	 ﾠ
defined	 ﾠterms,	 ﾠits	 ﾠessential	 ﾠfunctions:
4	 ﾠ	 ﾠnamely,	 ﾠto	 ﾠ“assist”	 ﾠthe	 ﾠHigh	 ﾠ
Representative	 ﾠand	 ﾠto	 ﾠ“work	 ﾠin	 ﾠcooperation	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdiplomatic	 ﾠservices	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
Member	 ﾠStates”.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThe	 ﾠprovision	 ﾠotherwise	 ﾠsets	 ﾠout	 ﾠa	 ﾠspecific	 ﾠprocedure	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
establish	 ﾠ“[t]he	 ﾠorganisation	 ﾠand	 ﾠfunctioning	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠExternal	 ﾠAction	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
1Council	 ﾠDecision	 ﾠ2010/42/EU	 ﾠestablishing	 ﾠthe	 ﾠorganisation	 ﾠand	 ﾠfunctioning	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠExternal	 ﾠ
Action	 ﾠService;	 ﾠOJ	 ﾠ2010	 ﾠL201/30.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
2	 ﾠSee	 ﾠPreamble	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠDecision.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
3	 ﾠThe	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠis	 ﾠalso	 ﾠmentioned	 ﾠin	 ﾠDeclarations	 ﾠ13	 ﾠand	 ﾠ14,	 ﾠconcerning	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcommon	 ﾠforeign	 ﾠand	 ﾠsecurity	 ﾠ
policy,	 ﾠand	 ﾠDeclaration	 ﾠ15	 ﾠon	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ27	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠTEU.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
4	 ﾠSee	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdiscussion	 ﾠon	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ2	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠDecision,	 ﾠbelow.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 7	 ﾠ
Service...	 ﾠ	 ﾠ[whereby	 ﾠthe]	 ﾠCouncil	 ﾠshall	 ﾠact	 ﾠon	 ﾠa	 ﾠproposal	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠHigh	 ﾠ
Representative	 ﾠafter	 ﾠconsulting	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠParliament	 ﾠand	 ﾠafter	 ﾠobtaining	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
consent	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCommission”.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
  Article	 ﾠ27(3)	 ﾠTEU	 ﾠthus	 ﾠgives	 ﾠa	 ﾠmandate	 ﾠto	 ﾠEU	 ﾠinstitutions	 ﾠto	 ﾠbuild	 ﾠupon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠTreaty	 ﾠ
provisions	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS.	 ﾠYet	 ﾠthis	 ﾠmandate	 ﾠappears	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠnarrowly	 ﾠdefined.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠ
Council	 ﾠis	 ﾠempowered	 ﾠto	 ﾠadopt	 ﾠa	 ﾠdecision	 ﾠonly	 ﾠto	 ﾠestablish	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ“organisation	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
functioning”	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS,
5	 ﾠas	 ﾠindeed	 ﾠrecalled	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfirst	 ﾠparagraph	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠ
Decision’s	 ﾠpreamble,	 ﾠin	 ﾠits	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ1(1),	 ﾠand	 ﾠin	 ﾠits	 ﾠvery	 ﾠtitle.	 ﾠ	 ﾠWhile	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnotions	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
“organisation	 ﾠand	 ﾠfunctioning”	 ﾠcould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠunderstood	 ﾠbroadly,	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠ
Decision,	 ﾠin	 ﾠview	 ﾠof	 ﾠits	 ﾠlegal	 ﾠbasis,	 ﾠcould	 ﾠhave	 ﾠincluded	 ﾠanything	 ﾠmore	 ﾠthan	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ




  Article	 ﾠ27(3)	 ﾠis	 ﾠlocated	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCFSP	 ﾠchapter	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠTEU	 ﾠ(Chapter	 ﾠ2,	 ﾠTitle	 ﾠV).	 ﾠThus,	 ﾠ
formally,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠDecision	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠCFSP	 ﾠact,	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠin	 ﾠturn	 ﾠwould	 ﾠsuggest	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
EEAS	 ﾠis	 ﾠconceived	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠCFSP	 ﾠcreature.	 ﾠYet,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnumbering	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠDecision	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
Official	 ﾠJournal	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEU	 ﾠ(“2010/427/EU”)	 ﾠcontains	 ﾠan	 ﾠ“EU”	 ﾠrather	 ﾠthan	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
“CFSP”	 ﾠreference	 ﾠthat	 ﾠCFSP	 ﾠacts	 ﾠusually	 ﾠhold.
7	 ﾠThe	 ﾠquestion	 ﾠcan	 ﾠthus	 ﾠbe	 ﾠraised	 ﾠas	 ﾠ
to	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠDecision	 ﾠwas	 ﾠconceived	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠmeasure	 ﾠhaving	 ﾠhorizontal	 ﾠ
nature	 ﾠand	 ﾠscope,	 ﾠrather	 ﾠthan	 ﾠof	 ﾠCFSP	 ﾠcharacter	 ﾠonly.	 ﾠSuch	 ﾠa	 ﾠbroad	 ﾠambit	 ﾠ
appears	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠborne	 ﾠout	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprovisions	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠDecision	 ﾠitself,
8	 ﾠand	 ﾠwould	 ﾠ
incidentally	 ﾠexplain	 ﾠthe	 ﾠGeneral	 ﾠCourt’s	 ﾠuninhibited	 ﾠapproach	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠDecision	 ﾠ
that	 ﾠtranspires	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠits	 ﾠOrder	 ﾠin	 ﾠcase	 ﾠEltid.o.ov	 ﾠDelegation	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠUnion	 ﾠ
to	 ﾠMontenegro.
9	 ﾠTo	 ﾠbe	 ﾠsure,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprocedure	 ﾠset	 ﾠout	 ﾠin	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ27(3)	 ﾠTEU	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠ
contrast	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠarchetypal	 ﾠCFSP	 ﾠdecision-ﾭ‐making	 ﾠprocedure	 ﾠevoked	 ﾠin	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ
24(1)	 ﾠand	 ﾠ31	 ﾠTEU,	 ﾠfor	 ﾠexample,	 ﾠnotably	 ﾠin	 ﾠview	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsignificant	 ﾠroles	 ﾠit	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
5	 ﾠThat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠTreaty	 ﾠof	 ﾠLisbon	 ﾠleft	 ﾠit	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEU	 ﾠinstitutions	 ﾠto	 ﾠelaborate	 ﾠthe	 ﾠorganisation	 ﾠand	 ﾠfunctioning	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠis	 ﾠquite	 ﾠremarkable	 ﾠin	 ﾠview	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnotable	 ﾠpreoccupation	 ﾠwith	 ﾠ?competence	 ﾠ	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ
otherwise	 ﾠconstrained	 ﾠits	 ﾠdrafting.	 ﾠIt	 ﾠalso	 ﾠindicates	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtangible	 ﾠcontribution	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
furthering	 ﾠcoherence	 ﾠessentially	 ﾠdepends	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠinstitutions	 ﾠbeing	 ﾠwilling	 ﾠand	 ﾠable	 ﾠto	 ﾠagree.	 ﾠ
6	 ﾠSee	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdiscussion	 ﾠon	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ2	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠDecision,	 ﾠbelow.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
7	 ﾠE.g.	 ﾠCouncil	 ﾠDecision	 ﾠ2012/392/CFSP	 ﾠof	 ﾠ16	 ﾠJuly	 ﾠ2012	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠUnion	 ﾠCSDP	 ﾠmission	 ﾠin	 ﾠNiger	 ﾠ
(EUCAP	 ﾠSahel	 ﾠNiger)	 ﾠ(OJ	 ﾠL	 ﾠ187,	 ﾠ17.7.2012,	 ﾠp.	 ﾠ48–51);	 ﾠCouncil	 ﾠDecision	 ﾠ2012/333/CFSP	 ﾠof	 ﾠ25	 ﾠJune	 ﾠ2012	 ﾠ
updating	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlist	 ﾠof	 ﾠpersons,	 ﾠgroups	 ﾠand	 ﾠentities	 ﾠsubject	 ﾠto	 ﾠArticles	 ﾠ2,	 ﾠ3	 ﾠand	 ﾠ4	 ﾠof	 ﾠCommon	 ﾠPosition	 ﾠ
2001/931/CFSP	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠapplication	 ﾠof	 ﾠspecific	 ﾠmeasures	 ﾠto	 ﾠcombat	 ﾠterrorism	 ﾠand	 ﾠrepealing	 ﾠDecision	 ﾠ
2011/872/CFSP	 ﾠ(OJ	 ﾠL	 ﾠ165,	 ﾠ26.6.2012,	 ﾠpp.	 ﾠ72–74).	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
8	 ﾠSee,	 ﾠfor	 ﾠinstance,	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ9	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠDecision,	 ﾠon	 ﾠexternal	 ﾠaction	 ﾠinstruments	 ﾠand	 ﾠprogramming;	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠdiscussion	 ﾠof	 ﾠthat	 ﾠprovision,	 ﾠbelow.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
9	 ﾠThe	 ﾠGC	 ﾠappears	 ﾠto	 ﾠconsider	 ﾠthat	 ﾠit	 ﾠhas	 ﾠjurisdiction	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠDecision;	 ﾠsee	 ﾠCase	 ﾠT-ﾭ‐395/11	 ﾠEltid.o.ov	 ﾠ
Delegation	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠUnion	 ﾠto	 ﾠMontenegro,	 ﾠJudgment	 ﾠof	 ﾠ4	 ﾠJune	 ﾠ2012,	 ﾠnyr,	 ﾠparas.	 ﾠ31ff.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 8	 ﾠ
attributes	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsupranational	 ﾠpolitical	 ﾠinstitutions	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠUnion.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠparticular,	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠCommission	 ﾠhas	 ﾠto	 ﾠgive	 ﾠits	 ﾠconsent	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdecision	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠadopted,	 ﾠwhile	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
Parliament	 ﾠhas	 ﾠthe	 ﾠright	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠconsulted,	 ﾠa	 ﾠright	 ﾠthat	 ﾠin	 ﾠpractice	 ﾠendowed	 ﾠit	 ﾠwith	 ﾠ
a	 ﾠsignificant	 ﾠinfluence	 ﾠover	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdecision-ﾭ‐making	 ﾠprocess.
10	 ﾠThe	 ﾠrationale	 ﾠfor	 ﾠ




  If	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠDecision	 ﾠwas	 ﾠindeed	 ﾠconceived	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠCFSP	 ﾠact,	 ﾠits	 ﾠscope	 ﾠis	 ﾠin	 ﾠprinciple	 ﾠ
circumscribed	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnon-ﾭ‐contamination	 ﾠprinciple	 ﾠof	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ40(1)	 ﾠTEU.
12	 ﾠWhile	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠCourt	 ﾠof	 ﾠJustice	 ﾠhas	 ﾠrecalled	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ“Union's	 ﾠcompetence	 ﾠin	 ﾠmatters	 ﾠof	 ﾠ[the	 ﾠ
CFSP]	 ﾠshall	 ﾠcover	 ﾠall	 ﾠareas	 ﾠof	 ﾠforeign	 ﾠpolicy	 ﾠand	 ﾠall	 ﾠquestions	 ﾠrelating	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
Union’s	 ﾠsecurity”,
13	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprovisions	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠDecision	 ﾠcannot	 ﾠin	 ﾠprinciple	 ﾠaffect	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠapplication	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ“procedures	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠextent	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpowers	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
institutions	 ﾠlaid	 ﾠdown	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠTreaties	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠexercise	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠUnion	 ﾠcompetences	 ﾠ
referred	 ﾠto	 ﾠin	 ﾠArticles	 ﾠ3	 ﾠto	 ﾠ6	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠTreaty	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠFunctioning	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠ
Union”.	 ﾠThat	 ﾠwould	 ﾠarguably	 ﾠbe	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcase	 ﾠif	 ﾠthe	 ﾠDecision	 ﾠlegally	 ﾠaffected	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
powers	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCommission,
14	 ﾠfor	 ﾠexample,	 ﾠas	 ﾠestablished	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠTFEU.
15	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
10	 ﾠFor	 ﾠmore	 ﾠ	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprocess	 ﾠleading	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠadoption	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdecision,	 ﾠsee	 ﾠB.	 ﾠVan	 ﾠVooren,	 ﾠ“A	 ﾠlegal-ﾭ‐
institutional	 ﾠperspective	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠExternal	 ﾠAction	 ﾠService”,	 ﾠCLEER	 ﾠWorking	 ﾠPaper	 ﾠ2010/7;	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
L.	 ﾠErkelens	 ﾠand	 ﾠS.	 ﾠBlockmans,	 ﾠ“Setting	 ﾠup	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠExternal	 ﾠAction	 ﾠService:	 ﾠAn	 ﾠinstitutional	 ﾠact	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
balance”	 ﾠ(2012)	 ﾠ8	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠConstitutional	 ﾠLaw	 ﾠReview,	 ﾠpp.	 ﾠ246-ﾭ‐279. 
11	 ﾠThe	 ﾠprovision	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠTreaty	 ﾠestablishing	 ﾠthe	 ﾠConstitution	 ﾠwas	 ﾠalso	 ﾠlocated	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠspecific	 ﾠ
CFSP	 ﾠChapter	 ﾠ(Article	 ﾠIII-ﾭ‐296).	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
12	 ﾠAccording	 ﾠto	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ40(1)	 ﾠTEU:	 ﾠ“The	 ﾠimplementation	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcommon	 ﾠforeign	 ﾠand	 ﾠsecurity	 ﾠpolicy	 ﾠ
shall	 ﾠnot	 ﾠaffect	 ﾠthe	 ﾠapplication	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprocedures	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠextent	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpowers	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠinstitutions	 ﾠlaid	 ﾠ
down	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠTreaties	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠexercise	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠUnion	 ﾠcompetences	 ﾠreferred	 ﾠto	 ﾠin	 ﾠArticles	 ﾠ3	 ﾠto	 ﾠ6	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
Treaty	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠFunctioning	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠUnion”.	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ40	 ﾠTEU	 ﾠis	 ﾠmentioned	 ﾠspecifically	 ﾠin	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ
4(3)(a)	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠdecision,	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsection	 ﾠconcerning	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrole	 ﾠof	 ﾠCSDP	 ﾠbodies	 ﾠincluded	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠ
central	 ﾠadministration,	 ﾠas	 ﾠif	 ﾠnone	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠother	 ﾠprovisions	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdecision	 ﾠwere	 ﾠin	 ﾠany	 ﾠway	 ﾠlikely	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
raise	 ﾠissues	 ﾠof	 ﾠcompatibility	 ﾠwith	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ40	 ﾠTEU.	 ﾠThis	 ﾠwould	 ﾠtend	 ﾠto	 ﾠfurther	 ﾠsupport	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnotion	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠdecision	 ﾠhas	 ﾠa	 ﾠhorizontal	 ﾠdimension.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
13	 ﾠSee	 ﾠC-ﾭ‐130/10	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠParliament	 ﾠv	 ﾠCouncil,	 ﾠJudgment	 ﾠof	 ﾠ19	 ﾠJuly	 ﾠ2012,	 ﾠnyr,	 ﾠat	 ﾠpara	 ﾠ62.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
14	 ﾠIn	 ﾠthis	 ﾠregard,	 ﾠsee	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdiscussion	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ‘normal	 ﾠtasks’	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCommission	 ﾠevoked	 ﾠin	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ2	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠ
Decision,	 ﾠbelow.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
15	 ﾠIn	 ﾠview	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcase	 ﾠlaw	 ﾠrelated	 ﾠto	 ﾠformer	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ47	 ﾠTEU	 ﾠ(e.g.	 ﾠCase	 ﾠC-ﾭ‐91/05	 ﾠCommission	 ﾠv	 ﾠ
Council[2008]	 ﾠECR	 ﾠI-ﾭ‐3651),	 ﾠquestioning	 ﾠthe	 ﾠvalidity	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠCFSP	 ﾠact	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠas	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠdecision	 ﾠby	 ﾠ
reference	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnon-ﾭ‐contamination	 ﾠprinciple	 ﾠ(now	 ﾠenshrined	 ﾠin	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ40(1)	 ﾠTEU),	 ﾠcan	 ﾠarise	 ﾠnot	 ﾠonly	 ﾠ
in	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcontext	 ﾠof	 ﾠannulment	 ﾠproceedings	 ﾠ(Article	 ﾠ263	 ﾠTFEU,	 ﾠi.e.	 ﾠwithin	 ﾠtwo	 ﾠmonths	 ﾠfollowing	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
adoption	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdecision),	 ﾠbut	 ﾠalso	 ﾠthrough	 ﾠa	 ﾠplea	 ﾠof	 ﾠillegality	 ﾠ(Article	 ﾠ277	 ﾠTFEU),	 ﾠif	 ﾠa	 ﾠdecision	 ﾠwas	 ﾠ
adopted	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbasis	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ2010	 ﾠDecision	 ﾠ–	 ﾠas	 ﾠthere	 ﾠhave	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠin	 ﾠpractice	 ﾠ(E.g.	 ﾠJoint	 ﾠDecision	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
Commission	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠHR	 ﾠon	 ﾠCooperation	 ﾠMechanisms	 ﾠconcerning	 ﾠthe	 ﾠManagement	 ﾠof	 ﾠDelegations	 ﾠof	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 9	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
  Incidentally,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠECOWAS	 ﾠcase	 ﾠlaw	 ﾠleaves	 ﾠimportant	 ﾠinterpretative	 ﾠscope	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
EEAS	 ﾠin	 ﾠline	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprinciple	 ﾠof	 ﾠcoherence.	 ﾠFirst,	 ﾠwhere	 ﾠacts	 ﾠdo	 ﾠnot	 ﾠresort	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
“legal	 ﾠeffect”,
16	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ40	 ﾠTEU	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot	 ﾠviolated.	 ﾠ	 ﾠHence	 ﾠthe	 ﾠService	 ﾠcan	 ﾠplay	 ﾠan	 ﾠ
important	 ﾠrole	 ﾠin	 ﾠnon	 ﾠCFSP-ﾭ‐issues	 ﾠwithout	 ﾠviolating	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnon-ﾭ‐contamination	 ﾠ
clause.	 ﾠ	 ﾠSecond,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCourt	 ﾠin	 ﾠECOWAS	 ﾠalso	 ﾠleft	 ﾠroom	 ﾠfor	 ﾠlegal	 ﾠinstruments	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠ
do	 ﾠnot	 ﾠ“implement”	 ﾠTEU	 ﾠ(CFSP)	 ﾠor	 ﾠTFEU	 ﾠpolicies,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠfunction	 ﾠat	 ﾠa	 ﾠlevel	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
generality	 ﾠin	 ﾠorder	 ﾠto	 ﾠensure	 ﾠcoherent	 ﾠEU	 ﾠexternal	 ﾠpolicies,	 ﾠand	 ﾠtherefore	 ﾠdo	 ﾠnot	 ﾠ
”prejudice	 ﾠquestions	 ﾠof	 ﾠcompetence”.
17	 ﾠ	 ﾠThus,	 ﾠlegally	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠhas	 ﾠquite	 ﾠa	 ﾠbit	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
leeway	 ﾠto	 ﾠfully	 ﾠplay	 ﾠits	 ﾠrole	 ﾠin	 ﾠensuring	 ﾠcoherence	 ﾠacross	 ﾠall	 ﾠEU	 ﾠforeign	 ﾠpolicies,	 ﾠ
regardless	 ﾠof	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ40	 ﾠTEU.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
  The	 ﾠscope	 ﾠand	 ﾠnature	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠDecision	 ﾠshould	 ﾠalso	 ﾠbe	 ﾠconsidered	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlight	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠDeclaration	 ﾠ14	 ﾠ(annexed	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠFinal	 ﾠAct	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠIntergovernmental	 ﾠConference	 ﾠ
which	 ﾠadopted	 ﾠthe	 ﾠTreaty	 ﾠof	 ﾠLisbon)	 ﾠaccording	 ﾠto	 ﾠwhich:	 ﾠ“the	 ﾠprovisions	 ﾠcovering	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠCommon	 ﾠForeign	 ﾠand	 ﾠSecurity	 ﾠPolicy	 ﾠincluding	 ﾠin	 ﾠrelation	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠHigh	 ﾠ
Representative	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠUnion	 ﾠfor	 ﾠForeign	 ﾠAffairs	 ﾠand	 ﾠSecurity	 ﾠPolicy	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
External	 ﾠAction	 ﾠService	 ﾠwill	 ﾠnot	 ﾠaffect	 ﾠthe	 ﾠexisting	 ﾠlegal	 ﾠbasis,	 ﾠresponsibilities,	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
powers	 ﾠof	 ﾠeach	 ﾠMember	 ﾠState	 ﾠin	 ﾠrelation	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠformulation	 ﾠand	 ﾠconduct	 ﾠof	 ﾠits	 ﾠ
foreign	 ﾠpolicy,	 ﾠits	 ﾠnational	 ﾠdiplomatic	 ﾠservice,	 ﾠrelations	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthird	 ﾠcountries	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
participation	 ﾠin	 ﾠinternational	 ﾠorganisations,	 ﾠincluding	 ﾠa	 ﾠMember	 ﾠState's	 ﾠ
membership	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠSecurity	 ﾠCouncil	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠUnited	 ﾠNations”	 ﾠ(emphasis	 ﾠadded).	 ﾠ
Thus	 ﾠin	 ﾠprinciple,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠDecision	 ﾠas	 ﾠCFSP	 ﾠact	 ﾠcould	 ﾠnot	 ﾠbe	 ﾠformulated	 ﾠin	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
way	 ﾠas	 ﾠto	 ﾠaffect	 ﾠmember	 ﾠstates’	 ﾠ(diplomatic	 ﾠservices)	 ﾠresponsibilities	 ﾠand	 ﾠpowers	 ﾠ







2.	 ﾠNature	 ﾠand	 ﾠscope	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 ﾠService	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 ﾠ	 ﾠ	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 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠUnion,	 ﾠJOIN(2012)8,	 ﾠ28.3.2012)	 ﾠor	 ﾠarguably	 ﾠthrough	 ﾠa	 ﾠpreliminary	 ﾠruling	 ﾠprocedure	 ﾠ
(Article	 ﾠ267	 ﾠTFEU).	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
16	 ﾠSee	 ﾠC.	 ﾠHillion	 ﾠand	 ﾠR.A.	 ﾠWessel,	 ﾠ“Competence	 ﾠDistribution	 ﾠin	 ﾠEU	 ﾠExternal	 ﾠRelations	 ﾠafter	 ﾠECOWAS:	 ﾠ
Clarification	 ﾠor	 ﾠContinued	 ﾠFuzziness”	 ﾠ(2009)	 ﾠ46	 ﾠCommon	 ﾠMarket	 ﾠLaw	 ﾠReview,	 ﾠpp.	 ﾠ551-ﾭ‐586.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
17	 ﾠSee	 ﾠB.	 ﾠVan	 ﾠVooren,	 ﾠ“The	 ﾠSmall	 ﾠArms	 ﾠJudgment	 ﾠin	 ﾠan	 ﾠAge	 ﾠof	 ﾠConstitutional	 ﾠTurmoil”	 ﾠ(2009)	 ﾠ14	 ﾠ
European	 ﾠForeign	 ﾠAffairs	 ﾠReview,	 ﾠpp.	 ﾠ231-ﾭ‐248.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 10	 ﾠ
  In	 ﾠline	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠposition	 ﾠdefended	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmember	 ﾠstates,
18	 ﾠand	 ﾠin	 ﾠcontrast	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
wishes	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠParliament	 ﾠ(and	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCommission),
19	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ1	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠ
Decision	 ﾠemphasises	 ﾠthe	 ﾠautonomous	 ﾠcharacter	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠin	 ﾠseveral	 ﾠways.	 ﾠ
Made	 ﾠup	 ﾠof	 ﾠits	 ﾠown	 ﾠ“central	 ﾠadministration	 ﾠand	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠUnion	 ﾠDelegations	 ﾠto	 ﾠthird	 ﾠ
countries	 ﾠand	 ﾠto	 ﾠinternational	 ﾠorganisations”,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠService	 ﾠis	 ﾠconceived	 ﾠas	 ﾠ“a	 ﾠ
functionally	 ﾠautonomous	 ﾠbody”	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEU,	 ﾠplaced	 ﾠ“under	 ﾠthe	 ﾠauthority	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠHigh	 ﾠ
Representative”,	 ﾠand	 ﾠ“separate	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠGeneral	 ﾠSecretariat	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCouncil	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
from	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCommission”.	 ﾠIt	 ﾠis	 ﾠendowed	 ﾠwith	 ﾠa	 ﾠ“legal	 ﾠcapacity	 ﾠnecessary	 ﾠto	 ﾠperform	 ﾠ
its	 ﾠtasks	 ﾠand	 ﾠattain	 ﾠits	 ﾠobjectives”.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
(i)	 ﾠA	 ﾠ“body”	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠUnion	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
  As	 ﾠa	 ﾠ“body”	 ﾠ(translated	 ﾠas	 ﾠ“organe”	 ﾠin	 ﾠFrench),	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot	 ﾠformally	 ﾠincluded	 ﾠ
in	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlist	 ﾠof	 ﾠEU	 ﾠinstitutions	 ﾠenshrined	 ﾠin	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ13	 ﾠTEU,	 ﾠalthough	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠenvisaged	 ﾠ




  The	 ﾠnotion	 ﾠof	 ﾠ“body”	 ﾠis	 ﾠreferred	 ﾠto	 ﾠin	 ﾠand	 ﾠregulated	 ﾠby	 ﾠseveral	 ﾠprovisions	 ﾠof	 ﾠEU	 ﾠ
primary	 ﾠlaw.
22	 ﾠ	 ﾠAkin	 ﾠto	 ﾠEU	 ﾠinstitutions,	 ﾠa	 ﾠ“body”	 ﾠis	 ﾠbound	 ﾠby	 ﾠe.g.	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprovisions	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	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 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
18	 ﾠSee	 ﾠe.g.	 ﾠPresidency	 ﾠReport	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠCouncil	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠExternal	 ﾠAction	 ﾠService,	 ﾠ
14930/09,	 ﾠ23	 ﾠOctober	 ﾠ2009.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
19See	 ﾠe.g.	 ﾠBrok	 ﾠReport	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCommittee	 ﾠon	 ﾠconstitutional	 ﾠaffairs	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠinstitutional	 ﾠaspects	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
setting	 ﾠup	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠExternal	 ﾠAction	 ﾠService	 ﾠ(2009/2133(INI))A7-ﾭ‐0041/2009.	 ﾠ
 
20Regulation	 ﾠ(EU,	 ﾠEuratom)	 ﾠNo	 ﾠ1080/2010	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠParliament	 ﾠand	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCouncil	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
24	 ﾠNovember	 ﾠ2010	 ﾠamending	 ﾠthe	 ﾠStaff	 ﾠRegulations	 ﾠof	 ﾠOfficials	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠCommunities	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
Conditions	 ﾠof	 ﾠEmployment	 ﾠof	 ﾠOther	 ﾠServants	 ﾠof	 ﾠthose	 ﾠCommunities,	 ﾠOJ	 ﾠL311,	 ﾠ26.11.2010,	 ﾠp.	 ﾠ1;	 ﾠ
Regulation	 ﾠ(EU,	 ﾠEURATOM)	 ﾠNo	 ﾠ1081/2010	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠParliament	 ﾠand	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCouncil	 ﾠof	 ﾠ24	 ﾠ
November	 ﾠ2010	 ﾠamending	 ﾠCouncil	 ﾠRegulation	 ﾠ(EC,	 ﾠEuratom)	 ﾠNo	 ﾠ1605/2002	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠFinancial	 ﾠ
Regulation	 ﾠapplicable	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠgeneral	 ﾠbudget	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠCommunities,	 ﾠas	 ﾠregards	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠ
External	 ﾠAction	 ﾠService,	 ﾠOJ	 ﾠL	 ﾠ311,	 ﾠ26.11.2010,	 ﾠp.	 ﾠ9	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
21	 ﾠSee	 ﾠpt	 ﾠ8	 ﾠof	 ﾠPreamble	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠDecision;	 ﾠsee	 ﾠalso	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdiscussion	 ﾠon	 ﾠArticles	 ﾠ6	 ﾠand	 ﾠ8	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠ
Decision,	 ﾠbelow.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
22	 ﾠHere	 ﾠare	 ﾠsome	 ﾠTreaty	 ﾠProvisions	 ﾠhaving	 ﾠlegal	 ﾠrelevance	 ﾠfor	 ﾠEU	 ﾠ“bodies”:	 ﾠTEU:	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ9	 ﾠ(all	 ﾠbodies	 ﾠ
respect	 ﾠdemocratic	 ﾠprinciples),	 ﾠTFEU:	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ15(1)	 ﾠ(transparency	 ﾠby	 ﾠall	 ﾠEU	 ﾠbodies);	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ15(3)	 ﾠ
(access	 ﾠto	 ﾠdocuments	 ﾠof	 ﾠall	 ﾠbodies);	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ16	 ﾠ(personal	 ﾠdata	 ﾠprotection	 ﾠby	 ﾠEU	 ﾠbodies);	 ﾠArticles	 ﾠ20	 ﾠ&	 ﾠ
24	 ﾠ(citizens	 ﾠmay	 ﾠpetition	 ﾠ“advisory	 ﾠbodies”	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEU);	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ71	 ﾠ(representatives	 ﾠof	 ﾠEU	 ﾠbodies	 ﾠmay	 ﾠ
participate	 ﾠin	 ﾠstanding	 ﾠcommittee	 ﾠon	 ﾠinternal	 ﾠsecurity);	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ88	 ﾠ(Europol	 ﾠreceiving	 ﾠinfo	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠ
‘bodies’);	 ﾠArticles	 ﾠ123	 ﾠ&	 ﾠ124	 ﾠ(prohibition	 ﾠof	 ﾠECB	 ﾠoverdraft	 ﾠfacilities	 ﾠto	 ﾠEU	 ﾠbodies);	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ226	 ﾠ(EP	 ﾠ
enquiries	 ﾠinto	 ﾠmaladministration,	 ﾠwithout	 ﾠprejudice	 ﾠto	 ﾠcompetence	 ﾠof	 ﾠother	 ﾠEU	 ﾠbodies	 ﾠor	 ﾠ
institutions),	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ228	 ﾠ(1)(EU	 ﾠombudsman	 ﾠmay	 ﾠreceive	 ﾠcomplaints	 ﾠon	 ﾠEU	 ﾠbodies’	 ﾠactivities);	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ
263	 ﾠ(review	 ﾠof	 ﾠlegality	 ﾠof	 ﾠacts	 ﾠof	 ﾠbodies,	 ﾠand	 ﾠacts	 ﾠof	 ﾠthose	 ﾠbodies	 ﾠmay	 ﾠset	 ﾠup	 ﾠconditions	 ﾠconcerning	 ﾠ
actions	 ﾠagainst	 ﾠthem);	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ265	 ﾠ(failure	 ﾠto	 ﾠact	 ﾠalso	 ﾠapplicable	 ﾠto	 ﾠEU	 ﾠbodies),	 ﾠ267	 ﾠ(prelim.	 ﾠreference	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 11	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠEU	 ﾠCharter	 ﾠof	 ﾠFundamental	 ﾠrights	 ﾠ(see	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ51	 ﾠEUCFR).	 ﾠIndeed,	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠbody,	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠmay	 ﾠbe	 ﾠbrought	 ﾠto	 ﾠCourt,	 ﾠe.g.	 ﾠunder	 ﾠArticles	 ﾠ263	 ﾠand	 ﾠ265	 ﾠTFEU,	 ﾠ
according	 ﾠto	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠ“acts	 ﾠof	 ﾠbodies	 ﾠintended	 ﾠto	 ﾠhave	 ﾠlegal	 ﾠeffects	 ﾠon	 ﾠthird	 ﾠ
parties”	 ﾠmay	 ﾠbe	 ﾠchallenged	 ﾠbefore	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠCourt	 ﾠof	 ﾠJustice	 ﾠin	 ﾠcase	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
violation	 ﾠof	 ﾠEU	 ﾠlaw.
23	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
  More	 ﾠgenerally,	 ﾠsome	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠTreaty	 ﾠprinciples	 ﾠgoverning	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfunctioning	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
“institutions”	 ﾠare	 ﾠarguably	 ﾠapplicable	 ﾠtobodies	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠas	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS.	 ﾠFor	 ﾠinstance,	 ﾠ
while	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ11	 ﾠTEU	 ﾠon	 ﾠtransparency,	 ﾠaccessibility,	 ﾠincluded	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠTitle	 ﾠon	 ﾠ
“democratic	 ﾠprinciples”,	 ﾠonly	 ﾠrefers	 ﾠto	 ﾠEU	 ﾠ“institutions”,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrules	 ﾠit	 ﾠencapsulates	 ﾠ
may	 ﾠapply	 ﾠmutatis	 ﾠmutandis	 ﾠto	 ﾠagencies	 ﾠor	 ﾠbodies	 ﾠgiven	 ﾠthat	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ9	 ﾠTEU,	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠ
operates	 ﾠas	 ﾠchapeau	 ﾠof	 ﾠthis	 ﾠTitle,	 ﾠemphasises	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ“[i]n	 ﾠall	 ﾠits	 ﾠactivities,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠUnion	 ﾠ
shall	 ﾠobserve	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprinciple	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠequality	 ﾠof	 ﾠits	 ﾠcitizens,	 ﾠwho	 ﾠshall	 ﾠreceive	 ﾠequal	 ﾠ
attention	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠits	 ﾠinstitutions,	 ﾠbodies,	 ﾠoffices	 ﾠand	 ﾠagencies”	 ﾠ(emphasis	 ﾠadded).At	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠvery	 ﾠleast,	 ﾠprovisions	 ﾠapplying	 ﾠto	 ﾠinstitutions	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcontext	 ﾠof	 ﾠprimary	 ﾠlaw	 ﾠ
apply	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠfunctioning	 ﾠas	 ﾠan	 ﾠ“institution”,	 ﾠviz.	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpurpose	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
Staff	 ﾠand	 ﾠFinancial	 ﾠRegulations.
24	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
  While	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS,	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠbody,	 ﾠmay	 ﾠbe	 ﾠsued,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠquestion	 ﾠmay	 ﾠbe	 ﾠraised	 ﾠas	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
whether	 ﾠit	 ﾠmay	 ﾠalso	 ﾠbring	 ﾠa	 ﾠcase	 ﾠbefore	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCourts.	 ﾠSuch	 ﾠa	 ﾠstanding	 ﾠcould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠ
derived	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ“legal	 ﾠcapacity”	 ﾠwith	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠis	 ﾠendowed	 ﾠ“to	 ﾠperform	 ﾠits	 ﾠ
tasks	 ﾠand	 ﾠattain	 ﾠits	 ﾠobjectives”	 ﾠ(Article	 ﾠ1(2)	 ﾠEEAS).
25	 ﾠIndeed,	 ﾠakin	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠ
Parliament	 ﾠin	 ﾠ1970-ﾭ‐80s,
26	 ﾠ	 ﾠthe	 ﾠService	 ﾠought	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠable	 ﾠto	 ﾠdefend	 ﾠits	 ﾠprerogatives	 ﾠ
before	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCourt	 ﾠof	 ﾠJustice	 ﾠprecisely	 ﾠ“to	 ﾠperform	 ﾠits	 ﾠtasks	 ﾠand	 ﾠattain	 ﾠits	 ﾠ
objectives”,	 ﾠhowever	 ﾠvaguely	 ﾠcrafted	 ﾠthey	 ﾠmay	 ﾠbe	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠDecision.
27	 ﾠAdmittedly,	 ﾠ
such	 ﾠstanding	 ﾠwould	 ﾠhowever	 ﾠbe	 ﾠcomplicated	 ﾠto	 ﾠexercise	 ﾠin	 ﾠpractice	 ﾠgiven	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠfalls	 ﾠunder	 ﾠthe	 ﾠauthority	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠHR,	 ﾠwho	 ﾠin	 ﾠturn	 ﾠis	 ﾠstructurally	 ﾠtied	 ﾠboth	 ﾠ
to	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCommission	 ﾠ(as	 ﾠVP)	 ﾠand	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCouncil	 ﾠ(as	 ﾠHR	 ﾠand	 ﾠPresident	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠFAC).	 ﾠ
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on	 ﾠacts	 ﾠof	 ﾠbodies	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEU),	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ287	 ﾠ1	 ﾠ&	 ﾠ3	 ﾠ(CoA	 ﾠexamines	 ﾠaccounts	 ﾠof	 ﾠall	 ﾠEU	 ﾠbodies),	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ298	 ﾠ
(EU	 ﾠbodies	 ﾠhave	 ﾠsupport	 ﾠof	 ﾠopen	 ﾠefficient	 ﾠand	 ﾠindependent	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠadministration),	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ325	 ﾠ
(combating	 ﾠfraud	 ﾠin	 ﾠall	 ﾠEU	 ﾠbodies).	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
23	 ﾠSee	 ﾠin	 ﾠthis	 ﾠrespect	 ﾠCase	 ﾠT-ﾭ‐395/11	 ﾠEltid.o.ov	 ﾠDelegation	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠUnion	 ﾠto	 ﾠMontenegro,	 ﾠ
Judgment	 ﾠof	 ﾠ4	 ﾠJune	 ﾠ2012,	 ﾠnyr,	 ﾠpara.	 ﾠ26,	 ﾠand	 ﾠpara.73	 ﾠa	 ﾠcontrario.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
24	 ﾠSee	 ﾠdiscussion	 ﾠon	 ﾠArticles	 ﾠ6	 ﾠand	 ﾠ8	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠDecision,	 ﾠbelow.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
25	 ﾠThe	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠalso	 ﾠhas	 ﾠits	 ﾠown	 ﾠLegal	 ﾠAffairs	 ﾠDivision.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
26	 ﾠSee	 ﾠCase	 ﾠ294/83LesVerts	 ﾠv	 ﾠParliament	 ﾠ[1986]	 ﾠECR	 ﾠ1339;	 ﾠand	 ﾠCase	 ﾠC-ﾭ‐70/88	 ﾠParliament	 ﾠv	 ﾠCouncil	 ﾠ
[1990]	 ﾠECR	 ﾠI-ﾭ‐2041.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
27	 ﾠSee	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdiscussion	 ﾠunder	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ2	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠDecision,	 ﾠbelow.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 12	 ﾠ
Still,	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot	 ﾠinconceivable	 ﾠthat,	 ﾠoccasionally,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠHR,	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠone	 ﾠ
hand,	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCommission,	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠother,	 ﾠmight	 ﾠnot	 ﾠshare	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsame	 ﾠinterest.
28	 ﾠ
(ii)	 ﾠA	 ﾠ“functionally	 ﾠautonomous”	 ﾠbody	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
  Undoubtedly	 ﾠits	 ﾠstructural	 ﾠlinks	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCouncil	 ﾠand	 ﾠCommission	 ﾠmay	 ﾠ
circumscribe	 ﾠthe	 ﾠautonomy	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS.	 ﾠTo	 ﾠbe	 ﾠsure,	 ﾠin	 ﾠdefining	 ﾠthe	 ﾠService	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
“functionally	 ﾠautonomous	 ﾠbody”,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdecision	 ﾠappears	 ﾠto	 ﾠqualify	 ﾠthe	 ﾠvery	 ﾠ
autonomy	 ﾠthat	 ﾠit	 ﾠenjoys.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
  This	 ﾠqualified	 ﾠautonomy	 ﾠmay	 ﾠindeed	 ﾠbe	 ﾠrelated	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtitle	 ﾠand	 ﾠscope	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠ
Decision	 ﾠitself,	 ﾠnamely	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ“organisation	 ﾠand	 ﾠfunctioning	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS”.	 ﾠ	 ﾠIn	 ﾠ
particular,	 ﾠit	 ﾠmay	 ﾠbe	 ﾠwondered	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠthe	 ﾠemphasis	 ﾠin	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ1	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
functional	 ﾠautonomy	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠService	 ﾠsuggests	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlatter	 ﾠis,	 ﾠby	 ﾠcontrast,	 ﾠnot	 ﾠ
organisationally	 ﾠautonomous.	 ﾠ	 ﾠIf	 ﾠso,	 ﾠthen	 ﾠthe	 ﾠquestion	 ﾠarises	 ﾠas	 ﾠto	 ﾠwhere	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
dividing	 ﾠline	 ﾠlies	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠ‘functioning’	 ﾠand	 ﾠ‘organisation’.	 ﾠ	 ﾠArguably,	 ﾠ
“functioning”	 ﾠrefers	 ﾠto	 ﾠcarrying	 ﾠout	 ﾠits	 ﾠtasks	 ﾠof	 ﾠformulating	 ﾠpolicy	 ﾠproposals,	 ﾠ
information-ﾭ‐gathering,	 ﾠetc.,	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠautonomously	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
Commission,	 ﾠwhereas	 ﾠorganisation	 ﾠrefers	 ﾠto	 ﾠelements	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠas	 ﾠ1)	 ﾠthe	 ﾠStaff	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
Financial	 ﾠRegulations	 ﾠwhere	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠhas	 ﾠto	 ﾠrespect	 ﾠrelevant	 ﾠrules,
29	 ﾠ2)	 ﾠ
accountability	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠParliament,	 ﾠand	 ﾠ3)	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfact	 ﾠthat	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠ‘under	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
authority’	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠHR.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
  A	 ﾠreading	 ﾠof	 ﾠdifferent	 ﾠlanguage	 ﾠversions	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠDecision	 ﾠconfirms	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠis	 ﾠ
not	 ﾠorganisationally	 ﾠbut	 ﾠonly	 ﾠfunctionally	 ﾠautonomous	 ﾠin	 ﾠcarrying	 ﾠout	 ﾠits	 ﾠtasks.	 ﾠ
Hence,	 ﾠtheFrench	 ﾠtext	 ﾠof	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ1	 ﾠenvisages	 ﾠthe	 ﾠService	 ﾠas	 ﾠ“un	 ﾠorgane	 ﾠde	 ﾠ
l'Unioneuropéenne	 ﾠfonctionnant	 ﾠde	 ﾠmanièreautonome”,
30	 ﾠan	 ﾠexpression	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ
sounds	 ﾠless	 ﾠconceptual	 ﾠand	 ﾠperhaps	 ﾠmore	 ﾠpractical	 ﾠthan	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEnglish	 ﾠphrase.
31	 ﾠThe	 ﾠ
notion	 ﾠof	 ﾠfunctioning	 ﾠautonomously	 ﾠevoked	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠFrench	 ﾠversion	 ﾠmight	 ﾠsuggest	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	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 ﾠ	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 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
28	 ﾠThe	 ﾠcase	 ﾠC-ﾭ‐658/11European	 ﾠParliament	 ﾠv	 ﾠCouncil	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠUnion	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEU	 ﾠagreement	 ﾠwith	 ﾠ
Mauritius	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠcase	 ﾠin	 ﾠpoint:	 ﾠit	 ﾠhas	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠsuggested	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠHR	 ﾠought	 ﾠto	 ﾠintervene	 ﾠin	 ﾠsupport	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
Council	 ﾠagainst	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠParliament,	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠis	 ﾠsupported	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠCommission,	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠ
intervenes	 ﾠcontrary	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlegal	 ﾠadvice	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠLegal	 ﾠAffairs	 ﾠDepartment.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
29	 ﾠAs	 ﾠregards	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEU	 ﾠdelegation	 ﾠin	 ﾠparticular,	 ﾠsee	 ﾠCase	 ﾠT-ﾭ‐395/11	 ﾠEltid.o.ov	 ﾠDelegation	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠ
Union	 ﾠto	 ﾠMontenegro,	 ﾠJudgment	 ﾠof	 ﾠ4	 ﾠJune	 ﾠ2012,	 ﾠnyr.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
30	 ﾠSimilarly,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠItalian	 ﾠversion	 ﾠrefers	 ﾠto	 ﾠ“un	 ﾠorganodell’Unioneeuropeache	 ﾠopera	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
autonomiafunzionale”,	 ﾠwhile	 ﾠthe	 ﾠDanish	 ﾠversion	 ﾠmentions	 ﾠ“etfunktioneltautonomt	 ﾠEU-ﾭ‐organ”.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠ
Dutch	 ﾠtext	 ﾠdescribes	 ﾠthe	 ﾠService	 ﾠas	 ﾠ“eenfunctioneelautonoomorgaan	 ﾠvan	 ﾠde	 ﾠEuropeseUnie”.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
31Since	 ﾠthe	 ﾠDecision	 ﾠwas	 ﾠdrafted	 ﾠin	 ﾠEnglish,	 ﾠthis	 ﾠtext	 ﾠarguably	 ﾠbest	 ﾠreflects	 ﾠthe	 ﾠinter-ﾭ‐institutional	 ﾠ
compromise,	 ﾠyet	 ﾠformally	 ﾠand	 ﾠlegally,	 ﾠthis	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠnot	 ﾠmatter	 ﾠas	 ﾠall	 ﾠlanguage	 ﾠversions	 ﾠhave	 ﾠequally	 ﾠ
authentic	 ﾠvalue.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 13	 ﾠ
that	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠfulfilling	 ﾠits	 ﾠ“tasks”	 ﾠ(to	 ﾠuse	 ﾠthe	 ﾠterminology	 ﾠof	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ2	 ﾠEEAS)	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
Service	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠnot	 ﾠneed	 ﾠthe	 ﾠorganisational	 ﾠsupport	 ﾠof	 ﾠanother	 ﾠactor;	 ﾠi.e.	 ﾠthat	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠ
organisationally	 ﾠand	 ﾠoperationally	 ﾠself-ﾭ‐sufficient.	 ﾠNote	 ﾠthat	 ﾠmany	 ﾠlanguage	 ﾠ
versions	 ﾠcall	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠan	 ﾠ“organ	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEU”,	 ﾠwith	 ﾠall	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthis	 ﾠpossibly	 ﾠentails	 ﾠin	 ﾠ




  In	 ﾠview	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠabove	 ﾠdiscussion	 ﾠon	 ﾠorganisational	 ﾠv	 ﾠfunctional	 ﾠautonomy,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
question	 ﾠmay	 ﾠbe	 ﾠraised	 ﾠas	 ﾠto	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠbringing	 ﾠcourt	 ﾠcases	 ﾠitself	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠfall	 ﾠ
under	 ﾠfunctioning,	 ﾠor	 ﾠorganisation.	 ﾠ	 ﾠVia	 ﾠthe	 ﾠVP,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠis	 ﾠcertainly	 ﾠclosely	 ﾠlinked	 ﾠ
to	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCommission.	 ﾠ	 ﾠHowever,	 ﾠit	 ﾠstands	 ﾠunder	 ﾠthe	 ﾠauthority	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠHR,	 ﾠthis	 ﾠmeans	 ﾠ
that	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ”office	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠHigh	 ﾠRepresentative”	 ﾠwhich,	 ﾠdue	 ﾠto	 ﾠorganisational	 ﾠ
dependence,	 ﾠis	 ﾠthe	 ﾠone	 ﾠthat	 ﾠought	 ﾠto	 ﾠdefend	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprerogatives	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS.	 ﾠDoes	 ﾠ
this	 ﾠthen	 ﾠmean	 ﾠthat	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠan	 ﾠoffice	 ﾠis	 ﾠthe	 ﾠentity	 ﾠthat	 ﾠshould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠconsidered	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
”body”	 ﾠfor	 ﾠpurposes	 ﾠof	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ267	 ﾠTFEU?	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
  However	 ﾠqualified,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠautonomy	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠcould	 ﾠincrease	 ﾠin	 ﾠview	 ﾠof	 ﾠseveral	 ﾠ
elements	 ﾠcontained	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠDecision	 ﾠand	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠresult	 ﾠof	 ﾠinternal	 ﾠpractices.	 ﾠHence,	 ﾠ
while	 ﾠthe	 ﾠDecision	 ﾠforesees	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠService	 ﾠhas	 ﾠits	 ﾠown	 ﾠbudget	 ﾠand	 ﾠstaff,
33	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
latter	 ﾠhas	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠorganised	 ﾠand	 ﾠlabelled	 ﾠto	 ﾠunderscore	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsingular	 ﾠadministrative	 ﾠ
identity	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠService	 ﾠ(e.g.	 ﾠ“Managing	 ﾠDirectorates”	 ﾠrather	 ﾠthan	 ﾠthe	 ﾠclassical	 ﾠ
Directorates-ﾭ‐General,	 ﾠheaded	 ﾠby	 ﾠa	 ﾠ“Corporate	 ﾠBoard”),	 ﾠepitomised	 ﾠby	 ﾠa	 ﾠdistinct	 ﾠ
logo,	 ﾠseparate	 ﾠwebsite,	 ﾠand	 ﾠindeed	 ﾠspecific	 ﾠemail	 ﾠaddress.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
  The	 ﾠautonomy	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠcould	 ﾠalso	 ﾠbe	 ﾠbolstered	 ﾠthanks	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ“legal	 ﾠcapacity”	 ﾠit	 ﾠ
is	 ﾠendowed	 ﾠwith	 ﾠ“to	 ﾠperform	 ﾠits	 ﾠtasks	 ﾠand	 ﾠattain	 ﾠits	 ﾠobjectives”.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠparticular,	 ﾠthis	 ﾠ
capacity	 ﾠmay	 ﾠbe	 ﾠused	 ﾠfor	 ﾠarticulating	 ﾠthe	 ﾠService’s	 ﾠmandate	 ﾠby	 ﾠreference	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
“objectives”	 ﾠwhich,	 ﾠin	 ﾠcontrast	 ﾠto	 ﾠits	 ﾠ“tasks”	 ﾠlisted	 ﾠin	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ2,	 ﾠare	 ﾠnot	 ﾠspelled	 ﾠout	 ﾠ
anywhere	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠDecision	 ﾠ–	 ﾠat	 ﾠleast	 ﾠnot	 ﾠexplicitly.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
(iii)	 ﾠ“separate	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠGeneral	 ﾠSecretariat	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCouncil	 ﾠand	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCommission”	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
32	 ﾠSee	 ﾠin	 ﾠthis	 ﾠrespect,	 ﾠH.G.	 ﾠSchermers	 ﾠand	 ﾠN.	 ﾠM.	 ﾠBlokker,	 ﾠInternational	 ﾠInstitutional	 ﾠLaw	 ﾠ(Leiden:	 ﾠ
MartinusNijhoff,5th	 ﾠEdition,	 ﾠ2011).	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
33	 ﾠSee	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdiscussion	 ﾠunder	 ﾠArticles	 ﾠ6	 ﾠand	 ﾠ8	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠDecision,	 ﾠbelow.	 ﾠIndeed,	 ﾠas	 ﾠregards	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠ
personnel,	 ﾠa	 ﾠnumber	 ﾠof	 ﾠcases	 ﾠalready	 ﾠhaving	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠdecided	 ﾠby	 ﾠor	 ﾠare	 ﾠcurrently	 ﾠpending	 ﾠbefore	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcivil	 ﾠ
service	 ﾠtribunal:	 ﾠSee	 ﾠcases	 ﾠF-ﾭ‐15/11	 ﾠ(on	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠofficials	 ﾠhaving	 ﾠto	 ﾠmove	 ﾠout	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠhotel	 ﾠin	 ﾠKabul)	 ﾠand	 ﾠF-ﾭ‐
64/12	 ﾠ(on	 ﾠrefusal	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠpromotion).	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 14	 ﾠ
  Unlike	 ﾠthe	 ﾠautonomy	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnotion	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠService	 ﾠis	 ﾠseparate	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
General	 ﾠSecretariat	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCouncil	 ﾠ(GSC)	 ﾠand	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCommission	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot	 ﾠqualified,	 ﾠ
either	 ﾠorganisationally	 ﾠor	 ﾠfunctionally.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
  Separate	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠGSC	 ﾠand	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCommission,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠService	 ﾠorganisationally	 ﾠ
falls	 ﾠunder	 ﾠthe	 ﾠauthority	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠHR,	 ﾠas	 ﾠstipulated	 ﾠin	 ﾠArticles	 ﾠ1(3)	 ﾠand	 ﾠ2.	 ﾠIt	 ﾠis	 ﾠindeed	 ﾠ
noteworthy	 ﾠthat	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ1(3)	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠDecision	 ﾠonly	 ﾠrefers	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠHR,	 ﾠwhile	 ﾠit	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠnot	 ﾠ
contain	 ﾠany	 ﾠreference	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠincumbent’s	 ﾠfunction	 ﾠas	 ﾠVice-ﾭ‐President	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
European	 ﾠCommission	 ﾠ(the	 ﾠsame	 ﾠholds	 ﾠtrue	 ﾠfor	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ2(1)).
34	 ﾠThis	 ﾠsuggests	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠcannot	 ﾠbe	 ﾠregarded	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠservice	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCommission	 ﾠand	 ﾠmust	 ﾠtherefore	 ﾠ
be	 ﾠseparate	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠit.	 ﾠThis	 ﾠalso	 ﾠmeans	 ﾠthat,	 ﾠformally,	 ﾠonly	 ﾠthe	 ﾠHR/VP	 ﾠcan	 ﾠinstruct	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠEEAS.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
  However,	 ﾠother	 ﾠprovisions	 ﾠought	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠconsidered.	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ2(2)	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠDecision	 ﾠ
establishes	 ﾠthe	 ﾠobligation	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠService	 ﾠto	 ﾠassist	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpresidents	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠ
Council	 ﾠand	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCommission	 ﾠrespectively,	 ﾠas	 ﾠwell	 ﾠas	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCommission	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
whole,	 ﾠ”in	 ﾠthe	 ﾠexercise	 ﾠof	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠrespective	 ﾠfunctions	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠarea	 ﾠof	 ﾠexternal	 ﾠ
relations”.	 ﾠThis	 ﾠobligation	 ﾠcould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠread	 ﾠas	 ﾠallowing	 ﾠthe	 ﾠactors	 ﾠmentioned	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
instruct	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS,	 ﾠalbeit	 ﾠarguably	 ﾠin	 ﾠconsultation	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠHR/VP.	 ﾠMoreover,	 ﾠit	 ﾠ
should	 ﾠbe	 ﾠrecalled	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠstaff,	 ﾠparticularly	 ﾠHeads	 ﾠof	 ﾠDelegations,	 ﾠmight	 ﾠ
sometimes	 ﾠoperate	 ﾠqua	 ﾠCommission,	 ﾠfor	 ﾠinstance	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠacting	 ﾠwith	 ﾠdelegated	 ﾠ
powers	 ﾠof	 ﾠbudget	 ﾠimplementation.
35	 ﾠThe	 ﾠCommission’s	 ﾠRules	 ﾠof	 ﾠProcedure	 ﾠmay	 ﾠ
also	 ﾠapply	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠit	 ﾠleads	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnegotiations	 ﾠof	 ﾠframework	 ﾠagreements	 ﾠ
covering	 ﾠboth	 ﾠCFSP	 ﾠand	 ﾠnon-ﾭ‐CFSP	 ﾠmatters	 ﾠ–	 ﾠas	 ﾠregards	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlatter.
36	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
  While	 ﾠrelative,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠseparate	 ﾠcharacter	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠhas	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠconsolidated	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
practice,	 ﾠat	 ﾠleast	 ﾠpartly.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠService’s	 ﾠoriginal	 ﾠumbilical	 ﾠlink	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCommission	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠGSC	 ﾠwill	 ﾠat	 ﾠsome	 ﾠpoint	 ﾠbe	 ﾠsevered.	 ﾠWhile	 ﾠoriginally	 ﾠmade	 ﾠof	 ﾠtransferred	 ﾠstaff	 ﾠ
from	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCommission	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCouncil,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠpersonnel	 ﾠwill	 ﾠbe	 ﾠincreasingly	 ﾠ
diversified,	 ﾠnotably	 ﾠas	 ﾠthe	 ﾠService	 ﾠwill	 ﾠbe	 ﾠable	 ﾠto	 ﾠrecruit	 ﾠnot	 ﾠonly	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠother	 ﾠ
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 ﾠ	 ﾠ	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 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
34	 ﾠIt	 ﾠshould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠnoted	 ﾠthat	 ﾠpara	 ﾠ1	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠPreamble	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠDecision	 ﾠstipulates	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ“the	 ﾠreference	 ﾠ
to	 ﾠthe	 ﾠterm	 ﾠ‘High	 ﾠRepresentative’	 ﾠwill	 ﾠbe	 ﾠinterpreted	 ﾠin	 ﾠaccordance	 ﾠwith	 ﾠhis/her	 ﾠdifferent	 ﾠfunctions	 ﾠ
under	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ18	 ﾠTEU”.	 ﾠFurther	 ﾠon	 ﾠthis	 ﾠpoint,	 ﾠsee	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdiscussion	 ﾠunder	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ2	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠDecision,	 ﾠbelow.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
35See	 ﾠCase	 ﾠT-ﾭ‐395/11	 ﾠEltid.o.ov	 ﾠDelegation	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠUnion	 ﾠto	 ﾠMontenegro,	 ﾠJudgment	 ﾠof	 ﾠ4	 ﾠJune	 ﾠ
2012,	 ﾠnyr;	 ﾠand	 ﾠcommentary	 ﾠof	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ8,	 ﾠbelow.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
36See	 ﾠthe	 ﾠVademecum	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠExternal	 ﾠAction	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠUnion	 ﾠ(SEC(2011)881);	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
“Operational	 ﾠguidelines	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpreparation	 ﾠand	 ﾠconduct	 ﾠof	 ﾠnegotiations	 ﾠfor	 ﾠframework	 ﾠagreements	 ﾠ
with	 ﾠthird	 ﾠcountries	 ﾠinvolving	 ﾠboth	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠCommission	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠHigh	 ﾠRepresentative	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
Union	 ﾠfor	 ﾠForeign	 ﾠAffairs	 ﾠand	 ﾠSecurity	 ﾠPolicy	 ﾠ(HR)”.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 15	 ﾠ
institutions,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠalso	 ﾠmore	 ﾠbroadly	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbasis	 ﾠof	 ﾠopen	 ﾠcompetitions.
37	 ﾠ
Moreover,	 ﾠand	 ﾠperhaps	 ﾠmore	 ﾠsymbolically,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠhas	 ﾠits	 ﾠown	 ﾠseparate	 ﾠ
premises.	 ﾠInstead	 ﾠof	 ﾠbeing	 ﾠlocated	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠbuilding	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCommission	 ﾠ(e.g.:	 ﾠ
Charlemagne)	 ﾠor	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCouncil	 ﾠ(e.g.	 ﾠLex),	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠplaced	 ﾠin-ﾭ‐between	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
headquarters	 ﾠof	 ﾠthese	 ﾠinstitutions,	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠSchuman	 ﾠRoundabout.
38	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 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
37See	 ﾠalso	 ﾠdiscussion	 ﾠon	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ6	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠDecision,	 ﾠbelow.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
38	 ﾠSome	 ﾠunits	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠnevertheless	 ﾠremain	 ﾠlocated	 ﾠwithin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCouncil	 ﾠor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCommission	 ﾠpremises	 ﾠ
(see	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdiscussion	 ﾠunder	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ12	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠDecision,	 ﾠbelow),	 ﾠwhile	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠhosts	 ﾠCommission	 ﾠstaff	 ﾠ
(viz.	 ﾠForeign	 ﾠPolicy	 ﾠInstruments	 ﾠService).	 ﾠ




1.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠshall	 ﾠsupport	 ﾠthe	 ﾠHigh	 ﾠRepresentative	 ﾠin	 ﾠfulfilling	 ﾠhis/her	 ﾠmandates	 ﾠas	 ﾠoutlined,	 ﾠnotably,	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
Articles	 ﾠ18	 ﾠand	 ﾠ27	 ﾠTEU:	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
—  in	 ﾠfulfilling	 ﾠhis/her	 ﾠmandate	 ﾠto	 ﾠconduct	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCommon	 ﾠForeign	 ﾠand	 ﾠSecurity	 ﾠPolicy	 ﾠ(‘CFSP’)	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
European	 ﾠUnion,	 ﾠincluding	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCommon	 ﾠSecurity	 ﾠand	 ﾠDefence	 ﾠPolicy	 ﾠ(‘CSDP’),	 ﾠto	 ﾠcontribute	 ﾠby	 ﾠ
his/her	 ﾠproposals	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdevelopment	 ﾠof	 ﾠthat	 ﾠpolicy,	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠhe/she	 ﾠshall	 ﾠcarry	 ﾠout	 ﾠas	 ﾠmandated	 ﾠby	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠCouncil	 ﾠand	 ﾠto	 ﾠensure	 ﾠthe	 ﾠconsistency	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠUnion’s	 ﾠexternal	 ﾠaction,	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
—  in	 ﾠhis/her	 ﾠcapacity	 ﾠas	 ﾠPresident	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠForeign	 ﾠAffairs	 ﾠCouncil,	 ﾠwithout	 ﾠprejudice	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnormal	 ﾠ
tasks	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠGeneral	 ﾠSecretariat	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCouncil,	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
—  in	 ﾠhis/her	 ﾠcapacity	 ﾠas	 ﾠVice-ﾭ‐President	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCommission	 ﾠfor	 ﾠfulfilling	 ﾠwithin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCommission	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
responsibilities	 ﾠincumbent	 ﾠon	 ﾠit	 ﾠin	 ﾠexternal	 ﾠrelations,	 ﾠand	 ﾠin	 ﾠcoordinating	 ﾠother	 ﾠaspects	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
Union’s	 ﾠexternal	 ﾠaction,	 ﾠwithout	 ﾠprejudice	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnormal	 ﾠtasks	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠservices	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCommission.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
2.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠshall	 ﾠassist	 ﾠthe	 ﾠPresident	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠCouncil,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠPresident	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCommission,	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠCommission	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠexercise	 ﾠof	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠrespective	 ﾠfunctions	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠarea	 ﾠof	 ﾠexternal	 ﾠrelations.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
Article	 ﾠ2	 ﾠdefines	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtasks	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠExternal	 ﾠAction	 ﾠService.	 ﾠIt	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠthis	 ﾠboth	 ﾠin	 ﾠfunctional	 ﾠ
(section	 ﾠ1)	 ﾠand	 ﾠpolicy	 ﾠterms	 ﾠ(section	 ﾠ2).	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
1.  The	 ﾠfunctional	 ﾠtasks	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
  In	 ﾠdescribing	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmandate	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS,	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ2	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCouncil	 ﾠDecision	 ﾠ
largely	 ﾠreflects	 ﾠthe	 ﾠstructure	 ﾠof	 ﾠArticles	 ﾠ18	 ﾠand	 ﾠ27	 ﾠTEU	 ﾠto	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠit	 ﾠrefers	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠchapeau.	 ﾠ	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ18	 ﾠis	 ﾠfound	 ﾠin	 ﾠTitle	 ﾠII	 ﾠ“Institutions”	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠTEU,	 ﾠand	 ﾠis	 ﾠ
therefore	 ﾠof	 ﾠgeneral	 ﾠapplication.	 ﾠBy	 ﾠcontrast,	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ27	 ﾠis	 ﾠincluded	 ﾠin	 ﾠTitle	 ﾠV	 ﾠ–	 ﾠ
Chapter	 ﾠ2	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠTEU,	 ﾠand	 ﾠis	 ﾠtherefore	 ﾠspecific	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCommon	 ﾠForeign	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
Security	 ﾠPolicy.	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ2	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠCouncil	 ﾠDecision	 ﾠmerges	 ﾠthese	 ﾠgeneral	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠCFSP-ﾭ‐specific	 ﾠaspects	 ﾠto	 ﾠattain	 ﾠan	 ﾠintegrated	 ﾠsupport	 ﾠmandate	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
office	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠHR/VP/FAC	 ﾠChairperson.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
  The	 ﾠaforementioned	 ﾠtriple-ﾭ‐hatted	 ﾠposition	 ﾠis	 ﾠset	 ﾠout	 ﾠin	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ18	 ﾠTEU.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThe	 ﾠ
first	 ﾠparagraph	 ﾠcontains	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprocedure	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠappointment	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠoffice	 ﾠ
holder,	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfollowing	 ﾠparagraphs	 ﾠdescribe	 ﾠthe	 ﾠthree	 ﾠhats	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfollowing	 ﾠ
succession:	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ18	 ﾠ(2)	 ﾠrefers	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠHigh	 ﾠRepresentative	 ﾠconducting	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
EU’s	 ﾠCFSP;	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ18	 ﾠ(3)	 ﾠrefers	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠHigh	 ﾠRepresentative	 ﾠpresiding	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
Foreign	 ﾠAffairs	 ﾠCouncil;	 ﾠand	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ18	 ﾠ(4)	 ﾠestablishes	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠHigh	 ﾠ
Representative	 ﾠshall	 ﾠbe	 ﾠone	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠVice	 ﾠPresidents	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCommission,	 ﾠensure	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠconsistency	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠUnion’s	 ﾠexternal	 ﾠaction,	 ﾠand	 ﾠbe	 ﾠresponsible	 ﾠwithin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
Commission	 ﾠfor	 ﾠresponsibilities	 ﾠincumbent	 ﾠon	 ﾠit	 ﾠin	 ﾠexternal	 ﾠrelations	 ﾠand	 ﾠfor	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 17	 ﾠ
coordinating	 ﾠaspects	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠUnion’s	 ﾠexternal	 ﾠaction.	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ2	 ﾠ(1)	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠ
Decision	 ﾠexactly	 ﾠfollows	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsequencing	 ﾠof	 ﾠfunctions	 ﾠset	 ﾠout	 ﾠin	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ18	 ﾠTEU;	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠmerges	 ﾠthem,	 ﾠthrough	 ﾠits	 ﾠfirst	 ﾠindent,	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCFSP-ﾭ‐related	 ﾠtasks	 ﾠas	 ﾠ
described	 ﾠin	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ27	 ﾠTEU.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
  In	 ﾠother	 ﾠwords,	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ2	 ﾠcreates	 ﾠa	 ﾠmandate	 ﾠof	 ﾠsupport	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
relation	 ﾠto	 ﾠall	 ﾠthree	 ﾠhats	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠHigh	 ﾠRepresentative,	 ﾠand	 ﾠthis	 ﾠwith	 ﾠno	 ﾠ
hierarchy	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠthem.	 ﾠArguing	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcontrary	 ﾠwould	 ﾠimply	 ﾠthe	 ﾠre-ﾭ‐
introduction	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpre-ﾭ‐Lisbon	 ﾠpillar	 ﾠapproach,	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠcontravenes	 ﾠthe	 ﾠspirit	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠthe	 ﾠTreaties.	 ﾠIndeed,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrationale	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtriple	 ﾠhats	 ﾠ–	 ﾠeven	 ﾠsince	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
European	 ﾠConvention	 ﾠin	 ﾠ2002	 ﾠ-ﾭ‐	 ﾠis	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠperson	 ﾠholding	 ﾠthis	 ﾠoffice	 ﾠwould	 ﾠ
integrate	 ﾠall	 ﾠaspects	 ﾠof	 ﾠEU	 ﾠexternal	 ﾠrelations	 ﾠmore	 ﾠsmoothly	 ﾠto	 ﾠensure	 ﾠ
coherence	 ﾠacross	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmultitude	 ﾠof	 ﾠEU	 ﾠactors	 ﾠand	 ﾠinstruments.
39	 ﾠ	 ﾠIt	 ﾠis	 ﾠ
therefore	 ﾠcrucial	 ﾠto	 ﾠpoint	 ﾠout	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtriple-ﾭ‐hatted	 ﾠpost	 ﾠof	 ﾠHigh	 ﾠ
Representative	 ﾠis	 ﾠcreated	 ﾠby	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ18	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠgeneral	 ﾠinstitutional	 ﾠTitle	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
Treaty	 ﾠon	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠUnion,	 ﾠand	 ﾠnot	 ﾠthe	 ﾠspecific	 ﾠChapter	 ﾠon	 ﾠCFSP	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠTEU.	 ﾠ
Indeed,	 ﾠCFSP	 ﾠas	 ﾠdescribed	 ﾠin	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ27	 ﾠTEU	 ﾠis	 ﾠbut	 ﾠone	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠthree	 ﾠmain	 ﾠtasks	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠthe	 ﾠHigh	 ﾠRepresentative	 ﾠnamed	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmore	 ﾠfundamental	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ18	 ﾠTEU,	 ﾠ
alongside	 ﾠthat	 ﾠof	 ﾠFAC	 ﾠChairperson	 ﾠand	 ﾠCommission	 ﾠVice	 ﾠPresident.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThe	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠ
then	 ﾠworks	 ﾠrather	 ﾠlike	 ﾠa	 ﾠchameleon:	 ﾠfunctioning	 ﾠakin	 ﾠto	 ﾠa	 ﾠCommission	 ﾠDG	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
relation	 ﾠto	 ﾠcertain	 ﾠVP-ﾭ‐related	 ﾠtasks;	 ﾠfunctioning	 ﾠakin	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCouncil	 ﾠGeneral	 ﾠ
Secretariat	 ﾠin	 ﾠCFSP	 ﾠor	 ﾠFAC	 ﾠrelated	 ﾠtasks;	 ﾠwithout	 ﾠone	 ﾠsupport	 ﾠfunction	 ﾠtaking	 ﾠ
precedence	 ﾠover	 ﾠthe	 ﾠother,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠwith	 ﾠinterlocking	 ﾠand	 ﾠequal	 ﾠimportance.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
  The	 ﾠEEAS’	 ﾠtasks	 ﾠare	 ﾠlargely	 ﾠdescribed	 ﾠby	 ﾠreference	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtasks	 ﾠof	 ﾠother	 ﾠ
prominent	 ﾠactors
40	 ﾠin	 ﾠEU	 ﾠexternal	 ﾠrelations:	 ﾠthe	 ﾠHR/VP/FAC	 ﾠChairperson	 ﾠ
predominantly,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠalso	 ﾠthe	 ﾠPresidents	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠCouncil	 ﾠand	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
Commission,	 ﾠrespectively,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCouncil	 ﾠGeneral	 ﾠSecretariat	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
Commission.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThe	 ﾠdescription	 ﾠin	 ﾠrelation	 ﾠto	 ﾠthem	 ﾠis	 ﾠthus	 ﾠboth	 ﾠ‘negative’	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
‘positive’:	 ﾠ	 ﾠe.g.	 ﾠpositive	 ﾠ-ﾭ‐	 ﾠby	 ﾠstating	 ﾠthat	 ﾠits	 ﾠtask	 ﾠis	 ﾠone	 ﾠof	 ﾠsupport/assistance	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
light	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmandates	 ﾠor	 ﾠfunctions	 ﾠof	 ﾠthese	 ﾠEU	 ﾠactors;	 ﾠnegative	 ﾠ–	 ﾠby	 ﾠ
proscribing	 ﾠits	 ﾠfunction	 ﾠ“without	 ﾠprejudice”	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ“normal	 ﾠtasks”	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
Commission	 ﾠservices	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCouncil	 ﾠGeneral	 ﾠSecretariat.	 ﾠ	 ﾠOne	 ﾠmust	 ﾠthus	 ﾠ
look	 ﾠat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠexact	 ﾠdescription	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtasks	 ﾠand	 ﾠfunctions	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠin	 ﾠrelation	 ﾠ
to	 ﾠthese	 ﾠactors,	 ﾠand	 ﾠestablish	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnormal	 ﾠtasks	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrespective	 ﾠactors	 ﾠ
are	 ﾠin	 ﾠorder	 ﾠto	 ﾠuncover	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS’	 ﾠmandate.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThe	 ﾠreference	 ﾠto	 ﾠ“normal”	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
39	 ﾠThe	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠConvention,	 ﾠFinal	 ﾠReport	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠWorking	 ﾠGroup	 ﾠVII	 ﾠon	 ﾠExternal	 ﾠAction,	 ﾠCONV	 ﾠ459/02,	 ﾠ
Brussels,	 ﾠ16	 ﾠDecember	 ﾠ2002,	 ﾠ19.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
40	 ﾠE.g.	 ﾠnot	 ﾠonly	 ﾠEU	 ﾠinstitutions	 ﾠin	 ﾠaccordance	 ﾠwith	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ13	 ﾠTEU.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 18	 ﾠ
creates	 ﾠa	 ﾠtension	 ﾠwhere	 ﾠit	 ﾠassumes	 ﾠthere	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠcommon	 ﾠunderstanding	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
respective	 ﾠtasks	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcompetent	 ﾠEU	 ﾠactors	 ﾠin	 ﾠexternal	 ﾠpolicy-ﾭ‐making.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
However,	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠaxiomatic	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠadvent	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠwould	 ﾠcreate	 ﾠa	 ﾠ“new	 ﾠ
normal”,	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠthis	 ﾠprovision	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠnot	 ﾠdefine.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcontext	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠongoing	 ﾠ
Review,	 ﾠand	 ﾠin	 ﾠview	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpossible	 ﾠrevision	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠdecision,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ“normal	 ﾠ
tasks”	 ﾠof	 ﾠeach	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠactors/institutions	 ﾠcould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠclarified,	 ﾠnotably	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
consideration	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠway	 ﾠin	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠthey	 ﾠhave	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠfleshed	 ﾠout	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfirst	 ﾠtwo	 ﾠ
years	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS’	 ﾠwork:	 ﾠnamely	 ﾠa	 ﾠpredominant	 ﾠclassical	 ﾠforeign	 ﾠpolicy	 ﾠ(CFSP)	 ﾠ




  In	 ﾠterms	 ﾠof	 ﾠwording,	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ2	 ﾠmeticulously	 ﾠbalances	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdifferent	 ﾠfunctional	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠsubstantive	 ﾠpositions	 ﾠand	 ﾠinter-ﾭ‐relationships	 ﾠto	 ﾠensure	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ“sui	 ﾠgeneris”	 ﾠ
nature	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠin	 ﾠrelation	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠother	 ﾠactors	 ﾠmentioned	 ﾠin	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ
provision.	 ﾠAs	 ﾠpreviously	 ﾠindicated,	 ﾠit	 ﾠalso	 ﾠfleshes	 ﾠout	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtriple	 ﾠhats	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
HR/VP.	 ﾠAs	 ﾠregards	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsubtle	 ﾠdifferences	 ﾠin	 ﾠwording,	 ﾠwe	 ﾠmay	 ﾠnote	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
following:	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
1.  Paragraph	 ﾠ1	 ﾠspeaks	 ﾠof	 ﾠ“mandates”	 ﾠ(plural)	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠHR	 ﾠand	 ﾠparagraph	 ﾠ2	 ﾠ
speaks	 ﾠof	 ﾠ“function”	 ﾠin	 ﾠrelation	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠPresidents	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCommission	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠCouncil.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
2.  Withinparagraph	 ﾠ1	 ﾠthereis	 ﾠthen	 ﾠa	 ﾠdifferentiation	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠthefirst	 ﾠindent,	 ﾠ
which	 ﾠspeaks	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ“mandate”	 ﾠto	 ﾠconduct	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCFSP,	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsecond	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
third	 ﾠindents	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠspeak	 ﾠof	 ﾠher	 ﾠ“capacity”	 ﾠas	 ﾠChair	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠFAC	 ﾠand	 ﾠVP	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠCommission.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
3.  There	 ﾠis	 ﾠalso	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdistinction	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtask	 ﾠof	 ﾠ“supporting”	 ﾠthe	 ﾠHigh	 ﾠ
Representative	 ﾠin	 ﾠfulfilling	 ﾠher	 ﾠmandates,	 ﾠand	 ﾠthat	 ﾠof	 ﾠ“assisting”	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
President	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠCouncil,	 ﾠPresident	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCommission,	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
Commission	 ﾠitself.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
4.  Finally,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠthird	 ﾠindent	 ﾠof	 ﾠparagraph	 ﾠ1	 ﾠthen	 ﾠestablishes	 ﾠa	 ﾠlink	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠCommission	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠthrough	 ﾠthe	 ﾠHR	 ﾠqua	 ﾠVP.	 ﾠ	 ﾠIt	 ﾠreads	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
EEAS	 ﾠshall	 ﾠsupport	 ﾠthe	 ﾠHR/VP	 ﾠ“...in	 ﾠhis/her	 ﾠcapacity	 ﾠas	 ﾠVice-ﾭ‐President	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠCommission	 ﾠfor	 ﾠfulfilling	 ﾠwithin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCommission	 ﾠthe	 ﾠresponsibilities	 ﾠ
incumbent	 ﾠon	 ﾠit	 ﾠin	 ﾠexternal	 ﾠrelations”	 ﾠ(emphasis	 ﾠadded).	 ﾠ	 ﾠThe	 ﾠword	 ﾠ“it”	 ﾠ
refers	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCommission,	 ﾠand	 ﾠthus	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠis	 ﾠto	 ﾠsupport	 ﾠthe	 ﾠVP	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
carrying	 ﾠout	 ﾠthe	 ﾠexternal	 ﾠrelations	 ﾠresponsibilities	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCommission.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
41See	 ﾠreport	 ﾠprepared	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠAFET	 ﾠCommittee	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠParliament,	 ﾠThe	 ﾠOrganis?zation	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
Functioning	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS:	 ﾠAchievements,	 ﾠChallenges	 ﾠand	 ﾠOpportunities,	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠpublished	 ﾠend	 ﾠFebruary	 ﾠ
2013.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 19	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
  In	 ﾠtwo	 ﾠyears	 ﾠof	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠpractice,	 ﾠit	 ﾠcan	 ﾠbe	 ﾠobserved	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthese	 ﾠdifferences	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
formulation	 ﾠhave	 ﾠa	 ﾠreal-ﾭ‐life	 ﾠrelevance	 ﾠand	 ﾠpolicy	 ﾠimpact.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠrelation	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
assisting	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfunction	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠPresidents	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠCommission	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
European	 ﾠCouncil,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtask	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠmainly	 ﾠconsists	 ﾠof	 ﾠproviding	 ﾠ
preparatory	 ﾠmaterial	 ﾠfor	 ﾠsummits	 ﾠand	 ﾠvisits	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠform	 ﾠof	 ﾠbriefings.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
“Assisting”	 ﾠthese	 ﾠtwo	 ﾠPresidents	 ﾠin	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠ“function”	 ﾠis	 ﾠhence	 ﾠmore	 ﾠlimited	 ﾠ
than	 ﾠ“supporting”	 ﾠthe	 ﾠHigh	 ﾠRepresentative	 ﾠin	 ﾠher	 ﾠ“mandates”	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
“capacities”.	 ﾠWe	 ﾠmay	 ﾠthus	 ﾠobserve	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ“mandates”	 ﾠrefers	 ﾠto	 ﾠsubstantive	 ﾠ
policy	 ﾠtasks	 ﾠbeing	 ﾠgiven	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠactor	 ﾠholding	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmandate;	 ﾠwhereas	 ﾠ
“function”	 ﾠand	 ﾠ“capacity”	 ﾠare	 ﾠmore	 ﾠinformative	 ﾠand	 ﾠmanagerial	 ﾠin	 ﾠnature.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
This	 ﾠis	 ﾠunderlined	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfact	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠkind	 ﾠof	 ﾠsupport	 ﾠtasks	 ﾠ(paragraph	 ﾠ1)	 ﾠor	 ﾠ
assistance	 ﾠ(paragraph	 ﾠ2)	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠgiven	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠare	 ﾠalso	 ﾠdifferent.
42	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠThis	 ﾠ
has	 ﾠan	 ﾠimportant	 ﾠconsequence	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmandate	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠin	 ﾠrelation	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
triple	 ﾠhats	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠHigh	 ﾠRepresentative.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThrough	 ﾠan	 ﾠa	 ﾠcontrarioreasoning	 ﾠwe	 ﾠ
submit	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠis	 ﾠthereby	 ﾠmore	 ﾠthan	 ﾠa	 ﾠmere	 ﾠ‘briefing-ﾭ‐generating	 ﾠ
machine’	 ﾠin	 ﾠall	 ﾠthree	 ﾠtasks	 ﾠlisted	 ﾠin	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ2	 ﾠ(1)	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠDecision,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠan	 ﾠ
entity	 ﾠthat	 ﾠis	 ﾠmeant	 ﾠto	 ﾠproactively	 ﾠgenerate	 ﾠnovel	 ﾠpolicy	 ﾠideas,	 ﾠnotably	 ﾠin	 ﾠline	 ﾠ
with	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcoherence	 ﾠmandate	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠexpected	 ﾠto	 ﾠsupport	 ﾠ(Art	 ﾠ18	 ﾠ(4)	 ﾠTEU	 ﾠ
iuncto	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ2	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠCouncil	 ﾠDecision).	 ﾠThis	 ﾠmeans	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnotion	 ﾠof	 ﾠ“normal	 ﾠ
tasks”	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCouncil	 ﾠSecretariat	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCommission	 ﾠmust	 ﾠduly	 ﾠtake	 ﾠaccount	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠthis.	 ﾠFinally,	 ﾠthese	 ﾠfindings	 ﾠought	 ﾠtherefore	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠconnected	 ﾠto	 ﾠdifferent	 ﾠ
provisions	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCouncil	 ﾠDecision,	 ﾠnotably	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ3	 ﾠ(Duty	 ﾠof	 ﾠCooperation),	 ﾠ
Article	 ﾠ5	 ﾠ(Delegations)	 ﾠand	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ9	 ﾠ(Programming).	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
  The	 ﾠfact	 ﾠthat	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ2	 ﾠ(1)	 ﾠand	 ﾠ(2)	 ﾠdifferentiate	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠsupport	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
assistance	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠHigh	 ﾠRepresentative	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠactors	 ﾠnamed	 ﾠin	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ2	 ﾠ(2)	 ﾠ
creates	 ﾠa	 ﾠdifferent	 ﾠfunctional	 ﾠrelationship	 ﾠas	 ﾠregards	 ﾠbeing	 ﾠable	 ﾠto	 ﾠ“instruct”	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠto	 ﾠcarry	 ﾠout	 ﾠcertain	 ﾠtask	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrespective	 ﾠoffice	 ﾠholder	 ﾠor	 ﾠ
institution.	 ﾠThis	 ﾠcan	 ﾠbe	 ﾠillustrated	 ﾠby	 ﾠreference	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS’	 ﾠtasks	 ﾠin	 ﾠrelation	 ﾠ
to	 ﾠthe	 ﾠPresident	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠCouncil.	 ﾠIt	 ﾠhas	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠreported	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠwork	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
42	 ﾠCompare	 ﾠhowever	 ﾠdifferent	 ﾠlanguage	 ﾠversions	 ﾠof	 ﾠthese	 ﾠtwo	 ﾠparagraphs,	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠpaint	 ﾠa	 ﾠmixed	 ﾠ
picture.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠFrench,	 ﾠparagraphs	 ﾠ1	 ﾠand	 ﾠ2	 ﾠof	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ2	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCouncil	 ﾠDecision	 ﾠuse	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsame	 ﾠverb	 ﾠ
“assister”,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠthey	 ﾠdistinguish	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠ“dansl'exécution	 ﾠde	 ﾠsesmandats	 ﾠ”	 ﾠin	 ﾠparagraph	 ﾠ1	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
“dansl'exercice	 ﾠde	 ﾠleursfonctionsrespectives”	 ﾠin	 ﾠparagraph	 ﾠ2.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠthe	 ﾠDutch	 ﾠand	 ﾠDanish	 ﾠversions	 ﾠtwo	 ﾠ
different	 ﾠverbs	 ﾠare	 ﾠused:	 ﾠ“ondersteunen”/”støtter”	 ﾠ(para	 ﾠ1)	 ﾠand	 ﾠ“bijstaan”/”bistår”	 ﾠ(para	 ﾠ2)	 ﾠ“in	 ﾠde	 ﾠ
uitoefening	 ﾠvan	 ﾠzijnmandaat”/”dennesmandater”	 ﾠ(para	 ﾠ1)	 ﾠand	 ﾠ“hun	 ﾠtaken”/”deresfunktioner”	 ﾠ(para	 ﾠ
2).	 ﾠ	 ﾠThe	 ﾠDutch	 ﾠand	 ﾠDanish	 ﾠversions	 ﾠthus	 ﾠprecisely	 ﾠmatch	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEnglish	 ﾠlanguage	 ﾠversion	 ﾠ(which	 ﾠwas	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
language	 ﾠin	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdocument	 ﾠhas	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠnegotiated),	 ﾠbut	 ﾠthis	 ﾠis	 ﾠless	 ﾠtrue	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠFrench	 ﾠversion.	 ﾠ
Moving	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠItalian	 ﾠversion,	 ﾠthere	 ﾠis	 ﾠyet	 ﾠanother	 ﾠreading	 ﾠ:	 ﾠhere	 ﾠthese	 ﾠparagraphs	 ﾠtwice	 ﾠuse	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
identical	 ﾠ“Il	 ﾠSEAE	 ﾠassiste”	 ﾠand	 ﾠboth	 ﾠparagraphs	 ﾠalso	 ﾠrefer	 ﾠto	 ﾠ“funzioni”,	 ﾠthus	 ﾠcontradicting	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsubtle	 ﾠ
differences	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEnglish	 ﾠlanguage	 ﾠversion.	 ﾠFinally	 ﾠthe	 ﾠGerman	 ﾠversion	 ﾠspeaks	 ﾠtwice	 ﾠof	 ﾠ“unterstützt”,	 ﾠ
but	 ﾠdistinguishes	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠ“seines	 ﾠAuftrags”	 ﾠand	 ﾠ“ihrerAufgaben”.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 20	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠin	 ﾠsupporting	 ﾠMr.	 ﾠVan	 ﾠRompuy	 ﾠ–	 ﾠfor	 ﾠexample	 ﾠat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠG20	 ﾠ–	 ﾠhas	 ﾠ
been	 ﾠ‘top	 ﾠnotch’
43,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnotion	 ﾠof	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠ“assistance”	 ﾠmeans	 ﾠcauses	 ﾠ
practical	 ﾠdifficulties:	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpre-ﾭ‐Lisbon	 ﾠera,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrotating	 ﾠpresidency	 ﾠhad	 ﾠa	 ﾠclear	 ﾠ
top-ﾭ‐to-ﾭ‐bottom	 ﾠchain	 ﾠof	 ﾠcommand	 ﾠin	 ﾠpreparing	 ﾠexternal	 ﾠrepresentation	 ﾠall	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
way	 ﾠdown	 ﾠto	 ﾠexpert	 ﾠworking	 ﾠgroup	 ﾠlevel.	 ﾠ	 ﾠHowever,	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnew	 ﾠsystem	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
office	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠCouncil,	 ﾠand	 ﾠthat	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS,	 ﾠhave	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠcreated	 ﾠ
without	 ﾠtruly	 ﾠ“embedding	 ﾠthem”	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠclear	 ﾠstructure	 ﾠand	 ﾠhierarchy.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThus,	 ﾠ
President	 ﾠVan	 ﾠRompuy	 ﾠonly	 ﾠhas	 ﾠ“chain	 ﾠof	 ﾠcommand”	 ﾠover	 ﾠhis	 ﾠcabinet,	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
while	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠis	 ﾠthere	 ﾠto	 ﾠ“assist”	 ﾠthe	 ﾠoffice	 ﾠholder.	 ﾠThis	 ﾠimplies	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
President	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠCouncil	 ﾠholds	 ﾠno	 ﾠhierarchical	 ﾠsuperiority	 ﾠand	 ﾠhas	 ﾠ
no	 ﾠlegal	 ﾠcompetence	 ﾠto	 ﾠgive	 ﾠinstructions.
44	 ﾠThis	 ﾠmeans	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpreparatory	 ﾠ
process	 ﾠwithin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠUnion	 ﾠis	 ﾠmore	 ﾠinfused	 ﾠwith	 ﾠa	 ﾠnumber	 ﾠof	 ﾠpolitical	 ﾠor	 ﾠ
institutional	 ﾠinterests,	 ﾠis	 ﾠmore	 ﾠbased	 ﾠon	 ﾠpersonal	 ﾠrelationships	 ﾠand	 ﾠgood	 ﾠwill,	 ﾠ
which	 ﾠrequire	 ﾠmore	 ﾠenergy	 ﾠto	 ﾠsteer	 ﾠEU	 ﾠexternal	 ﾠrelations	 ﾠtowards	 ﾠa	 ﾠdesirable	 ﾠ
outcome.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
2.  The	 ﾠsubstantive	 ﾠtasks	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
  Whereas	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ2	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠDecision	 ﾠdefines	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtasks	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠin	 ﾠfunctional	 ﾠ
terms,	 ﾠthere	 ﾠis	 ﾠvery	 ﾠlittle	 ﾠreference	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsubstantive	 ﾠpolicy	 ﾠtasks	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
Service.	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ2(1),	 ﾠindent	 ﾠ1,	 ﾠis	 ﾠthe	 ﾠonly	 ﾠsegment	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprovision	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠ
mentions	 ﾠtwo	 ﾠexplicit	 ﾠsubstantive	 ﾠpolicy-ﾭ‐related	 ﾠtasks:	 ﾠfirst,	 ﾠsupport	 ﾠthe	 ﾠHigh	 ﾠ
Representative	 ﾠto	 ﾠconduct	 ﾠand	 ﾠformulate	 ﾠpolicy	 ﾠproposals	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfield	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
CFSP/CSDP;	 ﾠand	 ﾠsecond	 ﾠto	 ﾠsupport	 ﾠthe	 ﾠHigh	 ﾠRepresentative	 ﾠin	 ﾠ“ensuring	 ﾠ
consistency”	 ﾠof	 ﾠEU	 ﾠexternal	 ﾠrelations	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠwhole.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
  In	 ﾠterms	 ﾠof	 ﾠdrafting	 ﾠthere	 ﾠis	 ﾠan	 ﾠimportant,	 ﾠyet	 ﾠsubtle	 ﾠdifference	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠ
Article	 ﾠ2	 ﾠ(1)	 ﾠfirst	 ﾠand	 ﾠthird	 ﾠindents;	 ﾠand	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ18	 ﾠ(2)	 ﾠand	 ﾠ(4).	 ﾠ	 ﾠIn	 ﾠthe	 ﾠTreaty,	 ﾠ
Article	 ﾠ18	 ﾠ(2)	 ﾠrefers	 ﾠonly	 ﾠto	 ﾠpolicy-ﾭ‐making	 ﾠtasks	 ﾠin	 ﾠrelation	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCFSP	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
High	 ﾠRepresentative.	 ﾠ	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ2	 ﾠ(1)	 ﾠfirst	 ﾠindent	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠDecision	 ﾠcopies	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
Treaty	 ﾠformulation,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠadds	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtask	 ﾠof	 ﾠensuring	 ﾠconsistency	 ﾠin	 ﾠEU	 ﾠexternal	 ﾠ
action.	 ﾠ	 ﾠConversely,	 ﾠin	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ18	 ﾠ(4)	 ﾠTEU	 ﾠwe	 ﾠfind	 ﾠthe	 ﾠVice-ﾭ‐Presidential	 ﾠ
Commission	 ﾠhat	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠHigh	 ﾠRepresentative,	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠexplicitly	 ﾠincludes	 ﾠtasks	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
relation	 ﾠto	 ﾠconsistency	 ﾠof	 ﾠEU	 ﾠexternal	 ﾠaction,	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠare	 ﾠfaithfully	 ﾠreproduced	 ﾠ
in	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ2	 ﾠ(1)	 ﾠthird	 ﾠindent,	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠDecision.	 ﾠThis	 ﾠimplies	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠis	 ﾠgiven	 ﾠ
a	 ﾠstronger	 ﾠ(compared	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠTreaties)	 ﾠcoherence-ﾭ‐oriented	 ﾠmandate	 ﾠfor	 ﾠEU	 ﾠ
external	 ﾠrelations	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠwhole,	 ﾠand	 ﾠnot	 ﾠsimply	 ﾠa	 ﾠCFSP-ﾭ‐oriented	 ﾠmandate.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
43	 ﾠSee	 ﾠthe	 ﾠreport	 ﾠprepared	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠAFET	 ﾠCommittee	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠParliament,	 ﾠThe	 ﾠOrganisation	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
Functioning	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS:	 ﾠAchievements,	 ﾠChallenges	 ﾠand	 ﾠOpportunities,	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠpublished	 ﾠend	 ﾠFebruary	 ﾠ
2013.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
44	 ﾠIbid.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 21	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
  As	 ﾠregards	 ﾠbalancing	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCFSP	 ﾠtask	 ﾠversus	 ﾠthe	 ﾠover-ﾭ‐arching	 ﾠcoherence	 ﾠ
mandate	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS,	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠbeing	 ﾠreported	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠhas	 ﾠso	 ﾠfar	 ﾠfocused	 ﾠ
mainly	 ﾠon	 ﾠits	 ﾠforeign	 ﾠpolicy	 ﾠtasks,	 ﾠeven	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpoint	 ﾠwhere	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠfinds	 ﾠ
itself	 ﾠin	 ﾠcompetition	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmember	 ﾠstates	 ﾠon	 ﾠ‘classical	 ﾠforeign	 ﾠpolicy’.
45	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
This	 ﾠbegs	 ﾠthe	 ﾠquestion	 ﾠof	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcoherence	 ﾠmandate	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠought	 ﾠ
to	 ﾠbe	 ﾠstrengthened.	 ﾠA	 ﾠrevised	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠDecision	 ﾠcould	 ﾠstrengthen	 ﾠthe	 ﾠService’s	 ﾠ
mandate	 ﾠas	 ﾠregards	 ﾠEU	 ﾠpolicy	 ﾠcoherence	 ﾠby	 ﾠincluding	 ﾠadditional	 ﾠlegal	 ﾠbases	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠa	 ﾠmore	 ﾠsubstantive	 ﾠnature.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThis	 ﾠwould	 ﾠthen	 ﾠchange	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpurely	 ﾠ“CFSP	 ﾠ
nature”	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠDecision,	 ﾠand	 ﾠtherefore	 ﾠsupport	 ﾠa	 ﾠwider	 ﾠambit	 ﾠof	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠtasks,	 ﾠ
albeit	 ﾠwithin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcurrent	 ﾠTreaty	 ﾠframework.	 ﾠ	 ﾠNotably,	 ﾠa	 ﾠnew	 ﾠDecision	 ﾠcould	 ﾠ
have	 ﾠregard	 ﾠto	 ﾠArticles	 ﾠ21	 ﾠTEU	 ﾠand	 ﾠ205	 ﾠTFEU.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠthis	 ﾠsense,	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠa	 ﾠnew	 ﾠlegal	 ﾠ
basis	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠ2.0	 ﾠDecision	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ“(organisation	 ﾠand)	 ﾠfunctioning”	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
EEAS	 ﾠwould	 ﾠconstitutionally	 ﾠembed	 ﾠand	 ﾠsubstantively	 ﾠwiden	 ﾠits	 ﾠfunction	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
contributing	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠHR’s	 ﾠmandate	 ﾠof	 ﾠensuring	 ﾠconsistency	 ﾠin	 ﾠEU	 ﾠexternal	 ﾠ
action	 ﾠ(as	 ﾠcurrently	 ﾠstated	 ﾠin	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ2(1),	 ﾠfirst	 ﾠindent,	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠDecision;	 ﾠas	 ﾠ
well	 ﾠas	 ﾠthe	 ﾠDecision’s	 ﾠpreamble).	 ﾠAs	 ﾠpreviously	 ﾠstated	 ﾠin	 ﾠthis	 ﾠcommentary,	 ﾠ
such	 ﾠa	 ﾠdual	 ﾠlegal	 ﾠbasis	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot	 ﾠnecessarily	 ﾠincompatible	 ﾠwith	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ40	 ﾠTEU	 ﾠas	 ﾠit	 ﾠ
can	 ﾠbe	 ﾠseen	 ﾠas	 ﾠimplementing	 ﾠa	 ﾠduty	 ﾠof	 ﾠcoherence	 ﾠand	 ﾠcooperation,	 ﾠ“without	 ﾠ
prejudice”	 ﾠto	 ﾠquestions	 ﾠof	 ﾠcompetence.
46	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
  As	 ﾠregards	 ﾠthe	 ﾠformulation	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS’	 ﾠtasks	 ﾠin	 ﾠrelation	 ﾠto	 ﾠthose	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠHigh	 ﾠ
Representative,	 ﾠone	 ﾠmust	 ﾠalso	 ﾠbe	 ﾠaware	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfact	 ﾠthat	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ2	 ﾠuses	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
words	 ﾠ“as	 ﾠoutlined,	 ﾠnotably”	 ﾠin	 ﾠArticles	 ﾠ18	 ﾠand	 ﾠ27	 ﾠTEU.	 ﾠTwo	 ﾠtextual	 ﾠelements	 ﾠ
are	 ﾠrelevant:	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠone	 ﾠhand,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠword	 ﾠmandates	 ﾠis	 ﾠplural;	 ﾠand	 ﾠsecond,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
words	 ﾠ“outlined”	 ﾠand	 ﾠ“notably”	 ﾠindicate	 ﾠthe	 ﾠopen-ﾭ‐ended	 ﾠnature	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠHR’s	 ﾠ
mandate,	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfact	 ﾠthat	 ﾠalongside	 ﾠArticles	 ﾠ18	 ﾠand	 ﾠ27	 ﾠTEU,	 ﾠother	 ﾠprovisions	 ﾠ
may	 ﾠbe	 ﾠrelevant.	 ﾠOne	 ﾠmust	 ﾠtherefore	 ﾠpiece	 ﾠtogether	 ﾠthe	 ﾠwhole	 ﾠmandate	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠHR	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠTreaties,	 ﾠand	 ﾠthereby	 ﾠalso	 ﾠsubstantively	 ﾠbroaden	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsupport	 ﾠ
tasks	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠitself.	 ﾠ	 ﾠAccording	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠTEU,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠHigh	 ﾠRepresentative:	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
“shall	 ﾠassist	 ﾠthe	 ﾠPresident	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠCouncil”;
47	 ﾠ“shall	 ﾠconduct	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
CFSP”;
48	 ﾠ“shall	 ﾠbe	 ﾠresponsible	 ﾠwithin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCommission	 ﾠfor	 ﾠresponsibilities	 ﾠ
incumbent	 ﾠon	 ﾠit	 ﾠin	 ﾠexternal	 ﾠrelations	 ﾠand	 ﾠfor	 ﾠcoordinating	 ﾠother	 ﾠaspects	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
45Interview	 ﾠwith	 ﾠa	 ﾠFormer	 ﾠHead	 ﾠof	 ﾠDelegation,	 ﾠ24	 ﾠOctober	 ﾠ2012.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
46	 ﾠCp.	 ﾠCase	 ﾠC-ﾭ‐130/10	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠParliament	 ﾠv	 ﾠCouncil,	 ﾠjudgment	 ﾠof	 ﾠ19	 ﾠJuly	 ﾠ2012,	 ﾠnyr.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
47	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ15(6)	 ﾠpenultimate	 ﾠparagraph,	 ﾠTEU.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
48	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ18(2)	 ﾠTEU.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 22	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠUnion’s	 ﾠexternal	 ﾠaction”;
49	 ﾠ“shall	 ﾠensure	 ﾠthe	 ﾠunity,	 ﾠconsistency	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
effectiveness	 ﾠof	 ﾠaction	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠUnion	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCFSP”;
50	 ﾠshall	 ﾠ“put	 ﾠinto	 ﾠeffect	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
CFSP”;
51	 ﾠ“shall	 ﾠchair	 ﾠthe	 ﾠForeign	 ﾠAffairs	 ﾠCouncil”;
52	 ﾠ“shall	 ﾠcontribute	 ﾠthrough	 ﾠ
his	 ﾠproposals	 ﾠtowards	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpreparation	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCFSP”;
53	 ﾠ“shall	 ﾠensure	 ﾠ
implementation	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdecisions	 ﾠadopted	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠCouncil	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
Council”;
54	 ﾠ“shall	 ﾠrepresent	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEU	 ﾠfor	 ﾠmatters	 ﾠrelated	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCFSP	 ﾠ…	 ﾠshall	 ﾠ
conduct	 ﾠpolitical	 ﾠdialogue	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠUnion’s	 ﾠbehalf	 ﾠ…	 ﾠshall	 ﾠexpress	 ﾠthe	 ﾠUnion’s	 ﾠ
position	 ﾠin	 ﾠinternational	 ﾠorganizations”;
55	 ﾠand	 ﾠfinally,	 ﾠshe	 ﾠhas	 ﾠan	 ﾠimportant	 ﾠ
role	 ﾠin	 ﾠCSDP	 ﾠdecision-ﾭ‐making.
56	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
  Characteristic	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠDecision	 ﾠis	 ﾠthat	 ﾠnot	 ﾠall	 ﾠinformation	 ﾠon	 ﾠany	 ﾠ
given	 ﾠissue	 ﾠis	 ﾠfound	 ﾠin	 ﾠone	 ﾠarticle	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlegal	 ﾠinstrument.	 ﾠ	 ﾠAs	 ﾠsuch,	 ﾠ
Article	 ﾠ4	 ﾠ(3)	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfashion	 ﾠin	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCentral	 ﾠAdministration	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
EEAS	 ﾠshall	 ﾠbe	 ﾠorganised	 ﾠis	 ﾠcrucial	 ﾠfor	 ﾠa	 ﾠgood	 ﾠunderstanding	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
Service’s	 ﾠ’	 ﾠtasks.	 ﾠ	 ﾠIndeed,	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlimited	 ﾠsubstantive	 ﾠpolicy	 ﾠreferences	 ﾠ
in	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS’	 ﾠsupport	 ﾠtasks,	 ﾠit	 ﾠmust	 ﾠbe	 ﾠacknowledged	 ﾠthat	 ﾠmuch	 ﾠ
information	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS’	 ﾠpolicy	 ﾠwork	 ﾠcan	 ﾠbe	 ﾠinferred	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠits	 ﾠ
organogram	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠstaff	 ﾠit	 ﾠhas	 ﾠabsorbed	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCouncil	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
Commission.	 ﾠIndeed,	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ4	 ﾠ(3)	 ﾠstates	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠshall	 ﾠhave	 ﾠ
geographic	 ﾠDG’s	 ﾠcovering	 ﾠall	 ﾠareas	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠworld,	 ﾠas	 ﾠwell	 ﾠas	 ﾠthematically	 ﾠ
focused	 ﾠorganisational	 ﾠsub-ﾭ‐entities.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
  	 ﾠ	 ﾠEvidently,	 ﾠhaving	 ﾠto	 ﾠinterpret	 ﾠand	 ﾠdefine	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsubstantive	 ﾠtasks	 ﾠof	 ﾠan	 ﾠ
organisation	 ﾠby	 ﾠlooking	 ﾠat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfashion	 ﾠin	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠinternally	 ﾠstructured	 ﾠ
is	 ﾠputting	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcart	 ﾠbefore	 ﾠthe	 ﾠhorse:	 ﾠinstitutional	 ﾠorganisation	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
staffing	 ﾠshould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠorganised	 ﾠin	 ﾠlight	 ﾠof	 ﾠprojected	 ﾠand	 ﾠclearly	 ﾠdefined	 ﾠ
tasks,	 ﾠrather	 ﾠthan	 ﾠthe	 ﾠreverse.	 ﾠThis	 ﾠproblem	 ﾠcan	 ﾠbe	 ﾠglossed	 ﾠover	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
relation	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠgeographic	 ﾠdesks	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠthis	 ﾠcase	 ﾠthey	 ﾠcan	 ﾠbe	 ﾠ
viewed	 ﾠas	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlogical	 ﾠconsequence	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS’	 ﾠfunction	 ﾠto	 ﾠaid	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
49Article	 ﾠ18(3)	 ﾠTEU.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
50Article	 ﾠ26(2)	 ﾠsecond	 ﾠindent	 ﾠTEU,	 ﾠtogether	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCouncil.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
51	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ26(3)	 ﾠTEU.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
52	 ﾠArticles	 ﾠ18(3)	 ﾠTEU	 ﾠand	 ﾠ27(1)	 ﾠTEU.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
53	 ﾠArticles	 ﾠ18(2)	 ﾠTEU	 ﾠand	 ﾠ27(1)	 ﾠTEU.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
54	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ27(1)	 ﾠTEU.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
55	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ27(2)	 ﾠTEU.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
56	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ42(4)	 ﾠTEU.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 23	 ﾠ
HR/VP	 ﾠin	 ﾠensuring	 ﾠcoherence	 ﾠof	 ﾠEU	 ﾠexternal	 ﾠpolicy.	 ﾠThis	 ﾠis	 ﾠalso	 ﾠwhy,	 ﾠ
since	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠConvention,	 ﾠa	 ﾠconsensus	 ﾠemerged	 ﾠthat	 ﾠno	 ﾠ
geographically	 ﾠorganised	 ﾠunits	 ﾠshould	 ﾠexist	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCommission	 ﾠor	 ﾠ
Council	 ﾠGeneral	 ﾠSecretariat.
57	 ﾠThe	 ﾠthematic	 ﾠdesks	 ﾠare	 ﾠmore	 ﾠ
problematic,	 ﾠas	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠsubstantive	 ﾠpolicy	 ﾠtasks	 ﾠare	 ﾠthe	 ﾠresult	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ2009-ﾭ‐
2010	 ﾠnegotiation	 ﾠprocess	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtug-ﾭ‐of-ﾭ‐war	 ﾠover	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcompetences	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCommission.	 ﾠ	 ﾠFor	 ﾠexample,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠabsence	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠthematic	 ﾠ
desk	 ﾠon	 ﾠenergy	 ﾠis	 ﾠthe	 ﾠresult	 ﾠof	 ﾠCommission	 ﾠefforts	 ﾠto	 ﾠavoid	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠ
siphoning	 ﾠin	 ﾠEU	 ﾠexternal	 ﾠenergy	 ﾠpolicy,	 ﾠrather	 ﾠthan	 ﾠa	 ﾠprincipled	 ﾠdecision	 ﾠ
on	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠor	 ﾠnot	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠa	 ﾠdesk	 ﾠwould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠuseful	 ﾠfor	 ﾠEU	 ﾠpolicy.
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 ﾠAnother	 ﾠ
example:	 ﾠthe	 ﾠinitial	 ﾠproposal	 ﾠfor	 ﾠa	 ﾠthematic	 ﾠdesk	 ﾠdealing	 ﾠwith	 ﾠgender	 ﾠ
issues	 ﾠwas	 ﾠdue	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠspecific	 ﾠinterest	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠperson	 ﾠholding	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
mandate	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠHR/VP	 ﾠin	 ﾠthis	 ﾠissue.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
  Apart	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ4	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠDecision,	 ﾠcertain	 ﾠother	 ﾠprovisions	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠ
legal	 ﾠinstrument,	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠas	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ5(9)	 ﾠand	 ﾠ(10),	 ﾠalso	 ﾠcontain	 ﾠa	 ﾠnumber	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
tasks	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠare	 ﾠnot	 ﾠcontained	 ﾠin	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ2.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThey	 ﾠcannot	 ﾠbe	 ﾠconsidered	 ﾠ
lexspecialis	 ﾠprovisions	 ﾠin	 ﾠrelation	 ﾠto	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ2	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCouncil	 ﾠDecision,	 ﾠ
but	 ﾠmore	 ﾠadditional	 ﾠtasks.	 ﾠThis	 ﾠindeed	 ﾠseems	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠa	 ﾠrecurrent	 ﾠproblem	 ﾠ
with	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠdecision,	 ﾠnamely:	 ﾠdespite	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfact	 ﾠthat	 ﾠprovisions	 ﾠare	 ﾠ
regrouped	 ﾠunder	 ﾠ‘tasks’,	 ﾠ‘cooperation’,	 ﾠ‘nature	 ﾠand	 ﾠscope’,	 ﾠetc.	 ﾠone	 ﾠstill	 ﾠ
finds	 ﾠprovisions	 ﾠthat	 ﾠcould	 ﾠfall	 ﾠunder	 ﾠeither	 ﾠof	 ﾠthese	 ﾠcategories,	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
various	 ﾠother	 ﾠarticles.	 ﾠ	 ﾠMore	 ﾠgenerally,	 ﾠwe	 ﾠmust	 ﾠalso	 ﾠlook	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
otherlegal/non-ﾭ‐legal	 ﾠsources	 ﾠto	 ﾠtease	 ﾠout	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtasks	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS:	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
o  the	 ﾠTEU	 ﾠdescribing	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmandate	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠHR/VP;	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
o  the	 ﾠdebate	 ﾠand	 ﾠdocuments	 ﾠrelating	 ﾠto	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠelements	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCouncil	 ﾠ
General	 ﾠSecretariat/Commission	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠwould/has	 ﾠabsorbed;	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
o  the	 ﾠorganogram,	 ﾠin	 ﾠall	 ﾠits	 ﾠdifferent	 ﾠiterations	 ﾠover	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlast	 ﾠ2	 ﾠyears,	 ﾠ
provides	 ﾠa	 ﾠsource	 ﾠof	 ﾠinformation	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsubstantive	 ﾠtasks	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS:	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠgeographic	 ﾠscope	 ﾠof	 ﾠits	 ﾠwork,	 ﾠas	 ﾠwell	 ﾠas	 ﾠthe	 ﾠthematic	 ﾠdesks.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
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 ﾠSee	 ﾠnote	 ﾠ39,	 ﾠabove.	 ﾠAlthough	 ﾠcertain	 ﾠCommission	 ﾠDGs	 ﾠhave	 ﾠsince	 ﾠthe	 ﾠadvent	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠbegun	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
organise	 ﾠthemselves	 ﾠaround	 ﾠgeographic	 ﾠscope,	 ﾠwhere	 ﾠthis	 ﾠis	 ﾠ“deemed	 ﾠnecessary”.See	 ﾠreport	 ﾠ
prepared	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠAFET	 ﾠCommittee	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠParliament,	 ﾠThe	 ﾠOrganisation	 ﾠand	 ﾠFunctioning	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠEEAS:	 ﾠAchievements,	 ﾠChallenges	 ﾠand	 ﾠOpportunities,	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠpublished	 ﾠend	 ﾠFebruary	 ﾠ2013.	 ﾠ
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 ﾠJ.	 ﾠF.	 ﾠBraun,	 ﾠ"EU	 ﾠEnergy	 ﾠPolicy	 ﾠunder	 ﾠthe	 ﾠTreaty	 ﾠof	 ﾠLisbon	 ﾠRules	 ﾠ-ﾭ‐	 ﾠBetween	 ﾠa	 ﾠnew	 ﾠpolicy	 ﾠand	 ﾠbusiness	 ﾠ
as	 ﾠusual"	 ﾠ(February	 ﾠ2011)	 ﾠCEPS	 ﾠWorking	 ﾠPaper	 ﾠNo	 ﾠ31,	 ﾠ4.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 24	 ﾠ
o  other	 ﾠdocuments	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠas	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS-ﾭ‐Commission	 ﾠworking	 ﾠarrangement	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠJanuary	 ﾠ2012;	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠJoint	 ﾠDecision	 ﾠon	 ﾠmanaging	 ﾠdelegations	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
March	 ﾠ2012.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
  A	 ﾠfinal	 ﾠconsideration	 ﾠis	 ﾠthe	 ﾠextent	 ﾠto	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmandate	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠis	 ﾠ
circumscribed	 ﾠin	 ﾠan	 ﾠexhaustive	 ﾠfashion.	 ﾠArguably,	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ2(1)	 ﾠallows	 ﾠit	 ﾠ
to	 ﾠbe	 ﾠentrusted	 ﾠwith	 ﾠtasks	 ﾠnot	 ﾠexplicitly	 ﾠmentioned	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠarticles	 ﾠit	 ﾠ
refers	 ﾠto,	 ﾠand	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠCouncil	 ﾠcould	 ﾠentrust	 ﾠthe	 ﾠHR	 ﾠand	 ﾠwith	 ﾠ
that	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠwith	 ﾠother	 ﾠtasks	 ﾠnot	 ﾠexplicitly	 ﾠprovided	 ﾠfor	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠTreaty,	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠway	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCommission	 ﾠhas	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpast	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠendowed	 ﾠwith	 ﾠtasks	 ﾠnot	 ﾠ
explicitly	 ﾠforeseen	 ﾠin	 ﾠprimary	 ﾠlaw	 ﾠ(e.g.	 ﾠmanagement	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠ
Development	 ﾠFund,	 ﾠor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠconduct	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEU	 ﾠpre-ﾭ‐accession	 ﾠstrategy).	 ﾠ
In	 ﾠsum,	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ2	 ﾠdid	 ﾠnot	 ﾠlay	 ﾠdown	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtasks	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠin	 ﾠany	 ﾠsolid,	 ﾠ
ascertainable	 ﾠfashion,	 ﾠthough	 ﾠthat	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot	 ﾠnecessarily	 ﾠproblematic.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThe	 ﾠ
question	 ﾠis	 ﾠthen,	 ﾠto	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠextent	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠnecessary	 ﾠto	 ﾠdo	 ﾠso	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠpotentially	 ﾠ
revised	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠdecision;	 ﾠand	 ﾠif	 ﾠso,	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠthis	 ﾠshould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠdone	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCouncil	 ﾠ
Decision.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠbigger	 ﾠquestion	 ﾠis	 ﾠthen	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcurrent	 ﾠTreaty	 ﾠrules	 ﾠeven	 ﾠ










1.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠshall	 ﾠsupport,	 ﾠand	 ﾠwork	 ﾠin	 ﾠcooperation	 ﾠwith,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdiplomatic	 ﾠservices	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠMember	 ﾠStates,	 ﾠ
as	 ﾠwell	 ﾠas	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠGeneral	 ﾠSecretariat	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCouncil	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠservices	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCommission,	 ﾠin	 ﾠorder	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
ensure	 ﾠconsistency	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdifferent	 ﾠareas	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠUnion’s	 ﾠexternal	 ﾠaction	 ﾠand	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠthose	 ﾠ
areas	 ﾠand	 ﾠits	 ﾠother	 ﾠpolicies.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
2.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠservices	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCommission	 ﾠshall	 ﾠconsult	 ﾠeach	 ﾠother	 ﾠon	 ﾠall	 ﾠmatters	 ﾠrelating	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
external	 ﾠaction	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠUnion	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠexercise	 ﾠof	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠrespective	 ﾠfunctions,	 ﾠexcept	 ﾠon	 ﾠmatters	 ﾠcovered	 ﾠby	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠCSDP.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠshall	 ﾠtake	 ﾠpart	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpreparatory	 ﾠwork	 ﾠand	 ﾠprocedures	 ﾠrelating	 ﾠto	 ﾠacts	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠ
prepared	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCommission	 ﾠin	 ﾠthis	 ﾠarea.	 ﾠ
This	 ﾠparagraph	 ﾠshall	 ﾠbe	 ﾠimplemented	 ﾠin	 ﾠaccordance	 ﾠwith	 ﾠChapter	 ﾠ1	 ﾠof	 ﾠTitle	 ﾠV	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠTEU,	 ﾠand	 ﾠwith	 ﾠ
Article	 ﾠ205	 ﾠTFEU.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
3.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠmay	 ﾠenter	 ﾠinto	 ﾠservice-ﾭ‐level	 ﾠarrangements	 ﾠwith	 ﾠrelevant	 ﾠservices	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠGeneral	 ﾠ
Secretariat	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCouncil,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCommission,	 ﾠor	 ﾠother	 ﾠoffices	 ﾠor	 ﾠinterinstitutional	 ﾠbodies	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠUnion.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
4.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠshall	 ﾠextend	 ﾠappropriate	 ﾠsupport	 ﾠand	 ﾠcooperation	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠother	 ﾠinstitutions	 ﾠand	 ﾠbodies	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠUnion,	 ﾠin	 ﾠparticular	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠParliament.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠmay	 ﾠalso	 ﾠbenefit	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsupport	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
cooperation	 ﾠof	 ﾠthose	 ﾠinstitutions	 ﾠand	 ﾠbodies,	 ﾠincluding	 ﾠagencies,	 ﾠas	 ﾠappropriate.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠinternal	 ﾠ
auditor	 ﾠwill	 ﾠcooperate	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠinternal	 ﾠauditor	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCommission	 ﾠto	 ﾠensure	 ﾠa	 ﾠconsistent	 ﾠaudit	 ﾠpolicy,	 ﾠ
with	 ﾠparticular	 ﾠreference	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCommission’s	 ﾠresponsibility	 ﾠfor	 ﾠoperational	 ﾠexpenditure.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠaddition,	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠshall	 ﾠcooperate	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠAnti-ﾭ‐Fraud	 ﾠOffice	 ﾠ("OLAF")	 ﾠin	 ﾠaccordance	 ﾠwith	 ﾠRegulation	 ﾠ
(EC)	 ﾠNo	 ﾠ1073/1999.	 ﾠIt	 ﾠshall,	 ﾠin	 ﾠparticular,	 ﾠadopt	 ﾠwithout	 ﾠdelay	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdecision	 ﾠrequired	 ﾠby	 ﾠthat	 ﾠRegulation	 ﾠ
on	 ﾠthe	 ﾠterms	 ﾠand	 ﾠconditions	 ﾠfor	 ﾠinternal	 ﾠinvestigations.	 ﾠAs	 ﾠprovided	 ﾠin	 ﾠthat	 ﾠRegulation,	 ﾠboth	 ﾠMember	 ﾠ
States,	 ﾠin	 ﾠaccordance	 ﾠwith	 ﾠnational	 ﾠprovisions,	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠinstitutions	 ﾠshall	 ﾠgive	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnecessary	 ﾠsupport	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
enable	 ﾠOLAF’s	 ﾠagents	 ﾠto	 ﾠfulfil	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠtasks.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
While	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ2	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠDecision	 ﾠpredominantly	 ﾠpurports	 ﾠto	 ﾠallocate	 ﾠ“tasks”	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠService	 ﾠby	 ﾠreference	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfunctions	 ﾠof	 ﾠother	 ﾠEU	 ﾠexternal	 ﾠrelations	 ﾠactors,	 ﾠ
Article	 ﾠ3	 ﾠis	 ﾠentirely	 ﾠdevoted	 ﾠto	 ﾠfostering	 ﾠcooperation	 ﾠamong	 ﾠthem	 ﾠ(section	 ﾠ1).	 ﾠ
Generally,	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ3	 ﾠis	 ﾠformulated	 ﾠin	 ﾠmandatory	 ﾠlanguage.	 ﾠIt	 ﾠthus	 ﾠestablishes	 ﾠan	 ﾠ
obligation	 ﾠof	 ﾠcooperation	 ﾠthat	 ﾠrecalls	 ﾠthe	 ﾠterminology	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠTEU	 ﾠ(Section	 ﾠ2).	 ﾠIt	 ﾠis	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
turn	 ﾠexpressed	 ﾠas	 ﾠvarious	 ﾠobligations	 ﾠof	 ﾠconduct	 ﾠinvolving	 ﾠprocedural	 ﾠduties	 ﾠ(Section	 ﾠ
3),	 ﾠwhose	 ﾠscope	 ﾠof	 ﾠapplication	 ﾠis	 ﾠbroad,	 ﾠparticularly	 ﾠin	 ﾠterms	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnumber	 ﾠof	 ﾠactors	 ﾠ
to	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠthey	 ﾠare	 ﾠaddressed	 ﾠ(Section	 ﾠ4).	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
1.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠrationale	 ﾠof	 ﾠcooperation	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠdecision	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
  That	 ﾠan	 ﾠentire	 ﾠarticle	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠDecision	 ﾠshould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠdedicated	 ﾠto	 ﾠcooperation	 ﾠis	 ﾠ
unsurprising	 ﾠfor	 ﾠat	 ﾠleast	 ﾠthree	 ﾠreasons.	 ﾠFirst,	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠessential	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠvery	 ﾠ
establishment	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS,	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠaccording	 ﾠto	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ27(3)	 ﾠTEU,	 ﾠis	 ﾠbased	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 26	 ﾠ
absorption	 ﾠand	 ﾠ(partial)	 ﾠamalgamation	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrelevant	 ﾠservices	 ﾠand	 ﾠtasks	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
Commission	 ﾠand	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠGeneral	 ﾠSecretariat	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCouncil,	 ﾠand	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
participation	 ﾠof	 ﾠmember	 ﾠstates’	 ﾠdiplomats.	 ﾠSecond,	 ﾠcooperation	 ﾠappears	 ﾠall	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
more	 ﾠnecessary	 ﾠsince	 ﾠthe	 ﾠallocation	 ﾠof	 ﾠ“tasks”	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠand	 ﾠothers	 ﾠ
external	 ﾠrelations	 ﾠplayers	 ﾠis	 ﾠvague,
59	 ﾠthus	 ﾠmaking	 ﾠpower	 ﾠoverlaps	 ﾠand	 ﾠfrictions	 ﾠ
almost	 ﾠinevitable.	 ﾠThird,	 ﾠcooperation	 ﾠis	 ﾠinstrumental	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcoherence	 ﾠmandate	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠthe	 ﾠHR/VP	 ﾠsupported	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS,	 ﾠgiven	 ﾠthe	 ﾠessential	 ﾠfunction	 ﾠthat	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠ
cooperation	 ﾠplays	 ﾠin	 ﾠensuring	 ﾠcoherence.
60	 ﾠIndeed,	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠ“Service”	 ﾠrather	 ﾠthan	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
fully-ﾭ‐fledged	 ﾠpolitical	 ﾠinstitution,	 ﾠlocated	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCommission	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
Council,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠis	 ﾠprimarily	 ﾠconceived	 ﾠto	 ﾠwork	 ﾠfor	 ﾠand	 ﾠwith	 ﾠother	 ﾠactors,	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
thus	 ﾠneeds	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlatter’s	 ﾠcooperation	 ﾠto	 ﾠeffectively	 ﾠfulfil	 ﾠits	 ﾠtasks.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
2.	 ﾠA	 ﾠspecific	 ﾠexpression	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠobligation	 ﾠof	 ﾠcooperation	 ﾠenshrined	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠTEU	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
  The	 ﾠcooperation	 ﾠforeseen	 ﾠin	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ3	 ﾠis	 ﾠcrafted	 ﾠas	 ﾠan	 ﾠobligation,	 ﾠas	 ﾠtestified	 ﾠby	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠrecurring	 ﾠusage	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠphrase	 ﾠ“shall”	 ﾠthroughout	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtext.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
  Paragraph	 ﾠ1,	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠmay	 ﾠbe	 ﾠread	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠchapeau	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠwhole	 ﾠarticle,	 ﾠrecalls	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
function	 ﾠof	 ﾠcooperation	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠmeans	 ﾠto	 ﾠensure	 ﾠconsistency.	 ﾠIndeed	 ﾠin	 ﾠreferring	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
consistency	 ﾠand	 ﾠin	 ﾠemphasising	 ﾠits	 ﾠmultifaceted	 ﾠapplication	 ﾠ(viz.	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠ
different	 ﾠareas	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEU	 ﾠexternal	 ﾠaction,	 ﾠand	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠthose	 ﾠareas	 ﾠand	 ﾠother	 ﾠ
policies),	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrequirement	 ﾠevoked	 ﾠin	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ3	 ﾠechoes	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcomprehensive	 ﾠ
coherence	 ﾠimperative	 ﾠset	 ﾠout	 ﾠin	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ21(3)	 ﾠTEU,	 ﾠof	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠit	 ﾠcan	 ﾠthus	 ﾠbe	 ﾠseen	 ﾠas	 ﾠ
a	 ﾠspecific	 ﾠapplication.	 ﾠTo	 ﾠbe	 ﾠsure,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpreamble	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠDecision	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠmake	 ﾠ
an	 ﾠexplicit	 ﾠreference	 ﾠto	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ21(3)	 ﾠTEU	 ﾠin	 ﾠits	 ﾠsecond	 ﾠindent,	 ﾠimmediately	 ﾠafter	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠparagraph	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpurpose	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmeasure.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
  The	 ﾠrole	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠin	 ﾠascertaining	 ﾠoverall	 ﾠconsistency	 ﾠresonates	 ﾠin	 ﾠparagraph	 ﾠ2	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ3	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠDecision,	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠunderlines	 ﾠthe	 ﾠduty	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCommission	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠto	 ﾠconsult	 ﾠon	 ﾠ“all	 ﾠmatters	 ﾠrelating	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠexternal	 ﾠaction	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
Union	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠexercise	 ﾠof	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠrespective	 ﾠfunctions”	 ﾠ(emphasis	 ﾠadded),	 ﾠexcept	 ﾠ
CSDP	 ﾠ(see	 ﾠfurther	 ﾠbelow).	 ﾠThe	 ﾠtwo	 ﾠshall	 ﾠthus	 ﾠconsult	 ﾠeach	 ﾠother	 ﾠnot	 ﾠonly	 ﾠon	 ﾠEU	 ﾠ
policies	 ﾠthat	 ﾠare	 ﾠprimarily	 ﾠexternal	 ﾠ(e.g.	 ﾠtrade,	 ﾠneighbourhood,	 ﾠdevelopment)	 ﾠbut	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
59	 ﾠSee	 ﾠdiscussion	 ﾠunder	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ2	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠDecision,	 ﾠabove.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
60	 ﾠOn	 ﾠthis	 ﾠconnection,	 ﾠsee	 ﾠe.g.	 ﾠC.	 ﾠHillion,	 ﾠ“Tous	 ﾠpour	 ﾠun,	 ﾠUn	 ﾠpour	 ﾠtous!	 ﾠ	 ﾠCoherence	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠExternal	 ﾠ
relations	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠUnion”	 ﾠin	 ﾠM.	 ﾠCremona	 ﾠ(ed.),	 ﾠDevelopments	 ﾠin	 ﾠEU	 ﾠExternal	 ﾠRelations	 ﾠLaw,	 ﾠ
Collected	 ﾠCourses	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠAcademy	 ﾠof	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠLaw	 ﾠ(Oxford:	 ﾠOxford	 ﾠUniversity	 ﾠPress,	 ﾠ2008)	 ﾠpp.	 ﾠ10-ﾭ‐36.	 ﾠ
More	 ﾠgenerally	 ﾠon	 ﾠcoherence,	 ﾠsee	 ﾠI.	 ﾠBosse-ﾭ‐Platière,	 ﾠL'article	 ﾠ3	 ﾠdu	 ﾠtraité	 ﾠUE	 ﾠ:	 ﾠRecherche	 ﾠsur	 ﾠune	 ﾠ
exigence	 ﾠde	 ﾠcohérence	 ﾠde	 ﾠl’action	 ﾠextérieure	 ﾠde	 ﾠl’Union	 ﾠeuropéenne	 ﾠ(Brussels	 ﾠ:	 ﾠBruylant,	 ﾠ2009).	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 27	 ﾠ
equally	 ﾠon	 ﾠall	 ﾠEU	 ﾠpolicies	 ﾠhaving	 ﾠan	 ﾠexternal	 ﾠdimension	 ﾠ(e.g.	 ﾠenvironment,	 ﾠ
transport,	 ﾠclimate	 ﾠchange,	 ﾠenergy).	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
  The	 ﾠterminology	 ﾠof	 ﾠcooperation	 ﾠused	 ﾠin	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ3	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠDecision	 ﾠalso	 ﾠrecalls	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
terms	 ﾠof	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ4(3)	 ﾠTEU	 ﾠestablishing	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprinciple	 ﾠof	 ﾠsincere	 ﾠcooperation	 ﾠ
between	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmember	 ﾠstates	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEU,	 ﾠas	 ﾠwell	 ﾠas	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprovisions	 ﾠof	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ13(2)	 ﾠ
TEU	 ﾠon	 ﾠinter-ﾭ‐institutional	 ﾠcooperation.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠobligation	 ﾠof	 ﾠcooperation	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠand	 ﾠother	 ﾠactors	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEU	 ﾠexternal	 ﾠaction	 ﾠthus	 ﾠarguably	 ﾠfinds	 ﾠits	 ﾠ
ultimate	 ﾠfoundations	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠTEU,	 ﾠand	 ﾠcould	 ﾠthereby	 ﾠbe	 ﾠenforced	 ﾠaccordingly.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
  In	 ﾠparticular,	 ﾠwhile	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠDecision	 ﾠis	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠCFSP	 ﾠnature,	 ﾠthereby	 ﾠlimiting	 ﾠits	 ﾠ
enforceability	 ﾠgiven	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcircumscribed	 ﾠjurisdiction	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠCourt	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
Justice	 ﾠin	 ﾠthis	 ﾠarea,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠobligations	 ﾠit	 ﾠcontains	 ﾠnonetheless	 ﾠought	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠconceived	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠpossibly	 ﾠapplied	 ﾠby	 ﾠreference	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠconstitutional	 ﾠprinciples	 ﾠand	 ﾠobligations	 ﾠ
they	 ﾠencapsulate,	 ﾠparticularly	 ﾠwhere	 ﾠthose	 ﾠare	 ﾠspecifically	 ﾠarticulated	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
subsequent	 ﾠdocuments,	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠas	 ﾠthe	 ﾠJoint	 ﾠDecision	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCommission	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
High	 ﾠRepresentative	 ﾠon	 ﾠCooperation	 ﾠMechanisms	 ﾠconcerning	 ﾠthe	 ﾠManagement	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠDelegations	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠUnion,
61	 ﾠor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ“operational	 ﾠguidelines	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
preparation	 ﾠand	 ﾠconduct	 ﾠof	 ﾠnegotiations	 ﾠfor	 ﾠframework	 ﾠagreements	 ﾠinvolving	 ﾠ
both	 ﾠthe	 ﾠHR	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCommission”.
62	 ﾠAccording	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlatter,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠis	 ﾠexpected	 ﾠ
to	 ﾠwork	 ﾠin	 ﾠclose	 ﾠcooperation	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠservices	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCommission	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠ
negotiating	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠcomprehensive	 ﾠagreements	 ﾠ(i.e.	 ﾠcovering	 ﾠCFSP	 ﾠand	 ﾠnon-ﾭ‐CFSP	 ﾠ
dimensions)	 ﾠon	 ﾠbehalf	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEU.	 ﾠThese	 ﾠarrangements	 ﾠarguably	 ﾠ“represent	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
fulfilment	 ﾠof	 ﾠ[the]	 ﾠduty	 ﾠof	 ﾠcooperation”
63	 ﾠas	 ﾠexpressed	 ﾠin	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ3	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠDecision	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠultimately	 ﾠfounded	 ﾠon	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ4(3)	 ﾠTEU.
64	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
  Indeed,	 ﾠakin	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠduty	 ﾠof	 ﾠcooperation	 ﾠarticulated	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠCourt	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
Justice,	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ3	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠDecision	 ﾠpoints	 ﾠto	 ﾠseveral	 ﾠobligations	 ﾠof	 ﾠconduct.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
61	 ﾠJoint	 ﾠDecision	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCommission	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠHigh	 ﾠRepresentative	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠUnion	 ﾠfor	 ﾠForeign	 ﾠAffairs	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
Security	 ﾠPolicy	 ﾠon	 ﾠCooperation	 ﾠMechanisms	 ﾠconcerning	 ﾠthe	 ﾠManagement	 ﾠof	 ﾠDelegations	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
European	 ﾠUnion;	 ﾠJOIN(2012)8,	 ﾠ28.3.2012.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
62“Operational	 ﾠguidelines	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpreparation	 ﾠand	 ﾠconduct	 ﾠof	 ﾠnegotiations	 ﾠfor	 ﾠframework	 ﾠagreements	 ﾠ
with	 ﾠthird	 ﾠcountries	 ﾠinvolving	 ﾠboth	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠCommission	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠHigh	 ﾠRepresentative	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
Union	 ﾠfor	 ﾠForeign	 ﾠAffairs	 ﾠand	 ﾠSecurity	 ﾠPolicy	 ﾠ(HR)”,	 ﾠsigned	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠSecretary-ﾭ‐General	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
Commission	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠChief	 ﾠOperating	 ﾠOfficer	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
63	 ﾠSee	 ﾠin	 ﾠthis	 ﾠregard,	 ﾠC-ﾭ‐25/94	 ﾠCommission	 ﾠv	 ﾠCouncil	 ﾠ[1996]	 ﾠECR	 ﾠI-ﾭ‐1469.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
64	 ﾠParagraph	 ﾠ6	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpreamble	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠJoint	 ﾠDecision	 ﾠexplicitly	 ﾠrefers	 ﾠto	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ3(1)	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠDecision,	 ﾠ
while	 ﾠits	 ﾠparagraph	 ﾠ1	 ﾠevokes	 ﾠthe	 ﾠneed	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCommission	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠ“to	 ﾠcollaborate	 ﾠclosely”	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
view	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpost-ﾭ‐Lisbon	 ﾠEU	 ﾠ“institutional	 ﾠset	 ﾠup	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠexternal	 ﾠrelations	 ﾠarea”.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsame	 ﾠvein,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
Guidelinesmention	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ“These	 ﾠarrangements…	 ﾠare	 ﾠdesigned	 ﾠto	 ﾠensure	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfull	 ﾠinvolvement	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
Commission	 ﾠservices	 ﾠand	 ﾠoptimise	 ﾠcooperation	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS”.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 28	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
2.	 ﾠCooperation	 ﾠas	 ﾠmultiple	 ﾠobligations	 ﾠof	 ﾠconduct	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
  The	 ﾠobligation	 ﾠof	 ﾠcooperation	 ﾠenshrined	 ﾠin	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ3	 ﾠtakes	 ﾠvarious	 ﾠexpressions	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠdifferent	 ﾠparagraphs	 ﾠthat	 ﾠcompose	 ﾠit.	 ﾠIt	 ﾠis	 ﾠformulated	 ﾠas	 ﾠduties	 ﾠto	 ﾠ“support”,	 ﾠ
“work	 ﾠin	 ﾠcooperation	 ﾠwith”	 ﾠ(paragraph	 ﾠ1),	 ﾠ“consult”,	 ﾠand	 ﾠ“take	 ﾠpart	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
preparatory	 ﾠwork”	 ﾠ(paragraph	 ﾠ2).	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ3	 ﾠthus	 ﾠpoints	 ﾠto	 ﾠseveral	 ﾠmore	 ﾠspecific	 ﾠ
duties	 ﾠthat	 ﾠremind	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠobligations	 ﾠof	 ﾠconduct	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCourt	 ﾠof	 ﾠJustice	 ﾠhas	 ﾠ
derived	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprinciple	 ﾠof	 ﾠcooperation	 ﾠenshrined	 ﾠin	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ4(3)	 ﾠTEU.
65	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
  It	 ﾠshould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠnoted	 ﾠthat	 ﾠall	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprocedural	 ﾠduties	 ﾠare	 ﾠnot	 ﾠabsolute,	 ﾠas	 ﾠsome	 ﾠ
appear	 ﾠto	 ﾠvary	 ﾠdepending	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsubject	 ﾠmatter	 ﾠand/or	 ﾠthe	 ﾠactor	 ﾠconcerned.	 ﾠ
Hence,	 ﾠas	 ﾠsuggested	 ﾠabove,	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ3(1)	 ﾠshould	 ﾠperhaps	 ﾠbe	 ﾠread	 ﾠas	 ﾠintroducing	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠobligationof	 ﾠcooperation	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠgeneral	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠduty	 ﾠto	 ﾠ“support	 ﾠand	 ﾠwork	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
cooperation	 ﾠwith”	 ﾠall	 ﾠactors	 ﾠinvolved,	 ﾠviz.	 ﾠthe	 ﾠservices	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCommission,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
General	 ﾠSecretariat	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCouncil,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmember	 ﾠstates’	 ﾠdiplomatic	 ﾠservices,	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
possibly	 ﾠ“other	 ﾠinstitutions	 ﾠand	 ﾠbodies	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠUnion,	 ﾠin	 ﾠparticular	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠ
Parliament”	 ﾠ(Article	 ﾠ3(4)).
66	 ﾠOther	 ﾠparagraphs	 ﾠ(as	 ﾠwell	 ﾠas	 ﾠother	 ﾠprovisions	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
EEAS	 ﾠDecision)	 ﾠwould	 ﾠby	 ﾠcontrast	 ﾠestablish	 ﾠspecial	 ﾠduties	 ﾠof	 ﾠconsultation,	 ﾠ
participation	 ﾠand	 ﾠassistance,	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠwould	 ﾠhave	 ﾠa	 ﾠmore	 ﾠspecific	 ﾠand	 ﾠthus	 ﾠ
differentiated	 ﾠapplication.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
(i)	 ﾠDuty	 ﾠto	 ﾠassist	 ﾠand	 ﾠduty	 ﾠto	 ﾠsupport	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
  The	 ﾠobligation	 ﾠof	 ﾠcooperation	 ﾠenvisaged	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠDecision	 ﾠseemingly	 ﾠmakes	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
distinction	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠthe	 ﾠduty	 ﾠto	 ﾠ“support”	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠduty	 ﾠto	 ﾠ“assist”.	 ﾠFor	 ﾠexample,	 ﾠ
while	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠ“shall	 ﾠsupport”	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdiplomatic	 ﾠservices	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmember	 ﾠstates,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
65	 ﾠSee	 ﾠin	 ﾠparticular:	 ﾠCase	 ﾠC-ﾭ‐266/03	 ﾠCommission	 ﾠv	 ﾠLuxembourg[2005]	 ﾠECR	 ﾠI-ﾭ‐4805;	 ﾠCase	 ﾠC-ﾭ‐433/03	 ﾠ
Commission	 ﾠv	 ﾠGermany	 ﾠ[2005]	 ﾠECR	 ﾠI-ﾭ‐6985;	 ﾠCase	 ﾠC-ﾭ‐459/03	 ﾠCommission	 ﾠv	 ﾠIreland	 ﾠ(‘MOX	 ﾠplant’)	 ﾠ[2006]	 ﾠ
ECR	 ﾠI-ﾭ‐4635;	 ﾠCase	 ﾠC-ﾭ‐246/07	 ﾠCommission	 ﾠv	 ﾠSweden(‘PFOS’),	 ﾠjudgment	 ﾠof	 ﾠ20	 ﾠApril	 ﾠ2010,	 ﾠnyr;	 ﾠand	 ﾠmore	 ﾠ
generally:	 ﾠM	 ﾠCremona,	 ﾠ“Defending	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCommunity	 ﾠInterest:	 ﾠthe	 ﾠDuties	 ﾠof	 ﾠCooperation	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
Compliance”	 ﾠin	 ﾠM	 ﾠCremona	 ﾠ&	 ﾠB	 ﾠDe	 ﾠWitte	 ﾠ(eds.)	 ﾠEU	 ﾠForeign	 ﾠRelations	 ﾠLaw:	 ﾠConstitutional	 ﾠ
fundamentals	 ﾠ(Oxford:	 ﾠHart	 ﾠPublishing,	 ﾠ2008)	 ﾠ125;	 ﾠE	 ﾠNeframi,	 ﾠ“The	 ﾠDuty	 ﾠof	 ﾠLoyalty:	 ﾠRethinking	 ﾠits	 ﾠ
Scope	 ﾠthrough	 ﾠits	 ﾠApplication	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠField	 ﾠof	 ﾠEU	 ﾠExternal	 ﾠRelations”	 ﾠ(2010)	 ﾠ47	 ﾠCommon	 ﾠMarket	 ﾠLaw	 ﾠ
Review	 ﾠ323;	 ﾠCHillion,	 ﾠ“Mixity	 ﾠand	 ﾠcoherence	 ﾠin	 ﾠEU	 ﾠexternal	 ﾠrelations:	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsignificance	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠduty	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
cooperation”	 ﾠin	 ﾠC	 ﾠHillion	 ﾠand	 ﾠP	 ﾠKoutrakos	 ﾠ(eds),	 ﾠMixed	 ﾠAgreements	 ﾠRevisited	 ﾠ–	 ﾠThe	 ﾠUnion	 ﾠand	 ﾠits	 ﾠ
Member	 ﾠStates	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠWorld	 ﾠ(Oxford:	 ﾠHart	 ﾠPublishing,	 ﾠ2010);	 ﾠ	 ﾠGDe	 ﾠBaere,	 ﾠ“O,	 ﾠWhere	 ﾠis	 ﾠFaith?	 ﾠO,	 ﾠ
Where	 ﾠis	 ﾠLoyalty?	 ﾠSome	 ﾠThoughts?	 ﾠOn	 ﾠthe	 ﾠDuty	 ﾠof	 ﾠLoyal	 ﾠCo-ﾭ‐operation	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠUnion’s	 ﾠExternal	 ﾠ
Environmental	 ﾠCompetences	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlight	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠPFOS	 ﾠCase”	 ﾠ(2011)	 ﾠ36	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠLaw	 ﾠReview	 ﾠ405.	 ﾠ
66	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ3(1)	 ﾠcould	 ﾠalso	 ﾠbe	 ﾠunderstood	 ﾠas	 ﾠestablishing	 ﾠa	 ﾠspecific	 ﾠduty	 ﾠof	 ﾠcooperation,	 ﾠinvolving	 ﾠ
procedural	 ﾠobligations	 ﾠof	 ﾠparticular	 ﾠrelevance	 ﾠto	 ﾠrelations	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmember	 ﾠstates	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCouncil	 ﾠ
General	 ﾠSecretariat.	 ﾠFor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCommission	 ﾠthis	 ﾠwould	 ﾠthen	 ﾠbe	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlexgeneralis,	 ﾠwhile	 ﾠbeing	 ﾠsubject	 ﾠto	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
lexspecialis	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠform	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠduty	 ﾠof	 ﾠconsultation	 ﾠin	 ﾠparagraph	 ﾠ2,	 ﾠspecifically	 ﾠrelated	 ﾠto	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ21	 ﾠTEU.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 29	 ﾠ
GSC	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠservices	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCommission	 ﾠ(Article	 ﾠ3(1)),	 ﾠit	 ﾠ“shall	 ﾠassist	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
President	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠCouncil,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠPresident	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠCommission,	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCommission	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠexercise	 ﾠof	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠrespective	 ﾠfunctions”	 ﾠ(Article	 ﾠ2(2),	 ﾠ
emphasis	 ﾠadded),	 ﾠbut	 ﾠit	 ﾠ“shall	 ﾠsupport	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ[HR]	 ﾠin	 ﾠfulfilling	 ﾠhis/her	 ﾠmandates”.
67	 ﾠ
Other	 ﾠprovisions	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠDecision	 ﾠthat	 ﾠappear	 ﾠto	 ﾠarticulate	 ﾠthe	 ﾠduty	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
cooperation	 ﾠalso	 ﾠrefer	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠobligation	 ﾠto	 ﾠ“assist”	 ﾠ(e.g.	 ﾠArticles	 ﾠ2(2)	 ﾠand	 ﾠ10(3)).	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠquestion	 ﾠmay	 ﾠthus	 ﾠbe	 ﾠraised	 ﾠas	 ﾠto	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtwo	 ﾠnotions,	 ﾠ“support”	 ﾠv	 ﾠ
“assist”,	 ﾠought	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠunderstood	 ﾠdifferently,	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsense	 ﾠof	 ﾠpossibly	 ﾠgenerating	 ﾠ
distinct	 ﾠobligations	 ﾠof	 ﾠconduct.	 ﾠIf	 ﾠso,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠobligation	 ﾠof	 ﾠcooperation	 ﾠwould	 ﾠtake	 ﾠ
different	 ﾠforms	 ﾠdepending	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠactor	 ﾠwith	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠhas	 ﾠto	 ﾠcooperate.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
  A	 ﾠlook	 ﾠat	 ﾠother	 ﾠlinguistic	 ﾠversions	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠDecision	 ﾠmay	 ﾠnuance	 ﾠthe	 ﾠimportance	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
such	 ﾠdistinction.	 ﾠFor	 ﾠinstance,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠFrench	 ﾠtext	 ﾠappears	 ﾠto	 ﾠuse	 ﾠthe	 ﾠword	 ﾠ	 ﾠ“assiste”	 ﾠ
both	 ﾠwhere	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEnglish	 ﾠrefers	 ﾠto	 ﾠeither	 ﾠ“support”	 ﾠor	 ﾠ“assist”.
68	 ﾠThis	 ﾠwould	 ﾠ
indicate	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnotion	 ﾠcould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠused	 ﾠinterchangeably.	 ﾠIndeed,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠduty	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
“assist”	 ﾠis	 ﾠconstitutive	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠgeneral	 ﾠprinciple	 ﾠof	 ﾠcooperation	 ﾠenshrined	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
Article	 ﾠ4(3)	 ﾠTEU.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠlatter	 ﾠnotably	 ﾠforesees	 ﾠthat	 ﾠpursuant	 ﾠto	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠprinciple,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
Union	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmember	 ﾠstates,	 ﾠshall	 ﾠin	 ﾠfull	 ﾠmutual	 ﾠrespect,	 ﾠassist	 ﾠeach	 ﾠother	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
carrying	 ﾠout	 ﾠtasks	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠflow	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠTreaty.	 ﾠThus	 ﾠin	 ﾠcalling	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠgenerally	 ﾠ
to	 ﾠwork	 ﾠin	 ﾠcooperation	 ﾠwith	 ﾠother	 ﾠplayers,	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ3(1)	 ﾠimplicitly	 ﾠencapsulates	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
duty	 ﾠto	 ﾠassist.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
(ii)	 ﾠDuty	 ﾠto	 ﾠconsult	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
  Article	 ﾠ3(2)	 ﾠestablishes	 ﾠa	 ﾠspecific	 ﾠobligation	 ﾠof	 ﾠconsultation	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ“services”	 ﾠ(plural)	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCommission,	 ﾠon	 ﾠall	 ﾠmatters	 ﾠrelating	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
external	 ﾠaction	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠUnion	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠexercise	 ﾠof	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠrespective	 ﾠfunctions.	 ﾠAs	 ﾠ
briefly	 ﾠevoked	 ﾠabove,	 ﾠthis	 ﾠentails	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCommission	 ﾠis	 ﾠdeemed	 ﾠto	 ﾠconsult	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
EEAS	 ﾠon	 ﾠall	 ﾠexternal	 ﾠaspects	 ﾠof	 ﾠinternal	 ﾠpolicies	 ﾠtoo.	 ﾠHence	 ﾠalongside	 ﾠtrade,	 ﾠ
neighbourhood	 ﾠand	 ﾠdevelopment	 ﾠpolicies,	 ﾠfor	 ﾠexample,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCommission	 ﾠis	 ﾠ
supposed	 ﾠto	 ﾠconsult	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠin	 ﾠexercising	 ﾠits	 ﾠown	 ﾠpowers	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfield	 ﾠof	 ﾠenergy	 ﾠ
policy,	 ﾠenvironmental	 ﾠprotection,	 ﾠjustice	 ﾠand	 ﾠhome	 ﾠaffairs,	 ﾠinsofar	 ﾠas	 ﾠthese	 ﾠfields	 ﾠ
touch	 ﾠupon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠexternal	 ﾠaction	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠUnion.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
67	 ﾠEmphasis	 ﾠadded.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠsame	 ﾠdistinctions	 ﾠcan	 ﾠbe	 ﾠfound	 ﾠin	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ2(2)	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠDecision,	 ﾠsee	 ﾠdiscussion	 ﾠ
above.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
68	 ﾠFor	 ﾠinstance,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfirst	 ﾠparagraph	 ﾠof	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ3	 ﾠuses	 ﾠthe	 ﾠword	 ﾠ“assiste”	 ﾠin	 ﾠFrench,	 ﾠwhere	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEnglish	 ﾠ
version	 ﾠsays	 ﾠ“support”.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 30	 ﾠ
  Similarly,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠhas	 ﾠto	 ﾠconsult	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCommission	 ﾠservices	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠexercising	 ﾠits	 ﾠ
functions,	 ﾠfor	 ﾠinstance	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcontext	 ﾠof	 ﾠinternational	 ﾠnegotiations	 ﾠas	 ﾠreferred	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
above,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠalso	 ﾠin	 ﾠsupporting	 ﾠthe	 ﾠHR	 ﾠin	 ﾠe.g.	 ﾠthe	 ﾠconduct	 ﾠof	 ﾠpolitical	 ﾠdialogue	 ﾠwith	 ﾠ
third	 ﾠstates.	 ﾠAs	 ﾠthe	 ﾠonly	 ﾠexpress	 ﾠlimitation	 ﾠin	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ3(2)	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠobligation	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
consultation	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCommission	 ﾠconcerns	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCSDP,	 ﾠit	 ﾠmay	 ﾠbe	 ﾠassumed	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
EEAS	 ﾠshall	 ﾠconsult	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCommission	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnon-ﾭ‐CSDP	 ﾠdimension	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCFSP.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
  The	 ﾠduty	 ﾠto	 ﾠconsult	 ﾠis	 ﾠexplicitly	 ﾠaddressed	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCommission.	 ﾠ
Article	 ﾠ3	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠnot	 ﾠevoke	 ﾠa	 ﾠpossible	 ﾠapplication	 ﾠof	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠduty	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCouncil	 ﾠservices	 ﾠor	 ﾠmembers	 ﾠstates’	 ﾠdiplomatic	 ﾠservices.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠquestion	 ﾠ
may	 ﾠthus	 ﾠbe	 ﾠraised	 ﾠas	 ﾠto	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠthis	 ﾠsilence	 ﾠentails	 ﾠthat	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠconsultation	 ﾠis	 ﾠ
neither	 ﾠrequired,	 ﾠnor	 ﾠeven	 ﾠenvisaged.	 ﾠArguably	 ﾠhowever,	 ﾠone	 ﾠmay	 ﾠsubmit	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠlatter	 ﾠis	 ﾠimplicit,	 ﾠand	 ﾠultimately	 ﾠresults	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠduty	 ﾠof	 ﾠsincere	 ﾠcooperation	 ﾠ
imposed	 ﾠby	 ﾠprimary	 ﾠlaw.	 ﾠ	 ﾠIndeed,	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ21(3)	 ﾠTEU	 ﾠforesees	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
Commission	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCouncil	 ﾠcooperate	 ﾠto	 ﾠensure	 ﾠconsistency,	 ﾠassisted	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
HR,	 ﾠhim/herself	 ﾠassisted	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS.	 ﾠArguably,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠability	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠHR	 ﾠand	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
fulfil	 ﾠthis	 ﾠcoherence-ﾭ‐making	 ﾠtask	 ﾠprimarily	 ﾠdepends	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcooperation	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ
both	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCommission	 ﾠand	 ﾠCouncil	 ﾠare	 ﾠable	 ﾠto	 ﾠprovide.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ(iii)	 ﾠDuty/right	 ﾠto	 ﾠtake	 ﾠpart	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
  While	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCommission	 ﾠis	 ﾠexplicitly	 ﾠcompelled	 ﾠto	 ﾠconsult	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS,	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ
3(2)	 ﾠalso	 ﾠobliges	 ﾠit	 ﾠto	 ﾠinvolve	 ﾠthe	 ﾠService	 ﾠin	 ﾠpreparatory	 ﾠwork	 ﾠand	 ﾠprocedures	 ﾠ
relating	 ﾠto	 ﾠacts	 ﾠit	 ﾠprepares	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠarea	 ﾠof	 ﾠEU	 ﾠexternal	 ﾠaction.
69	 ﾠThus,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
cooperation	 ﾠobligation	 ﾠof	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ3	 ﾠgoes	 ﾠfurther	 ﾠthan	 ﾠmere	 ﾠconsultation	 ﾠas	 ﾠ
regards	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCommission.	 ﾠIt	 ﾠalso	 ﾠentails	 ﾠparticipative	 ﾠrights	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠin	 ﾠpolicy	 ﾠ
shaping	 ﾠin	 ﾠall	 ﾠareas	 ﾠof	 ﾠEU	 ﾠexternal	 ﾠaction,	 ﾠthus	 ﾠincluding	 ﾠdevelopment,	 ﾠ
neighbourhood,	 ﾠand	 ﾠtrade,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠalso	 ﾠin	 ﾠforging	 ﾠthe	 ﾠexternal	 ﾠdimension	 ﾠof	 ﾠEU	 ﾠ
environment,	 ﾠtransport,	 ﾠenergy	 ﾠpolicies.
70	 ﾠThis	 ﾠparticipation	 ﾠhas	 ﾠalready	 ﾠ
materialised	 ﾠin	 ﾠvarious	 ﾠways	 ﾠ(e.g.	 ﾠ“Joint	 ﾠCommunications”)	 ﾠand	 ﾠis	 ﾠsometimes	 ﾠ
required	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠTreaty	 ﾠprovisions	 ﾠ(cf.	 ﾠArticles	 ﾠ215	 ﾠand	 ﾠ222	 ﾠTFEU).
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 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	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 ﾠ	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 ﾠ	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 ﾠ	 ﾠ	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 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	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 ﾠ	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 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
69	 ﾠIndeed,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠphrase	 ﾠ“this	 ﾠarea”	 ﾠat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠend	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsentence	 ﾠrelates	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ“external	 ﾠaction	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
Union”	 ﾠ(cf	 ﾠproposal	 ﾠof	 ﾠAshton),	 ﾠnot	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCSDP	 ﾠevoked	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprevious	 ﾠsentence	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠprima	 ﾠfacie	 ﾠreading	 ﾠ
would	 ﾠsuggest.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠambiguity	 ﾠcomes	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfact	 ﾠthat	 ﾠoriginally	 ﾠ(i.e.	 ﾠin	 ﾠAshton’s	 ﾠproposal	 ﾠof	 ﾠMarch	 ﾠ
2010),	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpreceding	 ﾠsentence	 ﾠdid	 ﾠnot	 ﾠcontain	 ﾠthe	 ﾠexpression	 ﾠ“except	 ﾠon	 ﾠmatters	 ﾠcovered	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
CSDP”.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
70	 ﾠThe	 ﾠpractice	 ﾠis	 ﾠsomewhat	 ﾠmore	 ﾠnuanced,	 ﾠas	 ﾠregards	 ﾠenergy	 ﾠpolicy	 ﾠfor	 ﾠinstance,	 ﾠsee	 ﾠB	 ﾠVan	 ﾠVooren,	 ﾠ
“Europe	 ﾠUnplugged:	 ﾠProgress,	 ﾠpotential	 ﾠand	 ﾠlimitations	 ﾠof	 ﾠEU	 ﾠexternal	 ﾠpolicy	 ﾠthree	 ﾠyears	 ﾠpost-ﾭ‐Lisbon”	 ﾠ
(2012)	 ﾠSIEPS	 ﾠReport	 ﾠ2012:5.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
71	 ﾠSee	 ﾠe.g.	 ﾠJoint	 ﾠCommunication	 ﾠDelivering	 ﾠon	 ﾠa	 ﾠNew	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠNeighbourhood	 ﾠPolicy,	 ﾠJOIN(2012)	 ﾠ14	 ﾠ
15.5.2012;	 ﾠJoint	 ﾠCommunication	 ﾠDeveloping	 ﾠa	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠUnion	 ﾠPolicy	 ﾠtowards	 ﾠthe	 ﾠArctic	 ﾠRegion:	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 31	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
  The	 ﾠcooperation	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCommission,	 ﾠboth	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠform	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
consultation	 ﾠand	 ﾠpreparatory	 ﾠcollaboration	 ﾠis	 ﾠdetermined	 ﾠby	 ﾠa	 ﾠspecific	 ﾠ
normative	 ﾠframework:	 ﾠ	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ3(2)	 ﾠforesees	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ“this	 ﾠparagraph	 ﾠshall	 ﾠbe	 ﾠ
implemented	 ﾠin	 ﾠaccordance	 ﾠwith	 ﾠChapter	 ﾠ1	 ﾠof	 ﾠTitle	 ﾠV	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠTEU,	 ﾠand	 ﾠwith	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ
205	 ﾠTFEU”	 ﾠ(emphasis	 ﾠadded).	 ﾠGiven	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthis	 ﾠChapter	 ﾠ1	 ﾠsets	 ﾠout	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ“general	 ﾠ
provisions	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠUnion’s	 ﾠexternal	 ﾠaction”,	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠsomewhat	 ﾠsurprising	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
reference	 ﾠto	 ﾠthis	 ﾠnormative	 ﾠframework	 ﾠshould	 ﾠonly	 ﾠbe	 ﾠmade	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠspecific	 ﾠ
context	 ﾠof	 ﾠparagraph	 ﾠ2,	 ﾠas	 ﾠif	 ﾠthe	 ﾠobjectives	 ﾠand	 ﾠtasks	 ﾠit	 ﾠencapsulates	 ﾠwere	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠ
achieved	 ﾠonly	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS-ﾭ‐Commission	 ﾠcooperation,	 ﾠand	 ﾠnot	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmember	 ﾠ
states	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠGeneral	 ﾠSecretariat	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCouncil.	 ﾠIt	 ﾠis	 ﾠcontended	 ﾠthat	 ﾠall	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
activities	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠand	 ﾠof	 ﾠother	 ﾠinstitutions	 ﾠtoo,	 ﾠand	 ﾠall	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠinteractions	 ﾠ
within	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEU	 ﾠsystem	 ﾠof	 ﾠexternal	 ﾠrelations	 ﾠare	 ﾠlegally	 ﾠdetermined	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
“general	 ﾠprovisions	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠUnion’s	 ﾠexternal	 ﾠaction”	 ﾠset	 ﾠout	 ﾠin	 ﾠthat	 ﾠChapter	 ﾠ1.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
3.	 ﾠScope	 ﾠof	 ﾠapplication	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠobligation	 ﾠof	 ﾠcooperation	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
(i)	 ﾠCooperation	 ﾠwith	 ﾠwhom?	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
  The	 ﾠfirst	 ﾠparagraph	 ﾠof	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ3	 ﾠemphasises	 ﾠthe	 ﾠduty	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠto	 ﾠcooperate	 ﾠ
with	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmember	 ﾠstates’	 ﾠdiplomatic	 ﾠservices,	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthose	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCommission	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
with	 ﾠthe	 ﾠGeneral	 ﾠSecretariat	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCouncil.	 ﾠWhile	 ﾠthe	 ﾠService	 ﾠwas	 ﾠdeemed,	 ﾠ
through	 ﾠits	 ﾠinitial	 ﾠcomposition,	 ﾠto	 ﾠincarnate	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrequested	 ﾠcooperation	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠ
previously	 ﾠcompeting	 ﾠCommission	 ﾠand	 ﾠCouncil	 ﾠservices,
72	 ﾠthis	 ﾠprovision	 ﾠis	 ﾠan	 ﾠ
acknowledgement	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠGSC	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCommission	 ﾠcontinue	 ﾠto	 ﾠplay	 ﾠa	 ﾠkey	 ﾠrole	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠexternal	 ﾠaction	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠUnion	 ﾠ–	 ﾠas	 ﾠdo	 ﾠindeed	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmember	 ﾠstates.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
  Indeed,	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠnoteworthy	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠobligation	 ﾠreferred	 ﾠto	 ﾠin	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ3(1)	 ﾠconcerns	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
equal	 ﾠterms	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmember	 ﾠstates’	 ﾠdiplomatic	 ﾠservices,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠGeneral	 ﾠSecretariat	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠCouncil	 ﾠand	 ﾠCommission	 ﾠservices.	 ﾠThis	 ﾠcan	 ﾠbe	 ﾠtaken	 ﾠas	 ﾠan	 ﾠindication	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
EEAS	 ﾠis	 ﾠequidistant	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthose	 ﾠthree	 ﾠactors,	 ﾠat	 ﾠleast	 ﾠin	 ﾠterms	 ﾠof	 ﾠobligation	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
cooperate.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
progress	 ﾠsince	 ﾠ2008	 ﾠand	 ﾠnext	 ﾠsteps,	 ﾠJOIN(2012)	 ﾠ19,	 ﾠ26.6.2012;	 ﾠJoint	 ﾠCommunication	 ﾠEU	 ﾠCounter-ﾭ‐
terrorism	 ﾠAction	 ﾠPlan	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠHorn	 ﾠof	 ﾠAfrica	 ﾠand	 ﾠYemen,	 ﾠJOIN	 ﾠ(2012)	 ﾠ24,	 ﾠ31.8.2012;	 ﾠJoint	 ﾠ
Communication	 ﾠHuman	 ﾠRights	 ﾠand	 ﾠDemocracy	 ﾠat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠHeart	 ﾠof	 ﾠEU	 ﾠExternal	 ﾠAction	 ﾠ–	 ﾠTowards	 ﾠa	 ﾠmore	 ﾠ
effective	 ﾠapproach,	 ﾠCOM(2011)	 ﾠ886	 ﾠ12.12.2011;	 ﾠJoint	 ﾠCommunication	 ﾠGlobal	 ﾠEurope	 ﾠ:	 ﾠA	 ﾠNew	 ﾠ
Approach	 ﾠto	 ﾠfinancing	 ﾠEU	 ﾠexternal	 ﾠaction	 ﾠBrussels,	 ﾠCOM(2011)	 ﾠ865,	 ﾠ7.12.2011.	 ﾠ
72	 ﾠSee	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ27(3)	 ﾠTEU;	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ6	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠDecision,	 ﾠas	 ﾠwell	 ﾠas	 ﾠthe	 ﾠAnnex	 ﾠthereto.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 32	 ﾠ
  The	 ﾠEEAS’	 ﾠduty	 ﾠof	 ﾠcooperation	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot	 ﾠlimited	 ﾠto	 ﾠthose	 ﾠactors	 ﾠmentioned	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfirst	 ﾠ
paragraphs.	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ2(2)	 ﾠenvisages	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠassists	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpresidents	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
European	 ﾠCouncil	 ﾠand	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠCommission,	 ﾠrespectively.	 ﾠAs	 ﾠsuggested	 ﾠ
above,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠreference	 ﾠto	 ﾠ“assist”	 ﾠrather	 ﾠthan	 ﾠ“support”	 ﾠought	 ﾠnot	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠoverrated.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
  Moreover,	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ3(4)	 ﾠforesees	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠ“shall	 ﾠextend	 ﾠappropriate	 ﾠsupport	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠcooperation	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠother	 ﾠinstitutions	 ﾠand	 ﾠbodies	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠUnion,	 ﾠin	 ﾠparticular	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠParliament”.	 ﾠIndeed,	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ3(3)	 ﾠenvisages	 ﾠpossible	 ﾠinter-ﾭ‐service	 ﾠ
arrangements	 ﾠnot	 ﾠonly	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCommission	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠGSC,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠalso	 ﾠwith	 ﾠ“other	 ﾠ
offices	 ﾠor	 ﾠinterinstitutional	 ﾠbodies	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠUnion”.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠessence,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠduty	 ﾠis	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
same	 ﾠkind	 ﾠas	 ﾠthe	 ﾠobligation	 ﾠto	 ﾠcooperate	 ﾠwith	 ﾠother	 ﾠactors	 ﾠgiven	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
provision	 ﾠrefers	 ﾠto	 ﾠextending	 ﾠsupport	 ﾠand	 ﾠcooperation.	 ﾠEqually	 ﾠmandatory	 ﾠ
(“shall”),	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠnonetheless	 ﾠexpressed	 ﾠin	 ﾠmore	 ﾠnuanced	 ﾠfashion	 ﾠby	 ﾠusing	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnotion	 ﾠ
“appropriate”.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠother	 ﾠwords	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsupport	 ﾠmight	 ﾠnot	 ﾠbe	 ﾠas	 ﾠgeneral	 ﾠand	 ﾠautomatic	 ﾠ
as	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcase	 ﾠof,	 ﾠe.g.,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCommission,	 ﾠCouncil	 ﾠor	 ﾠmember	 ﾠstates	 ﾠservices.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠ
notion	 ﾠof	 ﾠappropriateness	 ﾠsuggests	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcooperation	 ﾠmight	 ﾠbe	 ﾠdecided	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
EEAS	 ﾠitself,	 ﾠunder	 ﾠthe	 ﾠauthority	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠHR,	 ﾠon	 ﾠa	 ﾠcase-ﾭ‐by-ﾭ‐case	 ﾠbasis,	 ﾠtaking	 ﾠaccount	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlimited	 ﾠrole	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEP	 ﾠin	 ﾠEU	 ﾠforeign	 ﾠpolicy.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠpractice	 ﾠhowever,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEP	 ﾠhas	 ﾠ
found	 ﾠmeans	 ﾠto	 ﾠinfluence	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbehaviour	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠand	 ﾠHR,	 ﾠand	 ﾠstrengthen	 ﾠits	 ﾠ




  Recital	 ﾠ7	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠPreamble	 ﾠprovides	 ﾠspecific	 ﾠinformation	 ﾠas	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠother	 ﾠbodies	 ﾠ
which	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠmight	 ﾠbe	 ﾠcalled	 ﾠto	 ﾠsupport:	 ﾠe.g.	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠDefence	 ﾠAgency,	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠEU	 ﾠSatellite	 ﾠCentre,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEU	 ﾠInstitute	 ﾠfor	 ﾠSecurity	 ﾠStudies	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠ
Security	 ﾠand	 ﾠDefence	 ﾠCollege;	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠground	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthey	 ﾠall	 ﾠinvolve	 ﾠHR	 ﾠ
responsibilities.	 ﾠApart	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠParliament	 ﾠand	 ﾠthese	 ﾠbodies,	 ﾠone	 ﾠmay	 ﾠ
presume	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmost	 ﾠobvious	 ﾠcandidates	 ﾠfor	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠextended	 ﾠcooperation	 ﾠwould	 ﾠ
be	 ﾠthe	 ﾠvarious	 ﾠEU	 ﾠagencies	 ﾠwith	 ﾠan	 ﾠexternal	 ﾠremit	 ﾠ(e.g.	 ﾠFrontex,	 ﾠEuropol).	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
  Cooperation	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠand	 ﾠCommission	 ﾠservices	 ﾠis	 ﾠalso	 ﾠrequired	 ﾠat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
level	 ﾠof	 ﾠEU	 ﾠDelegations,	 ﾠin	 ﾠview	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠinclusion	 ﾠof	 ﾠCommission	 ﾠstaff	 ﾠwithin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
Delegations	 ﾠ(Article	 ﾠ5	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠDecision).	 ﾠAs	 ﾠevoked	 ﾠabove,	 ﾠa	 ﾠJoint	 ﾠDecision	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
Commission	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠHR	 ﾠ“on	 ﾠCooperation	 ﾠmechanisms	 ﾠconcerning	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
management	 ﾠof	 ﾠdelegations	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠUnion”	 ﾠhas	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠadopted	 ﾠin	 ﾠMarch	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠ2012,	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠseemingly	 ﾠfulfils	 ﾠthe	 ﾠduty	 ﾠof	 ﾠcooperation	 ﾠof	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ3,	 ﾠto	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠit	 ﾠ
explicitly	 ﾠrefers.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
73	 ﾠSee,	 ﾠe.g.,	 ﾠDeclaration	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠHigh	 ﾠRepresentative	 ﾠon	 ﾠPolitical	 ﾠAccountability,	 ﾠOJ	 ﾠ2010	 ﾠC	 ﾠ210/1,	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠFramework	 ﾠAgreement	 ﾠon	 ﾠRelations	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠParliament	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠ
Commission,	 ﾠOJ	 ﾠ2010	 ﾠL	 ﾠ304/47).	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 33	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
  Other	 ﾠprovisions	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠDecision	 ﾠenvisage	 ﾠinternal	 ﾠcooperation,	 ﾠamong	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
different	 ﾠservices	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS.	 ﾠHence,	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ4(3)(b)	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠDecision	 ﾠemphasises	 ﾠ
that	 ﾠfull	 ﾠcoordination	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠall	 ﾠthe	 ﾠstructures	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠ“shall	 ﾠbe	 ﾠensured”.	 ﾠ
This	 ﾠis	 ﾠparticularly	 ﾠimportant	 ﾠin	 ﾠview	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠinitial	 ﾠcomposition	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠ
also	 ﾠconsidering	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlevel	 ﾠof	 ﾠprocedural	 ﾠand	 ﾠorganisational	 ﾠdifferentiation	 ﾠthat	 ﾠhas	 ﾠ
been	 ﾠmaintained	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcreation	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS,	 ﾠas	 ﾠevidenced	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlast	 ﾠindent	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
Article	 ﾠ4(3)(a)	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠDecision.
74	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
  Article	 ﾠ3(4)	 ﾠrequires	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠto	 ﾠcooperate	 ﾠalso	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEU	 ﾠAnti-ﾭ‐Fraud	 ﾠOffice,	 ﾠ
OLAF,	 ﾠan	 ﾠoffice	 ﾠset	 ﾠup	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCommission	 ﾠdeemed	 ﾠto	 ﾠhelp	 ﾠit	 ﾠperform	 ﾠits	 ﾠduty	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
implement	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbudget.
75	 ﾠThe	 ﾠprovision	 ﾠincludes	 ﾠa	 ﾠreference	 ﾠto	 ﾠRegulation	 ﾠ
1073/1999
76	 ﾠabout	 ﾠOLAF’s	 ﾠinvestigation	 ﾠpowers,	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrequest	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠ
adopt	 ﾠa	 ﾠdecision	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠterms	 ﾠand	 ﾠconditions	 ﾠfor	 ﾠinternal	 ﾠinvestigations.	 ﾠ
Cooperation	 ﾠis	 ﾠequally	 ﾠneeded	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCommission	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠrespective	 ﾠ
internal	 ﾠauditors,	 ﾠwith	 ﾠa	 ﾠview	 ﾠto	 ﾠensure	 ﾠconsistent	 ﾠaudit	 ﾠpolicy.
77	 ﾠIt	 ﾠshould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠ
noticed	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthis	 ﾠfourth	 ﾠparagraph	 ﾠwas	 ﾠmuch	 ﾠleaner	 ﾠin	 ﾠHR	 ﾠ/VP	 ﾠAshton’s	 ﾠproposal	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠMarch	 ﾠ2010,	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠread	 ﾠas	 ﾠfollows:	 ﾠ“The	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠshall	 ﾠextend	 ﾠappropriate	 ﾠsupport	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠcooperation	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠother	 ﾠinstitutions	 ﾠand	 ﾠbodies	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠUnion”.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
(ii)	 ﾠReciprocal	 ﾠcooperation?	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
  The	 ﾠobligation	 ﾠof	 ﾠcooperation	 ﾠenshrined	 ﾠin	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ3	 ﾠappears	 ﾠto	 ﾠoperate	 ﾠonly	 ﾠone	 ﾠ
way	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS-ﾭ‐member	 ﾠstates	 ﾠdiplomatic	 ﾠservices	 ﾠnexus.	 ﾠIndeed,	 ﾠin	 ﾠcontrast	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
earlier	 ﾠdrafts,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠDecision	 ﾠis	 ﾠmostly	 ﾠsilent	 ﾠon	 ﾠa	 ﾠpossible	 ﾠreverse	 ﾠmember	 ﾠstates’	 ﾠ
duty	 ﾠof	 ﾠcooperation	 ﾠvis-ﾭ‐à-ﾭ‐vis	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS.	 ﾠThus	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ5(9)	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠDecision	 ﾠno	 ﾠlonger	 ﾠ
expressly	 ﾠforesees	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠUnion	 ﾠdelegation	 ﾠdiplomatic	 ﾠservices	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmember	 ﾠ
states	 ﾠexchange	 ﾠinformation,	 ﾠon	 ﾠa	 ﾠreciprocal	 ﾠbasis.
78	 ﾠSeemingly,	 ﾠonly	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ
10(3)	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠDecision	 ﾠrequires	 ﾠassistance	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠmember	 ﾠstates,	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠspecific	 ﾠfield	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
74	 ﾠSee	 ﾠdiscussion	 ﾠon	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ4,	 ﾠbelow.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
75	 ﾠIn	 ﾠthis	 ﾠrespect,	 ﾠsee	 ﾠCase	 ﾠC-ﾭ‐11/00	 ﾠCommission	 ﾠv	 ﾠECB	 ﾠ[2003)	 ﾠECR	 ﾠI-ﾭ‐7215.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
76Regulation	 ﾠ(EC)	 ﾠno	 ﾠ1073/1999	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠParliament	 ﾠand	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCouncil	 ﾠof	 ﾠ25	 ﾠmay	 ﾠ1999	 ﾠ
concerning	 ﾠinvestigations	 ﾠconducted	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠanti-ﾭ‐fraud	 ﾠoffice	 ﾠ(Olaf)	 ﾠ[OJ	 ﾠ1999	 ﾠL	 ﾠ136/1].	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
77	 ﾠSee	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdiscussion	 ﾠunder	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ8,	 ﾠbelow;	 ﾠand	 ﾠCase	 ﾠT-ﾭ‐395/11	 ﾠEltid.o.ov	 ﾠDelegation	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠ
Union	 ﾠto	 ﾠMontenegro,	 ﾠJudgment	 ﾠof	 ﾠ4	 ﾠJune	 ﾠ2012,	 ﾠnyr.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
78	 ﾠAshton’s	 ﾠproposal	 ﾠof	 ﾠMarch	 ﾠ2010	 ﾠread	 ﾠas	 ﾠfollows:	 ﾠ“The	 ﾠUnion	 ﾠdelegations	 ﾠshall	 ﾠwork	 ﾠin	 ﾠclose	 ﾠ
cooperation	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdiplomatic	 ﾠservices	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠMember	 ﾠStates.	 ﾠThey	 ﾠshall,	 ﾠon	 ﾠa	 ﾠreciprocal	 ﾠbasis,	 ﾠ
provide	 ﾠall	 ﾠrelevant	 ﾠinformation”	 ﾠ(emphasis	 ﾠadded).	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 34	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠsecurity.
79	 ﾠOne	 ﾠmay	 ﾠthus	 ﾠsurmise	 ﾠthat	 ﾠmember	 ﾠstates’	 ﾠdiplomatic	 ﾠservices	 ﾠare	 ﾠ
mostly	 ﾠfree	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠany	 ﾠobligation	 ﾠtowards	 ﾠthe	 ﾠservices	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
  It	 ﾠmay	 ﾠnevertheless	 ﾠbe	 ﾠargued	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠduty	 ﾠof	 ﾠcooperation	 ﾠmutually	 ﾠapplies	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmember	 ﾠstates.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠprovisions	 ﾠof	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ4(3)	 ﾠTEU	 ﾠon	 ﾠsincere	 ﾠ
cooperation	 ﾠentail	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmember	 ﾠstates	 ﾠcooperate	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠin	 ﾠfulfilling	 ﾠ
its	 ﾠtasks,	 ﾠakin	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcooperation	 ﾠmember	 ﾠstates	 ﾠare	 ﾠexpected	 ﾠto	 ﾠshow	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
relation	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCommission	 ﾠin	 ﾠother	 ﾠareas.	 ﾠOne	 ﾠcould	 ﾠfor	 ﾠinstance	 ﾠexpect	 ﾠ
national	 ﾠMinistries	 ﾠof	 ﾠForeign	 ﾠAffairs	 ﾠto	 ﾠconsult	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrelevant	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠservices	 ﾠ
before	 ﾠtaking	 ﾠinitiatives	 ﾠin	 ﾠrelation	 ﾠto	 ﾠa	 ﾠthird	 ﾠcountry	 ﾠwith	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEU	 ﾠis	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
process	 ﾠof	 ﾠforging	 ﾠnew	 ﾠties,	 ﾠespecially	 ﾠif	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠhas	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠentrusted	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
negotiations	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠcomprehensive	 ﾠagreement	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthat	 ﾠcountry.
80	 ﾠAt	 ﾠthe	 ﾠvery	 ﾠ
least,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcooperation	 ﾠof	 ﾠmember	 ﾠstates	 ﾠis	 ﾠrequired	 ﾠin	 ﾠorganisational	 ﾠterms	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
ensure	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsmooth	 ﾠfunctioning	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS,	 ﾠgiven	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnational	 ﾠelement	 ﾠof	 ﾠits	 ﾠ
composition.
81	 ﾠIncidentally,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠDecision	 ﾠprovision	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcooperation	 ﾠ
between	 ﾠUnion	 ﾠdelegations	 ﾠand	 ﾠmember	 ﾠstates’	 ﾠdiplomatic	 ﾠservices,	 ﾠevoked	 ﾠ
above,	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠnot	 ﾠseem	 ﾠto	 ﾠexclude	 ﾠreciprocity	 ﾠentirely	 ﾠas	 ﾠregards	 ﾠtransmission	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
information.	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ5(9)	 ﾠforesees	 ﾠthat	 ﾠUnion	 ﾠdelegations	 ﾠ“share	 ﾠinformation	 ﾠ




  The	 ﾠGSC	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot	 ﾠexplicitly	 ﾠcovered	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmutual	 ﾠobligation	 ﾠof	 ﾠcooperation	 ﾠset	 ﾠout	 ﾠ
in	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ3(2)	 ﾠeither.	 ﾠDoes	 ﾠthis	 ﾠentail	 ﾠthat	 ﾠonly	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCommission	 ﾠis	 ﾠsubject	 ﾠto	 ﾠan	 ﾠ
obligation	 ﾠof	 ﾠconsultation	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS?	 ﾠArguably,	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠa	 ﾠsilence	 ﾠcould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠ
explained	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfact	 ﾠthat,	 ﾠfirst,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠGSC	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot	 ﾠa	 ﾠpolicy	 ﾠinitiator	 ﾠas	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
Commission	 ﾠis,	 ﾠand	 ﾠsecond,	 ﾠall	 ﾠrelevant	 ﾠservices	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠGSC	 ﾠthat	 ﾠhave	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠ
involved	 ﾠin	 ﾠexternal	 ﾠaction	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpast	 ﾠhave	 ﾠin	 ﾠprinciple	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠtransferred	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
EEAS.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠpractice	 ﾠhowever,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠGSC	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot	 ﾠdisconnected	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠpolicy-ﾭ‐making	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
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 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	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 ﾠ	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 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
79	 ﾠSee	 ﾠfurther	 ﾠdiscussion	 ﾠunder	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ10	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠDecision,	 ﾠbelow.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
80	 ﾠAs	 ﾠenvisaged	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ“Guidelines”	 ﾠmentioned	 ﾠabove.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠthis	 ﾠsituation,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠobligations	 ﾠof	 ﾠconduct,	 ﾠ
evoked	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCourt	 ﾠin	 ﾠcases	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠas	 ﾠC-ﾭ‐266/03	 ﾠCommission	 ﾠv	 ﾠLuxembourg[2005]	 ﾠECR	 ﾠI-ﾭ‐4805;	 ﾠCase	 ﾠC-ﾭ‐
433/03	 ﾠCommission	 ﾠv	 ﾠGermany	 ﾠ[2005]	 ﾠECR	 ﾠI-ﾭ‐6985Case	 ﾠC-ﾭ‐459/03	 ﾠCommission	 ﾠv	 ﾠIreland	 ﾠ(‘MOX	 ﾠplant’)	 ﾠ
[2006]	 ﾠECR	 ﾠI-ﾭ‐4635;	 ﾠCase	 ﾠC-ﾭ‐246/07	 ﾠCommission	 ﾠv	 ﾠSweden(‘PFOS’)	 ﾠ(Judgment	 ﾠof	 ﾠ20	 ﾠApril	 ﾠ2010,	 ﾠnyr),	 ﾠ
could	 ﾠbe	 ﾠapplicable	 ﾠmutatis	 ﾠmutandis	 ﾠin	 ﾠrelation	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
81	 ﾠIn	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsame	 ﾠvein,	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ13(1)	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠDecision	 ﾠforesees	 ﾠthat	 ﾠboth	 ﾠthe	 ﾠHR	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCouncil	 ﾠ(as	 ﾠwell	 ﾠas	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠCommission	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmember	 ﾠstates)	 ﾠare	 ﾠresponsible	 ﾠfor	 ﾠimplementing	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdecision,	 ﾠit	 ﾠalso	 ﾠsays	 ﾠ
that	 ﾠthey	 ﾠ“shall	 ﾠtake	 ﾠall	 ﾠmeasures	 ﾠnecessary	 ﾠin	 ﾠfurtherance	 ﾠthereof”.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
82	 ﾠSimilarly,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠFrench	 ﾠversion	 ﾠof	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ5(9)	 ﾠsays	 ﾠ“échangent	 ﾠdes	 ﾠinformationsavec	 ﾠles	 ﾠservices	 ﾠ
diplomatiques	 ﾠdes	 ﾠÉtats	 ﾠmembres”;	 ﾠrather	 ﾠthan	 ﾠ“échangent	 ﾠleurs	 ﾠinformations”.	 ﾠIndeed,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠword	 ﾠ
“échangent”	 ﾠsuggests	 ﾠa	 ﾠtwo	 ﾠway	 ﾠprocess,	 ﾠas	 ﾠcould	 ﾠthe	 ﾠphrase	 ﾠ”share”.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 35	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠexternal	 ﾠsphere.	 ﾠIndeed,	 ﾠvarious	 ﾠunits	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠGSC	 ﾠcontinue	 ﾠto	 ﾠdeal	 ﾠ
specifically	 ﾠwith	 ﾠexternal	 ﾠrelations,
83	 ﾠwhile	 ﾠseveral	 ﾠpreparatory	 ﾠbodies	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
Council,	 ﾠworking	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠFAC,	 ﾠare	 ﾠnot	 ﾠchaired	 ﾠby	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠstaff,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrotating	 ﾠ
presidency	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCouncil	 ﾠthus	 ﾠhelped	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠGSC.
84It	 ﾠis	 ﾠindeed	 ﾠnoteworthy	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ
at	 ﾠno	 ﾠpoint	 ﾠis	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCouncil	 ﾠPresidency	 ﾠmentioned	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠDecision,	 ﾠnotably	 ﾠas	 ﾠ
regards	 ﾠthe	 ﾠduty	 ﾠof	 ﾠcooperation,	 ﾠdespite	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlatter’s	 ﾠinvolvement	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠexternal	 ﾠ
action	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠUnion	 ﾠpost-ﾭ‐Lisbon.
85	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
  It	 ﾠis	 ﾠthus	 ﾠcontended	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠobligation	 ﾠof	 ﾠcooperation	 ﾠalso	 ﾠoperates	 ﾠin	 ﾠrelation	 ﾠ
to	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCouncil	 ﾠservices,	 ﾠat	 ﾠleast	 ﾠto	 ﾠallow	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠto	 ﾠfulfil	 ﾠits	 ﾠkey	 ﾠconsistency-ﾭ‐
seeking	 ﾠfunction.	 ﾠSupport	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthis	 ﾠcan	 ﾠbe	 ﾠfound	 ﾠin	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ3(3)	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠopens	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
possibility	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠto	 ﾠconclude	 ﾠinter-ﾭ‐services	 ﾠarrangements,	 ﾠto	 ﾠspecify	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
desired	 ﾠcooperation	 ﾠnot	 ﾠonly	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠservices	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCommission,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠalso	 ﾠwith	 ﾠ
those	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCouncil.
86	 ﾠArguably,	 ﾠthis	 ﾠprovision	 ﾠwould	 ﾠnot	 ﾠhave	 ﾠmuch	 ﾠsense	 ﾠif	 ﾠ
there	 ﾠwere	 ﾠno	 ﾠGSC	 ﾠduty	 ﾠto	 ﾠcooperate	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS.	 ﾠMoreover,	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ4(5)	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠ
Decision	 ﾠexplicitly	 ﾠforesees	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠHR	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠshall	 ﾠbe	 ﾠassisted	 ﾠwhere	 ﾠ
necessary	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠGeneral	 ﾠSecretariat	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCouncil	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrelevant	 ﾠ
departments	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCommission.	 ﾠHere	 ﾠtoo,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠDecision	 ﾠevokes	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpossibility	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
inter-ﾭ‐services	 ﾠarrangements	 ﾠto	 ﾠspecify	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠassistance.	 ﾠIncidentally,	 ﾠone	 ﾠmay	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
wonder	 ﾠwhy	 ﾠthis	 ﾠprovision	 ﾠwas	 ﾠnot	 ﾠincluded	 ﾠin	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ3.	 ﾠ
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 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
83Directorate	 ﾠGeneral	 ﾠC	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠGSC	 ﾠdeals	 ﾠwith	 ﾠ“Foreign	 ﾠAffairs,	 ﾠEnlargement	 ﾠand	 ﾠcivil	 ﾠprotection”	 ﾠ
comprising	 ﾠDirectorate	 ﾠ1	 ﾠ-ﾭ‐	 ﾠTrade,	 ﾠDevelopment,	 ﾠEU–ACP	 ﾠrelations;	 ﾠDirectorate	 ﾠ2	 ﾠ-ﾭ‐	 ﾠEnlargement,	 ﾠ





84	 ﾠFor	 ﾠinstance:	 ﾠthe	 ﾠWorking	 ﾠParty	 ﾠof	 ﾠForeign	 ﾠRelations	 ﾠCounsellors	 ﾠ(RELEX),	 ﾠthe	 ﾠWorking	 ﾠParty	 ﾠon	 ﾠ
Terrorism	 ﾠ(International	 ﾠAspects)	 ﾠ(COTER),	 ﾠthe	 ﾠWorking	 ﾠParty	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠapplication	 ﾠof	 ﾠspecific	 ﾠmeasures	 ﾠ
to	 ﾠcombat	 ﾠterrorism	 ﾠ(COCOP),	 ﾠthe	 ﾠWorking	 ﾠParty	 ﾠon	 ﾠConsular	 ﾠAffairs	 ﾠ(COCON),	 ﾠthe	 ﾠWorking	 ﾠParty	 ﾠon	 ﾠ
Public	 ﾠInternational	 ﾠLaw	 ﾠ(COJUR),	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠWorking	 ﾠParty	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠLaw	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠSea	 ﾠ(COMAR),	 ﾠthe	 ﾠACP	 ﾠ
Working	 ﾠParty,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠWorking	 ﾠParty	 ﾠon	 ﾠDevelopment	 ﾠCooperation	 ﾠ(DEVGEN),	 ﾠthe	 ﾠWorking	 ﾠParty	 ﾠon	 ﾠ
EFTA,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠWorking	 ﾠParty	 ﾠon	 ﾠDual-ﾭ‐Use	 ﾠGoods,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠWorking	 ﾠParty	 ﾠon	 ﾠTrade	 ﾠQuestions,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠWorking	 ﾠ
Party	 ﾠon	 ﾠCommodities,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠWorking	 ﾠParty	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠGeneralised	 ﾠSystem	 ﾠof	 ﾠPreferences,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ	 ﾠWorking	 ﾠ
Party	 ﾠon	 ﾠPreparation	 ﾠfor	 ﾠInternational	 ﾠDevelopment	 ﾠConferences/UNCCD	 ﾠDesertification/UNCTAD,	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠWorking	 ﾠParty	 ﾠon	 ﾠHumanitarian	 ﾠAid	 ﾠand	 ﾠFood	 ﾠAid	 ﾠ;	 ﾠsee	 ﾠCouncil	 ﾠDecision	 ﾠ2009/908/EU	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
1	 ﾠDecember	 ﾠ2009	 ﾠlaying	 ﾠdown	 ﾠmeasures	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠimplementation	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠCouncil	 ﾠDecision	 ﾠon	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠexercise	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠPresidency	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCouncil,	 ﾠand	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠchairmanship	 ﾠof	 ﾠpreparatory	 ﾠbodies	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
Council,	 ﾠOJ	 ﾠ2009	 ﾠL	 ﾠ322/28. 
	 ﾠ
85	 ﾠSee	 ﾠEditorial	 ﾠComments,	 ﾠ“The	 ﾠpost-ﾭ‐Lisbon	 ﾠinstitutional	 ﾠpackage:	 ﾠDo	 ﾠold	 ﾠhabits	 ﾠdie	 ﾠhard?”	 ﾠ(2010)	 ﾠ47	 ﾠ
CMLRev	 ﾠ597.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
86	 ﾠIndeed,	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ3(3)	 ﾠmentions	 ﾠthe	 ﾠGSC	 ﾠbefore	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCommission	 ﾠfor	 ﾠpossible	 ﾠservice-ﾭ‐level	 ﾠ
arrangements,	 ﾠwhile	 ﾠthe	 ﾠAshton	 ﾠproposal	 ﾠput	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCommission	 ﾠfirst,	 ﾠbefore	 ﾠthe	 ﾠGSC.	 ﾠ	 ﾠTo	 ﾠour	 ﾠ
knowledge,	 ﾠno	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠservice	 ﾠarrangement	 ﾠhas	 ﾠyet	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠagreed	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠthe	 ﾠGSC	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS.	 ﾠ
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 ﾠ
  More	 ﾠgenerally,	 ﾠone	 ﾠcould	 ﾠinvoke	 ﾠthe	 ﾠTreaty	 ﾠprovisions	 ﾠon	 ﾠsincere	 ﾠcooperation,	 ﾠ
namely	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ4(3)	 ﾠTEU	 ﾠto	 ﾠfill	 ﾠthe	 ﾠgaps	 ﾠof	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ3	 ﾠEEAS.	 ﾠHence,	 ﾠdespite	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
silence	 ﾠof	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ3	 ﾠEEAS,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCouncil,	 ﾠincluding	 ﾠall	 ﾠits	 ﾠservices,	 ﾠbeing	 ﾠsubject	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
an	 ﾠobligation	 ﾠof	 ﾠcooperation	 ﾠwith	 ﾠother	 ﾠinstitutions	 ﾠunder	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ13(2)	 ﾠTEU,	 ﾠ
should	 ﾠby	 ﾠextension	 ﾠcooperate	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS,	 ﾠnotably	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlatter	 ﾠperforms	 ﾠ
functions	 ﾠon	 ﾠbehalf	 ﾠof,	 ﾠor	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠwere	 ﾠpreviously	 ﾠperformed	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCommission.	 ﾠ
It	 ﾠwould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠsurprising	 ﾠthat,	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠresult	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtransfer	 ﾠof	 ﾠCommission	 ﾠfunctions	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠEEAS,	 ﾠnotably	 ﾠto	 ﾠfulfil	 ﾠthe	 ﾠconsistency	 ﾠobjective	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠTreaty	 ﾠmakers,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
cooperative	 ﾠduties	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCouncil	 ﾠwould	 ﾠdiminish.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
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1.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠshall	 ﾠbe	 ﾠmanaged	 ﾠby	 ﾠan	 ﾠExecutive	 ﾠSecretary-ﾭ‐General	 ﾠwho	 ﾠwill	 ﾠoperate	 ﾠunder	 ﾠthe	 ﾠauthority	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
High	 ﾠRepresentative.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠExecutive	 ﾠSecretary-ﾭ‐General	 ﾠshall	 ﾠtake	 ﾠall	 ﾠmeasures	 ﾠnecessary	 ﾠto	 ﾠensure	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsmooth	 ﾠ
functioning	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS,	 ﾠincluding	 ﾠits	 ﾠadministrative	 ﾠand	 ﾠbudgetary	 ﾠmanagement.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠExecutive	 ﾠSecretary-ﾭ‐
General	 ﾠshall	 ﾠensure	 ﾠeffective	 ﾠcoordination	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠall	 ﾠdepartments	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcentral	 ﾠadministration	 ﾠas	 ﾠwell	 ﾠas	 ﾠ
with	 ﾠthe	 ﾠUnion	 ﾠDelegations.	 ﾠ
2.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠExecutive	 ﾠSecretary-ﾭ‐General	 ﾠshall	 ﾠbe	 ﾠassisted	 ﾠby	 ﾠtwo	 ﾠDeputy	 ﾠSecretaries-ﾭ‐General.	 ﾠ
3.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠcentral	 ﾠadministration	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠshall	 ﾠbe	 ﾠorganised	 ﾠin	 ﾠdirectorates-ﾭ‐general.	 ﾠ
(a)	 ﾠIt	 ﾠshall,	 ﾠin	 ﾠparticular,	 ﾠinclude:	 ﾠ
—	 ﾠa	 ﾠnumber	 ﾠof	 ﾠdirectorates-ﾭ‐general	 ﾠcomprising	 ﾠgeographic	 ﾠdesks	 ﾠcovering	 ﾠall	 ﾠcountries	 ﾠand	 ﾠregions	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
world,	 ﾠas	 ﾠwell	 ﾠas	 ﾠmultilateral	 ﾠand	 ﾠthematic	 ﾠdesks.	 ﾠThese	 ﾠdepartments	 ﾠshall	 ﾠcoordinate	 ﾠas	 ﾠnecessary	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
General	 ﾠSecretariat	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCouncil	 ﾠand	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrelevant	 ﾠservices	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCommission,	 ﾠ
—	 ﾠa	 ﾠdirectorate-ﾭ‐general	 ﾠfor	 ﾠadministrative,	 ﾠstaffing,	 ﾠbudgetary,	 ﾠsecurity	 ﾠand	 ﾠcommunication	 ﾠand	 ﾠinformation	 ﾠ
system	 ﾠmatters,	 ﾠworking	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠframework	 ﾠmanaged	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠExecutive	 ﾠSecretary-ﾭ‐General.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠHigh	 ﾠ
Representative	 ﾠshall	 ﾠappoint,	 ﾠin	 ﾠaccordance	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnormal	 ﾠrules	 ﾠof	 ﾠrecruitment,	 ﾠa	 ﾠDirector-ﾭ‐General	 ﾠfor	 ﾠ
budget	 ﾠand	 ﾠadministration	 ﾠwho	 ﾠshall	 ﾠwork	 ﾠunder	 ﾠthe	 ﾠauthority	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠHigh	 ﾠRepresentative.	 ﾠHe/she	 ﾠshall	 ﾠbe	 ﾠ
responsible	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠHigh	 ﾠRepresentative	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠadministrative	 ﾠand	 ﾠinternal	 ﾠbudgetary	 ﾠmanagement	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
EEAS.	 ﾠHe/she	 ﾠshall	 ﾠfollow	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsame	 ﾠbudget	 ﾠlines	 ﾠand	 ﾠadministrative	 ﾠrules	 ﾠas	 ﾠare	 ﾠapplicable	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpart	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
Section	 ﾠIII	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠUnion’s	 ﾠbudget	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠfalls	 ﾠunder	 ﾠHeading	 ﾠ5	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠMultiannual	 ﾠFinancial	 ﾠFramework,	 ﾠ
—	 ﾠt h e 	 ﾠc r i s i s 	 ﾠm a n a g e m e n t 	 ﾠa n d 	 ﾠp l a n n i n g 	 ﾠd i r e c t orate,	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ civilian	 ﾠ planning	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ conduct	 ﾠ capability,	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ
European	 ﾠUnion	 ﾠMilitary	 ﾠStaff	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠUnion	 ﾠSituation	 ﾠCentre,	 ﾠplaced	 ﾠunder	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdirect	 ﾠauthority	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠresponsibility	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠHigh	 ﾠRepresentative,	 ﾠand	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠshall	 ﾠassist	 ﾠhim/her	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtask	 ﾠof	 ﾠconducting	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
Union’s	 ﾠCFSP	 ﾠin	 ﾠaccordance	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprovisions	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠTreaty	 ﾠwhile	 ﾠrespecting,	 ﾠin	 ﾠaccordance	 ﾠwith	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ40	 ﾠ
TEU,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠother	 ﾠcompetences	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠUnion.	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠspecificities	 ﾠof	 ﾠthese	 ﾠstructures,	 ﾠas	 ﾠwell	 ﾠas	 ﾠthe	 ﾠparticularities	 ﾠof	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠfunctions,	 ﾠrecruitment	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠstatus	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠthe	 ﾠstaff	 ﾠshall	 ﾠbe	 ﾠrespected.	 ﾠ
Full	 ﾠcoordination	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠall	 ﾠthe	 ﾠstructures	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠshall	 ﾠbe	 ﾠensured.	 ﾠ
(b)	 ﾠThe	 ﾠcentral	 ﾠadministration	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠshall	 ﾠalso	 ﾠinclude:	 ﾠ
—	 ﾠa	 ﾠstrategic	 ﾠpolicy	 ﾠplanning	 ﾠdepartment,	 ﾠ
—	 ﾠa	 ﾠlegal	 ﾠdepartment	 ﾠunder	 ﾠthe	 ﾠadministrative	 ﾠauthority	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠExecutive	 ﾠSecretary-ﾭ‐General	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠshall	 ﾠwork	 ﾠ
closely	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠLegal	 ﾠServices	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCouncil	 ﾠand	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCommission,	 ﾠ
—	 ﾠd e p a r t m e n t s 	 ﾠf o r 	 ﾠi n t e r i n s t i t u t i o n a l 	 ﾠr e l a t i o n s , 	 ﾠi n f o r m a t i o n 	 ﾠa n d 	 ﾠp u b l i c 	 ﾠd i p l o m a c y , 	 ﾠi n t e r n a l 	 ﾠa u d i t 	 ﾠa n d 	 ﾠ
inspections,	 ﾠand	 ﾠpersonal	 ﾠdata	 ﾠprotection.	 ﾠ
4.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠHigh	 ﾠRepresentative	 ﾠshall	 ﾠdesignate	 ﾠthe	 ﾠchairpersons	 ﾠof	 ﾠCouncil	 ﾠpreparatory	 ﾠbodies	 ﾠthat	 ﾠare	 ﾠchaired	 ﾠby	 ﾠ
a	 ﾠrepresentative	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠHigh	 ﾠRepresentative,	 ﾠincluding	 ﾠthe	 ﾠchair	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠPolitical	 ﾠand	 ﾠSecurity	 ﾠCommittee,	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
accordance	 ﾠ with	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ detailed	 ﾠ arrangements	 ﾠ set	 ﾠ out	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ Annex	 ﾠ II	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ Council	 ﾠ Decision	 ﾠ 2009/908/EU	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ 1	 ﾠ
December	 ﾠ2009	 ﾠlaying	 ﾠdown	 ﾠmeasures	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠimplementation	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠCouncil	 ﾠDecision	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
exercise	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠPresidency	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCouncil,	 ﾠand	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠchairmanship	 ﾠof	 ﾠpreparatory	 ﾠbodies	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCouncil.	 ﾠ
5.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠHigh	 ﾠRepresentative	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠshall	 ﾠbe	 ﾠassisted	 ﾠwhere	 ﾠnecessary	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠGeneral	 ﾠSecretariat	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
Council	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrelevant	 ﾠdepartments	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCommission.	 ﾠService-ﾭ‐level	 ﾠarrangements	 ﾠmay	 ﾠbe	 ﾠdrawn	 ﾠup	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
that	 ﾠeffect	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠGeneral	 ﾠSecretariat	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCouncil	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrelevant	 ﾠCommission	 ﾠdepartments.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 38	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠprincipal	 ﾠaim	 ﾠof	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ4	 ﾠis	 ﾠto	 ﾠset	 ﾠout	 ﾠthe	 ﾠkey	 ﾠmanagement	 ﾠand	 ﾠadministrative	 ﾠ
bodies	 ﾠresponsible	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠeveryday	 ﾠrunning	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠService.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfollowing,	 ﾠboth	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
basic	 ﾠshape	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠ(1)	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠspecific	 ﾠroles	 ﾠand	 ﾠfunctions	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠExecutive	 ﾠ
Secretary-ﾭ‐General	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ Director-ﾭ‐General	 ﾠ for	 ﾠ budget	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ administration	 ﾠ (2),	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ
geographical,	 ﾠthematic	 ﾠand	 ﾠmultilateral	 ﾠdesks	 ﾠ(3),	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcrisis	 ﾠmanagement	 ﾠstructures	 ﾠ
(4),	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdepartments	 ﾠ(5)	 ﾠand	 ﾠCouncil	 ﾠworking	 ﾠparties	 ﾠ(6)	 ﾠare	 ﾠdiscussed.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
1. Basic	 ﾠshape	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠService	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
  It	 ﾠwill	 ﾠbe	 ﾠrecalled	 ﾠthat	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ27(3)	 ﾠTEU	 ﾠsketches	 ﾠout	 ﾠonly	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbasic	 ﾠaspects	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
EEAS,	 ﾠ including	 ﾠ its	 ﾠ mandate	 ﾠ (to	 ﾠ assist	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ High	 ﾠ Representative)	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ its	 ﾠ
composition	 ﾠ(the	 ﾠrelevant	 ﾠdepartments	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠGeneral	 ﾠSecretariat	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCouncil,	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠCommission	 ﾠand	 ﾠstaff	 ﾠseconded	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnational	 ﾠdiplomatic	 ﾠservices	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
Member	 ﾠStates).	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
  Article	 ﾠ1(4)	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCouncil	 ﾠdecision	 ﾠspecifies	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠshall	 ﾠbe	 ﾠmade	 ﾠup	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
“central	 ﾠ administration”	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ “Union	 ﾠ delegations	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ third	 ﾠ countries	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ
international	 ﾠorganisations”.	 ﾠIt	 ﾠis	 ﾠalso	 ﾠworth	 ﾠnoting	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠterminology	 ﾠused	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠ EEAS	 ﾠ differs	 ﾠ from	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ commonly	 ﾠ found	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ EU	 ﾠ institutions	 ﾠ (Managing	 ﾠ
Directors	 ﾠinstead	 ﾠof	 ﾠDirector-ﾭ‐Generals,	 ﾠDivisions	 ﾠinstead	 ﾠof	 ﾠDirectorates-ﾭ‐General,	 ﾠ
as	 ﾠwell	 ﾠas	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpresence	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠCorporate	 ﾠBoard).	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
  The	 ﾠ basic	 ﾠ shape	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ Service	 ﾠ had,	 ﾠ however,	 ﾠ been	 ﾠ outlined	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ number	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ
preparatory	 ﾠdocuments.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠJoint	 ﾠProgress	 ﾠReport	 ﾠof	 ﾠSolana	 ﾠand	 ﾠBarroso	 ﾠof	 ﾠ9	 ﾠ
June	 ﾠ2005	 ﾠindicated	 ﾠan	 ﾠexpansive	 ﾠService	 ﾠcomprising	 ﾠ“geographical	 ﾠdesks	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠ
cover	 ﾠ all	 ﾠ countries/regions	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ world”.	 ﾠ Alongside	 ﾠ these	 ﾠ there	 ﾠ should	 ﾠ be	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ
number	 ﾠof	 ﾠ“single	 ﾠthematic	 ﾠdesks”
87	 ﾠfocusing	 ﾠon	 ﾠissues	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠas	 ﾠ“human	 ﾠrights,	 ﾠ
counter-ﾭ‐terrorism,	 ﾠ non-ﾭ‐proliferation	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ relations	 ﾠ with	 ﾠ international	 ﾠ
organisations	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠas	 ﾠthe	 ﾠUN”.
88	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
  Even	 ﾠ at	 ﾠ this	 ﾠ early	 ﾠ stage,	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ Joint	 ﾠ Progress	 ﾠ Report	 ﾠ raised	 ﾠ prescient	 ﾠ questions	 ﾠ
regarding	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcentral	 ﾠadministration	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS.	 ﾠThese	 ﾠincluded	 ﾠhow	 ﾠit	 ﾠwould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠ
possible	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ have	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ single	 ﾠ ‘tableau	 ﾠ d'effectifs’	 ﾠ when	 ﾠ drawing	 ﾠ staff	 ﾠ from	 ﾠ three	 ﾠ
sources;	 ﾠhow	 ﾠthe	 ﾠHigh	 ﾠRepresentative,	 ﾠas	 ﾠthe	 ﾠhighest	 ﾠappointing	 ﾠauthority,	 ﾠcan	 ﾠbe	 ﾠ
responsible	 ﾠfor	 ﾠrecruitment	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbasis	 ﾠof	 ﾠmerit,	 ﾠwhile	 ﾠensuring	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ“staff	 ﾠare	 ﾠ
recruited	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbroadest	 ﾠpossible	 ﾠgeographical	 ﾠbasis”;	 ﾠhow	 ﾠto	 ﾠreflect	 ﾠspecific	 ﾠ
EEAS	 ﾠrequirements	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠStaff	 ﾠRegulations,	 ﾠand	 ﾠhow	 ﾠto	 ﾠmeet	 ﾠthe	 ﾠadministrative	 ﾠ
costs	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠwhile	 ﾠretaining	 ﾠa	 ﾠlevel	 ﾠof	 ﾠautonomy.
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87	 ﾠJoint	 ﾠProgress	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89	 ﾠIbid.	 ﾠpara.	 ﾠ21.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 39	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
  The	 ﾠSwedish	 ﾠPresidency	 ﾠReport	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠCouncil	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠof	 ﾠOctober	 ﾠ
2009	 ﾠbriefly	 ﾠmentioned	 ﾠthe	 ﾠneed	 ﾠfor	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠto	 ﾠhave	 ﾠa	 ﾠlimited	 ﾠnumber	 ﾠof	 ﾠsupport	 ﾠ
functions,	 ﾠ“in	 ﾠparticular,	 ﾠIT,	 ﾠmanagement	 ﾠof	 ﾠhuman	 ﾠresources.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠwill	 ﾠneed	 ﾠ
a	 ﾠsmall	 ﾠcapacity	 ﾠfor	 ﾠspecific	 ﾠlegal	 ﾠadvice	 ﾠwithin	 ﾠits	 ﾠstructure”.
90	 ﾠFor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpurpose	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
cost-ﾭ‐efficiency,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠreport	 ﾠrecommended	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠHigh	 ﾠRepresentative	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
EEAS	 ﾠbe	 ﾠable	 ﾠto	 ﾠdraw	 ﾠon	 ﾠ“other	 ﾠservices	 ﾠwithin	 ﾠboth	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCommission	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
General	 ﾠSecretariat	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCouncil	 ﾠin	 ﾠorder	 ﾠto	 ﾠfulfil	 ﾠhis/her	 ﾠmandate”.
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 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
  Due	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ multiple	 ﾠ roles	 ﾠ performed	 ﾠ by	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ HR/VP,	 ﾠ as	 ﾠ well	 ﾠ as	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ need	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ
personally	 ﾠ attend	 ﾠ meetings	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ both	 ﾠ Brussels	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ abroad,	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ importance	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ
delegation	 ﾠhas	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠwidely	 ﾠrecognised.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠParliament	 ﾠadvocated	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
establishment	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ three	 ﾠ deputies	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ charge	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ multilateral,	 ﾠ bilateral	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ crisis	 ﾠ
management.
92	 ﾠThe	 ﾠ EEAS	 ﾠ Decision	 ﾠ does	 ﾠ not	 ﾠ contain	 ﾠ any	 ﾠ provisions	 ﾠ for	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ
nomination	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ Deputies,	 ﾠ but	 ﾠ it	 ﾠ was	 ﾠ suggested	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ Article	 ﾠ 33	 ﾠ TEU	 ﾠ allowing	 ﾠ
nomination	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ special	 ﾠ representatives,	 ﾠ could	 ﾠ provide	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ legal	 ﾠ basis	 ﾠ for	 ﾠ such	 ﾠ
nomination.	 ﾠIt	 ﾠis	 ﾠstill	 ﾠquestionable	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrole	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠHR/VP	 ﾠcould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠtruly	 ﾠ
‘deputised’	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsense	 ﾠof	 ﾠallowing	 ﾠanother	 ﾠindividual	 ﾠto	 ﾠfulfil	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrole	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
HR/VP,	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠas	 ﾠchairing	 ﾠthe	 ﾠForeign	 ﾠAffairs	 ﾠCouncil	 ﾠwithout	 ﾠa	 ﾠspecific	 ﾠlegal	 ﾠbasis	 ﾠ
for	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠa	 ﾠrole.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
  The	 ﾠlack	 ﾠof	 ﾠany	 ﾠformal	 ﾠdeputisation	 ﾠ(the	 ﾠformal	 ﾠdelegation	 ﾠof	 ﾠauthority)	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
High	 ﾠRepresentative	 ﾠin	 ﾠeither	 ﾠthe	 ﾠLisbon	 ﾠTreaty	 ﾠ(Article	 ﾠ18	 ﾠTEU)	 ﾠor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCouncil	 ﾠ
decision	 ﾠis	 ﾠsurprising	 ﾠgiven	 ﾠthe	 ﾠattention	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠissue	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠConvention	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
Future	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ Europe	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ fact	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ Article	 ﾠ 17.6c	 ﾠ TEU	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ Article	 ﾠ 25	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ
Commission’s	 ﾠRules	 ﾠof	 ﾠProcedure	 ﾠclearly	 ﾠenvisage	 ﾠdeputisation	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠPresident	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ Commission.	 ﾠ The	 ﾠ complexity	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ deputising	 ﾠ for	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ HR/VP	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ all	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ her	 ﾠ
various	 ﾠ roles	 ﾠ (Commission,	 ﾠ Foreign	 ﾠ Affairs	 ﾠ Council,	 ﾠ European	 ﾠ Parliament	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ
external	 ﾠ representation)	 ﾠ has	 ﾠ created	 ﾠ slightly	 ﾠ different	 ﾠ challenges.	 ﾠ For	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ
European	 ﾠ Parliament,	 ﾠ deputisation	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ carried	 ﾠ out	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ accordance	 ﾠ with	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ
Declaration	 ﾠ on	 ﾠ Political	 ﾠ Accountability	 ﾠ (8	 ﾠ July	 ﾠ 2010),	 ﾠ an	 ﾠ Inter-ﾭ‐Institutional	 ﾠ
Agreement	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠthe	 ﾠParliament	 ﾠand	 ﾠCommission	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠRules	 ﾠof	 ﾠProcedure	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ Council.	 ﾠ Namely,	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ Commissioner	 ﾠ will	 ﾠ replace	 ﾠ her	 ﾠ for	 ﾠ issues	 ﾠ falling	 ﾠ
exclusively	 ﾠ or	 ﾠ primarily	 ﾠ under	 ﾠ Commission	 ﾠ competences	 ﾠ or,	 ﾠ for	 ﾠ those	 ﾠ issues	 ﾠ
falling	 ﾠunder	 ﾠCFSP,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrotating	 ﾠPresidency	 ﾠor	 ﾠone	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtwo	 ﾠrelevant	 ﾠministers	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠ‘trio	 ﾠPresidency’.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcase	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCommission	 ﾠthe	 ﾠabsent	 ﾠmember	 ﾠcan	 ﾠbe	 ﾠ
represented	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠappropriate	 ﾠChef	 ﾠde	 ﾠCabinet,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠwith	 ﾠno	 ﾠvoting	 ﾠrights	 ﾠor	 ﾠ
other	 ﾠrights	 ﾠbeyond	 ﾠexpressing	 ﾠthe	 ﾠabsent	 ﾠCommissioner’s	 ﾠposition.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcase	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠForeign	 ﾠAffairs	 ﾠCommittee,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠMinister	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrotating	 ﾠPresidency	 ﾠcan	 ﾠbe	 ﾠ
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92	 ﾠProposal	 ﾠ for	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ Establishment	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ EEAS,	 ﾠ Working	 ﾠ Document	 ﾠ by	 ﾠ ElmarBrok	 ﾠ (AFET)	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ Guy	 ﾠ
Verhofstadt	 ﾠ(AFCO),	 ﾠrapporteurs	 ﾠon	 ﾠEEAS,	 ﾠUpdated	 ﾠVersion,	 ﾠ20	 ﾠApril	 ﾠ2010,	 ﾠpp.4-ﾭ‐5.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 40	 ﾠ
invited	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ chair	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ absence	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ High	 ﾠ Representative..	 ﾠ For	 ﾠ external	 ﾠ
representation	 ﾠand	 ﾠdialogues	 ﾠthe	 ﾠHR/VP	 ﾠis,	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠnecessary,	 ﾠrepresented	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
rotating	 ﾠPresidency	 ﾠwith	 ﾠa	 ﾠCommissioner	 ﾠ(normally	 ﾠStabilisation	 ﾠand	 ﾠAssociation	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠCooperation	 ﾠCouncil	 ﾠmeetings).	 ﾠIn	 ﾠthose	 ﾠcases	 ﾠwhere	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrotating	 ﾠPresidency	 ﾠ
is	 ﾠunable	 ﾠto	 ﾠreplace	 ﾠthe	 ﾠHR/VP,	 ﾠan	 ﾠappropriate	 ﾠministerial	 ﾠrepresentative	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠ
another	 ﾠmember	 ﾠstate	 ﾠmay	 ﾠbe	 ﾠinvited.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
  The	 ﾠarticle	 ﾠalso	 ﾠmakes	 ﾠprovision	 ﾠfor	 ﾠtwo	 ﾠDeputy	 ﾠSecretaries-ﾭ‐General	 ﾠ(para.	 ﾠ2).	 ﾠ
One	 ﾠaddresses	 ﾠPolitical	 ﾠAffairs	 ﾠwhile	 ﾠthe	 ﾠother	 ﾠconcentrates	 ﾠon	 ﾠInter-ﾭ‐Institutional	 ﾠ
affairs.	 ﾠAlong	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠHigh	 ﾠRepresentative	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠExecutive	 ﾠSecretary-ﾭ‐General,	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠfour	 ﾠconstitute	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCorporate	 ﾠBoard	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS.	 ﾠSince	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtwo	 ﾠDeputies	 ﾠare	 ﾠ
charged	 ﾠ with	 ﾠ ‘assisting	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ Executive	 ﾠ Secretary-ﾭ‐General’	 ﾠ their	 ﾠ roles	 ﾠ should	 ﾠ
therefore	 ﾠbe	 ﾠunderstood	 ﾠin	 ﾠterms	 ﾠof	 ﾠensuring	 ﾠeffective	 ﾠcoordination	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠall	 ﾠ
departments	 ﾠand	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdelegations.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
2. Executive	 ﾠ Secretary-ﾭ‐General	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ Director-ﾭ‐General	 ﾠ for	 ﾠ budget	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ
administration	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
  The	 ﾠoriginal	 ﾠdraft	 ﾠdecision	 ﾠof	 ﾠ25	 ﾠMarch	 ﾠ2010	 ﾠ(‘the	 ﾠMarch	 ﾠdraft	 ﾠdecision’)	 ﾠdid	 ﾠnot	 ﾠ
mention	 ﾠthe	 ﾠDirector-ﾭ‐General	 ﾠfor	 ﾠbudget	 ﾠand	 ﾠadministration.	 ﾠThese	 ﾠaspects	 ﾠfell	 ﾠ
under	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ‘Secretary-ﾭ‐General’.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠrevised	 ﾠdraft	 ﾠdecision	 ﾠfollowing	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ21	 ﾠJune	 ﾠ
2010	 ﾠ Quadrilogue	 ﾠ (‘the	 ﾠ June	 ﾠ draft	 ﾠ decision’)	 ﾠ showed	 ﾠ clear	 ﾠ concern	 ﾠ from	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ
European	 ﾠ Parliament’s	 ﾠ perspective	 ﾠ regarding	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ budgetary	 ﾠ aspects	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ
Service.	 ﾠThis	 ﾠreflected	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpost-ﾭ‐quadrilogue	 ﾠdraft	 ﾠof	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ4,	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠintroduced	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠpost	 ﾠof	 ﾠ“Director	 ﾠGeneral	 ﾠfor	 ﾠbudget	 ﾠand	 ﾠadministration	 ﾠwho	 ﾠshall	 ﾠwork	 ﾠunder	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠauthority	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠHigh	 ﾠRepresentative”	 ﾠand	 ﾠwho,	 ﾠin	 ﾠthis	 ﾠcapacity,	 ﾠis	 ﾠresponsible	 ﾠ
for	 ﾠthe	 ﾠadministrative	 ﾠand	 ﾠbudgetary	 ﾠmanagement	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS.	 ﾠMention	 ﾠof	 ﾠthis	 ﾠ
post	 ﾠwas	 ﾠincluded	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠstatement	 ﾠgiven	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠHR,	 ﾠmentioning	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠincumbent	 ﾠ




  The	 ﾠ role	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ Secretary-ﾭ‐General	 ﾠ was	 ﾠ also	 ﾠ altered	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ reflect	 ﾠ management	 ﾠ
responsibilities	 ﾠ for	 ﾠ administrative,	 ﾠ staffing,	 ﾠ budgetary,	 ﾠ security	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ
communication	 ﾠand	 ﾠinformation	 ﾠsystems
94	 ﾠ–	 ﾠrather	 ﾠthan	 ﾠthe	 ﾠattribution	 ﾠof	 ﾠ‘direct	 ﾠ
authority’	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠMarch	 ﾠdraft	 ﾠdecision.
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 ﾠto	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 ﾠMarch	 ﾠdraft	 ﾠdecision	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Secretary-ﾭ‐General	 ﾠ became	 ﾠ an	 ﾠ ‘Executive	 ﾠ Secretary-ﾭ‐General’.	 ﾠ In	 ﾠ addition	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ his	 ﾠ
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93	 ﾠElements	 ﾠfor	 ﾠa	 ﾠstatement	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠgiven	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠHigh	 ﾠRepresentative	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠplenary	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠ
Parliament	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbasic	 ﾠorganisation	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠcentral	 ﾠadministration,	 ﾠ21	 ﾠJune	 ﾠ2010.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
94Revised	 ﾠdraft	 ﾠ(21	 ﾠJune	 ﾠ2010),	 ﾠConsolidated	 ﾠVersion	 ﾠwith	 ﾠLatest	 ﾠAmendments	 ﾠPost-ﾭ‐Quadrilogue	 ﾠof	 ﾠ21	 ﾠ
June	 ﾠ2010,	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ4.	 ﾠ
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95	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ4(1),	 ﾠsecond	 ﾠpara.,in	 ﾠfine,	 ﾠproposal	 ﾠfor	 ﾠa	 ﾠCouncil	 ﾠDecision	 ﾠestablishing	 ﾠthe	 ﾠorganisation	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
functioning	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠExternal	 ﾠAction	 ﾠService	 ﾠ(25	 ﾠMarch	 ﾠ2010).	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 41	 ﾠ
coordination	 ﾠ role,	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ March	 ﾠ draft	 ﾠ decision	 ﾠ also	 ﾠ mentioned	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ he	 ﾠ shall	 ﾠ
“represent	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ EEAS”.	 ﾠ Under	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ EEAS	 ﾠ Decision	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ role	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ Executive	 ﾠ
Secretary-ﾭ‐General	 ﾠomits	 ﾠthis	 ﾠbroader	 ﾠrepresentative	 ﾠfunction,	 ﾠlimiting	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpost-ﾭ‐
holder	 ﾠto	 ﾠresponsibility	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ“smooth	 ﾠfunctioning”	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠoriginal	 ﾠ
intention	 ﾠwas	 ﾠtherefore	 ﾠto	 ﾠassist	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠneed	 ﾠto	 ﾠdelegate	 ﾠcertain	 ﾠrepresentative	 ﾠ
functions	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠHR	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠExecutive	 ﾠSecretary-ﾭ‐General.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
  The	 ﾠsubsequent	 ﾠdrafts	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCouncil	 ﾠdecision	 ﾠclearly	 ﾠillustrate	 ﾠthe	 ﾠshifting	 ﾠrole	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠ Executive	 ﾠ Secretary-ﾭ‐General	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ insertion	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ Director-ﾭ‐General	 ﾠ for	 ﾠ
budget	 ﾠand	 ﾠadministration,	 ﾠlargely	 ﾠat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbehest	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠParliament.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠ
EEAS	 ﾠ Decision	 ﾠ reflects	 ﾠ both	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ these	 ﾠ changes	 ﾠ but,	 ﾠ by	 ﾠ so	 ﾠ doing,	 ﾠ it	 ﾠ introduces	 ﾠ
significant	 ﾠelements	 ﾠof	 ﾠambiguity	 ﾠregarding	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrole	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠExecutive	 ﾠSecretary-ﾭ‐
General	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrelationship	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠthis	 ﾠpost	 ﾠand	 ﾠthat	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠDirector-ﾭ‐General	 ﾠ
for	 ﾠbudget	 ﾠand	 ﾠadministration.	 ﾠ	 ﾠSince	 ﾠthe	 ﾠformer	 ﾠis	 ﾠresponsible	 ﾠfor	 ﾠ“all	 ﾠmeasures”	 ﾠ
necessary	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsmooth	 ﾠfunctioning	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠService,	 ﾠincluding	 ﾠthe	 ﾠadministrative	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠ budgetary	 ﾠ measures,	 ﾠ it	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ noteworthy	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ latter	 ﾠ works	 ﾠ “under	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ
authority	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ High	 ﾠ Representative”	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ not,	 ﾠ as	 ﾠ might	 ﾠ be	 ﾠ anticipated,	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ
Executive	 ﾠSecretary-ﾭ‐General.	 ﾠThis	 ﾠis	 ﾠmost	 ﾠlikely	 ﾠbecause	 ﾠlegal	 ﾠresponsibility	 ﾠfor	 ﾠ
budgetary	 ﾠand	 ﾠpersonnel	 ﾠmatters	 ﾠresides	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠHR	 ﾠand,	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthis	 ﾠin	 ﾠmind,	 ﾠ
reporting	 ﾠon	 ﾠthese	 ﾠissues	 ﾠgoes	 ﾠdirectly	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠHR.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
3. Geographical,	 ﾠthematic	 ﾠand	 ﾠmultilateral	 ﾠdesks	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
  In	 ﾠparagraph	 ﾠ3,	 ﾠmention	 ﾠis	 ﾠmade	 ﾠof	 ﾠboth	 ﾠgeographical	 ﾠand	 ﾠthematic	 ﾠdesks.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠ
former	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ more	 ﾠ obvious,	 ﾠ based	 ﾠ upon	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ transferral	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ desks	 ﾠ from	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ
Commission	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠGeneral	 ﾠSecretariat	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCouncil	 ﾠ(these	 ﾠare	 ﾠlaid	 ﾠout	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
Annex	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠDecision).	 ﾠA	 ﾠlimited	 ﾠimpression	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlatter	 ﾠcan	 ﾠbe	 ﾠgleaned	 ﾠby	 ﾠ
reading	 ﾠthrough	 ﾠthe	 ﾠannex.	 ﾠIt	 ﾠwas	 ﾠevident	 ﾠprior	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcreation	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠService	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ
certain	 ﾠareas	 ﾠlike	 ﾠclimate	 ﾠchange	 ﾠ(see	 ﾠfirst	 ﾠorganogram	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠaccompanying	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠMarch	 ﾠdraft	 ﾠdecision)	 ﾠwere	 ﾠcontested	 ﾠin	 ﾠterms	 ﾠof	 ﾠcompetences.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠresult	 ﾠis	 ﾠ
that	 ﾠthe	 ﾠthematic	 ﾠareas	 ﾠcovered	 ﾠapparently	 ﾠexclude	 ﾠsome	 ﾠglobal	 ﾠissues	 ﾠthat	 ﾠare	 ﾠ
important	 ﾠin	 ﾠterms	 ﾠof	 ﾠEU	 ﾠpolicy,	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠas	 ﾠclimate	 ﾠchange	 ﾠor	 ﾠenergy	 ﾠsecurity.	 ﾠThere	 ﾠ
is	 ﾠalso	 ﾠlittle	 ﾠguidance	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠDecision	 ﾠas	 ﾠto	 ﾠhow	 ﾠthe	 ﾠthematic	 ﾠand	 ﾠgeographic	 ﾠdesks	 ﾠ
should	 ﾠinter-ﾭ‐relate.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠhorizontal	 ﾠthematic	 ﾠdesks	 ﾠcan	 ﾠoffer	 ﾠsupport	 ﾠto	 ﾠgeographic	 ﾠ
desks	 ﾠon	 ﾠa	 ﾠwide	 ﾠrange	 ﾠof	 ﾠissues	 ﾠincluding	 ﾠhuman	 ﾠrights	 ﾠand	 ﾠdemocracy,	 ﾠcounter-ﾭ‐
terrorism	 ﾠand	 ﾠnon-ﾭ‐proliferation,	 ﾠhowever	 ﾠthis	 ﾠrequires	 ﾠco-ﾭ‐ordination	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
thematic	 ﾠand	 ﾠgeographic	 ﾠdesks.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
  It	 ﾠwas	 ﾠagreed	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠthematic	 ﾠand	 ﾠgeographic	 ﾠdesks	 ﾠshould	 ﾠnot	 ﾠbe	 ﾠduplicated	 ﾠ
within	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCommission	 ﾠor	 ﾠCouncil	 ﾠGeneral	 ﾠSecretariat,	 ﾠtaking	 ﾠinto	 ﾠaccount	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
Commission	 ﾠ DGs’	 ﾠ roles	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ enlargement,	 ﾠ humanitarian	 ﾠ aid,	 ﾠ trade,	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ
development	 ﾠpolicy.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
4. Crisis	 ﾠmanagement	 ﾠstructures	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
  The	 ﾠ provisions	 ﾠ on	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ crisis	 ﾠ management	 ﾠ bodies	 ﾠ (CMPD,	 ﾠ CPCC,	 ﾠ EUMS,	 ﾠ EU	 ﾠ
Situation	 ﾠCentre)	 ﾠmake	 ﾠthem	 ﾠwork	 ﾠunder	 ﾠthe	 ﾠauthority	 ﾠand	 ﾠresponsibility	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 42	 ﾠ
HR.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠtravauxpréparatoires	 ﾠindicate	 ﾠsensitivity	 ﾠabout	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrole	 ﾠof	 ﾠthese	 ﾠbodies,	 ﾠ
with	 ﾠthe	 ﾠSwedish	 ﾠPresidency	 ﾠreport	 ﾠnoting	 ﾠthe	 ﾠneed	 ﾠto	 ﾠtake	 ﾠ“full	 ﾠaccount	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
specificities	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ these	 ﾠ structures	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ preserving	 ﾠ their	 ﾠ particular	 ﾠ functions,	 ﾠ
procedures	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ staffing	 ﾠ conditions”.
96	 ﾠThe	 ﾠ ambiguous	 ﾠ position	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ crisis	 ﾠ
management	 ﾠbodies	 ﾠwas	 ﾠreinforced	 ﾠby	 ﾠsome	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmember	 ﾠstates.	 ﾠFor	 ﾠinstance,	 ﾠ
Slovakia	 ﾠrecommended	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ“ESDP	 ﾠand	 ﾠcrisis	 ﾠmanagement	 ﾠshould	 ﾠstay	 ﾠout	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
EEAS	 ﾠ(definitely	 ﾠat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbeginning)”.
97	 ﾠAlthough	 ﾠthis	 ﾠview	 ﾠdid	 ﾠnot	 ﾠprevail,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsense	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠseparateness	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠspecific	 ﾠlink	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠHR	 ﾠwas	 ﾠreflected	 ﾠin	 ﾠAshton’s	 ﾠ‘Step	 ﾠ
Change’	 ﾠ paper.
98 	 ﾠBelgium,	 ﾠ although	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ favour	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ integration	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ these	 ﾠ
structures	 ﾠ into	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ Service,	 ﾠ wanted	 ﾠ “to	 ﾠ preserve	 ﾠ their	 ﾠ specificity	 ﾠ as	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ single	 ﾠ
Directorate	 ﾠ General,	 ﾠ under	 ﾠ direct	 ﾠ authority	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ direct	 ﾠ access	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ High	 ﾠ
Representative”.
99 	 ﾠThe	 ﾠ Finnish	 ﾠ government	 ﾠ saw	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ inclusion	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ crisis	 ﾠ
response	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcrisis	 ﾠmanagement	 ﾠtasks	 ﾠwithin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠ“major	 ﾠstructural	 ﾠ
improvement”.
100	 ﾠThe	 ﾠ formulations	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ October	 ﾠ 2009	 ﾠ Swedish	 ﾠ Presidency	 ﾠ
report,	 ﾠas	 ﾠwell	 ﾠas	 ﾠsome	 ﾠpositions	 ﾠof	 ﾠmember	 ﾠstates,	 ﾠwere	 ﾠreflected	 ﾠin	 ﾠboth	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
draft	 ﾠdecision	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfinal	 ﾠversion.	 ﾠHence,	 ﾠmention	 ﾠis	 ﾠmade	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ“specificities”	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠ“particularities”	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcrisis	 ﾠmanagement	 ﾠbodies	 ﾠmentioned	 ﾠ(all	 ﾠof	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠ
were	 ﾠformerly	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠGeneral	 ﾠSecretariat	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCouncil).	 ﾠThe	 ﾠchallenge	 ﾠis	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠ
found	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfollowing	 ﾠsentence	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠDecision,	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠstates	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ“[f]ull	 ﾠ
coordination	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠall	 ﾠthe	 ﾠstructures	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠshall	 ﾠbe	 ﾠensured”.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
  The	 ﾠ stipulations	 ﾠ regarding	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ crisis	 ﾠ management	 ﾠ bodies	 ﾠ are	 ﾠ framed	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ
accordance	 ﾠ with	 ﾠ Article	 ﾠ 40	 ﾠ TEU	 ﾠ and,	 ﾠ by	 ﾠ reference,	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ Articles	 ﾠ 3-ﾭ‐6	 ﾠ TFEU.	 ﾠ The	 ﾠ
presence	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ such	 ﾠ references	 ﾠ serves	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ remind	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ reader	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ still	 ﾠ partially	 ﾠ
pillarised	 ﾠnature	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠUnion	 ﾠand,	 ﾠmore	 ﾠspecifically,	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠattainment	 ﾠof	 ﾠany	 ﾠ
comprehensive	 ﾠsecurity	 ﾠapproach	 ﾠshould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠmindful	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠother	 ﾠrelated	 ﾠareas	 ﾠ
partially	 ﾠ or	 ﾠ exclusively	 ﾠ falling	 ﾠ under	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ Commission’s	 ﾠ competences	 ﾠ (crisis	 ﾠ
prevention;	 ﾠcivil	 ﾠprotection;	 ﾠpost-ﾭ‐conflict	 ﾠstabilisation;	 ﾠsecurity	 ﾠsector	 ﾠreform	 ﾠetc).	 ﾠ
More	 ﾠspecifically,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlack	 ﾠof	 ﾠlinkage,	 ﾠother	 ﾠthan	 ﾠthrough	 ﾠthe	 ﾠHR,	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
crisis	 ﾠmanagement	 ﾠbodies	 ﾠmentioned	 ﾠin	 ﾠthis	 ﾠparagraph	 ﾠand	 ﾠother	 ﾠparts	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
Service	 ﾠ having	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ more	 ﾠ general	 ﾠ crisis	 ﾠ response	 ﾠ function	 ﾠ implies	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ there	 ﾠ are	 ﾠ
challenges	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ ‘coordination’	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ potentially	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ ‘smooth	 ﾠ functioning	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ
EEAS’	 ﾠ (see	 ﾠ above),	 ﾠ which	 ﾠ raises	 ﾠ legitimate	 ﾠ questions	 ﾠ about	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ soft	 ﾠ nature	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ
these	 ﾠstipulations.	 ﾠIt	 ﾠis	 ﾠalso	 ﾠworth	 ﾠnoting	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠreference	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtext	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
Council	 ﾠdecision	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEU	 ﾠSituation	 ﾠCentre	 ﾠis	 ﾠincorrect	 ﾠsince	 ﾠit	 ﾠhas	 ﾠsince	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠ
renamed	 ﾠthe	 ﾠIntelligence	 ﾠand	 ﾠAnalysis	 ﾠCentre	 ﾠ(IntCen).	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
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 ﾠ	 ﾠ	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 ﾠ	 ﾠ	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 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
96Presidency	 ﾠReport	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠCouncil	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠExternal	 ﾠAction	 ﾠService,	 ﾠ14930/09,	 ﾠ23	 ﾠ
October	 ﾠ2009,	 ﾠpara.	 ﾠ7.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
97Non-ﾭ‐paper	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠSlovak	 ﾠRepublic	 ﾠon	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠ(Replies	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠPresidency	 ﾠquestions),	 ﾠundated.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
98“A	 ﾠStep	 ﾠChange	 ﾠin	 ﾠexternal	 ﾠpolicy	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠUnion:	 ﾠDelivering	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpromise	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠLisbon	 ﾠTreaty”,	 ﾠ
Annex	 ﾠ1,	 ﾠ3	 ﾠMarch	 ﾠ2010.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
99	 ﾠLetter	 ﾠof	 ﾠSteven	 ﾠVanackere,	 ﾠBelgian	 ﾠDeputy	 ﾠPrime	 ﾠMinister	 ﾠand	 ﾠMinister	 ﾠof	 ﾠForeign	 ﾠAffairs	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
Institutional	 ﾠReform,	 ﾠto	 ﾠAshton,	 ﾠ4	 ﾠMarch	 ﾠ2010.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ




  Article	 ﾠ4	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠDecision	 ﾠmentions	 ﾠa	 ﾠnumber	 ﾠof	 ﾠspecific	 ﾠdepartments	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠ
included	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ EEAS	 ﾠ central	 ﾠ administration.	 ﾠ These	 ﾠ include	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ department	 ﾠ for	 ﾠ
strategic	 ﾠ policy	 ﾠ planning,	 ﾠ departments	 ﾠ for	 ﾠ inter-ﾭ‐institutional	 ﾠ relations,	 ﾠ
information	 ﾠand	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠdiplomacy,	 ﾠinternal	 ﾠaudit	 ﾠand	 ﾠinspections,	 ﾠpersonal	 ﾠdata	 ﾠ
protection,	 ﾠas	 ﾠwell	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠlegal	 ﾠdepartment.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠlegal	 ﾠdepartment	 ﾠremains	 ﾠ
relatively	 ﾠsmall,	 ﾠand	 ﾠis	 ﾠto	 ﾠwork	 ﾠclosely	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠLegal	 ﾠServices	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCouncil	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
Commission.	 ﾠA	 ﾠpolicy	 ﾠplanning	 ﾠdepartment	 ﾠis	 ﾠresponsible	 ﾠfor	 ﾠlonger	 ﾠterm	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
strategic	 ﾠ planning	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ EEAS,	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ should	 ﾠ be	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ constant	 ﾠ dialogue	 ﾠ with	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ
thematic	 ﾠand	 ﾠgeographic	 ﾠdesks.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠDecision	 ﾠbuilds	 ﾠupon	 ﾠAshton’s	 ﾠ‘Step	 ﾠ
Change’	 ﾠ document	 ﾠ where	 ﾠ she	 ﾠ stressed	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ 21
st	 ﾠ century	 ﾠ external	 ﾠ service	 ﾠ
required	 ﾠa	 ﾠprofessional	 ﾠcommunications	 ﾠstructure,	 ﾠa	 ﾠsubstantive	 ﾠmedia	 ﾠoperation	 ﾠ




  Most	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ suggested	 ﾠ departments	 ﾠ subsequently	 ﾠ materialised	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ EEAS	 ﾠ
although,	 ﾠ surprisingly,	 ﾠ public	 ﾠ diplomacy	 ﾠ was	 ﾠ placed	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ Foreign	 ﾠ Policy	 ﾠ
Instrument	 ﾠ (FPI)	 ﾠ (alongside	 ﾠ election	 ﾠ observation,	 ﾠ which	 ﾠ also	 ﾠ appears	 ﾠ under	 ﾠ
Human	 ﾠ Rights	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ Democracy	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ Global	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ Multilateral	 ﾠ Issues	 ﾠ division),	 ﾠ
which	 ﾠhas	 ﾠa	 ﾠparticular	 ﾠstatus	 ﾠvis-ﾭ‐à-ﾭ‐vis	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠbut	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot	 ﾠtouched	 ﾠupon	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
this	 ﾠarticle.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠclear	 ﾠintent	 ﾠof	 ﾠthis	 ﾠparagraph	 ﾠwas	 ﾠto	 ﾠplace	 ﾠthis	 ﾠfunction	 ﾠwithin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
‘central	 ﾠadministration’	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS.	 ﾠIt	 ﾠis	 ﾠarguable	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠthis	 ﾠhas	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠdone	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
practice,	 ﾠespecially	 ﾠbearing	 ﾠin	 ﾠmind	 ﾠthat	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠdiplomacy	 ﾠgoes	 ﾠbeyond	 ﾠstrategic	 ﾠ
communication.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
6. Council	 ﾠworking	 ﾠparties	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
  The	 ﾠstipulation	 ﾠin	 ﾠparagraph	 ﾠ5	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠHigh	 ﾠRepresentative	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠshall	 ﾠbe	 ﾠ
assisted	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠGeneral	 ﾠSecretariat	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCouncil	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrelevant	 ﾠdepartments	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCommission,	 ﾠrelates	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠPreamble	 ﾠ(Para.	 ﾠ3)	 ﾠsince	 ﾠany	 ﾠassistance	 ﾠhas	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
be	 ﾠunderstood	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcontext	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ’normal	 ﾠtasks’	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCouncil	 ﾠSecretariat	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠCommission.	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ3(2)	 ﾠcreates	 ﾠan	 ﾠobligation	 ﾠof	 ﾠmutual	 ﾠassistance	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
context	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCommission	 ﾠbut	 ﾠnot	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCouncil	 ﾠSecretariat.
102	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
  The	 ﾠ Decision	 ﾠ also	 ﾠ expressly	 ﾠ refers	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ chairing	 ﾠ arrangements	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ Council’s	 ﾠ
preparatory	 ﾠbodies.	 ﾠThis	 ﾠwas	 ﾠnecessary	 ﾠdue	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠchanges	 ﾠintroduced	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
rotating	 ﾠPresidency	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠLisbon	 ﾠTreaty.
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 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ4(4)	 ﾠstipulates	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠHigh	 ﾠ
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101	 ﾠ“A	 ﾠStep	 ﾠChange	 ﾠin	 ﾠexternal	 ﾠpolicy	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠUnion:	 ﾠDelivering	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpromise	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠLisbon	 ﾠTreaty”,	 ﾠ
Annex	 ﾠ1,	 ﾠ3	 ﾠMarch	 ﾠ2010.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
102	 ﾠSee	 ﾠcommentary	 ﾠof	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ3,	 ﾠabove.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
103	 ﾠFor	 ﾠ an	 ﾠ overview	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ chairing	 ﾠ arrangements	 ﾠ see	 ﾠ Annex	 ﾠ 1,	 ﾠ (Foreign	 ﾠ Affairs)	 ﾠ List	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ Council	 ﾠ
Preparatory	 ﾠBodies,	 ﾠCouncil	 ﾠdoc.	 ﾠ12223/12,	 ﾠ4	 ﾠJuly	 ﾠ2012.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 44	 ﾠ
Representative	 ﾠ“shall	 ﾠdesignate	 ﾠthe	 ﾠchairpersons	 ﾠof	 ﾠCouncil	 ﾠpreparatory	 ﾠbodies	 ﾠ
that	 ﾠare	 ﾠchaired	 ﾠby	 ﾠa	 ﾠrepresentative	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠHigh	 ﾠRepresentative,	 ﾠincluding	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
chair	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠPolitical	 ﾠand	 ﾠSecurity	 ﾠCommittee,	 ﾠin	 ﾠaccordance	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdetailed	 ﾠ
arrangements	 ﾠset	 ﾠout	 ﾠin	 ﾠAnnex	 ﾠII	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCouncil	 ﾠDecision	 ﾠconcerned.”
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104	 ﾠCouncil	 ﾠDecision	 ﾠ2009/908/EU	 ﾠof	 ﾠ1	 ﾠDecember	 ﾠ2009	 ﾠlaying	 ﾠdown	 ﾠmeasures	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠimplementation	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ European	 ﾠ Council	 ﾠ Decision	 ﾠ on	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ exercise	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ Presidency	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ Council,	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ on	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ






1.	 ﾠ The	 ﾠ decision	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ open	 ﾠ or	 ﾠ close	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ delegation	 ﾠ shall	 ﾠ be	 ﾠ adopted	 ﾠ by	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ High	 ﾠ Representative,	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ
agreement	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCouncil	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCommission.	 ﾠ
2.	 ﾠEach	 ﾠUnion	 ﾠDelegation	 ﾠshall	 ﾠbe	 ﾠplaced	 ﾠunder	 ﾠthe	 ﾠauthority	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠHead	 ﾠof	 ﾠDelegation.	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠHead	 ﾠof	 ﾠDelegation	 ﾠshall	 ﾠhave	 ﾠauthority	 ﾠover	 ﾠall	 ﾠstaff	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdelegation,	 ﾠwhatever	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠstatus,	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
for	 ﾠ all	 ﾠ its	 ﾠ activities.	 ﾠ He/she	 ﾠ shall	 ﾠ be	 ﾠ accountable	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ High	 ﾠ Representative	 ﾠf o r 	 ﾠt h e 	 ﾠo v e r a l l 	 ﾠ
management	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠwork	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdelegation	 ﾠand	 ﾠfor	 ﾠensuring	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcoordination	 ﾠof	 ﾠall	 ﾠactions	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
Union.	 ﾠ
Staff	 ﾠin	 ﾠdelegations	 ﾠshall	 ﾠcomprise	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠstaff	 ﾠand,	 ﾠwhere	 ﾠappropriate	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠimplementation	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
Union	 ﾠbudget	 ﾠand	 ﾠUnion	 ﾠpolicies	 ﾠother	 ﾠthan	 ﾠthose	 ﾠunder	 ﾠthe	 ﾠremit	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS,	 ﾠCommission	 ﾠstaff.	 ﾠ
3.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠHead	 ﾠof	 ﾠDelegation	 ﾠshall	 ﾠreceive	 ﾠinstructions	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠHigh	 ﾠRepresentative	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS,	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
shall	 ﾠbe	 ﾠresponsible	 ﾠfor	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠexecution.	 ﾠ
In	 ﾠ areas	 ﾠ where	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ Commission	 ﾠ exercises	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ powers	 ﾠ conferred	 ﾠ upon	 ﾠ it	 ﾠ by	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ Treaties,	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ
Commission	 ﾠmay,	 ﾠin	 ﾠaccordance	 ﾠwith	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ221(2)	 ﾠTFEU,	 ﾠalso	 ﾠissue	 ﾠinstructions	 ﾠto	 ﾠdelegations,	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠ
shall	 ﾠbe	 ﾠexecuted	 ﾠunder	 ﾠthe	 ﾠoverall	 ﾠresponsibility	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠHead	 ﾠof	 ﾠDelegation.	 ﾠ
4.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠHead	 ﾠof	 ﾠDelegation	 ﾠshall	 ﾠimplement	 ﾠoperational	 ﾠcredits	 ﾠin	 ﾠrelation	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠUnion’s	 ﾠprojects	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
corresponding	 ﾠ third	 ﾠ country,	 ﾠ where	 ﾠ sub-ﾭ‐delegated	 ﾠ by	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ Commission,	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ accordance	 ﾠ with	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ
Financial	 ﾠRegulation.	 ﾠ
5.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠoperation	 ﾠof	 ﾠeach	 ﾠdelegation	 ﾠshall	 ﾠbe	 ﾠperiodically	 ﾠevaluated	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠExecutive	 ﾠSecretary-ﾭ‐General	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ EEAS;	 ﾠ evaluation	 ﾠ shall	 ﾠ include	 ﾠ financial	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ administrative	 ﾠ audits.	 ﾠ For	 ﾠ this	 ﾠ purpose,	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ
Executive	 ﾠ Secretary-ﾭ‐General	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ EEAS	 ﾠ may	 ﾠ request	 ﾠ assistance	 ﾠ from	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ relevant	 ﾠ Commission	 ﾠ
departments.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠaddition	 ﾠto	 ﾠinternal	 ﾠmeasures	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS,	 ﾠOLAF	 ﾠshall	 ﾠexercise	 ﾠits	 ﾠpowers,	 ﾠnotably	 ﾠby	 ﾠ
conducting	 ﾠanti-ﾭ‐fraud	 ﾠmeasures,	 ﾠin	 ﾠaccordance	 ﾠwith	 ﾠRegulation	 ﾠ(EC)	 ﾠNo	 ﾠ1073/1999.	 ﾠ
6.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠHigh	 ﾠRepresentative	 ﾠshall	 ﾠenter	 ﾠinto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnecessary	 ﾠarrangements	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠhost	 ﾠcountry,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
international	 ﾠorganisation,	 ﾠor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠthird	 ﾠcountry	 ﾠconcerned.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠparticular,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠHigh	 ﾠRepresentative	 ﾠshall	 ﾠ
take	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnecessary	 ﾠmeasures	 ﾠto	 ﾠensure	 ﾠthat	 ﾠhost	 ﾠStates	 ﾠgrant	 ﾠthe	 ﾠUnion	 ﾠdelegations,	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠstaff	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
their	 ﾠproperty,	 ﾠprivileges	 ﾠand	 ﾠimmunities	 ﾠequivalent	 ﾠto	 ﾠthose	 ﾠreferred	 ﾠto	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠVienna	 ﾠConvention	 ﾠon	 ﾠ
Diplomatic	 ﾠRelations	 ﾠof	 ﾠ18	 ﾠApril	 ﾠ1961.	 ﾠ
7.	 ﾠUnion	 ﾠdelegations	 ﾠshall	 ﾠhave	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcapacity	 ﾠto	 ﾠrespond	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠneeds	 ﾠof	 ﾠother	 ﾠinstitutions	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠUnion,	 ﾠ
in	 ﾠparticular	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠParliament,	 ﾠin	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠcontacts	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠinternational	 ﾠorganisations	 ﾠor	 ﾠthird	 ﾠ
countries	 ﾠto	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdelegations	 ﾠare	 ﾠaccredited.	 ﾠ
8.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠHead	 ﾠof	 ﾠDelegation	 ﾠshall	 ﾠhave	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpower	 ﾠto	 ﾠrepresent	 ﾠthe	 ﾠUnion	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcountry	 ﾠwhere	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
delegation	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ accredited,	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ particular	 ﾠ for	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ conclusion	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ contracts,	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ as	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ party	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ legal	 ﾠ
proceedings.	 ﾠ
9.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠUnion	 ﾠdelegations	 ﾠshall	 ﾠwork	 ﾠin	 ﾠclose	 ﾠcooperation	 ﾠand	 ﾠshare	 ﾠinformation	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdiplomatic	 ﾠ
services	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠMember	 ﾠStates.	 ﾠ
10.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠUnion	 ﾠdelegations	 ﾠshall,	 ﾠacting	 ﾠin	 ﾠaccordance	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠthird	 ﾠparagraph	 ﾠof	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ35	 ﾠTEU,	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
upon	 ﾠrequest	 ﾠby	 ﾠMember	 ﾠStates,	 ﾠsupport	 ﾠthe	 ﾠMember	 ﾠStates	 ﾠin	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠdiplomatic	 ﾠrelations	 ﾠand	 ﾠin	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 46	 ﾠ




The	 ﾠestablishment	 ﾠof	 ﾠUnion	 ﾠdelegations	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠmajor	 ﾠinnovation	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠLisbon	 ﾠTreaty	 ﾠ(1).	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠpurpose	 ﾠof	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ5	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠDecision	 ﾠis	 ﾠto	 ﾠarticulate	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠoperation.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠ
commenting	 ﾠthis	 ﾠarticle,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠexchange	 ﾠof	 ﾠinformation	 ﾠwith	 ﾠand	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmember	 ﾠ
states	 ﾠwill	 ﾠbe	 ﾠdiscussed	 ﾠ(2),	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrole	 ﾠand	 ﾠfunctions	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠHead	 ﾠof	 ﾠDelegation	 ﾠ(3),	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
status	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ Delegations	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ third	 ﾠ states	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ at	 ﾠ international	 ﾠ organisations	 ﾠ (4),	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ
Delegations’	 ﾠ(potential)	 ﾠrole	 ﾠin	 ﾠdiplomatic	 ﾠand	 ﾠconsular	 ﾠprotection	 ﾠ(5).	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
1. A	 ﾠsingle	 ﾠdiplomatic	 ﾠpresence	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
  The	 ﾠpivotal	 ﾠrole	 ﾠin	 ﾠexternal	 ﾠrepresentation	 ﾠby	 ﾠEU	 ﾠdelegations	 ﾠfinds	 ﾠits	 ﾠbasis	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
Article	 ﾠ221(1)	 ﾠTFEU,	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠwas	 ﾠnewly	 ﾠinserted	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠLisbon	 ﾠTreaty:	 ﾠ“Union	 ﾠ
delegations	 ﾠin	 ﾠthird	 ﾠcountries	 ﾠand	 ﾠat	 ﾠinternational	 ﾠorganisations	 ﾠshall	 ﾠrepresent	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠUnion.”	 ﾠThe	 ﾠambition	 ﾠflowing	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthis	 ﾠnew	 ﾠprovision	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠTFEU	 ﾠis	 ﾠquite	 ﾠ
clear:	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ Union	 ﾠ no	 ﾠ longer	 ﾠ wishes	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ have	 ﾠ an	 ﾠ international	 ﾠ presence	 ﾠ through	 ﾠ
delegations	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ only	 ﾠ one	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ its	 ﾠ institutions	 ﾠ (e.g.	 ﾠ Commission	 ﾠ Delegations),	 ﾠ or	 ﾠ
through	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdiplomats	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmember	 ﾠstate	 ﾠholding	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrotating	 ﾠPresidency.
105	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠ purpose	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ this	 ﾠ Treaty	 ﾠ provision	 ﾠ was	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ have	 ﾠ “less	 ﾠ Europeans	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ more	 ﾠ
EU”
106,	 ﾠa	 ﾠsingle	 ﾠdiplomatic	 ﾠpresence	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠUnion	 ﾠspeaking	 ﾠon	 ﾠbehalf	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠsingle	 ﾠ
legal	 ﾠentity	 ﾠactive	 ﾠglobally.	 ﾠImplementing	 ﾠthis	 ﾠambition	 ﾠhas	 ﾠmeant	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠformer	 ﾠ
‘Commission	 ﾠDelegations’	 ﾠhave	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠturned	 ﾠinto	 ﾠ‘Union	 ﾠdelegations’
107	 ﾠand	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ
for	 ﾠall	 ﾠpractical	 ﾠdiplomatic	 ﾠpurposes	 ﾠthey	 ﾠare	 ﾠseen	 ﾠas	 ﾠEU	 ﾠ‘embassies’.
108	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
  Given	 ﾠthe	 ﾠobjective	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠsingle	 ﾠdiplomatic	 ﾠpresence,	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠstriking	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠSpecial	 ﾠ
Representatives	 ﾠare	 ﾠnot	 ﾠmentioned	 ﾠin	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ5	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠDecision.	 ﾠStill,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠ
Union	 ﾠcurrently	 ﾠhas	 ﾠeleven	 ﾠSpecial	 ﾠRepresentatives	 ﾠ(EUSRs)	 ﾠin	 ﾠdifferent	 ﾠcountries	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠregions	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠworld.	 ﾠThey	 ﾠsupport	 ﾠthe	 ﾠwork	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠHigh	 ﾠRepresentative	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
form	 ﾠpart	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠexternal	 ﾠmachinery.	 ﾠ
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 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
105	 ﾠBut	 ﾠsee	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠdocument	 ﾠ‘EU	 ﾠDiplomatic	 ﾠRepresentation	 ﾠin	 ﾠthird	 ﾠcountries	 ﾠ–	 ﾠFirst	 ﾠhalf	 ﾠof	 ﾠ2012’,	 ﾠ
Council	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠUnion,	 ﾠDoc.	 ﾠ18975/1/11,	 ﾠREV	 ﾠ1,	 ﾠ11	 ﾠJanuary	 ﾠ2012,	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠreveals	 ﾠthat	 ﾠin	 ﾠsome	 ﾠ
countries	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEU	 ﾠis	 ﾠstill	 ﾠrepresented	 ﾠby	 ﾠa	 ﾠmember	 ﾠstate.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
106	 ﾠA.	 ﾠ Missiroli,	 ﾠ “The	 ﾠ New	 ﾠ EU	 ﾠ Foreign	 ﾠ Policy	 ﾠ System	 ﾠ after	 ﾠ Lisbon:	 ﾠ A	 ﾠ Work	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ Progress”	 ﾠ 15	 ﾠ (2010)	 ﾠ
European	 ﾠForeign	 ﾠAffairs	 ﾠReview	 ﾠpp.	 ﾠ427-ﾭ‐452.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
107	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠExternal	 ﾠAction	 ﾠService,	 ﾠReport	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠHigh	 ﾠRepresentative	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠParliament,	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠCouncil	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCommission,	 ﾠ22	 ﾠDecember	 ﾠ2011,	 ﾠ16.	 ﾠSee	 ﾠalso	 ﾠF.	 ﾠBergmüller,	 ﾠ“The	 ﾠEEAS:	 ﾠA	 ﾠLoss	 ﾠfor	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠCommission’s	 ﾠExternal	 ﾠRelations	 ﾠCapacities?”,	 ﾠin	 ﾠP.	 ﾠQuinn	 ﾠ(ed.),	 ﾠMaking	 ﾠEU	 ﾠDiplomacy	 ﾠ
work:	 ﾠCan	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠdeliver?	 ﾠ(2011)	 ﾠEU	 ﾠDiplomacy	 ﾠPapers8/2011,	 ﾠCollege	 ﾠof	 ﾠEurope,	 ﾠpp.	 ﾠ14-ﾭ‐18.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
108	 ﾠJ.	 ﾠWouters	 ﾠand	 ﾠS.	 ﾠDuquet,	 ﾠ‘The	 ﾠEU	 ﾠand	 ﾠInternational	 ﾠDiplomatic	 ﾠLaw:	 ﾠNew	 ﾠHorizons?’	 ﾠ(2012)	 ﾠ7	 ﾠ
Hague	 ﾠJournal	 ﾠof	 ﾠDiplomacy	 ﾠpp.	 ﾠ31-ﾭ‐49.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 47	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
  In	 ﾠa	 ﾠjoint	 ﾠletter	 ﾠof	 ﾠ3	 ﾠMarch	 ﾠ2010	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠForeign	 ﾠMinisters	 ﾠBildt	 ﾠof	 ﾠSweden	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
Miliband	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠUK	 ﾠto	 ﾠHigh	 ﾠRepresentative	 ﾠAshton,	 ﾠit	 ﾠwas	 ﾠnevertheless	 ﾠstressed	 ﾠ
that	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠwill	 ﾠneed	 ﾠan	 ﾠ“intimate	 ﾠrelationship	 ﾠwith	 ﾠits	 ﾠprincipal	 ﾠstakeholders	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠrest	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCommission,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠit	 ﾠmust	 ﾠhave	 ﾠthe	 ﾠkeys	 ﾠto	 ﾠits	 ﾠown	 ﾠhouse”.
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 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
  According	 ﾠto	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ5(1),	 ﾠthe	 ﾠHigh	 ﾠRepresentative	 ﾠis	 ﾠresponsible	 ﾠfor	 ﾠopening	 ﾠor	 ﾠ
closing	 ﾠ delegations.	 ﾠ He/she	 ﾠ does	 ﾠ so	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ agreement	 ﾠ with	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ Council	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ
Commission.	 ﾠ Given	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ fact	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ former	 ﾠ delegations	 ﾠ were	 ﾠ part	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ
Commission,	 ﾠthis	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠmajor	 ﾠinnovation.	 ﾠOpening	 ﾠa	 ﾠmission	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠforeign	 ﾠstate	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
thereby	 ﾠinstitutionalising	 ﾠdiplomatic	 ﾠrelations	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthat	 ﾠstate	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠfundamental	 ﾠ
step	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ international	 ﾠ law.	 ﾠ It	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ an	 ﾠ important	 ﾠ power	 ﾠ vested	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ High	 ﾠ
Representative,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCommission	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCouncil	 ﾠmust	 ﾠconcur.	 ﾠThis	 ﾠraises	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
question	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠpossibilities	 ﾠthe	 ﾠHigh	 ﾠRepresentative	 ﾠhas	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠone	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlatter,	 ﾠor	 ﾠ
both,	 ﾠdo	 ﾠnot	 ﾠagree.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠdecision	 ﾠto	 ﾠsend	 ﾠan	 ﾠenvoy	 ﾠor	 ﾠset	 ﾠup	 ﾠa	 ﾠless	 ﾠprestigious	 ﾠtype	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠpresence,	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠas	 ﾠan	 ﾠ‘office’,	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot	 ﾠmade	 ﾠdependent	 ﾠon	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠagreement.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
  The	 ﾠfacilities	 ﾠoffered	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠUnion	 ﾠDelegations	 ﾠare	 ﾠnot	 ﾠjust	 ﾠat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠservice	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
EEAS	 ﾠ itself	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ Commission,	 ﾠ but	 ﾠ also	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ other	 ﾠ institutions.	 ﾠ As	 ﾠ Article	 ﾠ 5(7)	 ﾠ
refers	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ “institutions	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ Union”,	 ﾠ it	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ clear	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ it	 ﾠ applies	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ formal	 ﾠ
institutions	 ﾠlisted	 ﾠin	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ13(1)	 ﾠTEU	 ﾠ(European	 ﾠParliament,	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠCouncil,	 ﾠ
Council,	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠCommission,	 ﾠCourt	 ﾠof	 ﾠJustice,	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠCentral	 ﾠBank,	 ﾠCourt	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
Auditors).	 ﾠIt	 ﾠcould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠsubmitted,	 ﾠthough,	 ﾠthat	 ﾠother	 ﾠEU	 ﾠbodies	 ﾠmay	 ﾠalso	 ﾠwant	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
rely	 ﾠon	 ﾠDelegations	 ﾠto	 ﾠ‘respond	 ﾠto	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠneeds’	 ﾠin	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠcontacts	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthird	 ﾠstates	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠinternational	 ﾠorganisations.	 ﾠThis	 ﾠsubmission	 ﾠis	 ﾠsupported	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprovisions	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
Art	 ﾠ 3(4)	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ EEAS	 ﾠ Decision	 ﾠ about	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ mandatory	 ﾠ extension	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ EEAS’	 ﾠ
”appropriate	 ﾠ support	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ other	 ﾠ institutions	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ bodies	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ Union”.	 ﾠ The	 ﾠ
latter’s	 ﾠformulation	 ﾠis	 ﾠgeneral:	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠis	 ﾠenvisaged	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠwhole,	 ﾠi.e.	 ﾠincluding	 ﾠ
central	 ﾠadministration	 ﾠand	 ﾠdelegations.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠidea	 ﾠis	 ﾠto	 ﾠhave	 ﾠDelegations	 ﾠfunction	 ﾠ
as	 ﾠa	 ﾠportal	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEU	 ﾠand	 ﾠit	 ﾠmakes	 ﾠsense	 ﾠnot	 ﾠto	 ﾠlimit	 ﾠthe	 ﾠquest	 ﾠfor	 ﾠconsistency	 ﾠon	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠbasis	 ﾠof	 ﾠformal	 ﾠrules.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠParliament	 ﾠis	 ﾠmentioned	 ﾠexplicitly.	 ﾠWhile	 ﾠ
this	 ﾠis	 ﾠlegally	 ﾠnot	 ﾠnecessary,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠreason	 ﾠmay	 ﾠbe	 ﾠto	 ﾠensure	 ﾠspecifically	 ﾠthat	 ﾠfor	 ﾠvisits	 ﾠ
abroad	 ﾠMEPs	 ﾠcan	 ﾠalso	 ﾠrely	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠservices	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠDelegations.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
  In	 ﾠterms	 ﾠof	 ﾠevaluation,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠDelegations	 ﾠare	 ﾠcovered	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsame	 ﾠrules	 ﾠas	 ﾠother	 ﾠEU	 ﾠ
bodies	 ﾠ(Article	 ﾠ5(5)).	 ﾠA	 ﾠsimilar	 ﾠprovision	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot	 ﾠincluded	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠas	 ﾠsuch,	 ﾠ
although	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ3(4)	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠrefer	 ﾠto	 ﾠspecific	 ﾠinspections	 ﾠby	 ﾠOLAF.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
2. Exchange	 ﾠof	 ﾠinformation	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠthe	 ﾠUnion	 ﾠDelegations	 ﾠand	 ﾠMember	 ﾠStates	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
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 ﾠJoint	 ﾠLetter	 ﾠdated	 ﾠ3	 ﾠMarch	 ﾠ2010	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠForeign	 ﾠMinisters	 ﾠCarl	 ﾠBildt	 ﾠand	 ﾠDavid	 ﾠMiliband	 ﾠto	 ﾠThe	 ﾠRight	 ﾠ
Honourable	 ﾠ Baroness	 ﾠ Ashton,	 ﾠ High	 ﾠ Representative	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ Union	 ﾠ for	 ﾠ Foreign	 ﾠ Affairs	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ Security	 ﾠ
Policy,	 ﾠVice	 ﾠPresident	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCommission.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 48	 ﾠ
  Article	 ﾠ5(9)	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCouncil	 ﾠDecision	 ﾠobliges	 ﾠUnion	 ﾠDelegations	 ﾠto	 ﾠwork	 ﾠin	 ﾠclose	 ﾠ
cooperation	 ﾠand	 ﾠshare	 ﾠinformation	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdiplomatic	 ﾠservices	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmember	 ﾠ
states.	 ﾠWhile	 ﾠthe	 ﾠMarch	 ﾠdraft	 ﾠdecision	 ﾠimposed	 ﾠa	 ﾠreciprocal	 ﾠobligation	 ﾠto	 ﾠshare	 ﾠ
information,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠDecision	 ﾠonly	 ﾠrefers	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠDelegations	 ﾠand	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠobligation	 ﾠ
to	 ﾠ share	 ﾠ information	 ﾠ with	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ diplomatic	 ﾠ services	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ Member	 ﾠ States.	 ﾠ The	 ﾠ
question	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ whether	 ﾠ this	 ﾠ would	 ﾠ imply	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ member	 ﾠ states	 ﾠ are	 ﾠ not	 ﾠ under	 ﾠ any	 ﾠ
obligation	 ﾠto	 ﾠshare	 ﾠinformation	 ﾠwith	 ﾠUnion	 ﾠDelegations.	 ﾠPursuant	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprinciple	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠsincere	 ﾠcooperation	 ﾠ(Article	 ﾠ4(3)	 ﾠTEU),	 ﾠthe	 ﾠloyalty	 ﾠobligation	 ﾠ(Article	 ﾠ24(3)	 ﾠTEU)	 ﾠ
as	 ﾠwell	 ﾠas	 ﾠthe	 ﾠspecific	 ﾠobligation	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdiplomatic	 ﾠmissions	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmember	 ﾠstates	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠthe	 ﾠUnion	 ﾠdelegations	 ﾠto	 ﾠcooperate	 ﾠ(Article	 ﾠ32(3)	 ﾠTEU),	 ﾠthis	 ﾠcannot,	 ﾠin	 ﾠour	 ﾠ
view,	 ﾠbe	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcorrect	 ﾠinterpretation.	 ﾠAs	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS-ﾭ‐Commission	 ﾠrelationship,	 ﾠone	 ﾠ
must	 ﾠagain	 ﾠlook	 ﾠat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠWorking	 ﾠArrangements	 ﾠof	 ﾠJanuary	 ﾠ2012,	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠstates	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
following	 ﾠconcerning	 ﾠreporting	 ﾠback	 ﾠto	 ﾠheadquarters:	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
EU	 ﾠ Delegations	 ﾠ shall	 ﾠ provide	 ﾠ political	 ﾠ reporting	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ HR/VP,	 ﾠ President	 ﾠ Barroso	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ
relevant	 ﾠ Commissioner(s),	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ EEAS	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ Commission	 ﾠ services	 ﾠ …A	 ﾠ two	 ﾠ way	 ﾠ flow	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ
information	 ﾠis	 ﾠessential	 ﾠ-ﾭ‐	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpolitical	 ﾠand	 ﾠtrade/economic	 ﾠsections	 ﾠof	 ﾠEU	 ﾠDelegations	 ﾠ
to	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠand	 ﾠCommission	 ﾠservices	 ﾠand	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠopposite	 ﾠdirection.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠgeographical	 ﾠdesks	 ﾠ
in	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠshall	 ﾠbe	 ﾠsystematically	 ﾠcopied	 ﾠon	 ﾠall	 ﾠreports	 ﾠand	 ﾠinformation	 ﾠrelative	 ﾠto	 ﾠher/his	 ﾠ
respective	 ﾠ country.	 ﾠ Delegations	 ﾠ shall	 ﾠ provide	 ﾠ relevant	 ﾠ reporting	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ other	 ﾠ Commission	 ﾠ
services	 ﾠ outside	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ external	 ﾠ relations	 ﾠ ‘family’.	 ﾠ The	 ﾠ Commission	 ﾠ services	 ﾠ shall	 ﾠ keep	 ﾠ EU	 ﾠ
Delegations	 ﾠinformed	 ﾠabout	 ﾠrelevant	 ﾠdevelopments,	 ﾠproviding	 ﾠlines	 ﾠto	 ﾠtake	 ﾠetc.
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 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
However,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠchallenge	 ﾠof	 ﾠpolitical	 ﾠreporting	 ﾠis	 ﾠless	 ﾠone	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠthe	 ﾠinstitutions	 ﾠ
themselves	 ﾠthan	 ﾠone	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEU	 ﾠDelegations	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmember	 ﾠstates.	 ﾠ	 ﾠAt	 ﾠ
present	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmember	 ﾠstates	 ﾠare	 ﾠmainly	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠreceiving	 ﾠend	 ﾠof	 ﾠEU	 ﾠDelegations’	 ﾠ
reports,	 ﾠ but	 ﾠ share	 ﾠ very	 ﾠ little	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ other	 ﾠ direction.	 ﾠ There	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ hope	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ
expectation	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthis	 ﾠwill	 ﾠchange	 ﾠas	 ﾠmember	 ﾠstates	 ﾠdiplomatic	 ﾠrepresentations	 ﾠ




3. Head	 ﾠof	 ﾠDelegation	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
  Pursuant	 ﾠto	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ5(2)	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCouncil	 ﾠDecision,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠHead	 ﾠof	 ﾠDelegation	 ﾠshall	 ﾠhave	 ﾠ
authority	 ﾠ over	 ﾠ all	 ﾠ staff	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ delegation	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ accountable	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ High	 ﾠ
Representative.	 ﾠHeads	 ﾠof	 ﾠDelegations	 ﾠde	 ﾠfacto	 ﾠact	 ﾠas	 ﾠ‘EU	 ﾠAmbassadors’.
112	 ﾠThe	 ﾠEU	 ﾠ
Heads	 ﾠof	 ﾠDelegations	 ﾠrepresenting	 ﾠthe	 ﾠUnion	 ﾠin	 ﾠthird	 ﾠstates	 ﾠand	 ﾠat	 ﾠinternational	 ﾠ
organisations	 ﾠare	 ﾠthus	 ﾠconferred	 ﾠthe	 ﾠauthority	 ﾠto	 ﾠperform	 ﾠfunctions	 ﾠequivalent	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
those	 ﾠof	 ﾠnational	 ﾠdiplomats.	 ﾠIt	 ﾠis	 ﾠinteresting	 ﾠto	 ﾠnote	 ﾠthat	 ﾠs/he	 ﾠhas	 ﾠauthority	 ﾠover	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
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 ﾠArrangements	 ﾠBetween	 ﾠCommission	 ﾠServices	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠExternal	 ﾠAction	 ﾠService	 ﾠ
(EEAS)	 ﾠin	 ﾠRelation	 ﾠto	 ﾠExternal	 ﾠRelations	 ﾠIssues,	 ﾠSEC(2012)48,	 ﾠpara.	 ﾠ1.2.	 ﾠ
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111	 ﾠB.	 ﾠvanVooren	 ﾠand	 ﾠR.A.	 ﾠWessel,	 ﾠ“External	 ﾠRepresentation	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠExternal	 ﾠAction	 ﾠService:	 ﾠ
Selected	 ﾠLegal	 ﾠChallenges”,	 ﾠin	 ﾠS.	 ﾠBlockmans	 ﾠand	 ﾠR.A.	 ﾠWessel	 ﾠ(Eds.),	 ﾠPrinciples	 ﾠand	 ﾠPractices	 ﾠof	 ﾠEU	 ﾠ
External	 ﾠRepresentation	 ﾠ(2012)	 ﾠThe	 ﾠHague:	 ﾠCLEER	 ﾠWorking	 ﾠPaper	 ﾠseries,	 ﾠpp.	 ﾠ59-ﾭ‐82.	 ﾠ
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112	 ﾠJ.	 ﾠWouters	 ﾠand	 ﾠS.	 ﾠDuquet,	 ﾠo.c.;	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpost-ﾭ‐Lisbon	 ﾠletters	 ﾠof	 ﾠcredence	 ﾠco-ﾭ‐signed	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠPresident	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠ European	 ﾠ Council	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ by	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ President	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ Commission	 ﾠ still	 ﾠ mention	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ head	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ
delegation	 ﾠshall	 ﾠhave	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ“rank	 ﾠand	 ﾠcourtesy	 ﾠtitle	 ﾠof	 ﾠambassador”.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 49	 ﾠ
all	 ﾠstaff,	 ﾠirrespective	 ﾠof	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠbriefs.	 ﾠThis	 ﾠimplies	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠHead	 ﾠof	 ﾠDelegation	 ﾠhas	 ﾠ
overall	 ﾠauthority,	 ﾠeven	 ﾠon	 ﾠdossiers	 ﾠthat	 ﾠwere	 ﾠnot	 ﾠprimarily	 ﾠprepared	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS,	 ﾠ
but	 ﾠ by	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ Commission.	 ﾠ Furthermore,	 ﾠ s/he	 ﾠ shall	 ﾠ be	 ﾠ accountable	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ High	 ﾠ
Representative	 ﾠin	 ﾠall	 ﾠcases,	 ﾠand	 ﾠnot	 ﾠto	 ﾠany	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCommissioners.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
  The	 ﾠHead	 ﾠof	 ﾠDelegation	 ﾠshall	 ﾠreceive	 ﾠinstructions	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠHigh	 ﾠRepresentative	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS,	 ﾠand	 ﾠshall	 ﾠbe	 ﾠresponsible	 ﾠfor	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠexecution	 ﾠ(Art.	 ﾠ5(3)	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCouncil	 ﾠ
Decision).	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
  During	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnegotiations	 ﾠon	 ﾠsetting	 ﾠup	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠquestions	 ﾠarose	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠsome	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
member	 ﾠstates	 ﾠwanting	 ﾠto	 ﾠsee	 ﾠ‘appropriate’	 ﾠinvolvement	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCommission	 ﾠbut	 ﾠ
with	 ﾠ‘all	 ﾠinstructions	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdelegations’	 ﾠflowing	 ﾠthrough	 ﾠthe	 ﾠHR	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
HoDs.
113	 ﾠArguably,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠformulation	 ﾠof	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ5(3)	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCouncil	 ﾠDecision	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠnot	 ﾠ
prevent	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ Commission	 ﾠ from	 ﾠ issuing	 ﾠ instructions	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ delegations	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ areas	 ﾠ
belonging	 ﾠto	 ﾠits	 ﾠcompetences,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠthese	 ﾠshall	 ﾠalso	 ﾠbe	 ﾠexecuted	 ﾠunder	 ﾠthe	 ﾠoverall	 ﾠ
responsibility	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ Head	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ Delegation.	 ﾠ The	 ﾠ 2012	 ﾠ Working	 ﾠ Arrangements	 ﾠ
between	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ Commission	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ EEAS	 ﾠ refer	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ situation	 ﾠ where	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ
Commission,	 ﾠthrough	 ﾠthe	 ﾠHead	 ﾠof	 ﾠDelegation,	 ﾠcalls	 ﾠon	 ﾠEU	 ﾠDelegations	 ﾠto	 ﾠcarry	 ﾠout	 ﾠ
activities	 ﾠrelated	 ﾠto	 ﾠpolicy	 ﾠimplementation,	 ﾠdemarches	 ﾠand	 ﾠpolicy	 ﾠadvocacy	 ﾠon	 ﾠ
issues	 ﾠof	 ﾠCommission	 ﾠcompetences	 ﾠ(e.g.	 ﾠtrade,	 ﾠhumanitarian	 ﾠaffairs,	 ﾠetc.).
114	 ﾠThe	 ﾠ
reference	 ﾠin	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ5(3)	 ﾠto	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ221(2)	 ﾠTFEU	 ﾠserves	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠreminder	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
Treaty	 ﾠitself	 ﾠhas	 ﾠplaced	 ﾠ“Union	 ﾠdelegations	 ﾠ[…]	 ﾠunder	 ﾠthe	 ﾠauthority	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠHigh	 ﾠ
Representative”.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠgeneral	 ﾠauthority	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠHead	 ﾠof	 ﾠDelegation,	 ﾠtogether	 ﾠwith	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠoverall	 ﾠresponsibility	 ﾠto	 ﾠexecute	 ﾠall	 ﾠinstructions	 ﾠis	 ﾠmeant	 ﾠto	 ﾠstrengthen	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
consistency	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEU’s	 ﾠpolicies	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠparticular	 ﾠthird	 ﾠstate	 ﾠor	 ﾠat	 ﾠan	 ﾠinternational	 ﾠ
organisation.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
  The	 ﾠ authority	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ responsibility	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ Head	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ Delegation	 ﾠ extends	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ
implementation	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfinancial	 ﾠdimensions	 ﾠof	 ﾠprojects	 ﾠin	 ﾠthird	 ﾠcountries,	 ﾠas	 ﾠs/he	 ﾠ
shall	 ﾠimplement	 ﾠthe	 ﾠoperational	 ﾠcredits.
115In	 ﾠthis	 ﾠcontext,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠHead	 ﾠof	 ﾠDelegation	 ﾠ
might	 ﾠbe	 ﾠacting	 ﾠon	 ﾠbehalf	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCommission.
116	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
  The	 ﾠEU	 ﾠenjoys	 ﾠinternational	 ﾠlegal	 ﾠpersonality,	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠallows	 ﾠit	 ﾠto	 ﾠenter	 ﾠinto	 ﾠlegal	 ﾠ
relations	 ﾠwith	 ﾠstates	 ﾠand	 ﾠother	 ﾠinternational	 ﾠorganisations.
117	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ5(8)	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	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 ﾠ	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 ﾠ	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 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
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113	 ﾠLetter	 ﾠDE	 ﾠAmb.	 ﾠPerm	 ﾠRep	 ﾠto	 ﾠES	 ﾠAmb.	 ﾠPerm	 ﾠRep,	 ﾠ2	 ﾠMarch	 ﾠ2010.	 ﾠ
114	 ﾠ	 ﾠWorking	 ﾠArrangements	 ﾠBetween	 ﾠCommission	 ﾠServices	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠExternal	 ﾠAction	 ﾠService	 ﾠ
(EEAS)	 ﾠin	 ﾠRelation	 ﾠto	 ﾠExternal	 ﾠRelations	 ﾠIssues,	 ﾠSEC(2012)48,	 ﾠpara.	 ﾠ1.1.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
115	 ﾠSee	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ9	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠDecision.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
116	 ﾠCf.	 ﾠCase	 ﾠT-ﾭ‐395/11	 ﾠEltid.o.o.	 ﾠv	 ﾠDelegation	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠUnion	 ﾠto	 ﾠMontenegro,	 ﾠOrder	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
General	 ﾠCourt	 ﾠ(Eighth	 ﾠChamber),	 ﾠjudgment	 ﾠof	 ﾠ4	 ﾠJune	 ﾠ2012,	 ﾠnyr.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
117	 ﾠSee	 ﾠmore	 ﾠextensively	 ﾠR.A.	 ﾠWessel,	 ﾠ“Revisiting	 ﾠthe	 ﾠInternational	 ﾠLegal	 ﾠStatus	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEU”,	 ﾠ(2000)	 ﾠ5	 ﾠ
European	 ﾠ Foreign	 ﾠ Affairs	 ﾠ Review	 ﾠ5 0 7 -ﾭ‐537;	 ﾠ R.A.	 ﾠ Wessel,	 ﾠ ‘The	 ﾠ European	 ﾠ Union	 ﾠ as	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ Party	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ
International	 ﾠ Agreements:	 ﾠ Shared	 ﾠ Competences,	 ﾠ Mixed	 ﾠ Responsibilities’,	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ A.	 ﾠ Dashwood	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ M.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 50	 ﾠ
Council	 ﾠ Decision	 ﾠ allows	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ Union	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ be	 ﾠ legally	 ﾠ represented	 ﾠ by	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ Head	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ
Delegation	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ country	 ﾠ where	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ Delegation	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ accredited.	 ﾠ The	 ﾠ provision	 ﾠ
explicitly	 ﾠ refers	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ conclusion	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ contracts,	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ role	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ Head	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ
Delegation	 ﾠ as	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ party	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ legal	 ﾠ proceedings,
118	 ﾠbut	 ﾠ this	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ not	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ be	 ﾠ seen	 ﾠ as	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ
limitative	 ﾠlist.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠthis	 ﾠcontext,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠquestion	 ﾠarises	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠa	 ﾠHead	 ﾠof	 ﾠDelegation	 ﾠ
could	 ﾠ initial	 ﾠ international	 ﾠ agreements	 ﾠ on	 ﾠ behalf	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ Union;	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ would	 ﾠ
obviously	 ﾠrequire	 ﾠadherence	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprovisions	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtreaty-ﾭ‐making	 ﾠprocedure	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
Article	 ﾠ218	 ﾠTFEU.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
4. Status	 ﾠof	 ﾠDelegations	 ﾠin	 ﾠthird	 ﾠstates	 ﾠand	 ﾠat	 ﾠinternational	 ﾠorganisations	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
  The	 ﾠEU	 ﾠis	 ﾠobviously	 ﾠnot	 ﾠa	 ﾠstate.	 ﾠYet,	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠan	 ﾠactive	 ﾠparticipant	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdiplomatic	 ﾠ
network	 ﾠof	 ﾠstates	 ﾠthat	 ﾠis	 ﾠ–	 ﾠprimarily	 ﾠ‒	 ﾠregulated	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠVienna	 ﾠConvention	 ﾠon	 ﾠ
Diplomatic	 ﾠRelations	 ﾠof	 ﾠ1961	 ﾠ(‘VCDR’).	 ﾠNot	 ﾠbeing	 ﾠa	 ﾠparty	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠVCDR,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠUnion	 ﾠ
has	 ﾠ developed	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ steady	 ﾠ practice	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ opt	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ its	 ﾠ application	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ contractual	 ﾠ
manner,	 ﾠ typically	 ﾠ through	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ conclusion	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ an	 ﾠ establishment	 ﾠ agreement	 ﾠ or	 ﾠ
headquarters	 ﾠ agreement.
119 	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ 5(6)	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ Council	 ﾠ Decision	 ﾠ foresees	 ﾠ
“arrangements”	 ﾠto	 ﾠdo	 ﾠexactly	 ﾠthis.	 ﾠAlthough	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtext	 ﾠrefers	 ﾠto	 ﾠ“arrangements”	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠ“measures”,	 ﾠin	 ﾠpractice	 ﾠan	 ﾠinternational	 ﾠagreement	 ﾠwill	 ﾠbe	 ﾠconcluded	 ﾠwith	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠhost	 ﾠstate	 ﾠor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠinternational	 ﾠorganisation	 ﾠconcerned,	 ﾠin	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠdiplomatic	 ﾠ
privileges	 ﾠand	 ﾠimmunities	 ﾠare	 ﾠprocured.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
  The	 ﾠfact	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠinternational	 ﾠrules	 ﾠon	 ﾠdiplomatic	 ﾠ(and	 ﾠconsular)	 ﾠrelations	 ﾠwere	 ﾠ
drafted	 ﾠfor	 ﾠstates	 ﾠmakes	 ﾠit	 ﾠdifficult	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEU	 ﾠto	 ﾠplay	 ﾠalong.	 ﾠOn	 ﾠan	 ﾠad	 ﾠhoc	 ﾠbasis	 ﾠit	 ﾠ
needs	 ﾠto	 ﾠcome	 ﾠto	 ﾠan	 ﾠagreement	 ﾠwith	 ﾠa	 ﾠthird	 ﾠstate	 ﾠor	 ﾠan	 ﾠinternational	 ﾠorganisation	 ﾠ
to	 ﾠregulate	 ﾠits	 ﾠstatus	 ﾠabroad.	 ﾠThis	 ﾠis	 ﾠfurther	 ﾠcomplicated	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfact	 ﾠthat	 ﾠin	 ﾠmost	 ﾠ
cases	 ﾠexternal	 ﾠcompetences	 ﾠare	 ﾠdivided	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEU	 ﾠand	 ﾠits	 ﾠmember	 ﾠstates.	 ﾠA	 ﾠ
practical	 ﾠissue,	 ﾠfor	 ﾠinstance,	 ﾠconcerns	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprovision	 ﾠof	 ﾠdiplomatic	 ﾠpassports.	 ﾠMost	 ﾠ
Member	 ﾠStates	 ﾠ(CZ,	 ﾠFR,	 ﾠIRL,	 ﾠLUX,	 ﾠLV,	 ﾠNL,	 ﾠPL,	 ﾠSK,	 ﾠSW)	 ﾠoffer	 ﾠpassports	 ﾠto	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠ
officials	 ﾠof	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠnationality,	 ﾠwhile	 ﾠothers	 ﾠcannot	 ﾠdo	 ﾠso	 ﾠwithout	 ﾠlegal	 ﾠchanges	 ﾠ(DE,	 ﾠ
EE,	 ﾠGR).	 ﾠGermany	 ﾠis	 ﾠreluctant	 ﾠto	 ﾠgrant	 ﾠdiplomatic	 ﾠpassports	 ﾠbecause	 ﾠit	 ﾠwould	 ﾠfeel	 ﾠ
compelled	 ﾠto	 ﾠprovide	 ﾠthem	 ﾠto	 ﾠall	 ﾠCommission	 ﾠofficials	 ﾠas	 ﾠwell.	 ﾠFR,	 ﾠGR,	 ﾠIRL,	 ﾠSW	 ﾠ
support	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ idea	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ common	 ﾠ European	 ﾠ travel	 ﾠ document	 ﾠ (laissez-ﾭ‐passer	 ﾠ
discussions	 ﾠwere	 ﾠhalted	 ﾠin	 ﾠ2009	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠobjective	 ﾠof	 ﾠissuing	 ﾠall	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠofficials	 ﾠwith	 ﾠ
a	 ﾠhigh	 ﾠquality	 ﾠtravel	 ﾠdocument).	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
5. Diplomatic	 ﾠand	 ﾠconsular	 ﾠsupport	 ﾠ
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 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Maresceau	 ﾠ (eds.),	 ﾠ Law	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ Practice	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ EU	 ﾠ External	 ﾠ Relations	 ﾠ –	 ﾠS a l i e n t 	 ﾠF e a t u r e s 	 ﾠo f 	 ﾠa 	 ﾠC h a n g i n g 	 ﾠ
Landscape	 ﾠ(Cambridge:	 ﾠCambridge	 ﾠUniversity	 ﾠPress,	 ﾠ2008)	 ﾠpp.	 ﾠ145-ﾭ‐180.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
118	 ﾠIbid.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠCase	 ﾠT-ﾭ‐395/11	 ﾠreferred	 ﾠto	 ﾠabove,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠGeneral	 ﾠCourt	 ﾠnuances	 ﾠthis	 ﾠrole	 ﾠby	 ﾠmaking	 ﾠit	 ﾠ
dependent	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠspecific	 ﾠsituation.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
119	 ﾠSee	 ﾠJ.	 ﾠWouters	 ﾠand	 ﾠS.	 ﾠDuquet,	 ﾠo.c.,	 ﾠ38-ﾭ‐39.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 51	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
  Another	 ﾠquestion	 ﾠis	 ﾠto	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠextent	 ﾠDelegations	 ﾠwould	 ﾠalso	 ﾠbe	 ﾠable	 ﾠto	 ﾠact	 ﾠas	 ﾠlegal	 ﾠ
representatives	 ﾠof	 ﾠEU	 ﾠcitizens,	 ﾠfor	 ﾠinstance	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmember	 ﾠstate	 ﾠof	 ﾠorigin	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠ
not	 ﾠhave	 ﾠa	 ﾠdiplomatic	 ﾠor	 ﾠconsular	 ﾠrepresentation	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠparticular	 ﾠthird	 ﾠstate.	 ﾠThis	 ﾠ
question	 ﾠis	 ﾠrelated	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmore	 ﾠgeneral	 ﾠquestion	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠand	 ﾠto	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠextent	 ﾠ
Delegations	 ﾠwould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠcompetent	 ﾠto	 ﾠact	 ﾠon	 ﾠbehalf	 ﾠon	 ﾠEU	 ﾠcitizens	 ﾠand	 ﾠto	 ﾠprotect	 ﾠ
their	 ﾠinterests	 ﾠabroad.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
  The	 ﾠMarch	 ﾠ2010	 ﾠdraft	 ﾠdecision	 ﾠmentioned	 ﾠ‘support	 ﾠthe	 ﾠMember	 ﾠStates	 ﾠin	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠ
diplomatic	 ﾠrelations	 ﾠand	 ﾠin	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠrole	 ﾠof	 ﾠproviding	 ﾠconsular	 ﾠprotection	 ﾠto	 ﾠUnion	 ﾠ
citizens	 ﾠin	 ﾠthird	 ﾠcountries”.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠCouncil	 ﾠDecision	 ﾠrefers	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsame	 ﾠrights	 ﾠ
but	 ﾠadds	 ﾠthe	 ﾠqualification	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthis	 ﾠmust	 ﾠbe	 ﾠ“on	 ﾠa	 ﾠresource-ﾭ‐neutral	 ﾠbasis”	 ﾠ(Article	 ﾠ
5(10)).	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
  Articles	 ﾠ3(5)	 ﾠTEU	 ﾠand	 ﾠ23	 ﾠTFEU	 ﾠprovide	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbasis	 ﾠfor	 ﾠdiplomatic	 ﾠprotection	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
consular	 ﾠassistance	 ﾠto	 ﾠEU	 ﾠcitizens.	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ3(5)	 ﾠTEU	 ﾠobliges	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEU	 ﾠto	 ﾠprotect	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
interests	 ﾠof	 ﾠits	 ﾠcitizens	 ﾠabroad,	 ﾠand	 ﾠpersons	 ﾠholding	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnationality	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠmember	 ﾠ
state	 ﾠare	 ﾠcitizens	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠUnion	 ﾠ(Article	 ﾠ20(1)	 ﾠTFEU).	 ﾠThe	 ﾠissue	 ﾠis	 ﾠcurrently	 ﾠunder	 ﾠ
discussion	 ﾠ on	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ basis	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ proposal	 ﾠ for	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ Council	 ﾠ Directive	 ﾠ on	 ﾠ
consular	 ﾠprotection	 ﾠfor	 ﾠcitizens	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠUnion	 ﾠabroad.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠrelation	 ﾠto	 ﾠa	 ﾠnumber	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
issues,	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ EP’s	 ﾠ Committee	 ﾠ on	 ﾠ Civil	 ﾠ Liberties,	 ﾠ Justice	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ Home	 ﾠ Affairs	 ﾠ (LIBE)	 ﾠ
proposed	 ﾠthe	 ﾠinclusion	 ﾠof	 ﾠan	 ﾠadditional	 ﾠrole	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠUnion	 ﾠdelegations	 ﾠin	 ﾠconsular	 ﾠ
protection	 ﾠas	 ﾠwell	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠclear	 ﾠcoordinating	 ﾠrole	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS.
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states	 ﾠare	 ﾠdivided	 ﾠon	 ﾠhow	 ﾠfar	 ﾠthe	 ﾠimplementation	 ﾠof	 ﾠthese	 ﾠprovisions	 ﾠshould	 ﾠgo.	 ﾠ
Some	 ﾠ	 ﾠsupport	 ﾠa	 ﾠgreater	 ﾠrole	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEU	 ﾠDelegations	 ﾠin	 ﾠconsular	 ﾠaffairs.	 ﾠThere	 ﾠ
seems	 ﾠroom	 ﾠfor	 ﾠdiscussion	 ﾠon	 ﾠa	 ﾠspecification	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠcivil	 ﾠprotection	 ﾠor	 ﾠevacuation	 ﾠ
role	 ﾠof	 ﾠDelegations	 ﾠfor	 ﾠfacilitating,	 ﾠpooling	 ﾠand	 ﾠdisseminating	 ﾠinformation	 ﾠdrawing	 ﾠ
on	 ﾠthe	 ﾠexperiences	 ﾠof	 ﾠJapan	 ﾠand	 ﾠSyria.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlong	 ﾠterm,	 ﾠif	 ﾠthe	 ﾠUnion	 ﾠwere	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
achieve	 ﾠfull	 ﾠdiplomatic	 ﾠmaturity,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmost	 ﾠfar-ﾭ‐reaching	 ﾠimplication	 ﾠmight	 ﾠbe	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠEU	 ﾠprovide	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠprotection	 ﾠas	 ﾠif	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpersons	 ﾠconcerned	 ﾠwere	 ﾠ‘nationals	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
EU’	 ﾠ for	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ purposes	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ international	 ﾠ law.	 ﾠ While	 ﾠ Article	 ﾠ 3(5)	 ﾠ TEU	 ﾠ could	 ﾠ
accommodate	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ interpretation,	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ role	 ﾠ explicitly	 ﾠ foreseen	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ EEAS	 ﾠ
Decision	 ﾠfor	 ﾠdiplomatic	 ﾠprotection	 ﾠand	 ﾠconsular	 ﾠassistance	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEU	 ﾠcurrently	 ﾠ
does	 ﾠnot,	 ﾠand	 ﾠis	 ﾠmerely	 ﾠsupplementary.	 ﾠWhat	 ﾠis	 ﾠcertain	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠperspective	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠEEAS,	 ﾠis	 ﾠthat	 ﾠif	 ﾠthe	 ﾠUnion	 ﾠwishes	 ﾠto	 ﾠpursue	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠa	 ﾠrole	 ﾠfor	 ﾠEU	 ﾠDelegations	 ﾠ
abroad,	 ﾠ significantly	 ﾠ more	 ﾠ financial	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ human	 ﾠ resources	 ﾠ will	 ﾠ need	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ be	 ﾠ
allocated	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ EU	 ﾠ diplomatic	 ﾠ service.	 ﾠ The	 ﾠ December	 ﾠ 2011	 ﾠ EEAS	 ﾠ evaluation	 ﾠ
report	 ﾠstated	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ“it	 ﾠis	 ﾠdifficult	 ﾠto	 ﾠsee	 ﾠhow	 ﾠthis	 ﾠobjective	 ﾠcould	 ﾠreasonably	 ﾠbe	 ﾠ
achieved	 ﾠ“on	 ﾠa	 ﾠresource-ﾭ‐	 ﾠneutral	 ﾠbasis”	 ﾠas	 ﾠrequired	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠDecision.	 ﾠIt	 ﾠwould	 ﾠ
certainly	 ﾠnot	 ﾠbe	 ﾠresponsible	 ﾠfor	 ﾠraising	 ﾠcitizens’	 ﾠexpectations	 ﾠabout	 ﾠthe	 ﾠservices	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
be	 ﾠprovided	 ﾠby	 ﾠEU	 ﾠDelegations,	 ﾠbeyond	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠcapacity	 ﾠto	 ﾠdeliver	 ﾠin	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠa	 ﾠsensitive	 ﾠ
area.	 ﾠAnd	 ﾠthe	 ﾠexisting	 ﾠexpertise	 ﾠwithin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠin	 ﾠthis	 ﾠarea	 ﾠis	 ﾠextremely	 ﾠlimited.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
120	 ﾠ	 ﾠReport	 ﾠof	 ﾠ10	 ﾠOctober	 ﾠ2012,	 ﾠPE	 ﾠ492.575v03-ﾭ‐00,	 ﾠA7-ﾭ‐0288/2012	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠproposal	 ﾠfor	 ﾠa	 ﾠCouncil	 ﾠ
directive	 ﾠon	 ﾠconsular	 ﾠprotection	 ﾠfor	 ﾠcitizens	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠUnion	 ﾠabroad,	 ﾠ(COM(2011)0881	 ﾠ–	 ﾠC7-ﾭ‐0017/2012	 ﾠ–	 ﾠ
2011/0432(CNS)),	 ﾠavailable	 ﾠat:	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
<http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-ﾭ‐//EP//TEXT+REPORT+A7-ﾭ‐2012-ﾭ‐
0288+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN>	 ﾠ(last	 ﾠvisited	 ﾠon	 ﾠ31	 ﾠJanuary).	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 52	 ﾠ
However,	 ﾠover	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpast	 ﾠyear	 ﾠwe	 ﾠhave	 ﾠalso	 ﾠseen	 ﾠthat	 ﾠEU	 ﾠDelegations	 ﾠcan	 ﾠplay	 ﾠan	 ﾠ
important	 ﾠrole	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcoordination	 ﾠof	 ﾠevacuations	 ﾠof	 ﾠcitizens	 ﾠand	 ﾠthat	 ﾠpragmatic	 ﾠ
solutions	 ﾠcan	 ﾠbe	 ﾠfound	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠground.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
  Article	 ﾠ5(8)	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCouncil	 ﾠDecision	 ﾠrefers	 ﾠto	 ﾠthird	 ﾠstates	 ﾠand	 ﾠnot	 ﾠto	 ﾠinternational	 ﾠ
organisations.	 ﾠ Yet,	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ legal	 ﾠ representation	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ Union	 ﾠ may	 ﾠ also	 ﾠ become	 ﾠ
relevant	 ﾠthere.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ




1.	 ﾠThis	 ﾠArticle,	 ﾠexcept	 ﾠparagraph	 ﾠ3,	 ﾠshall	 ﾠapply	 ﾠwithout	 ﾠprejudice	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠStaff	 ﾠRegulations	 ﾠof	 ﾠOfficials	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠCommunities	 ﾠ(‘Staff	 ﾠRegulations’)	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠConditions	 ﾠof	 ﾠEmployment	 ﾠof	 ﾠOther	 ﾠServants	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠthose	 ﾠCommunities	 ﾠ(‘CEOS’),	 ﾠincluding	 ﾠthe	 ﾠamendments	 ﾠmade	 ﾠto	 ﾠthose	 ﾠrules,	 ﾠin	 ﾠaccordance	 ﾠwith	 ﾠ
Article	 ﾠ336	 ﾠTFEU,	 ﾠin	 ﾠorder	 ﾠto	 ﾠadapt	 ﾠthem	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠneeds	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
2.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠshall	 ﾠcomprise	 ﾠofficials	 ﾠand	 ﾠother	 ﾠservants	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠUnion,	 ﾠincluding	 ﾠpersonnel	 ﾠ
from	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdiplomatic	 ﾠservices	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠMember	 ﾠStates	 ﾠappointed	 ﾠas	 ﾠtemporary	 ﾠagents.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠStaff	 ﾠRegulations	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCEOS	 ﾠshall	 ﾠapply	 ﾠto	 ﾠthis	 ﾠstaff.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
3.	 ﾠIf	 ﾠnecessary,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠmay,	 ﾠin	 ﾠspecific	 ﾠcases,	 ﾠhave	 ﾠrecourse	 ﾠto	 ﾠa	 ﾠlimited	 ﾠnumber	 ﾠof	 ﾠspecialised	 ﾠ
seconded	 ﾠnational	 ﾠexperts	 ﾠ(SNEs).	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠ High	 ﾠ Representative	 ﾠ shall	 ﾠ adopt	 ﾠ rules,	 ﾠ equivalent	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ those	 ﾠ laid	 ﾠ down	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ Council	 ﾠ Decision	 ﾠ
2003/479/EC	 ﾠof	 ﾠ16	 ﾠJune	 ﾠ2003	 ﾠconcerning	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrules	 ﾠapplicable	 ﾠto	 ﾠnational	 ﾠexperts	 ﾠand	 ﾠmilitary	 ﾠstaff	 ﾠon	 ﾠ
secondment	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠGeneral	 ﾠSecretariat	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCouncil	 ﾠ(	 ﾠ1	 ﾠ),	 ﾠunder	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠSNEs	 ﾠare	 ﾠput	 ﾠat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdisposal	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠin	 ﾠorder	 ﾠto	 ﾠprovide	 ﾠspecialised	 ﾠexpertise.	 ﾠ
4.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠstaff	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠshall	 ﾠcarry	 ﾠout	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠduties	 ﾠand	 ﾠconduct	 ﾠthemselves	 ﾠsolely	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠinterests	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠUnion	 ﾠin	 ﾠmind.	 ﾠWithout	 ﾠprejudice	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠthird	 ﾠindent	 ﾠof	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ2(1)	 ﾠand	 ﾠArticles	 ﾠ2(2)	 ﾠand	 ﾠ5(3),	 ﾠthey	 ﾠ
shall	 ﾠ neither	 ﾠ seek	 ﾠ nor	 ﾠ take	 ﾠ instructions	 ﾠ from	 ﾠ any	 ﾠ government,	 ﾠ authority,	 ﾠ organisation	 ﾠ or	 ﾠ person	 ﾠ
outside	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠor	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠany	 ﾠbody	 ﾠor	 ﾠperson	 ﾠother	 ﾠthan	 ﾠthe	 ﾠHigh	 ﾠRepresentative.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠaccordance	 ﾠwith	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠsecond	 ﾠparagraph	 ﾠof	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ11	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠStaff	 ﾠRegulations,	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠstaff	 ﾠshall	 ﾠnot	 ﾠaccept	 ﾠany	 ﾠpayments	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠany	 ﾠkind	 ﾠwhatever	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠany	 ﾠother	 ﾠsource	 ﾠoutside	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
5.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠpowers	 ﾠconferred	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠappointing	 ﾠauthority	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠStaff	 ﾠRegulations	 ﾠand	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠauthority	 ﾠ
authorised	 ﾠto	 ﾠconclude	 ﾠcontracts	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCEOS	 ﾠshall	 ﾠbe	 ﾠvested	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠHigh	 ﾠRepresentative,	 ﾠwho	 ﾠmay	 ﾠ
delegate	 ﾠthose	 ﾠpowers	 ﾠinside	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
6.	 ﾠRecruitment	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠshall	 ﾠbe	 ﾠbased	 ﾠon	 ﾠmerit	 ﾠwhilst	 ﾠensuring	 ﾠadequate	 ﾠgeographical	 ﾠand	 ﾠgender	 ﾠ
balance.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠstaff	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠshall	 ﾠcomprise	 ﾠa	 ﾠmeaningful	 ﾠpresence	 ﾠof	 ﾠnationals	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠall	 ﾠthe	 ﾠMember	 ﾠ
States.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠreview	 ﾠprovided	 ﾠfor	 ﾠin	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ13(3)	 ﾠshall	 ﾠalso	 ﾠcover	 ﾠthis	 ﾠissue,	 ﾠincluding,	 ﾠas	 ﾠappropriate,	 ﾠ
suggestions	 ﾠfor	 ﾠadditional	 ﾠspecific	 ﾠmeasures	 ﾠto	 ﾠcorrect	 ﾠpossible	 ﾠimbalances.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
7.	 ﾠOfficials	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠUnion	 ﾠand	 ﾠtemporary	 ﾠagents	 ﾠcoming	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdiplomatic	 ﾠservices	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠMember	 ﾠ
States	 ﾠshall	 ﾠhave	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsame	 ﾠrights	 ﾠand	 ﾠobligations	 ﾠand	 ﾠbe	 ﾠtreated	 ﾠequally,	 ﾠin	 ﾠparticular	 ﾠas	 ﾠconcerns	 ﾠ
their	 ﾠ eligibility	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ assume	 ﾠ all	 ﾠ positions	 ﾠ under	 ﾠ equivalent	 ﾠ conditions.	 ﾠ No	 ﾠ distinction	 ﾠ shall	 ﾠ be	 ﾠ made	 ﾠ
between	 ﾠtemporary	 ﾠagents	 ﾠcoming	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠnational	 ﾠdiplomatic	 ﾠservices	 ﾠand	 ﾠofficials	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠUnion	 ﾠas	 ﾠ
regards	 ﾠthe	 ﾠassignment	 ﾠof	 ﾠduties	 ﾠto	 ﾠperform	 ﾠin	 ﾠall	 ﾠareas	 ﾠof	 ﾠactivities	 ﾠand	 ﾠpolicies	 ﾠimplemented	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
EEAS.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠaccordance	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprovisions	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠFinancial	 ﾠRegulation,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠMember	 ﾠStates	 ﾠshall	 ﾠsupport	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠ Union	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ enforcement	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ financial	 ﾠ liabilities	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ EEAS	 ﾠ temporary	 ﾠ agents	 ﾠ coming	 ﾠ from	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ
Member	 ﾠStates’	 ﾠdiplomatic	 ﾠservices	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠresult	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠa	 ﾠliability	 ﾠunder	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ66	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠFinancial	 ﾠ
Regulation.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
8.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠHigh	 ﾠRepresentative	 ﾠshall	 ﾠestablish	 ﾠthe	 ﾠselection	 ﾠprocedures	 ﾠfor	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠstaff,	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠshall	 ﾠbe	 ﾠ
undertaken	 ﾠ through	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ transparent	 ﾠ procedure	 ﾠ based	 ﾠ on	 ﾠ merit	 ﾠ with	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ objective	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ securing	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ
services	 ﾠof	 ﾠstaff	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠhighest	 ﾠstandard	 ﾠof	 ﾠability,	 ﾠefficiency	 ﾠand	 ﾠintegrity,	 ﾠwhile	 ﾠensuring	 ﾠadequate	 ﾠ
geographical	 ﾠand	 ﾠgender	 ﾠbalance,	 ﾠand	 ﾠa	 ﾠmeaningful	 ﾠpresence	 ﾠof	 ﾠnationals	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠall	 ﾠMember	 ﾠStates	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠEEAS.	 ﾠRepresentatives	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠMember	 ﾠStates,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠGeneral	 ﾠSecretariat	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCouncil	 ﾠand	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
Commission	 ﾠshall	 ﾠbe	 ﾠinvolved	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrecruitment	 ﾠprocedure	 ﾠfor	 ﾠvacant	 ﾠposts	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS.	 ﾠ
9.	 ﾠWhen	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠhas	 ﾠreached	 ﾠits	 ﾠfull	 ﾠcapacity,	 ﾠstaff	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠMember	 ﾠStates,	 ﾠas	 ﾠreferred	 ﾠto	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfirst	 ﾠ
subparagraph	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ paragraph	 ﾠ 2,	 ﾠ should	 ﾠ represent	 ﾠ at	 ﾠ least	 ﾠ one	 ﾠ third	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ all	 ﾠ EEAS	 ﾠ staff	 ﾠ at	 ﾠ AD	 ﾠ level.	 ﾠ
Likewise,	 ﾠpermanent	 ﾠofficials	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠUnion	 ﾠshould	 ﾠrepresent	 ﾠat	 ﾠleast	 ﾠ60	 ﾠ%	 ﾠof	 ﾠall	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠstaff	 ﾠat	 ﾠAD	 ﾠlevel,	 ﾠ
including	 ﾠ staff	 ﾠ coming	 ﾠ from	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ diplomatic	 ﾠ services	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ Member	 ﾠ States	 ﾠ who	 ﾠ have	 ﾠ become	 ﾠ
permanent	 ﾠofficials	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠUnion	 ﾠin	 ﾠaccordance	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprovisions	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠStaff	 ﾠRegulations.	 ﾠEach	 ﾠyear,	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 54	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠHigh	 ﾠRepresentative	 ﾠshall	 ﾠpresent	 ﾠa	 ﾠreport	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠParliament	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCouncil	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
occupation	 ﾠof	 ﾠposts	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
10.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠHigh	 ﾠRepresentative	 ﾠshall	 ﾠlay	 ﾠdown	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrules	 ﾠon	 ﾠmobility	 ﾠso	 ﾠas	 ﾠto	 ﾠensure	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmembers	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠstaff	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠare	 ﾠsubject	 ﾠto	 ﾠa	 ﾠhigh	 ﾠdegree	 ﾠof	 ﾠmobility.	 ﾠSpecific	 ﾠand	 ﾠdetailed	 ﾠarrangements	 ﾠshall	 ﾠ
apply	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpersonnel	 ﾠreferred	 ﾠto	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠthird	 ﾠindent	 ﾠof	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ4(3)(a).	 ﾠIn	 ﾠprinciple,	 ﾠall	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠstaff	 ﾠshall	 ﾠ
periodically	 ﾠserve	 ﾠin	 ﾠUnion	 ﾠdelegations.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠHigh	 ﾠRepresentative	 ﾠshall	 ﾠestablish	 ﾠrules	 ﾠto	 ﾠthat	 ﾠeffect.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
11.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠaccordance	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠapplicable	 ﾠprovisions	 ﾠof	 ﾠits	 ﾠnational	 ﾠlaw,	 ﾠeach	 ﾠMember	 ﾠState	 ﾠshall	 ﾠprovide	 ﾠ
its	 ﾠ officials	 ﾠ who	 ﾠ have	 ﾠ become	 ﾠ temporary	 ﾠ agents	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ EEAS	 ﾠ with	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ guarantee	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ immediate	 ﾠ
reinstatement	 ﾠat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠend	 ﾠof	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠperiod	 ﾠof	 ﾠservice	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS.	 ﾠThis	 ﾠperiod	 ﾠof	 ﾠservice,	 ﾠin	 ﾠaccordance	 ﾠ
with	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprovisions	 ﾠof	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ50b	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCEOS,	 ﾠshall	 ﾠnot	 ﾠexceed	 ﾠeight	 ﾠyears,	 ﾠunless,	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠextended	 ﾠfor	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
maximum	 ﾠperiod	 ﾠof	 ﾠtwo	 ﾠyears	 ﾠin	 ﾠexceptional	 ﾠcircumstances	 ﾠand	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠinterest	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠservice.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Officials	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠUnion	 ﾠserving	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠshall	 ﾠhave	 ﾠthe	 ﾠright	 ﾠto	 ﾠapply	 ﾠfor	 ﾠposts	 ﾠin	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠinstitution	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
origin	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsame	 ﾠterms	 ﾠas	 ﾠinternal	 ﾠapplicants.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
12.	 ﾠSteps	 ﾠshall	 ﾠbe	 ﾠtaken	 ﾠin	 ﾠorder	 ﾠto	 ﾠprovide	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠstaff	 ﾠwith	 ﾠadequate	 ﾠcommon	 ﾠtraining,	 ﾠbuilding	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
particular	 ﾠon	 ﾠexisting	 ﾠpractices	 ﾠand	 ﾠstructures	 ﾠat	 ﾠnational	 ﾠand	 ﾠUnion	 ﾠlevel.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠHigh	 ﾠRepresentative	 ﾠ
shall	 ﾠtake	 ﾠappropriate	 ﾠmeasures	 ﾠto	 ﾠthat	 ﾠeffect	 ﾠwithin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠyear	 ﾠfollowing	 ﾠthe	 ﾠentry	 ﾠinto	 ﾠforce	 ﾠof	 ﾠthis	 ﾠ
Decision.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
This	 ﾠlong	 ﾠarticle	 ﾠaddresses	 ﾠstaffing	 ﾠissues	 ﾠat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS.	 ﾠAs	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ27(3)	 ﾠTEU	 ﾠenvisaged	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠcomposition	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠService	 ﾠonly	 ﾠin	 ﾠgeneral	 ﾠterms	 ﾠ(“shall	 ﾠcomprise	 ﾠofficials	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠ
relevant	 ﾠdepartments	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠGeneral	 ﾠSecretariat	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCouncil	 ﾠand	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
Commission	 ﾠas	 ﾠwell	 ﾠas	 ﾠstaff	 ﾠseconded	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠnational	 ﾠdiplomatic	 ﾠservices	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
Member	 ﾠStates”),	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠDecisionhad	 ﾠto	 ﾠinclude	 ﾠa	 ﾠfair	 ﾠdegree	 ﾠof	 ﾠdetail,	 ﾠ–on	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠ
are	 ﾠprimarily	 ﾠinternal	 ﾠmatters.	 ﾠFrequent	 ﾠreference	 ﾠis	 ﾠmade	 ﾠin	 ﾠthis	 ﾠarticle	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
(amended)	 ﾠStaff	 ﾠRegulations	 ﾠand	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠConditions	 ﾠof	 ﾠEmployment	 ﾠof	 ﾠOther	 ﾠServants	 ﾠ
(CEOS).
121	 ﾠThe	 ﾠamended	 ﾠStaff	 ﾠRegulations	 ﾠnote	 ﾠthat,	 ﾠ“in	 ﾠview	 ﾠof	 ﾠ[the	 ﾠService’s]	 ﾠ
specific	 ﾠtasks,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠshould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠgranted	 ﾠautonomy	 ﾠwithin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠframework	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
Staff	 ﾠRegulations”.	 ﾠ	 ﾠFor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpurposes	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠStaff	 ﾠRegulations	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCEOS,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠ





  The	 ﾠbasic	 ﾠ(initial)	 ﾠcomposition	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠstaff	 ﾠhad	 ﾠalready	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠdetermined	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
final	 ﾠ report	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ Convention’s	 ﾠ Working	 ﾠ Group	 ﾠ VII	 ﾠ on	 ﾠ External	 ﾠ Action	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ 16	 ﾠ
December	 ﾠ2002,	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠtouched	 ﾠupon	 ﾠstaffing	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprojected	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠen	 ﾠpassant,	 ﾠ
mentioning	 ﾠthat	 ﾠit	 ﾠwould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠcomposed	 ﾠof	 ﾠstaff	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠDG	 ﾠRelex,	 ﾠCouncil	 ﾠSecretariat	 ﾠ
officials	 ﾠand	 ﾠstaff	 ﾠseconded	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnational	 ﾠdiplomatic	 ﾠservices.
122	 ﾠThe	 ﾠ2005	 ﾠ
Barroso	 ﾠand	 ﾠSolana	 ﾠJoint	 ﾠProgress	 ﾠReport	 ﾠstressed	 ﾠthe	 ﾠimportance	 ﾠof	 ﾠhaving	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
“sufficient	 ﾠ number”	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ national	 ﾠ diplomats	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ EEAS	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ argued	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ they	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
121	 ﾠRegulation	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠParliament	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCouncil	 ﾠamending	 ﾠthe	 ﾠStaff	 ﾠRegulations	 ﾠof	 ﾠOfficials	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ European	 ﾠ Communities	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ Conditions	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ Employment	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ Other	 ﾠ Servants	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ those	 ﾠ
Communities,	 ﾠPE-ﾭ‐CONS	 ﾠ52/10,	 ﾠStrasbourg,	 ﾠ9	 ﾠNovember	 ﾠ2010.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
122	 ﾠFinal	 ﾠReport	 ﾠof	 ﾠWorking	 ﾠGroup	 ﾠVII	 ﾠon	 ﾠExternal	 ﾠAction,	 ﾠBrussels,	 ﾠCONV	 ﾠ459/02,	 ﾠ16	 ﾠDecember	 ﾠ2002,	 ﾠ
p.	 ﾠ6.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 55	 ﾠ
should	 ﾠbe	 ﾠtemporarily	 ﾠassigned,	 ﾠrather	 ﾠthan	 ﾠseconded,	 ﾠso	 ﾠthat	 ﾠall	 ﾠstaff	 ﾠshould	 ﾠ
have	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ“same	 ﾠstatus	 ﾠand	 ﾠconditions	 ﾠof	 ﾠemployment”.	 ﾠIt	 ﾠwas	 ﾠalso	 ﾠagreed	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠnomination	 ﾠof	 ﾠstaff	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠshould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠ“based	 ﾠon	 ﾠmerit	 ﾠwith	 ﾠappropriate	 ﾠ
selection	 ﾠ procedures”.
123	 ﾠA	 ﾠ fiche	 ﾠ on	 ﾠ “Specific	 ﾠ arrangements	 ﾠ concerning	 ﾠ EEAS	 ﾠ
staff”	 ﾠof	 ﾠ12	 ﾠOctober	 ﾠ2009	 ﾠhelpfully	 ﾠdistinguished	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠthe	 ﾠstaffing	 ﾠdemands	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠthe	 ﾠinitial	 ﾠset-ﾭ‐up	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠService	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfollowing	 ﾠperiod	 ﾠand	 ﾠnoted	 ﾠthe	 ﾠneed	 ﾠfor	 ﾠ
a	 ﾠpolicy	 ﾠof	 ﾠmobility	 ﾠin	 ﾠorder	 ﾠto	 ﾠavoid	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcreation	 ﾠof	 ﾠ“flagged	 ﾠposts”.
124	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
  The	 ﾠ High	 ﾠ Representative’s	 ﾠ “Step	 ﾠ Change”	 ﾠ document,	 ﾠ which	 ﾠ was	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ effect	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ
preview	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ March	 ﾠ 2010	 ﾠ draft	 ﾠ decision,	 ﾠ gave	 ﾠ an	 ﾠ overview	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ both	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ
architecture	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠService	 ﾠas	 ﾠwell	 ﾠas	 ﾠreaffirming	 ﾠmany	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpreviously	 ﾠdiscussed	 ﾠ
staffing	 ﾠ aspects,	 ﾠ including	 ﾠ transitional	 ﾠ arrangements	 ﾠ for	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ start-ﾭ‐up	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ
Service	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ pledge	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ EEAS	 ﾠ Decision	 ﾠ would	 ﾠ establish	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ principle	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ
rotation	 ﾠwithin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS.
125	 ﾠThe	 ﾠactual	 ﾠexplanatory	 ﾠmemorandum	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠMarch	 ﾠ
draft	 ﾠ decision	 ﾠ reiterates	 ﾠ many	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ above	 ﾠ points	 ﾠ but,	 ﾠ somewhat	 ﾠ curiously,	 ﾠ
introduces	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ Consultative	 ﾠ Committee	 ﾠ on	 ﾠ Appointments	 ﾠ (CCA),	 ﾠ which	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ
selection	 ﾠpanel	 ﾠfor	 ﾠsenior	 ﾠappointments	 ﾠ(director	 ﾠand	 ﾠabove)	 ﾠas	 ﾠwell	 ﾠas	 ﾠhaving	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
more	 ﾠgeneral	 ﾠmandate	 ﾠto	 ﾠmonitor	 ﾠgender	 ﾠand	 ﾠgeographical	 ﾠbalance,	 ﾠalthough	 ﾠthis	 ﾠ
is	 ﾠ not	 ﾠ mentioned	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ EEAS	 ﾠ Decision	 ﾠ itself.
126	 ﾠThe	 ﾠ list	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ staff	 ﾠ due	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ be	 ﾠ
transferred	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ EEAS	 ﾠ (was)	 ﾠ transmitted	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ an	 ﾠ annex	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ this	 ﾠ document	 ﾠ
communicated	 ﾠalmost	 ﾠa	 ﾠmonth	 ﾠlater.
127	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
  The	 ﾠ specifics	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ how	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ ensure	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ desired	 ﾠ one-ﾭ‐third	 ﾠ contribution	 ﾠ from	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ
member	 ﾠstates	 ﾠ(at	 ﾠAD	 ﾠlevel)	 ﾠreceived	 ﾠfurther	 ﾠthought	 ﾠand	 ﾠattention	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠreport	 ﾠby	 ﾠ




  Amendments	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠStaff	 ﾠRegulations	 ﾠand	 ﾠCEOS	 ﾠwere	 ﾠnecessary	 ﾠto	 ﾠincorporate	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠEEAS.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠrevised	 ﾠRegulations	 ﾠreflect	 ﾠmany	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠissues	 ﾠdiscussed	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
travauxpréparatoires,	 ﾠ such	 ﾠ as	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ balance	 ﾠ between	 ﾠ AD	 ﾠ officials	 ﾠ coming	 ﾠ from	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
123Joint	 ﾠProgress	 ﾠReport	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠSecretary-ﾭ‐General/High	 ﾠRepresentative	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCommission	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
European	 ﾠExternal	 ﾠAction	 ﾠService,	 ﾠ9956/05,	 ﾠBrussels,	 ﾠ9	 ﾠJune	 ﾠ2005,	 ﾠParas.	 ﾠ13-ﾭ‐14.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
124Fiche	 ﾠon	 ﾠSpecific	 ﾠArrangements	 ﾠconcerning	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠstaff,	 ﾠ12	 ﾠOctober	 ﾠ2009,	 ﾠp.	 ﾠ5.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
125	 ﾠ“A	 ﾠStep	 ﾠChange	 ﾠin	 ﾠexternal	 ﾠpolicy	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠUnion:	 ﾠDelivering	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpromise	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠLisbon	 ﾠTreaty”,	 ﾠ
Annex	 ﾠ1,	 ﾠ3	 ﾠMarch	 ﾠ2010,	 ﾠSection	 ﾠ5.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
126	 ﾠDraft	 ﾠ decision	 ﾠ establishing	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ organisation	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ functioning	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ European	 ﾠ External	 ﾠ Action	 ﾠ
Service,	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠHigh	 ﾠRepresentative	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCouncil,	 ﾠExplanatory	 ﾠMemorandum,	 ﾠ8029/10,	 ﾠBrussels,	 ﾠ
25	 ﾠMarch	 ﾠ2010,	 ﾠp.	 ﾠ3.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
127Annex	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠproposal	 ﾠfor	 ﾠa	 ﾠCouncil	 ﾠdecision	 ﾠestablishing	 ﾠthe	 ﾠorganisation	 ﾠand	 ﾠfunctioning	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
European	 ﾠExternal	 ﾠAction	 ﾠService,	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠHigh	 ﾠRepresentative	 ﾠto	 ﾠCOREPER,	 ﾠ8870/10,	 ﾠ22	 ﾠApril	 ﾠ2010.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
128	 ﾠReport	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠHigh	 ﾠRepresentative,	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠStaffing	 ﾠ–	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcontribution	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠMember	 ﾠStates,	 ﾠ4	 ﾠ
June	 ﾠ2010.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 56	 ﾠ
member	 ﾠ states’	 ﾠ diplomatic	 ﾠ services	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ permanent	 ﾠ EU	 ﾠ officials.	 ﾠ The	 ﾠ issue	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ
geographical	 ﾠand	 ﾠgender	 ﾠbalance	 ﾠwas	 ﾠdiscussed	 ﾠintensively	 ﾠduring	 ﾠthe	 ﾠco-ﾭ‐decision	 ﾠ
procedure,	 ﾠresulting	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlegal	 ﾠtext	 ﾠbeing	 ﾠsupplemented	 ﾠby	 ﾠstatements	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
High	 ﾠ Representative	 ﾠ pledging	 ﾠ appropriate	 ﾠ action	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ promote	 ﾠ geographical	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ
gender	 ﾠbalance.
129	 ﾠReference	 ﾠin	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ6(1)	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCouncil	 ﾠDecision	 ﾠto	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ336	 ﾠ
TFEU	 ﾠserves	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠreminder	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprocedures	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠamendment	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠStaff	 ﾠ
Regulations	 ﾠ (“in	 ﾠ accordance	 ﾠ with	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ ordinary	 ﾠ legislative	 ﾠ procedure	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ after	 ﾠ
consulting	 ﾠother	 ﾠinstitutions	 ﾠconcerned...”).	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
  Article	 ﾠ 6(2)	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ Council	 ﾠ Decision	 ﾠ reaffirms	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ composition	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ EEAS.	 ﾠ It	 ﾠ
should	 ﾠ be	 ﾠ noted	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ general	 ﾠ wording	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ paragraph	 ﾠ serves	 ﾠ both	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ
current	 ﾠ (transition)	 ﾠ composition	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ EEAS	 ﾠ until	 ﾠ 30	 ﾠ June	 ﾠ 2013	 ﾠ (in	 ﾠ line	 ﾠ with	 ﾠ
Article	 ﾠ98(1)	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠStaff	 ﾠRegulations)	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsituation	 ﾠthereafter	 ﾠwhereby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
Service	 ﾠshall	 ﾠconsider	 ﾠapplications	 ﾠof	 ﾠofficials	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠother	 ﾠEU	 ﾠinstitutions.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
  The	 ﾠ importance	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ quota	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ permanent	 ﾠ officials	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ temporarily	 ﾠ assigned	 ﾠ
diplomats	 ﾠ reflects	 ﾠ concerns	 ﾠ stemming	 ﾠ from	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ number	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ
travauxpréparatoires.	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ6(9)	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠnot	 ﾠspecify	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠshould	 ﾠ‘reach	 ﾠ
full	 ﾠcapacity’	 ﾠbut	 ﾠthe	 ﾠamended	 ﾠStaff	 ﾠRegulations	 ﾠmake	 ﾠit	 ﾠclear	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthis	 ﾠshould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠ
by	 ﾠ 1	 ﾠ July	 ﾠ 2013	 ﾠ (at	 ﾠ which	 ﾠ time	 ﾠ derogations	 ﾠ from	 ﾠ Article	 ﾠ 98(1)	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ Staff	 ﾠ
Regulations	 ﾠ should	 ﾠ desist).	 ﾠ The	 ﾠ latest	 ﾠ EEAS	 ﾠ report	 ﾠ on	 ﾠ staffing,	 ﾠ reflecting	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ
situation	 ﾠas	 ﾠof	 ﾠ1	 ﾠJune	 ﾠ2012,	 ﾠdemonstrates	 ﾠgood	 ﾠprogress	 ﾠon	 ﾠattaining	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdesired	 ﾠ
one-ﾭ‐third	 ﾠlevel	 ﾠfor	 ﾠstaff	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmember	 ﾠstates	 ﾠat	 ﾠAD	 ﾠlevel.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠparagraph	 ﾠrefers	 ﾠ
only	 ﾠto	 ﾠa	 ﾠgeneral	 ﾠbalance	 ﾠand	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠnot	 ﾠspecify	 ﾠhow	 ﾠany	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠbalance	 ﾠshould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠ
attained	 ﾠ between	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ headquarters	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ Delegations.	 ﾠ The	 ﾠ indication	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ
desirable	 ﾠ ‘balance’	 ﾠ between	 ﾠ temporarily	 ﾠ assigned	 ﾠ national	 ﾠ diplomats	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ EU	 ﾠ
officials	 ﾠgives	 ﾠrise	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠquestion,	 ﾠwith	 ﾠregard	 ﾠto	 ﾠparagraphs	 ﾠ6	 ﾠand	 ﾠ8,	 ﾠof	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠ
other	 ﾠforms	 ﾠof	 ﾠbalance	 ﾠshould	 ﾠnot	 ﾠbe	 ﾠexpressed	 ﾠin	 ﾠgeneral	 ﾠterms.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
  The	 ﾠsituation	 ﾠfollowing	 ﾠexpiry	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠderogations	 ﾠnoted	 ﾠabove	 ﾠ(which	 ﾠwill	 ﾠcoincide	 ﾠ
with	 ﾠthe	 ﾠreview	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS)	 ﾠimplies	 ﾠthat	 ﾠdirect	 ﾠrecruitment	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠService	 ﾠwill	 ﾠbe	 ﾠ
possible	 ﾠ on	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ basis	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ open	 ﾠ competition,	 ﾠ beyond	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ pool	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ primarily	 ﾠ
transferred	 ﾠstaff	 ﾠ(see	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ7	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCouncil	 ﾠdecision)	 ﾠwho	 ﾠcomprised	 ﾠmuch	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠinitial	 ﾠService.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠlikely	 ﾠimplications	 ﾠof	 ﾠthis	 ﾠfor	 ﾠany	 ﾠnecessary	 ﾠrebalancing	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
line	 ﾠwith	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ6(6	 ﾠand	 ﾠ8)	 ﾠshould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠcarefully	 ﾠconsidered.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
  The	 ﾠRules	 ﾠregarding	 ﾠSeconded	 ﾠNational	 ﾠExperts	 ﾠreferred	 ﾠto	 ﾠin	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ6(3)	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
Council	 ﾠDecision	 ﾠhave	 ﾠsince	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠadopted.
130	 ﾠParagraph	 ﾠ3	 ﾠstates	 ﾠthat	 ﾠrules	 ﾠshall	 ﾠ
be	 ﾠadopted	 ﾠequivalent	 ﾠto	 ﾠthose	 ﾠlaid	 ﾠdown	 ﾠin	 ﾠCouncil	 ﾠDecision	 ﾠ2003/479/EC	 ﾠof	 ﾠ16	 ﾠ
June	 ﾠ2003,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠthese	 ﾠhave	 ﾠsince	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠrepealed	 ﾠand	 ﾠreplaced	 ﾠby	 ﾠCouncil	 ﾠDecision	 ﾠ
2007/829/EC	 ﾠof	 ﾠ5	 ﾠDecember	 ﾠ2007.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
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 ﾠSee	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠExternal	 ﾠAction	 ﾠService	 ﾠ–	 ﾠadoption	 ﾠof	 ﾠfinal	 ﾠlegal	 ﾠacts,	 ﾠMEMO/10.521,	 ﾠBrussels,	 ﾠ25	 ﾠ
October	 ﾠ2010.	 ﾠ
130	 ﾠSee	 ﾠDecision	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠHigh	 ﾠRepresentative	 ﾠof	 ﾠ23	 ﾠMarch	 ﾠ2011	 ﾠestablishing	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrules	 ﾠapplicable	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
National	 ﾠExperts	 ﾠSeconded	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 57	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
  Article	 ﾠ6(7)	 ﾠreflects	 ﾠconcerns	 ﾠvoiced	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtravauxpréparatoiresregarding	 ﾠequal	 ﾠ
treatment	 ﾠof	 ﾠnational	 ﾠdiplomats	 ﾠand	 ﾠofficials	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠUnion,	 ﾠaccording	 ﾠthem	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
same	 ﾠrights	 ﾠand	 ﾠobligations.	 ﾠThis	 ﾠis	 ﾠconfirmed	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠamended	 ﾠStaff	 ﾠRegulations	 ﾠ
(Preamble,	 ﾠfourth	 ﾠrecital).	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
2. Appointing	 ﾠauthority	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
  A	 ﾠ report	 ﾠ from	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ European	 ﾠ Parliament’s	 ﾠ Committee	 ﾠ on	 ﾠ Constitutional	 ﾠ Affairs	 ﾠ
stressed	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ“all	 ﾠstaff	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠshould	 ﾠhave	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsame	 ﾠpermanent	 ﾠor	 ﾠtemporary	 ﾠ
status	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsame	 ﾠrights	 ﾠand	 ﾠobligations	 ﾠirrespective	 ﾠof	 ﾠorigin”,	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpowers	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠ appointing	 ﾠ authority	 ﾠ within	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ EEAS	 ﾠ should	 ﾠ reside	 ﾠ with	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ High	 ﾠ
Representative/Vice-ﾭ‐President,	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ EEAS	 ﾠ staff	 ﾠ should	 ﾠ “possess	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ certain	 ﾠ
objective	 ﾠ independence”.
131The	 ﾠ Swedish	 ﾠ Presidency	 ﾠ Report	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ European	 ﾠ
Council	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ 23	 ﾠ October	 ﾠ 2009	 ﾠ also	 ﾠ assigned	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ High	 ﾠ Representative	 ﾠ as	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ
appointing	 ﾠ authority.
132	 ﾠIn	 ﾠ this	 ﾠ context,	 ﾠ Article	 ﾠ 6(5)	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ Council	 ﾠ Decision	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ
rather	 ﾠstraightforward.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
  In	 ﾠpractice	 ﾠthose	 ﾠappointments	 ﾠat	 ﾠdirector	 ﾠlevel	 ﾠand	 ﾠabove	 ﾠrequire	 ﾠa	 ﾠdecision	 ﾠby	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠHigh	 ﾠRepresentative/Vice-ﾭ‐President	 ﾠwhile	 ﾠthose	 ﾠbelow	 ﾠare	 ﾠdelegated.	 ﾠThis	 ﾠis	 ﾠ
confirmed	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠStaff	 ﾠRegulations	 ﾠ(third	 ﾠrecital	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpreamble	 ﾠand	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ95(1)).	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
3. Meaning	 ﾠof	 ﾠmerit	 ﾠand	 ﾠrelationship	 ﾠwith	 ﾠgeographical/gender	 ﾠbalance	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
  Notions	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠas	 ﾠ“merit”	 ﾠand	 ﾠ“adequate	 ﾠgeographical	 ﾠand	 ﾠgender	 ﾠbalance”	 ﾠ(see	 ﾠ
paragraphs	 ﾠ 6	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ 8	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ Article	 ﾠ 6)	 ﾠ are	 ﾠ subjective	 ﾠ terms	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ are	 ﾠ open	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ
interpretation.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠformer,	 ﾠhowever,	 ﾠcould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠunderstood	 ﾠin	 ﾠterms	 ﾠof	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
candidate	 ﾠfor	 ﾠa	 ﾠposition	 ﾠwithin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠService	 ﾠmeets	 ﾠthe	 ﾠjob	 ﾠrequirements	 ﾠexpressed	 ﾠ
in	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ job	 ﾠ announcement.	 ﾠ The	 ﾠ EP	 ﾠ amendments	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ March	 ﾠ draft	 ﾠ decision	 ﾠ
suggested	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ equivalent	 ﾠ measures	 ﾠ should	 ﾠ be	 ﾠ undertaken	 ﾠ akin	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ Council	 ﾠ
Regulation	 ﾠ 401/2004/EC,	 ﾠ which	 ﾠ advocated	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ special	 ﾠ temporary	 ﾠ measures	 ﾠ
should	 ﾠ be	 ﾠ undertaken	 ﾠ departing	 ﾠ from	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ Staff	 ﾠ Regulations	 ﾠ due	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ
“exceptional	 ﾠnature”	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ“forthcoming	 ﾠenlargement”–i.e.	 ﾠsome	 ﾠform	 ﾠof	 ﾠspecial	 ﾠ
recruitment	 ﾠshould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠenvisaged	 ﾠ(but	 ﾠthis	 ﾠonly	 ﾠdeals	 ﾠwith	 ﾠgeographical	 ﾠbalance	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠnot	 ﾠaddress	 ﾠadequacy	 ﾠor	 ﾠmeaningful	 ﾠpresence).	 ﾠThe	 ﾠword	 ﾠ‘ensuring’	 ﾠwas	 ﾠ
introduced	 ﾠ by	 ﾠ MEP	 ﾠ FranziskaBrantner	 ﾠ et	 ﾠ al.	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ ensure	 ﾠ “stronger	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ more	 ﾠ
appropriate	 ﾠphrasing”.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
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 ﾠ“Report	 ﾠ on	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ Interinstitutional	 ﾠ aspects	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ setting	 ﾠ up	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ European	 ﾠ External	 ﾠ Action	 ﾠ Service”,	 ﾠ
Committee	 ﾠon	 ﾠConstitutional	 ﾠAffairs,	 ﾠElmar	 ﾠBrock,	 ﾠrapporteur,	 ﾠA7-ﾭ‐0041/2009,	 ﾠ20	 ﾠOctober	 ﾠ2009,	 ﾠpara.	 ﾠ
7.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
132Presidency	 ﾠReport	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠCouncil	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠExternal	 ﾠAction	 ﾠService,	 ﾠ14930/09,	 ﾠ23	 ﾠ
October	 ﾠ2009,	 ﾠpara.	 ﾠ21.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 58	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
  The	 ﾠwording	 ﾠof	 ﾠparagraph	 ﾠ8	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsame	 ﾠarticle	 ﾠconfuses	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsituation	 ﾠfurther	 ﾠby	 ﾠ
referring	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ “adequate	 ﾠ geographical	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ gender	 ﾠ balance,	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ meaningful	 ﾠ
presence	 ﾠof	 ﾠnationals	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠall	 ﾠMember	 ﾠStates”;	 ﾠthus	 ﾠintroducing	 ﾠa	 ﾠfurther	 ﾠlayer	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
subjectivity	 ﾠ without	 ﾠ reference	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ Staff	 ﾠ Regulations	 ﾠ or	 ﾠ other	 ﾠ internal	 ﾠ
documents	 ﾠthat	 ﾠmight	 ﾠadd	 ﾠmeaning	 ﾠto	 ﾠthese	 ﾠterms.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠHigh	 ﾠRepresentative	 ﾠis	 ﾠ
authorised	 ﾠto	 ﾠ“promote	 ﾠequal	 ﾠopportunities	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠunder-ﾭ‐represented	 ﾠgender	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
certain	 ﾠfunction	 ﾠgroups,	 ﾠmore	 ﾠparticularly	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠAD	 ﾠfunction	 ﾠgroup”	 ﾠin	 ﾠArticles	 ﾠ
1d(2-ﾭ‐3)	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ amended	 ﾠ Staff	 ﾠ Regulations.	 ﾠ Given	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ specific	 ﾠ mention	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ
balance	 ﾠissue	 ﾠis	 ﾠmade	 ﾠin	 ﾠrelation	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠforthcoming	 ﾠreview	 ﾠ(Article	 ﾠ13(3)),	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
lack	 ﾠof	 ﾠany	 ﾠprecision	 ﾠregarding	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnature	 ﾠof	 ﾠany	 ﾠinadequacy	 ﾠand	 ﾠits	 ﾠpossible	 ﾠ
consequences	 ﾠmay	 ﾠpose	 ﾠproblems.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
4. Selection	 ﾠprocedures	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
  As	 ﾠhas	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠsuggested	 ﾠabove,	 ﾠparagraphs	 ﾠ6	 ﾠand	 ﾠ8	 ﾠare	 ﾠsomewhat	 ﾠduplicative	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
could	 ﾠbe	 ﾠmerged	 ﾠand,	 ﾠif	 ﾠnot,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠconfusing	 ﾠreference	 ﾠto	 ﾠgender	 ﾠand	 ﾠgeographical	 ﾠ
balance	 ﾠin	 ﾠthis	 ﾠparagraph	 ﾠcould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠomitted	 ﾠsince	 ﾠit	 ﾠappears	 ﾠin	 ﾠparagraph	 ﾠ6.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠ
absence	 ﾠof	 ﾠany	 ﾠmention	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠConsultative	 ﾠCommittee	 ﾠon	 ﾠAppointments	 ﾠ(CCA)	 ﾠis	 ﾠ
understandable	 ﾠ since	 ﾠ it	 ﾠ was	 ﾠ not	 ﾠ formally	 ﾠ created	 ﾠ until	 ﾠ March	 ﾠ 2011.	 ﾠ Its	 ﾠ
establishment,	 ﾠ however,	 ﾠ was	 ﾠ clearly	 ﾠ envisaged	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ High	 ﾠ Representative’s	 ﾠ
explanatory	 ﾠ memorandum	 ﾠ accompanying	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ March	 ﾠ draft	 ﾠ decision.
133 	 ﾠThe	 ﾠ
explanatory	 ﾠmemorandum	 ﾠnotes	 ﾠthat	 ﾠin	 ﾠaddition	 ﾠto	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠduties	 ﾠregarding	 ﾠsenior	 ﾠ
appointments,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCCA	 ﾠ“shall	 ﾠalso	 ﾠmonitor	 ﾠselection	 ﾠprocedures	 ﾠat	 ﾠother	 ﾠlevels	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdevelopment	 ﾠof	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠstaffing,	 ﾠincluding	 ﾠwith	 ﾠregard	 ﾠto	 ﾠgender	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠgeographical	 ﾠbalance”.
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 ﾠSince	 ﾠthe	 ﾠissue	 ﾠof	 ﾠgeographical	 ﾠand	 ﾠgender	 ﾠbalance	 ﾠ
is	 ﾠ mentioned	 ﾠ twice	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ this	 ﾠ article,	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ role	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ CCA	 ﾠ could	 ﾠ now	 ﾠ be	 ﾠ usefully	 ﾠ
mentioned	 ﾠin	 ﾠterms	 ﾠof	 ﾠits	 ﾠgeneral	 ﾠmandate	 ﾠas	 ﾠwell	 ﾠas	 ﾠits	 ﾠspecific	 ﾠduties	 ﾠregarding	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠmonitoring	 ﾠof	 ﾠgeographical	 ﾠand	 ﾠgender	 ﾠbalance,	 ﾠespecially	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠabsence	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
any	 ﾠother	 ﾠobjective	 ﾠmeasurement	 ﾠof	 ﾠbalance.	 ﾠMention	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCCA	 ﾠwould	 ﾠalso	 ﾠ
permit	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ High	 ﾠ Representative	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ ask	 ﾠ them	 ﾠ for	 ﾠ further	 ﾠ guidance	 ﾠ on	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ
development	 ﾠof	 ﾠthis	 ﾠfacet.	 ﾠWith	 ﾠregard	 ﾠto	 ﾠthis	 ﾠparagraph	 ﾠand	 ﾠparagraph	 ﾠ3,	 ﾠneither	 ﾠ
makes	 ﾠit	 ﾠclear	 ﾠthat	 ﾠseconded	 ﾠnational	 ﾠexperts	 ﾠshall	 ﾠnot	 ﾠbe	 ﾠcounted	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠone-ﾭ‐
third	 ﾠof	 ﾠall	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠstaff	 ﾠat	 ﾠAD	 ﾠlevel,	 ﾠalthough	 ﾠthis	 ﾠis	 ﾠmentioned	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠamended	 ﾠStaff	 ﾠ
Regulations	 ﾠ(eighteenth	 ﾠrecital	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpreamble).	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
5. Mobility,	 ﾠreinstatement	 ﾠand	 ﾠtraining	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
  The	 ﾠCCA	 ﾠmet	 ﾠon	 ﾠ14	 ﾠJune	 ﾠ2012	 ﾠto	 ﾠdiscuss	 ﾠthe	 ﾠevolution	 ﾠof	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠmobility	 ﾠpolicy	 ﾠ
being	 ﾠdeveloped	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbasis	 ﾠof	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ6(10)	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCouncil	 ﾠDecision.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠService	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
133	 ﾠExplanatory	 ﾠMemorandum	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠHigh	 ﾠRepresentative	 ﾠfor	 ﾠForeign	 ﾠAffairs	 ﾠand	 ﾠSecurity	 ﾠPolicy	 ﾠ
attached	 ﾠto	 ﾠDraft	 ﾠCouncil	 ﾠdecision	 ﾠestablishing	 ﾠthe	 ﾠorganisation	 ﾠand	 ﾠfunctioning	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠ
External	 ﾠAction	 ﾠService,	 ﾠ8029/10,	 ﾠBrussels,	 ﾠ25	 ﾠMarch	 ﾠ2010,	 ﾠp.	 ﾠ3.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
134Ibid.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 59	 ﾠ
is	 ﾠat	 ﾠan	 ﾠearly	 ﾠstage	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdevelopment	 ﾠof	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠa	 ﾠpolicy.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠprincipal	 ﾠchallenge	 ﾠ
facing	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠis	 ﾠits	 ﾠabsorption	 ﾠcapacity	 ﾠto	 ﾠmake	 ﾠroom	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthose	 ﾠrotating	 ﾠback	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
headquarters	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠDelegations.	 ﾠA	 ﾠfurther	 ﾠchallenge	 ﾠis	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdiversity	 ﾠof	 ﾠnational	 ﾠ
systems	 ﾠof	 ﾠmobility.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
  Article	 ﾠ6(11)	 ﾠalso	 ﾠaddresses	 ﾠconcerns	 ﾠraised	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtravauxpréparatoires,	 ﾠthis	 ﾠtime	 ﾠ
regarding	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrights	 ﾠof	 ﾠtemporary	 ﾠagents	 ﾠserving	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠMember	 ﾠ
States	 ﾠto	 ﾠensure	 ﾠimmediate	 ﾠreinstatement.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠparagraph	 ﾠmentions	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ50(b)	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCEOS,	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠspecifies	 ﾠthat	 ﾠstaff	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠnational	 ﾠdiplomatic	 ﾠservices	 ﾠmay	 ﾠbe	 ﾠ
engaged	 ﾠ “for	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ maximum	 ﾠ period	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ four	 ﾠ years”	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ “contracts	 ﾠ may	 ﾠ be	 ﾠ
renewed	 ﾠ for	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ maximum	 ﾠ period	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ four	 ﾠ years”,	 ﾠ with	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ engagement	 ﾠ not	 ﾠ
exceeding	 ﾠeight	 ﾠyears	 ﾠin	 ﾠtotal	 ﾠ(with	 ﾠexceptional	 ﾠprovision	 ﾠfor	 ﾠan	 ﾠextension	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
further	 ﾠtwo	 ﾠyears).	 ﾠIt	 ﾠshould,	 ﾠhowever,	 ﾠbe	 ﾠnoted	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprinciple	 ﾠof	 ﾠmobility	 ﾠ(see	 ﾠ
paragraph	 ﾠ10)	 ﾠimplies	 ﾠthat	 ﾠmember	 ﾠstate	 ﾠdiplomats	 ﾠwho	 ﾠhave	 ﾠserved	 ﾠfour	 ﾠyears	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠ who	 ﾠ wish	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ remain	 ﾠ for	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ further	 ﾠ four	 ﾠ years,	 ﾠ would	 ﾠ not	 ﾠ be	 ﾠ guaranteed	 ﾠ
automatic	 ﾠrenewal	 ﾠand	 ﾠwould	 ﾠhave	 ﾠto	 ﾠapply	 ﾠfor	 ﾠa	 ﾠnew	 ﾠjob;	 ﾠwhereas	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpossibility	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠcontinuing	 ﾠservice	 ﾠat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠend	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠeighth	 ﾠyear	 ﾠis	 ﾠan	 ﾠextension	 ﾠof	 ﾠan	 ﾠexisting	 ﾠ
contract.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
  The	 ﾠprovisions	 ﾠon	 ﾠ“adequate	 ﾠcommon	 ﾠtraining,	 ﾠbuilding	 ﾠin	 ﾠparticular	 ﾠon	 ﾠexisting	 ﾠ
practices	 ﾠand	 ﾠstructures	 ﾠat	 ﾠnational	 ﾠand	 ﾠUnion	 ﾠlevel”	 ﾠ(Article	 ﾠ6(12)	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCouncil	 ﾠ
Decision)	 ﾠwere	 ﾠpredicated	 ﾠupon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠassumption	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠwould	 ﾠhave	 ﾠsome	 ﾠ
budgetary	 ﾠ independence	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ this	 ﾠ regard.	 ﾠ The	 ﾠ inclusion	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ EEAS-ﾭ‐related	 ﾠ training	 ﾠ
under	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ Commission’s	 ﾠ budget	 ﾠ (DG	 ﾠ HR)	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ existence	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ pre-ﾭ‐existing	 ﾠ
framework	 ﾠ contracts	 ﾠ mean	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ EEAS	 ﾠ has	 ﾠ been	 ﾠ unable	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ fully	 ﾠ develop	 ﾠ
“adequate	 ﾠcommon	 ﾠtraining”	 ﾠand	 ﾠhas	 ﾠnot	 ﾠsystematically	 ﾠinvolved	 ﾠ“practices	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
structures	 ﾠat	 ﾠnational	 ﾠand	 ﾠUnion	 ﾠlevel”.	 ﾠIt	 ﾠis	 ﾠdebatable	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsteps	 ﾠtaken	 ﾠ
are	 ﾠadequate,	 ﾠand	 ﾠthere	 ﾠis	 ﾠrelatively	 ﾠlittle	 ﾠnational	 ﾠinvolvement.	 ﾠThis	 ﾠaside,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
expression	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠtimescale	 ﾠthat	 ﾠhas	 ﾠnow	 ﾠpassed	 ﾠis	 ﾠinappropriate	 ﾠand	 ﾠserves	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
specific	 ﾠ example	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ overall	 ﾠ emphasis	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ EEAS	 ﾠ Decision	 ﾠ upon	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ
establishment	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠService	 ﾠin	 ﾠits	 ﾠtransitory	 ﾠphase	 ﾠ–	 ﾠnot	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠdocument	 ﾠthat	 ﾠlooks	 ﾠ
much	 ﾠ beyond	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ immediate	 ﾠ period	 ﾠ until	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ first	 ﾠ major	 ﾠ review	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ mid-ﾭ‐2013.	 ﾠ
Hence,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠchoice	 ﾠis	 ﾠto	 ﾠamend	 ﾠthe	 ﾠparagraph	 ﾠwith	 ﾠmore	 ﾠspecific	 ﾠdirections	 ﾠand	 ﾠan	 ﾠ





  Finally,	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ6(4)	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCouncil	 ﾠDecision	 ﾠreminds	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠstaff	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthey	 ﾠshall	 ﾠcarry	 ﾠ
out	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠduties	 ﾠ“solely	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠinterests	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠUnion	 ﾠin	 ﾠmind”.	 ﾠReference	 ﾠis	 ﾠ
made	 ﾠto	 ﾠseveral	 ﾠother	 ﾠparts	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠDecision	 ﾠ(Articles	 ﾠ2(1)	 ﾠthird	 ﾠindent,	 ﾠ2(2)	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠ5(3)).	 ﾠThe	 ﾠmain	 ﾠimplication	 ﾠof	 ﾠthese	 ﾠreferences	 ﾠis	 ﾠto	 ﾠensure	 ﾠthat	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠconduct	 ﾠ
is	 ﾠreflected	 ﾠas	 ﾠbroadly	 ﾠas	 ﾠpossible,	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠincludes	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsupport	 ﾠrole	 ﾠplayed	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
Service	 ﾠ with	 ﾠ regard	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ High	 ﾠ Representative/Vice-ﾭ‐President,	 ﾠ as	 ﾠ well	 ﾠ as	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ
President	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠCouncil,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠPresident	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCommission,	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
Commission	 ﾠ (as	 ﾠ stipulated	 ﾠ by	 ﾠ Arts	 ﾠ 2(2)	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ 3	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ EEAS	 ﾠ Decision),	 ﾠ which	 ﾠ
significantly	 ﾠbroadens	 ﾠthe	 ﾠenvisaged	 ﾠfunction	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠService	 ﾠas	 ﾠlaid	 ﾠout	 ﾠin	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 60	 ﾠ
27(3)	 ﾠTEU.	 ﾠIt	 ﾠalso	 ﾠapplies	 ﾠto	 ﾠHeads	 ﾠof	 ﾠDelegation.
135	 ﾠ	 ﾠComplications	 ﾠmay	 ﾠarise	 ﾠwith	 ﾠ
temporarily	 ﾠassigned	 ﾠdiplomats	 ﾠwho	 ﾠmay	 ﾠhave	 ﾠtaken	 ﾠsimilar	 ﾠoaths	 ﾠof	 ﾠallegiance	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠnational	 ﾠcontext.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠpractical	 ﾠterms,	 ﾠit	 ﾠmay	 ﾠbe	 ﾠdifficult	 ﾠto	 ﾠdetermine	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠ
national	 ﾠdiplomats	 ﾠalways	 ﾠconduct	 ﾠthemselves	 ﾠ“solely	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠinterests	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
Union	 ﾠin	 ﾠmind”.	 ﾠIt	 ﾠis	 ﾠworth	 ﾠnoting	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ“an	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠofficial	 ﾠwho	 ﾠhas	 ﾠto	 ﾠcarry	 ﾠout	 ﾠtasks	 ﾠ
for	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCommission	 ﾠas	 ﾠpart	 ﾠof	 ﾠhis	 ﾠduties”	 ﾠis	 ﾠexpected	 ﾠto	 ﾠfollow	 ﾠinstructions	 ﾠgiven	 ﾠ
by	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCommission	 ﾠin	 ﾠaccordance	 ﾠwith	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ221(2)	 ﾠTFEU	 ﾠ(Staff	 ﾠRegulations,	 ﾠfifth	 ﾠ
recital	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpreamble	 ﾠand	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ96).	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
  A	 ﾠcomparison	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprovision	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠJune	 ﾠdraft	 ﾠdecision	 ﾠdemonstrates	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
only	 ﾠsubstantive	 ﾠconcern	 ﾠwith	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ6	 ﾠwas	 ﾠthe	 ﾠinsertion	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠstipulation	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ
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 ﾠSee	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ5	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCouncil	 ﾠDecision.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 61	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ARTICLE	 ﾠ7	 ﾠ
Transitional	 ﾠprovisions	 ﾠregarding	 ﾠstaff	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
1.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠrelevant	 ﾠdepartments	 ﾠand	 ﾠfunctions	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠGeneral	 ﾠSecretariat	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCouncil	 ﾠand	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
Commission	 ﾠlisted	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠAnnex	 ﾠshall	 ﾠbe	 ﾠtransferred	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS.	 ﾠOfficials	 ﾠand	 ﾠtemporary	 ﾠagents	 ﾠ
occupying	 ﾠa	 ﾠpost	 ﾠin	 ﾠdepartments	 ﾠor	 ﾠfunctions	 ﾠlisted	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠAnnex	 ﾠshall	 ﾠbe	 ﾠtransferred	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS.	 ﾠ
This	 ﾠshall	 ﾠapply	 ﾠmutatis	 ﾠmutandis	 ﾠto	 ﾠcontract	 ﾠand	 ﾠlocal	 ﾠstaff	 ﾠassigned	 ﾠto	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠdepartments	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
functions.	 ﾠSNEs	 ﾠworking	 ﾠin	 ﾠthose	 ﾠdepartments	 ﾠor	 ﾠfunctions	 ﾠshall	 ﾠalso	 ﾠbe	 ﾠtransferred	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠ
with	 ﾠthe	 ﾠconsent	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠauthorities	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠoriginating	 ﾠMember	 ﾠState.	 ﾠ
These	 ﾠtransfers	 ﾠshall	 ﾠtake	 ﾠeffect	 ﾠon	 ﾠ1	 ﾠJanuary	 ﾠ2011.	 ﾠ
In	 ﾠaccordance	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠStaff	 ﾠRegulations,	 ﾠupon	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠtransfer	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠHigh	 ﾠRepresentative	 ﾠ
shall	 ﾠassign	 ﾠeach	 ﾠofficial	 ﾠto	 ﾠa	 ﾠpost	 ﾠin	 ﾠhis/her	 ﾠfunction	 ﾠgroup	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠcorresponds	 ﾠto	 ﾠthat	 ﾠofficial’s	 ﾠ
grade.	 ﾠ
2.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠprocedures	 ﾠfor	 ﾠrecruiting	 ﾠstaff	 ﾠfor	 ﾠposts	 ﾠtransferred	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠare	 ﾠongoing	 ﾠat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
date	 ﾠof	 ﾠentry	 ﾠinto	 ﾠforce	 ﾠof	 ﾠthis	 ﾠDecision	 ﾠshall	 ﾠremain	 ﾠvalid:	 ﾠthey	 ﾠshall	 ﾠbe	 ﾠcarried	 ﾠon	 ﾠand	 ﾠcompleted	 ﾠ
under	 ﾠthe	 ﾠauthority	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠHigh	 ﾠRepresentative	 ﾠin	 ﾠaccordance	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrelevant	 ﾠvacancy	 ﾠnotices	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠthe	 ﾠapplicable	 ﾠrules	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠStaff	 ﾠRegulations	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCEOS.	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
One	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠinitial	 ﾠchallenges	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠwas	 ﾠintegrating	 ﾠstaff	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠEU	 ﾠinstitutions	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠ member	 ﾠ states.	 ﾠ Paras.	 ﾠ 1-ﾭ‐2	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ this	 ﾠ Article	 ﾠ deal	 ﾠ with	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ transitional	 ﾠ
arrangements	 ﾠfor	 ﾠstaff	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCouncil	 ﾠGeneral	 ﾠSecretariat	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCommission	 ﾠ
who	 ﾠwere	 ﾠtransferred	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠand	 ﾠseek	 ﾠto	 ﾠmaintain	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprivileges,	 ﾠstatus,	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠmobility	 ﾠof	 ﾠCouncil	 ﾠand	 ﾠCommission	 ﾠstaff.	 ﾠThis	 ﾠarticle	 ﾠwas	 ﾠrequired	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠ
around	 ﾠ1,500	 ﾠstaff	 ﾠwere	 ﾠtransferred	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠon	 ﾠ1	 ﾠJanuary	 ﾠ2011.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
  The	 ﾠ“relevant	 ﾠdepartments”,	 ﾠas	 ﾠenvisaged	 ﾠby	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ27(3)	 ﾠTEU	 ﾠare	 ﾠlaid	 ﾠout	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠ annex	 ﾠ attached	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ Council	 ﾠ Decision.	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ The	 ﾠ annex	 ﾠ refers	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ
“administrative	 ﾠentities”	 ﾠ	 ﾠbut	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlist	 ﾠprovided	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot	 ﾠintended	 ﾠto	 ﾠprejudge	 ﾠ
“the	 ﾠadditional	 ﾠneeds	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠallocation	 ﾠof	 ﾠresources	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠdetermined	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
overall	 ﾠ budget	 ﾠ negotiations	 ﾠ establishing	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ EEAS,	 ﾠ nor	 ﾠ decisions	 ﾠ on	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ
provision	 ﾠof	 ﾠadequate	 ﾠstaff	 ﾠresponsible	 ﾠfor	 ﾠsupport	 ﾠfunctions,	 ﾠnor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlinked	 ﾠ
need	 ﾠfor	 ﾠservice-ﾭ‐level	 ﾠarrangements.”	 ﾠThe	 ﾠCouncil	 ﾠdecision	 ﾠdoes,	 ﾠhowever,	 ﾠ
effectively	 ﾠprejudge	 ﾠthese	 ﾠissues	 ﾠby	 ﾠstipulating	 ﾠin	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ1(15)	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠ
should	 ﾠbe	 ﾠguided	 ﾠ“by	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprinciple	 ﾠof	 ﾠcost-ﾭ‐efficiency	 ﾠaiming	 ﾠtoward	 ﾠbudget	 ﾠ
neutrality.”	 ﾠ	 ﾠThis	 ﾠraises	 ﾠthe	 ﾠinteresting	 ﾠissue	 ﾠof	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠmight	 ﾠhappen	 ﾠif	 ﾠthere	 ﾠ
were	 ﾠfound	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠinadequate	 ﾠstaff	 ﾠfor	 ﾠsupport	 ﾠfunctions,	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠmight	 ﾠimply	 ﾠ
budgetary	 ﾠadjustments	 ﾠbeyond	 ﾠ‘neutrality’.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
  The	 ﾠ Swedish	 ﾠ Presidency	 ﾠ report	 ﾠ emphasised	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ there	 ﾠ should	 ﾠ be	 ﾠ no	 ﾠ
distinction	 ﾠmade	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsources	 ﾠof	 ﾠstaff	 ﾠin	 ﾠterms	 ﾠof	 ﾠconditions	 ﾠand	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 62	 ﾠ
tasks.
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 ﾠThe	 ﾠtransitional	 ﾠperiod	 ﾠmeant	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠhuman	 ﾠresources	 ﾠdepartment	 ﾠ
initially	 ﾠfaced	 ﾠa	 ﾠnumber	 ﾠof	 ﾠquestions,	 ﾠcomplaints	 ﾠand	 ﾠadministrative	 ﾠissues	 ﾠ
relating	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtransitional	 ﾠprovisions	 ﾠtouching	 ﾠupon	 ﾠissues	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠas	 ﾠfunctions,	 ﾠ
responsibilities,	 ﾠ promotion,	 ﾠ pay,	 ﾠ leave	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ social	 ﾠ benefits.	 ﾠ These	 ﾠ
administrative	 ﾠissues	 ﾠhave	 ﾠlargely	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠdealt	 ﾠwith.	 ﾠImportantly,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠequal	 ﾠ
treatment	 ﾠof	 ﾠstaff	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠdifferent	 ﾠbackgrounds	 ﾠis	 ﾠvital	 ﾠto	 ﾠestablishing	 ﾠa	 ﾠstrong	 ﾠ
esprit	 ﾠde	 ﾠcorps	 ﾠwithin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnew	 ﾠService.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
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1.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠduties	 ﾠof	 ﾠauthorising	 ﾠofficer	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠsection	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠgeneral	 ﾠbudget	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠUnion	 ﾠ
shall	 ﾠbe	 ﾠdelegated	 ﾠin	 ﾠaccordance	 ﾠwith	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ59	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠFinancial	 ﾠRegulation.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠHigh	 ﾠRepresentative	 ﾠ
shall	 ﾠadopt	 ﾠthe	 ﾠinternal	 ﾠrules	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmanagement	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠadministrative	 ﾠbudget	 ﾠlines.	 ﾠOperational	 ﾠ
expenditure	 ﾠshall	 ﾠremain	 ﾠwithin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCommission	 ﾠsection	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbudget.	 ﾠ
2.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠshall	 ﾠexercise	 ﾠits	 ﾠpowers	 ﾠin	 ﾠaccordance	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠFinancial	 ﾠRegulation	 ﾠapplicable	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
general	 ﾠbudget	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠUnion	 ﾠwithin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlimits	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠappropriations	 ﾠallocated	 ﾠto	 ﾠit.	 ﾠ
3.	 ﾠWhen	 ﾠdrawing	 ﾠup	 ﾠestimates	 ﾠof	 ﾠadministrative	 ﾠexpenditure	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠHigh	 ﾠRepresentative	 ﾠ
will	 ﾠhold	 ﾠconsultations	 ﾠwith,	 ﾠrespectively,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCommissioner	 ﾠresponsible	 ﾠfor	 ﾠDevelopment	 ﾠPolicy	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠCommissioner	 ﾠresponsible	 ﾠfor	 ﾠNeighbourhood	 ﾠPolicy	 ﾠregarding	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠrespective	 ﾠresponsibilities.	 ﾠ
4.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠaccordance	 ﾠwith	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ314(1)	 ﾠTFEU,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠshall	 ﾠdraw	 ﾠup	 ﾠestimates	 ﾠof	 ﾠits	 ﾠexpenditure	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
following	 ﾠfinancial	 ﾠyear.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠCommission	 ﾠshall	 ﾠconsolidate	 ﾠthose	 ﾠestimates	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠdraft	 ﾠbudget,	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠ
may	 ﾠcontain	 ﾠdifferent	 ﾠestimates.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠCommission	 ﾠmay	 ﾠamend	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdraft	 ﾠbudget	 ﾠas	 ﾠprovided	 ﾠfor	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
Article	 ﾠ314(2)	 ﾠTFEU.	 ﾠ
5.	 ﾠ In	 ﾠ order	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ ensure	 ﾠ budgetary	 ﾠ transparency	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ area	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ external	 ﾠ action	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ Union,	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ
Commission	 ﾠwill	 ﾠtransmit	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbudgetary	 ﾠauthority,	 ﾠtogether	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdraft	 ﾠgeneral	 ﾠbudget	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
European	 ﾠUnion,	 ﾠa	 ﾠworking	 ﾠdocument	 ﾠpresenting,	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠcomprehensive	 ﾠway,	 ﾠall	 ﾠexpenditure	 ﾠrelated	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠexternal	 ﾠaction	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠUnion.	 ﾠ
6.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠshall	 ﾠbe	 ﾠsubject	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprocedures	 ﾠregarding	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdischarge	 ﾠprovided	 ﾠfor	 ﾠin	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ319	 ﾠTFEU	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠin	 ﾠArticles	 ﾠ145	 ﾠto	 ﾠ147	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠFinancial	 ﾠRegulation.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠwill,	 ﾠin	 ﾠthis	 ﾠcontext,	 ﾠfully	 ﾠcooperate	 ﾠ
with	 ﾠthe	 ﾠinstitutions	 ﾠinvolved	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdischarge	 ﾠprocedure	 ﾠand	 ﾠprovide,	 ﾠas	 ﾠappropriate,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠadditional	 ﾠ
necessary	 ﾠinformation,	 ﾠincluding	 ﾠthrough	 ﾠattendance	 ﾠat	 ﾠmeetings	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrelevant	 ﾠbodies.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
At	 ﾠfirst	 ﾠsight	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ8	 ﾠis	 ﾠan	 ﾠoddly	 ﾠstructured	 ﾠprovision,	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠcontains	 ﾠcryptic	 ﾠ
formulations	 ﾠand	 ﾠample	 ﾠcross-ﾭ‐references	 ﾠto	 ﾠtreaty	 ﾠarticles	 ﾠand	 ﾠsecondary	 ﾠlegislation.	 ﾠ
Yet,	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠan	 ﾠimportant	 ﾠarticle,	 ﾠas	 ﾠit	 ﾠdetermines	 ﾠthe	 ﾠscope	 ﾠof	 ﾠbudgetary	 ﾠcontrol	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
EEAS	 ﾠhas	 ﾠover	 ﾠits	 ﾠorganisation	 ﾠand	 ﾠfunctioning.	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ8	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠprovision	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠbears	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠmarks	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠinter-ﾭ‐institutional	 ﾠstrife	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtravauxpréparatoires,	 ﾠand	 ﾠone	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ
packs	 ﾠa	 ﾠfew	 ﾠsurprises,	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠas	 ﾠthe	 ﾠqualification	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠas	 ﾠan	 ﾠinstitution	 ﾠ–	 ﾠalbeit	 ﾠ
for	 ﾠbudgetary	 ﾠmatters	 ﾠonly	 ﾠ(Section	 ﾠ1),	 ﾠa	 ﾠreference	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ‘powers’	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠService	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
other	 ﾠpeculiarities	 ﾠ(Section	 ﾠ2).	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
1.  The	 ﾠEEAS,	 ﾠan	 ﾠinstitution	 ﾠfor	 ﾠbudgetary	 ﾠpurposes
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 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
  In	 ﾠits	 ﾠOctober	 ﾠ2009	 ﾠ‘guidelines’	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfuture	 ﾠHR/VP,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠCouncil	 ﾠ
stated	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ“The	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠshould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠa	 ﾠservice	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠsui	 ﾠgeneris	 ﾠnature	 ﾠseparate	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠCommission	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠGeneral	 ﾠSecretariat	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCouncil.	 ﾠIt	 ﾠshould	 ﾠhave	 ﾠ
autonomy	 ﾠin	 ﾠterms	 ﾠof	 ﾠadministrative	 ﾠbudget	 ﾠand	 ﾠmanagement	 ﾠof	 ﾠstaff”.
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 ﾠSee	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdiscussion	 ﾠunder	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ1	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠDecision,	 ﾠabove.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 64	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
  Although	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbasis	 ﾠof	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ27(3)	 ﾠTEU	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠParliament	 ﾠonly	 ﾠneeded	 ﾠ
to	 ﾠbe	 ﾠconsulted	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdraft	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠDecision,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEP	 ﾠenjoys	 ﾠthe	 ﾠright	 ﾠof	 ﾠco-ﾭ‐
decision	 ﾠwith	 ﾠregard	 ﾠto	 ﾠboth	 ﾠthe	 ﾠstaff	 ﾠand	 ﾠbudgetary	 ﾠregulations	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠneeded	 ﾠ
to	 ﾠbe	 ﾠamended	 ﾠto	 ﾠoperationalise	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠEP	 ﾠmaximised	 ﾠits	 ﾠnegotiating	 ﾠ
position	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠformer	 ﾠby	 ﾠcoupling	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtwo	 ﾠissues	 ﾠand	 ﾠwielding	 ﾠits	 ﾠveto	 ﾠpower	 ﾠ
over	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlatter.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
  The	 ﾠEP	 ﾠundertook	 ﾠto	 ﾠpromote	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ‘Community’	 ﾠmethod,	 ﾠfor	 ﾠinstance	 ﾠby	 ﾠ
proposing	 ﾠto	 ﾠincrease	 ﾠthe	 ﾠinfluence	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCommission	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠadministrative,	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
particular	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbudgetary	 ﾠstructures	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnew	 ﾠService.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠEP	 ﾠstated	 ﾠits	 ﾠbelief	 ﾠ
that:	 ﾠ“(...)	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠservice	 ﾠthat	 ﾠis	 ﾠsui	 ﾠgeneris	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠan	 ﾠorganisational	 ﾠand	 ﾠbudgetary	 ﾠ
point	 ﾠof	 ﾠview,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠmust	 ﾠbe	 ﾠincorporated	 ﾠinto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCommission’s	 ﾠ
administrative	 ﾠstructure,	 ﾠas	 ﾠthis	 ﾠwould	 ﾠensure	 ﾠfull	 ﾠtransparency”.
139	 ﾠIn	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠNon-ﾭ‐
paper	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS,	 ﾠMEPs	 ﾠBrok	 ﾠand	 ﾠVerhofstadt	 ﾠinsisted	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠshould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠ
an	 ﾠautonomous	 ﾠservice	 ﾠassisting	 ﾠthe	 ﾠHR/VP	 ﾠand	 ﾠaccountable	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠ
Parliament,	 ﾠboth	 ﾠin	 ﾠpolitical	 ﾠand	 ﾠbudgetary	 ﾠterms.
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  In	 ﾠthe	 ﾠquadrilogue,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEP	 ﾠnegotiated	 ﾠrather	 ﾠsuccessfully	 ﾠto	 ﾠenhance	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
influence	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCommission	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠadministrative	 ﾠstructure	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS,	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
particular	 ﾠwith	 ﾠregard	 ﾠto	 ﾠbudgetary	 ﾠprocedures.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtalks	 ﾠit	 ﾠbecame	 ﾠclear	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠwould	 ﾠhave	 ﾠto	 ﾠfollow	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsame	 ﾠbudget	 ﾠlines	 ﾠand	 ﾠadministrative	 ﾠrules	 ﾠas	 ﾠ
applicable	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEU	 ﾠbudget	 ﾠfalling	 ﾠunder	 ﾠHeading	 ﾠV	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠMultiannual	 ﾠFinancial	 ﾠ
Framework.
141	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ8(1)	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠDecision	 ﾠreinforces	 ﾠthis	 ﾠby	 ﾠprescribing	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ–	 ﾠall	 ﾠ
–	 ﾠ“operational	 ﾠexpenditure	 ﾠshall	 ﾠremain	 ﾠwithin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCommission	 ﾠsection	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
budget”,	 ﾠand	 ﾠnot	 ﾠjust	 ﾠthe	 ﾠoperational	 ﾠexpenditure	 ﾠarising	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
implementation	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCFSP	 ﾠbudget	 ﾠand	 ﾠa	 ﾠnumber	 ﾠof	 ﾠ	 ﾠprogrammes,
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 ﾠas	 ﾠ
proposed	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠHR/VP	 ﾠin	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ7(3)	 ﾠof	 ﾠher	 ﾠdraft	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠDecision	 ﾠof	 ﾠMarch	 ﾠ2010.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
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 ﾠPresidency	 ﾠConclusions	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠCouncil	 ﾠof	 ﾠ29/30	 ﾠOctober	 ﾠ2009,	 ﾠdoc.	 ﾠ15265/1/09,	 ﾠBrussels,	 ﾠ
1	 ﾠDecember	 ﾠ2009,	 ﾠitem	 ﾠ16.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
139	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠParliament	 ﾠresolution	 ﾠof	 ﾠ22	 ﾠOctober	 ﾠ2009	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠinstitutional	 ﾠaspects	 ﾠof	 ﾠsetting	 ﾠup	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
European	 ﾠExternal	 ﾠAction	 ﾠService	 ﾠ(2009/2133(INI),	 ﾠoperative	 ﾠparagraph	 ﾠ7.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
140	 ﾠNon-ﾭ‐paper	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠof	 ﾠ18	 ﾠMarch	 ﾠ2010	 ﾠ(plus	 ﾠattached	 ﾠto	 ﾠit	 ﾠan	 ﾠorganisational	 ﾠchart	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS)	 ﾠby	 ﾠ
ElmarBrok	 ﾠand	 ﾠGuy	 ﾠVerhofstadt,	 ﾠavailable	 ﾠat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠwebsite	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
Euractiv<http://www.euractiv.com/en/future-ﾭ‐eu/parliament-ﾭ‐pulls-ﾭ‐its-ﾭ‐weight-ﾭ‐eeas-ﾭ‐negotiations-ﾭ‐
news-ﾭ‐375926>	 ﾠ(last	 ﾠaccessed	 ﾠ31	 ﾠJanuary	 ﾠ2013).	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
141	 ﾠCf.	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ4(3)(a),	 ﾠlast	 ﾠsentence	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsecond	 ﾠindent	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠCouncil	 ﾠDecision.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠHR/VP’s	 ﾠ
proposal	 ﾠof	 ﾠ25	 ﾠMarch	 ﾠ2010	 ﾠdid	 ﾠnot	 ﾠcontain	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠa	 ﾠprovision.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
142	 ﾠThe	 ﾠInstrument	 ﾠfor	 ﾠStability,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠInstrument	 ﾠfor	 ﾠCooperation	 ﾠwith	 ﾠIndustrialised	 ﾠCountries,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
Communication	 ﾠand	 ﾠPublic	 ﾠDiplomacy,	 ﾠas	 ﾠwell	 ﾠas	 ﾠElection	 ﾠObservation	 ﾠMissions.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 65	 ﾠ
  The	 ﾠEU	 ﾠoperational	 ﾠexpenditure	 ﾠis	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtotal	 ﾠEU	 ﾠprogramme	 ﾠbudget	 ﾠless	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
administrative	 ﾠexpenditure	 ﾠadministrative	 ﾠcosts	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠCommission.
143	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠadministrative	 ﾠcost	 ﾠcalculation	 ﾠis	 ﾠboth	 ﾠfinancial	 ﾠand	 ﾠin	 ﾠkind.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠfinancial	 ﾠ
cost	 ﾠcalculation	 ﾠis	 ﾠtowards	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfixed	 ﾠoverhead	 ﾠcosts,	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠas	 ﾠrental	 ﾠof	 ﾠoffices,	 ﾠ
expenses	 ﾠof	 ﾠmeetings	 ﾠand	 ﾠpublications.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠin-ﾭ‐kind	 ﾠexpenditure	 ﾠrefers	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
supply	 ﾠof	 ﾠhuman	 ﾠresources	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠthrough	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsecondment	 ﾠof	 ﾠnational	 ﾠ
experts.	 ﾠThese	 ﾠexperts	 ﾠare	 ﾠcost-ﾭ‐free	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEU	 ﾠas	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠsalary	 ﾠand	 ﾠbenefits	 ﾠare	 ﾠ
covered	 ﾠby	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠemployers	 ﾠin	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠhome	 ﾠcountries.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
  The	 ﾠCommission	 ﾠalso	 ﾠobtained	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdiscretionary	 ﾠpower	 ﾠto	 ﾠconsolidate	 ﾠbudget	 ﾠ
estimates	 ﾠand	 ﾠto	 ﾠamend	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbudget	 ﾠ(Article	 ﾠ8(4)).
144	 ﾠSuch	 ﾠa	 ﾠbudgetary	 ﾠprocedure	 ﾠ
is	 ﾠfully	 ﾠin	 ﾠkeeping	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠgeneral	 ﾠrules	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠTFEU,	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠprescribe	 ﾠthat,	 ﾠwith	 ﾠ
a	 ﾠview	 ﾠto	 ﾠhelping	 ﾠto	 ﾠprepare	 ﾠthe	 ﾠestablishment	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEU’s	 ﾠannual	 ﾠbudget,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
institutions	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠUnion	 ﾠhave	 ﾠto	 ﾠdraw	 ﾠup	 ﾠbudget	 ﾠestimates,	 ﾠand	 ﾠthat	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
competence	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCommission	 ﾠto	 ﾠconsolidate	 ﾠand	 ﾠ(wherever	 ﾠnecessary	 ﾠor	 ﾠ
considered	 ﾠappropriate)	 ﾠto	 ﾠamend	 ﾠthese	 ﾠbudget	 ﾠestimates.
145	 ﾠThe	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠemerges	 ﾠ
here	 ﾠ–	 ﾠby	 ﾠimplication	 ﾠ–	 ﾠas	 ﾠan	 ﾠinstitution	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠUnion	 ﾠwith	 ﾠrespect	 ﾠto	 ﾠbudgetary	 ﾠ
matters.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
  The	 ﾠEP	 ﾠhammered	 ﾠthe	 ﾠimportance	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠinstitutional	 ﾠstatus	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠhome	 ﾠ
(i.e.	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCouncil	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠHR/VP)	 ﾠduring	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnegotiations	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcollateral	 ﾠ
Financial	 ﾠRegulation.	 ﾠRegulation	 ﾠNo	 ﾠ1081/2010	 ﾠamended	 ﾠthe	 ﾠexisting	 ﾠFinancial	 ﾠ
Regulation	 ﾠapplicable	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠgeneral	 ﾠbudget	 ﾠso	 ﾠas	 ﾠto	 ﾠinclude	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠ




  Thus,	 ﾠalso	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdischarge	 ﾠprocedure	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠshould	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠseen	 ﾠas	 ﾠan	 ﾠ
institution	 ﾠand	 ﾠtherefore	 ﾠ“fully	 ﾠsubject	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprocedures	 ﾠprovided	 ﾠfor	 ﾠin	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
143	 ﾠSee,	 ﾠgenerally,	 ﾠ	 ﾠ<http://ec.europa.eu/budget/explained/budg_system/structure/struct_en.cfm>	 ﾠ
(last	 ﾠaccessed	 ﾠ31	 ﾠJanuary	 ﾠ2013).	 ﾠNote	 ﾠthat	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ41	 ﾠTEU	 ﾠspeaks	 ﾠof	 ﾠ“operating”	 ﾠbudget.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
144	 ﾠThis	 ﾠprovision	 ﾠ(and	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCommission	 ﾠcompetence	 ﾠincluded	 ﾠin	 ﾠit)	 ﾠdid	 ﾠnot	 ﾠfeature	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠHR/VP’s	 ﾠ
proposal	 ﾠof	 ﾠ25	 ﾠMarch	 ﾠ2010.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
145	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ314(1)	 ﾠTFEU	 ﾠ(first	 ﾠtwo	 ﾠsentences):	 ﾠ“With	 ﾠthe	 ﾠexception	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠCentral	 ﾠBank,	 ﾠeach	 ﾠ
institution	 ﾠshall,	 ﾠbefore	 ﾠ1	 ﾠJuly,	 ﾠdraw	 ﾠup	 ﾠestimates	 ﾠof	 ﾠits	 ﾠexpenditure	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfollowing	 ﾠfinancial	 ﾠyear.	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠCommission	 ﾠshall	 ﾠconsolidate	 ﾠthese	 ﾠestimates	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠdraft	 ﾠbudget	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠmay	 ﾠcontain	 ﾠdifferent	 ﾠ
estimates.”	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
146	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ1(2)	 ﾠof	 ﾠRegulation	 ﾠ(EU,	 ﾠEuratom)	 ﾠNo	 ﾠ1081/2010	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠParliament	 ﾠand	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
Council	 ﾠof	 ﾠ24	 ﾠNovember	 ﾠ2010	 ﾠamending	 ﾠCouncil	 ﾠRegulation	 ﾠ(EC,	 ﾠEuratom)	 ﾠNo	 ﾠ1605/2002	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
Financial	 ﾠRegulation	 ﾠapplicable	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠgeneral	 ﾠbudget	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠCommunities,	 ﾠas	 ﾠregards	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
European	 ﾠExternal	 ﾠAction	 ﾠService,	 ﾠOJ	 ﾠ2010	 ﾠL	 ﾠ311/	 ﾠ9.”	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 66	 ﾠ
319	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠTreaty	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠFunctioning	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠUnion	 ﾠand	 ﾠin	 ﾠArticles	 ﾠ145	 ﾠ
to	 ﾠ147	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠFinancial	 ﾠRegulation”.
147	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
  The	 ﾠbudgetary	 ﾠlines	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCommission	 ﾠwere	 ﾠfurther	 ﾠ
tightened	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠarea	 ﾠof	 ﾠdevelopment	 ﾠcooperation	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠ
Neighbourhood	 ﾠPolicy	 ﾠ(ENP).	 ﾠAccording	 ﾠto	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ8(3)	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠDecision,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
estimates	 ﾠof	 ﾠadministrative	 ﾠexpenditure	 ﾠin	 ﾠthese	 ﾠareas	 ﾠhave	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠdrawn	 ﾠup	 ﾠby	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠHR	 ﾠ“in	 ﾠconsultation	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCommissioners	 ﾠfor	 ﾠDevelopment	 ﾠPolicy	 ﾠand	 ﾠfor	 ﾠ
European	 ﾠNeighbourhood	 ﾠPolicy	 ﾠregarding	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠrespective	 ﾠresponsibilities”.
148	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠFinancial	 ﾠRegulation	 ﾠextended	 ﾠthis	 ﾠobligation	 ﾠof	 ﾠbudgetary	 ﾠcooperation	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
international	 ﾠcooperation,	 ﾠhumanitarian	 ﾠaid	 ﾠand	 ﾠcrisis	 ﾠresponse.
149	 ﾠSuch	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
provision	 ﾠof	 ﾠclose	 ﾠcooperation	 ﾠdid	 ﾠnot	 ﾠfeature	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠoriginal	 ﾠHR/VP	 ﾠproposal	 ﾠat	 ﾠ
all.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
  Further,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠinternal	 ﾠauditors	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCommission	 ﾠwould	 ﾠhave	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
cooperate	 ﾠto	 ﾠensure	 ﾠthe	 ﾠaudit	 ﾠpolicy.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠaccordance	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠapplicable	 ﾠrules,	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠas	 ﾠis	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcase	 ﾠfor	 ﾠother	 ﾠinstitutions,	 ﾠa	 ﾠpart	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠannual	 ﾠreport	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCourt	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠAuditors	 ﾠis	 ﾠdedicated	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS,




  Finally,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠOffice	 ﾠAgainst	 ﾠFraud	 ﾠ(OLAF)	 ﾠhas	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠgranted	 ﾠinvestigative	 ﾠ
powers	 ﾠwith	 ﾠregard	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS.
152	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
  From	 ﾠthe	 ﾠforegoing,	 ﾠone	 ﾠcan	 ﾠdraw	 ﾠa	 ﾠfew	 ﾠconclusions.	 ﾠFirstly,	 ﾠoperational	 ﾠ
expenditure	 ﾠ(i.e.	 ﾠexcluding	 ﾠcosts	 ﾠfor	 ﾠadministration)	 ﾠremains	 ﾠwithin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
Commission	 ﾠsection	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbudget.	 ﾠThis	 ﾠgives	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCommission	 ﾠcontrol	 ﾠover	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠcan	 ﾠdo	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠoperational	 ﾠsphere.	 ﾠSecondly,	 ﾠwith	 ﾠregard	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
administrative	 ﾠexpenditures	 ﾠin	 ﾠthree	 ﾠshared	 ﾠcompetence	 ﾠareas	 ﾠ(development,	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
147	 ﾠSee	 ﾠthird	 ﾠpreambular	 ﾠparagraph	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠDecision.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
148	 ﾠAgain,	 ﾠthis	 ﾠprovision	 ﾠdid	 ﾠnot	 ﾠfeature	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠHR/VP’s	 ﾠproposal	 ﾠof	 ﾠ25	 ﾠMarch	 ﾠ2010.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
149	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ1(6)	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ2010	 ﾠFinancial	 ﾠRegulation:	 ﾠ“The	 ﾠHigh	 ﾠRepresentative	 ﾠwill	 ﾠhold	 ﾠconsultations	 ﾠwith	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠMembers	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCommission	 ﾠresponsible	 ﾠfor	 ﾠdevelopment	 ﾠpolicy,	 ﾠneighbourhood	 ﾠpolicy	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
international	 ﾠcooperation,	 ﾠhumanitarian	 ﾠaid	 ﾠand	 ﾠcrisis	 ﾠresponse,	 ﾠregarding	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠrespective	 ﾠ
responsibilities.”	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
150	 ﾠSee,	 ﾠe.g.,	 ﾠCourt	 ﾠof	 ﾠAuditors,	 ﾠAnnual	 ﾠReport	 ﾠConcerning	 ﾠthe	 ﾠFinancial	 ﾠYear	 ﾠ2011,	 ﾠOJ	 ﾠ2012	 ﾠC	 ﾠ344,	 ﾠ
Chapter	 ﾠ9,	 ﾠparagraphs	 ﾠ9.25-ﾭ‐9.28:	 ﾠEUR	 ﾠ682	 ﾠMio	 ﾠmade	 ﾠin	 ﾠpayments,	 ﾠamounting	 ﾠto	 ﾠ0,5%	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEU	 ﾠtotal.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
151	 ﾠSee	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdiscussion	 ﾠunder	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ3(4)	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠDecision,	 ﾠabove.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
152	 ﾠIbid.	 ﾠSee	 ﾠRegulation	 ﾠ(EC)	 ﾠNo	 ﾠ1073/1999	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠParliament	 ﾠand	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCouncil	 ﾠof	 ﾠ25	 ﾠMay	 ﾠ
1999	 ﾠconcerning	 ﾠinvestigations	 ﾠconducted	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠanti-ﾭ‐fraud	 ﾠoffice	 ﾠ(Olaf),	 ﾠOJ	 ﾠ1999	 ﾠL	 ﾠ136/1.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 67	 ﾠ
ENP,	 ﾠand	 ﾠinternational	 ﾠcooperation,	 ﾠhumanitarian	 ﾠaid	 ﾠand	 ﾠcrisis	 ﾠresponse)	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
EEAS	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCommission	 ﾠhave	 ﾠto	 ﾠconsult	 ﾠeach	 ﾠother.	 ﾠThirdly,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbudgetary	 ﾠ
procedures	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠhave	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠaligned	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthose	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCommission.	 ﾠThis	 ﾠ
should	 ﾠfacilitate	 ﾠcooperation.	 ﾠFourthly,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠstandard	 ﾠprocedures	 ﾠfor	 ﾠdrawing	 ﾠup	 ﾠ
budget	 ﾠestimates	 ﾠand	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdischarge	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbudget	 ﾠapply	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠas	 ﾠwell.	 ﾠ
As	 ﾠsuch,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠhas	 ﾠemerged	 ﾠas	 ﾠan	 ﾠinstitutionwith	 ﾠregard	 ﾠto	 ﾠbudgetary	 ﾠ
matters,	 ﾠwith	 ﾠits	 ﾠown	 ﾠsection	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEU	 ﾠbudget.	 ﾠBut,	 ﾠfifthly,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠassumption	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
these	 ﾠspecific	 ﾠresponsibilities	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠnot	 ﾠby	 ﾠitself	 ﾠenhance	 ﾠthe	 ﾠstatus	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠ
as	 ﾠan	 ﾠinstitution	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsense	 ﾠof	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ13	 ﾠTEU.	 ﾠRather,	 ﾠthese	 ﾠresponsibilities	 ﾠ
enhanced	 ﾠthe	 ﾠposition	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠParliament	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠbudgetary	 ﾠauthority	 ﾠover	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠEEAS.	 ﾠFrom	 ﾠa	 ﾠpolitical	 ﾠand	 ﾠinstitutional	 ﾠperspective,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠoutcome	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
negotiations	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ2010	 ﾠCouncil	 ﾠDecision	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcollateral	 ﾠFinancial	 ﾠ
Regulation	 ﾠhas	 ﾠenhanced	 ﾠthe	 ﾠposition	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEP	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠbudgetary	 ﾠauthority	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
strengthened	 ﾠits	 ﾠsupervisory	 ﾠpowers	 ﾠover	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠEP’s	 ﾠForeign	 ﾠAffairs	 ﾠ
Committee	 ﾠ(AFET)	 ﾠgot	 ﾠit	 ﾠright	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠit	 ﾠsaid	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠoperational	 ﾠpart	 ﾠ(in	 ﾠparticular	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠmanagement	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠexternal	 ﾠaction	 ﾠprogrammes)	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠbudget	 ﾠwould	 ﾠ
be	 ﾠpart	 ﾠof	 ﾠthat	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCommission,	 ﾠwhereas	 ﾠthe	 ﾠadministrative	 ﾠpart	 ﾠwould	 ﾠ
remain	 ﾠseparate	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEU	 ﾠbudget	 ﾠbut	 ﾠstill	 ﾠfall	 ﾠunder	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcontrol	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEP.
153	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
2.  	 ﾠInstitutional	 ﾠand	 ﾠprocedural	 ﾠpeculiarities	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
(i)  Split	 ﾠbudget	 ﾠlines:	 ﾠrepresentation	 ﾠand	 ﾠdelegation	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
  Article	 ﾠ8	 ﾠopens	 ﾠwith	 ﾠa	 ﾠrather	 ﾠcryptic	 ﾠparagraph	 ﾠwhich,	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠdeciphered,	 ﾠ
exposes	 ﾠa	 ﾠmulti-ﾭ‐layered	 ﾠregulatory	 ﾠframework.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠits	 ﾠfirst	 ﾠsentence	 ﾠit	 ﾠstates	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ
“The	 ﾠduties	 ﾠof	 ﾠauthorising	 ﾠofficer	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠsection	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠgeneral	 ﾠbudget	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠUnion	 ﾠshall	 ﾠbe	 ﾠdelegated	 ﾠin	 ﾠaccordance	 ﾠwith	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ59	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
Financial	 ﾠRegulation.”	 ﾠAccording	 ﾠto	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ59(1)	 ﾠof	 ﾠCouncil	 ﾠRegulation	 ﾠNo	 ﾠ
1605/2002,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ“institution	 ﾠshall	 ﾠperform	 ﾠthe	 ﾠduties	 ﾠof	 ﾠauthorising	 ﾠofficer”.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Article	 ﾠ8(1)	 ﾠthus	 ﾠimplicitly	 ﾠqualifies	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠas	 ﾠan	 ﾠ“institution”	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
budgetary	 ﾠmatters	 ﾠcontained	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprovision.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
  According	 ﾠto	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ59(2)	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠFinancial	 ﾠRegulation,	 ﾠ“[e]ach	 ﾠinstitution	 ﾠshall	 ﾠlay	 ﾠ
down	 ﾠin	 ﾠits	 ﾠinternal	 ﾠadministrative	 ﾠrules	 ﾠthe	 ﾠstaff	 ﾠof	 ﾠan	 ﾠappropriate	 ﾠlevel	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
whom	 ﾠit	 ﾠdelegates	 ﾠin	 ﾠcompliance	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠconditions	 ﾠin	 ﾠits	 ﾠrules	 ﾠof	 ﾠprocedure	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠduties	 ﾠof	 ﾠauthorising	 ﾠofficer,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠscope	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpowers	 ﾠdelegated	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
possibility	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpersons	 ﾠto	 ﾠwhom	 ﾠthese	 ﾠpowers	 ﾠare	 ﾠdelegated	 ﾠto	 ﾠsub-ﾭ‐delegate	 ﾠ
them”.	 ﾠResonating	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlanguage	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠFinancial	 ﾠRegulation,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsecond	 ﾠ
sentence	 ﾠof	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ8(1)	 ﾠstates	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ“The	 ﾠHigh	 ﾠRepresentative	 ﾠshall	 ﾠadopt	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
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 ﾠSee	 ﾠEP	 ﾠpress	 ﾠrelease	 ﾠof	 ﾠ30	 ﾠJune	 ﾠ2010,	 ﾠ“External	 ﾠAction	 ﾠService:	 ﾠEP's	 ﾠbudgetary	 ﾠpowers	 ﾠguarantee	 ﾠ
parliamentary	 ﾠoversight”.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 68	 ﾠ
internal	 ﾠrules	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmanagement	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠadministrative	 ﾠbudget	 ﾠlines”.	 ﾠTo	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ
end,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠHR	 ﾠadopted	 ﾠDecision	 ﾠPROC	 ﾠHR(2011)	 ﾠ001	 ﾠof	 ﾠ31	 ﾠJanuary	 ﾠ2011	 ﾠ“On	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
Internal	 ﾠRules	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠimplementation	 ﾠof	 ﾠbudget	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠExternal	 ﾠAction	 ﾠ
Service	 ﾠ(Section	 ﾠX)”.
154	 ﾠAs	 ﾠsuch,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠHR	 ﾠ“represents”	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠin	 ﾠperforming	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
duties	 ﾠof	 ﾠauthorising	 ﾠofficer	 ﾠpursuant	 ﾠto	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ59(1)	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠFinancial	 ﾠRegulation.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
  In	 ﾠaccordance	 ﾠwith	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ59(3)
155	 ﾠand	 ﾠ(4)
156	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠFinancial	 ﾠRegulation,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
High	 ﾠRepresentative	 ﾠdecided	 ﾠto	 ﾠdelegate	 ﾠthe	 ﾠService’s	 ﾠ“powers	 ﾠof	 ﾠbudget	 ﾠ
implementation	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠChief	 ﾠOperating	 ﾠOfficer	 ﾠ(Director	 ﾠGeneral	 ﾠfor	 ﾠBudget	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
Administration),	 ﾠwho	 ﾠcarries	 ﾠout	 ﾠthe	 ﾠduties	 ﾠof	 ﾠdelegated	 ﾠauthorising	 ﾠofficer	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠEEAS”	 ﾠand	 ﾠwho	 ﾠexercises	 ﾠthose	 ﾠdelegated	 ﾠpowers	 ﾠ“in	 ﾠaccordance	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
provisions	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ‘Charter	 ﾠof	 ﾠtasks	 ﾠand	 ﾠresponsibilities	 ﾠof	 ﾠauthorising	 ﾠofficers	 ﾠby	 ﾠ
delegation’,	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠthe	 ﾠauthorising	 ﾠofficer	 ﾠby	 ﾠdelegation	 ﾠshall	 ﾠsign	 ﾠupon	 ﾠtaking	 ﾠup	 ﾠ
duty	 ﾠand	 ﾠwhenever	 ﾠany	 ﾠchanges	 ﾠare	 ﾠmade	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCharter”.
157	 ﾠThe	 ﾠpowers	 ﾠ
delegated	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠChief	 ﾠOperating	 ﾠOfficer	 ﾠunder	 ﾠthese	 ﾠinternal	 ﾠrules	 ﾠallow	 ﾠhim	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
implement	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbudget	 ﾠby	 ﾠmaking	 ﾠbudgetary	 ﾠand	 ﾠlegal	 ﾠcommitments,	 ﾠvalidating	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠauthorising	 ﾠpayments,	 ﾠestablishing	 ﾠentitlements	 ﾠand	 ﾠissuing	 ﾠrecovery	 ﾠ
orders,	 ﾠtaking	 ﾠindividual	 ﾠdecisions	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠaward	 ﾠof	 ﾠgrants	 ﾠor	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠcontracts	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
proposing	 ﾠtransfers	 ﾠof	 ﾠappropriations	 ﾠin	 ﾠaccordance	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠInternal	 ﾠRules.
158	 ﾠ
As	 ﾠdelegated	 ﾠauthorising	 ﾠofficer,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠChief	 ﾠOperating	 ﾠOfficer	 ﾠmay	 ﾠin	 ﾠturn	 ﾠ
delegate	 ﾠhis	 ﾠpowers	 ﾠto	 ﾠsub-ﾭ‐delegated	 ﾠauthorising	 ﾠofficers,
159	 ﾠin	 ﾠkeeping	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
principles,	 ﾠrules	 ﾠand	 ﾠlimits	 ﾠfixed	 ﾠin	 ﾠArticles	 ﾠ7-ﾭ‐11	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠInternal	 ﾠRules.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
  In	 ﾠorder	 ﾠto	 ﾠensure	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ“continuity	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfunctioning	 ﾠof	 ﾠUnion	 ﾠDelegations	 ﾠand,	 ﾠ
in	 ﾠparticular,	 ﾠcontinuity	 ﾠand	 ﾠefficiency	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmanagement	 ﾠof	 ﾠexternal	 ﾠaid	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
Delegations”,
160	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ2010	 ﾠrevision	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠFinancial	 ﾠRegulation	 ﾠadded	 ﾠa	 ﾠfifth	 ﾠ
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 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	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 ﾠ	 ﾠ	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 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	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 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	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 ﾠ
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 ﾠRef.	 ﾠAres(2011)109103	 ﾠ-ﾭ‐	 ﾠ01/02/2011.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
155	 ﾠ”The	 ﾠpowers	 ﾠof	 ﾠauthorising	 ﾠofficer	 ﾠshall	 ﾠbe	 ﾠdelegated	 ﾠor	 ﾠsub-ﾭ‐delegated	 ﾠonly	 ﾠto	 ﾠpersons	 ﾠcovered	 ﾠby	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠ[Staff	 ﾠRegulations]“.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
156	 ﾠ“Authorising	 ﾠofficers	 ﾠby	 ﾠdelegation	 ﾠor	 ﾠsub-ﾭ‐delegation	 ﾠmay	 ﾠact	 ﾠonly	 ﾠwithin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlimits	 ﾠset	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
instrument	 ﾠof	 ﾠdelegation	 ﾠor	 ﾠsub-ﾭ‐delegation.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠresponsible	 ﾠauthorising	 ﾠofficer	 ﾠby	 ﾠdelegation	 ﾠor	 ﾠsub-ﾭ‐
delegation	 ﾠmay	 ﾠbe	 ﾠassisted	 ﾠin	 ﾠhis/her	 ﾠtask	 ﾠby	 ﾠone	 ﾠor	 ﾠmore	 ﾠmembers	 ﾠof	 ﾠstaff	 ﾠentrusted,	 ﾠunder	 ﾠhis/her	 ﾠ
responsibility,	 ﾠto	 ﾠcarry	 ﾠout	 ﾠcertain	 ﾠoperations	 ﾠnecessary	 ﾠfor	 ﾠimplementation	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbudget	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
presentation	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠaccounts”.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
157	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ4(1)	 ﾠand	 ﾠ(2)	 ﾠof	 ﾠHR	 ﾠPROC(2011)	 ﾠ001.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
158	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ4(3)	 ﾠof	 ﾠHR	 ﾠPROC(2011)	 ﾠ001.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
159	 ﾠArticles	 ﾠ6	 ﾠresp.	 ﾠ5	 ﾠof	 ﾠHR	 ﾠPROC(2011)	 ﾠ001.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
160Recital	 ﾠ7	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpreamble	 ﾠto	 ﾠRegulation	 ﾠ(EU,	 ﾠEuratom)	 ﾠNo	 ﾠ1081/2010.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 69	 ﾠ
paragraph	 ﾠto	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ59:	 ﾠ“Where	 ﾠHeads	 ﾠof	 ﾠUnion	 ﾠDelegations	 ﾠact	 ﾠas	 ﾠauthorising	 ﾠ
officers	 ﾠby	 ﾠsub-ﾭ‐delegation	 ﾠin	 ﾠaccordance	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsecond	 ﾠparagraph	 ﾠof	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ
51,	 ﾠthey	 ﾠshall	 ﾠbe	 ﾠsubject	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCommission	 ﾠas	 ﾠthe	 ﾠinstitution	 ﾠresponsible	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
definition,	 ﾠexercise,	 ﾠcontrol	 ﾠand	 ﾠappraisal	 ﾠof	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠduties	 ﾠand	 ﾠresponsibilities	 ﾠas	 ﾠ
authorising	 ﾠofficers	 ﾠby	 ﾠsub-ﾭ‐delegation.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠCommission	 ﾠshall,	 ﾠat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsame	 ﾠtime,	 ﾠ
inform	 ﾠthe	 ﾠHigh	 ﾠRepresentative	 ﾠthereof”.
161	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
  In	 ﾠline	 ﾠwith	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ317	 ﾠTFEU,	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠattributes	 ﾠresponsibility	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠ
Commission	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠimplementation	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠoperational	 ﾠbudget,	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ59(5)	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠFinancial	 ﾠRegulation	 ﾠentrenches	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrift	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
Commission	 ﾠin	 ﾠmatters	 ﾠof	 ﾠbudgetary	 ﾠcontrol,	 ﾠestablished	 ﾠby	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ8(1)	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠ
Decision.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠlatter’s	 ﾠsecond	 ﾠsentence	 ﾠimposes	 ﾠan	 ﾠobligation	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠHR	 ﾠto	 ﾠadopt	 ﾠ
internal	 ﾠrules	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmanagement	 ﾠof	 ﾠ“administrative	 ﾠbudget	 ﾠlines”,	 ﾠwhereas	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
third	 ﾠsentence	 ﾠprescribes	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ“[o]perational	 ﾠexpenditure	 ﾠshall	 ﾠremain	 ﾠwithin	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠCommission	 ﾠsection	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbudget.”	 ﾠThus,	 ﾠleaving	 ﾠaside	 ﾠthe	 ﾠquestion	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
blurred	 ﾠboundaries	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠ“administrative	 ﾠbudget	 ﾠlines”	 ﾠand	 ﾠ“operational	 ﾠ
expenditure”,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcombination	 ﾠof	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ8(1)	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠDecision	 ﾠand	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ59(5)	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠ2010	 ﾠFinancial	 ﾠRegulation	 ﾠeffectively	 ﾠcreates	 ﾠsplit	 ﾠfinancial	 ﾠcircuits	 ﾠat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
level	 ﾠof	 ﾠEU	 ﾠDelegations.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
  In	 ﾠorder	 ﾠto	 ﾠovercome	 ﾠpotential	 ﾠdifficulties	 ﾠarising	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsplit	 ﾠof	 ﾠcircuits,	 ﾠ
procedures	 ﾠand	 ﾠaccountability,
162	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ15	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠInternal	 ﾠRules	 ﾠdecided	 ﾠupon	 ﾠ
by	 ﾠthe	 ﾠHigh	 ﾠRepresentative	 ﾠprovides	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ“[o]n	 ﾠan	 ﾠexceptional	 ﾠbasis,	 ﾠand	 ﾠfor	 ﾠ
reasons	 ﾠof	 ﾠgood	 ﾠbudgetary	 ﾠexecution,	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠUnion’s	 ﾠDelegations,	 ﾠ
specific	 ﾠadministrative	 ﾠarrangements	 ﾠmay	 ﾠbe	 ﾠagreed	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
European	 ﾠCommission,	 ﾠin	 ﾠaccordance	 ﾠwith	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ50	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠFinancial	 ﾠ
Regulation”.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
  The	 ﾠ“Working	 ﾠarrangements	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠCommission	 ﾠservices	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠ
External	 ﾠAction	 ﾠService	 ﾠ(EEAS)	 ﾠin	 ﾠrelation	 ﾠto	 ﾠexternal	 ﾠrelations	 ﾠissues”	 ﾠagreed	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
in	 ﾠJanuary	 ﾠ2012	 ﾠlay	 ﾠdown	 ﾠin	 ﾠconsiderable	 ﾠdetail	 ﾠhow	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfinancial	 ﾠcircuits	 ﾠ
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 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ51(2)	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠFinancial	 ﾠRegulation	 ﾠprovides	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ”the	 ﾠCommission	 ﾠmay	 ﾠdelegate	 ﾠits	 ﾠpowers	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
budget	 ﾠimplementation	 ﾠconcerning	 ﾠthe	 ﾠoperational	 ﾠappropriations	 ﾠof	 ﾠits	 ﾠown	 ﾠsection	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠHeads	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
Union	 ﾠDelegations”	 ﾠand	 ﾠthat,	 ﾠ”[w]hen	 ﾠHeads	 ﾠof	 ﾠUnion	 ﾠDelegations	 ﾠact	 ﾠas	 ﾠsub-ﾭ‐delegated	 ﾠauthorising	 ﾠ
officers	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCommission,	 ﾠthey	 ﾠshall	 ﾠapply	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCommission	 ﾠrules	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠimplementation	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
budget	 ﾠand	 ﾠshall	 ﾠbe	 ﾠsubmitted	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsame	 ﾠduties,	 ﾠobligations	 ﾠand	 ﾠaccountability	 ﾠas	 ﾠany	 ﾠother	 ﾠsub-ﾭ‐
delegated	 ﾠauthorising	 ﾠofficer	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCommission”.	 ﾠSee,	 ﾠin	 ﾠthis	 ﾠrespect,	 ﾠOrder	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠGeneral	 ﾠCourt	 ﾠof	 ﾠ4	 ﾠ
July	 ﾠ2012	 ﾠin	 ﾠCase	 ﾠT	 ﾠ395/11,	 ﾠEltid.o.o.	 ﾠv.	 ﾠDelegation	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠUnion	 ﾠto	 ﾠMontenegro,	 ﾠnyr.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
162	 ﾠRecital	 ﾠ14	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpreamble	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠDecision:	 ﾠ“Decisions	 ﾠhaving	 ﾠa	 ﾠfinancial	 ﾠimpact	 ﾠwill,	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
particular,	 ﾠcomply	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠresponsibilities	 ﾠlaid	 ﾠdown	 ﾠin	 ﾠTitle	 ﾠIV	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠFinancial	 ﾠRegulation,	 ﾠespecially	 ﾠ
Articles	 ﾠ64	 ﾠto	 ﾠ68	 ﾠthereof	 ﾠregarding	 ﾠliability	 ﾠof	 ﾠfinancial	 ﾠactors,	 ﾠand	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ75	 ﾠthereof	 ﾠregarding	 ﾠ
expenditure	 ﾠoperations”.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 70	 ﾠ
between	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCommission	 ﾠpan	 ﾠout.	 ﾠIt	 ﾠstates,	 ﾠinter	 ﾠalia,	 ﾠthat,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
Heads	 ﾠof	 ﾠDelegation	 ﾠ“can	 ﾠreceive	 ﾠsub-ﾭ‐delegation	 ﾠof	 ﾠpower	 ﾠof	 ﾠauthorising	 ﾠofficer	 ﾠ
for	 ﾠbudget	 ﾠimplementation	 ﾠtasks	 ﾠbelonging	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCommission's	 ﾠcompetence	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠresponsibility,	 ﾠfor	 ﾠoperational	 ﾠappropriations	 ﾠonly”.	 ﾠAs	 ﾠsuch,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠHeads	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
Delegation	 ﾠapply	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCommission	 ﾠrules	 ﾠand	 ﾠare	 ﾠsubject	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsame	 ﾠduties,	 ﾠ
obligations	 ﾠand	 ﾠaccountability	 ﾠas	 ﾠany	 ﾠother	 ﾠsub-ﾭ‐delegated	 ﾠauthorising	 ﾠofficer	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠCommission.
163	 ﾠThey	 ﾠcan	 ﾠsub-ﾭ‐delegate	 ﾠthese	 ﾠpowers	 ﾠonly	 ﾠto	 ﾠCommission	 ﾠ
staff	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠDelegation,	 ﾠnot	 ﾠto	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠstaff.	 ﾠConversely,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠHeads	 ﾠof	 ﾠDelegation	 ﾠ
can	 ﾠreceive	 ﾠsub-ﾭ‐delegation	 ﾠof	 ﾠpower	 ﾠof	 ﾠauthorising	 ﾠofficer	 ﾠfor	 ﾠbudget	 ﾠ
implementation	 ﾠtasks	 ﾠbelonging	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS'	 ﾠcompetence	 ﾠand	 ﾠresponsibility;	 ﾠ
powers	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠthey	 ﾠcan	 ﾠsub-ﾭ‐delegate	 ﾠonly	 ﾠto	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠstaff	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdelegation,	 ﾠnot	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
Commission	 ﾠstaff.
164	 ﾠIn	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfinancial	 ﾠcircuits	 ﾠin	 ﾠEU	 ﾠDelegations	 ﾠthe	 ﾠroles	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
verification	 ﾠand	 ﾠauthorisation	 ﾠare	 ﾠrestricted	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠstaff	 ﾠbelonging	 ﾠto	 ﾠeach	 ﾠ
“institution”;
165	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠexception	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdouble-ﾭ‐hatted	 ﾠrole	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠHead	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
Delegation,	 ﾠin	 ﾠaccordance	 ﾠwith	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ51	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠFinancial	 ﾠRegulation.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
  This	 ﾠsplit	 ﾠfinancial	 ﾠregime	 ﾠhas	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠconfirmed	 ﾠby	 ﾠorder	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠGeneral	 ﾠCourt,	 ﾠ
which	 ﾠobserved	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEU	 ﾠDelegations	 ﾠmay	 ﾠhave	 ﾠa	 ﾠrole	 ﾠof	 ﾠassisting	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
Commission	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠimplementation	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEU	 ﾠbudget	 ﾠat	 ﾠlocal	 ﾠlevel,	 ﾠmore	 ﾠ
specifically	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠevent	 ﾠof	 ﾠimplementation	 ﾠof	 ﾠprojects	 ﾠfinanced	 ﾠunder	 ﾠEU	 ﾠ
external	 ﾠaid	 ﾠprogrammes.	 ﾠThat	 ﾠassistance,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠGeneral	 ﾠCourt	 ﾠruled,	 ﾠ“which	 ﾠis	 ﾠ
part	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠsub-ﾭ‐delegation	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠHead	 ﾠof	 ﾠDelegation,	 ﾠis	 ﾠdone	 ﾠunder	 ﾠthe	 ﾠstrict	 ﾠ
control	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCommission,	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠis,	 ﾠpursuant	 ﾠto	 ﾠArticles	 ﾠ317	 ﾠTFEU	 ﾠand	 ﾠ319	 ﾠ
TFEU,	 ﾠcharged	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠimplementation	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbudget	 ﾠand	 ﾠholds,	 ﾠunder	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ
51	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠFinancial	 ﾠRegulation,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpower	 ﾠto	 ﾠwithdraw	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdelegation	 ﾠgranted.”	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
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 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ60a	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠFinancial	 ﾠRegulation	 ﾠstates	 ﾠthat	 ﾠHeads	 ﾠof	 ﾠUnion	 ﾠDelegations	 ﾠacting	 ﾠas	 ﾠauthorising	 ﾠ
officers	 ﾠby	 ﾠsub-ﾭ‐delegation	 ﾠmust,	 ﾠfirst,	 ﾠreport	 ﾠto	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠauthorising	 ﾠofficer	 ﾠby	 ﾠdelegation	 ﾠconcerning,	 ﾠ
inter	 ﾠalia,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmanagement	 ﾠof	 ﾠoperations	 ﾠsub-ﾭ‐delegated	 ﾠto	 ﾠthem	 ﾠand,	 ﾠsecond,	 ﾠreply	 ﾠto	 ﾠany	 ﾠrequest	 ﾠby	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠauthorising	 ﾠofficer	 ﾠby	 ﾠdelegation	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCommission.	 ﾠAccording	 ﾠto	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ85	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠFinancial	 ﾠ
Regulation,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠHeads	 ﾠof	 ﾠUnion	 ﾠDelegations	 ﾠacting	 ﾠas	 ﾠauthorising	 ﾠofficers	 ﾠby	 ﾠsub-ﾭ‐delegation	 ﾠ“shall	 ﾠbe	 ﾠ
subject	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠverifying	 ﾠpowers	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠinternal	 ﾠauditor	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCommission	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfinancial	 ﾠ
management	 ﾠsub-ﾭ‐delegated	 ﾠto	 ﾠthem”.	 ﾠFurthermore,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ2010	 ﾠFinancial	 ﾠRegulation	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ2010	 ﾠ
amendment	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠStaff	 ﾠRegulations	 ﾠof	 ﾠOfficials	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠCommunities	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠConditions	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
Employment	 ﾠof	 ﾠOther	 ﾠServants	 ﾠof	 ﾠthose	 ﾠCommunities	 ﾠ(OJ	 ﾠ2010	 ﾠL	 ﾠ311/	 ﾠ1)	 ﾠadded	 ﾠa	 ﾠnew	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ96	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
those	 ﾠregulations,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsecond	 ﾠparagraph	 ﾠof	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠprovides	 ﾠthat	 ﾠan	 ﾠ”EEAS	 ﾠofficial	 ﾠwho	 ﾠhas	 ﾠto	 ﾠcarry	 ﾠout	 ﾠ
tasks	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCommission	 ﾠas	 ﾠpart	 ﾠof	 ﾠhis	 ﾠduties	 ﾠshall	 ﾠtake	 ﾠinstructions	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCommission	 ﾠwith	 ﾠregard	 ﾠ
to	 ﾠthose	 ﾠtasks,	 ﾠin	 ﾠaccordance	 ﾠwith	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ221(2)	 ﾠ[TFEU]”.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
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 ﾠRef.	 ﾠAres(2012)41133	 ﾠ-ﾭ‐	 ﾠ13/01/2012,	 ﾠp.	 ﾠ5.	 ﾠSee	 ﾠalso	 ﾠresponsibility	 ﾠfor	 ﾠstaff	 ﾠin	 ﾠEU	 ﾠDelegations	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
Article	 ﾠ5	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠCouncil	 ﾠDecision.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
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 ﾠNevertheless	 ﾠinitiation	 ﾠtasks	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠbudget	 ﾠcan	 ﾠbe	 ﾠentrusted	 ﾠto	 ﾠCommission	 ﾠstaff,	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
exceptional	 ﾠcases	 ﾠand	 ﾠon	 ﾠa	 ﾠtransitional	 ﾠbasis,	 ﾠas	 ﾠforeseen	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠInternal	 ﾠRules	 ﾠdecision	 ﾠof	 ﾠboth	 ﾠ
institutions.	 ﾠFor	 ﾠmore	 ﾠdetails	 ﾠon	 ﾠinter-ﾭ‐service	 ﾠarrangements	 ﾠon	 ﾠfinancial	 ﾠissues,	 ﾠibid.,	 ﾠpp.	 ﾠ6-ﾭ‐9.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 71	 ﾠ
In	 ﾠa	 ﾠrather	 ﾠliberal	 ﾠinterpretation	 ﾠof	 ﾠits	 ﾠown	 ﾠjurisdiction,
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 ﾠthe	 ﾠGeneral	 ﾠCourt	 ﾠ
then	 ﾠconcluded	 ﾠthat	 ﾠit	 ﾠ“follows	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ221	 ﾠTFEU,	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdecision	 ﾠof	 ﾠ26	 ﾠ
July	 ﾠ2010	 ﾠand	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrelevant	 ﾠprovisions	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠFinancial	 ﾠRegulation	 ﾠreferred	 ﾠ
to	 ﾠabove	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlegal	 ﾠstatus	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠUnion	 ﾠDelegations	 ﾠis	 ﾠcharacterised	 ﾠby	 ﾠa	 ﾠtwo-ﾭ‐
fold	 ﾠorganic	 ﾠand	 ﾠfunctional	 ﾠdependence	 ﾠwith	 ﾠrespect	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ





(ii)  Powers	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
  Two	 ﾠobservations	 ﾠcan	 ﾠbe	 ﾠmade	 ﾠwith	 ﾠrespect	 ﾠto	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ8(2).	 ﾠThe	 ﾠfirst	 ﾠconcerns	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠone	 ﾠand	 ﾠonly	 ﾠdirect	 ﾠreference	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCouncil	 ﾠDecision	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ“powers”	 ﾠvested	 ﾠ
in	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠitself.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠsecond	 ﾠobservation	 ﾠconcerns	 ﾠthe	 ﾠscope	 ﾠof	 ﾠthose	 ﾠpowers.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
  The	 ﾠuse	 ﾠof	 ﾠterminology	 ﾠis	 ﾠstriking	 ﾠif	 ﾠone	 ﾠconsiders	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠDecision	 ﾠ
otherwise	 ﾠonly	 ﾠspeaks	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠService’s	 ﾠ“tasks”	 ﾠ(Articles	 ﾠ1(2)	 ﾠand	 ﾠ2).	 ﾠWhereas	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
latter	 ﾠare	 ﾠderivative	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpowers	 ﾠvested	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠHigh	 ﾠRepresentative	 ﾠ(as	 ﾠ
outlined,	 ﾠnotably,	 ﾠin	 ﾠArticles	 ﾠ18	 ﾠand	 ﾠ27	 ﾠTEU),	 ﾠthe	 ﾠPresident	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠ
Council,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠPresident	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCommission,	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCommission	 ﾠ(in	 ﾠthe	 ﾠexercise	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠrespective	 ﾠfunctions	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠarea	 ﾠof	 ﾠexternal	 ﾠrelations),	 ﾠthe	 ﾠreference	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠEEAS’	 ﾠown	 ﾠpowers	 ﾠhas	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠunderstood	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsense	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthese	 ﾠare	 ﾠpowers	 ﾠ
which	 ﾠhave	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠbestowed	 ﾠupon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠService	 ﾠby	 ﾠvirtue	 ﾠof	 ﾠArticles	 ﾠ8(1)	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠ
Decision	 ﾠand	 ﾠ1(2)	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ2010	 ﾠFinancial	 ﾠRegulation,	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠ–	 ﾠfor	 ﾠbudgetary	 ﾠ
matters	 ﾠ–	 ﾠelevated	 ﾠthe	 ﾠstatus	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠExternal	 ﾠAction	 ﾠService	 ﾠto	 ﾠthat	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
an	 ﾠ“institution”.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
  As	 ﾠhas	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠnoted	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcommentary	 ﾠon	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ8(1),	 ﾠthe	 ﾠscope	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS’	 ﾠ
budgetary	 ﾠpowers	 ﾠis	 ﾠlimited	 ﾠto	 ﾠadministrative	 ﾠexpenditures.	 ﾠParagraph	 ﾠ2	 ﾠmakes	 ﾠ
it	 ﾠclear	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthese	 ﾠpowers	 ﾠwill	 ﾠbe	 ﾠexercised	 ﾠin	 ﾠaccordance	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠFinancial	 ﾠ
Regulation	 ﾠapplicable	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠgeneral	 ﾠbudget	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEU,	 ﾠ“within	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlimits	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
appropriations	 ﾠallocated	 ﾠto	 ﾠ[the	 ﾠService]”.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
(iii)  Duty	 ﾠof	 ﾠcooperation	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
  Article	 ﾠ8(3)	 ﾠprovides	 ﾠthat,	 ﾠ“[w]hen	 ﾠdrawing	 ﾠup	 ﾠestimates	 ﾠof	 ﾠadministrative	 ﾠ
expenditure	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠHigh	 ﾠRepresentative	 ﾠwill	 ﾠhold	 ﾠconsultations	 ﾠwith,	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
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 ﾠSee	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdiscussion	 ﾠunder	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ1	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠDecision,	 ﾠabove.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
167Order	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠGeneral	 ﾠCourt	 ﾠof	 ﾠ4	 ﾠJuly	 ﾠ2012	 ﾠin	 ﾠCase	 ﾠT	 ﾠ395/11,	 ﾠEltid.o.o.	 ﾠv.	 ﾠDelegation	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠ
Union	 ﾠto	 ﾠMontenegro,	 ﾠnyr,	 ﾠparagraphs	 ﾠ44-ﾭ‐46.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 72	 ﾠ
respectively,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCommissioner	 ﾠresponsible	 ﾠfor	 ﾠDevelopment	 ﾠPolicy	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
Commissioner	 ﾠresponsible	 ﾠfor	 ﾠNeighbourhood	 ﾠPolicy	 ﾠregarding	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠrespective	 ﾠ
responsibilities”.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
  The	 ﾠrationale	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠinclusion	 ﾠof	 ﾠthis	 ﾠparagraph	 ﾠlies	 ﾠwithin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠagreement	 ﾠ
between	 ﾠmember	 ﾠstates	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠestablishment	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠshould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠguided	 ﾠby	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠprinciple	 ﾠof	 ﾠcost-ﾭ‐efficiency	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠavoidance	 ﾠof	 ﾠunnecessary	 ﾠduplication	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
tasks,	 ﾠfunctions	 ﾠand	 ﾠresources	 ﾠwith,	 ﾠe.g.,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCommission.
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 ﾠAs	 ﾠsuch,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠduty	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
consult	 ﾠenshrined	 ﾠin	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ8(3)	 ﾠis	 ﾠan	 ﾠelaboration	 ﾠof	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ3(2)	 ﾠand	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠHigh	 ﾠ
Representative’s	 ﾠduty	 ﾠto	 ﾠensure	 ﾠconsistency	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠUnion’s	 ﾠexternal	 ﾠaction	 ﾠ
pursuant	 ﾠto	 ﾠArticles	 ﾠ18(4),	 ﾠ21(3)	 ﾠand	 ﾠ26(2)	 ﾠTEU.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
  Apparent	 ﾠin	 ﾠparagraph	 ﾠ3	 ﾠof	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ8	 ﾠis	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlimitation	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠscope	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠHR’s	 ﾠ
duty	 ﾠto	 ﾠconsult:	 ﾠit	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠnot	 ﾠseem	 ﾠto	 ﾠconcern	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠshared	 ﾠexternal	 ﾠcompetences	 ﾠ
areas	 ﾠas	 ﾠenlargement,	 ﾠhumanitarian	 ﾠaid	 ﾠand	 ﾠcrisis	 ﾠresponse.	 ﾠWith	 ﾠrespect	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
shared	 ﾠcompetence	 ﾠareas	 ﾠof	 ﾠinternational	 ﾠcooperation,	 ﾠhumanitarian	 ﾠaid	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
crisis	 ﾠresponse,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠgap	 ﾠhas	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠplugged	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ2010	 ﾠrevision	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠFinancial	 ﾠ
Regulation,	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠextends	 ﾠthe	 ﾠobligation	 ﾠof	 ﾠbudgetary	 ﾠconsultation	 ﾠto	 ﾠthese	 ﾠ
areas.
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 ﾠ	 ﾠDrawing	 ﾠup	 ﾠestimates	 ﾠof	 ﾠadministrative	 ﾠexpenditures	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfield	 ﾠof	 ﾠEU	 ﾠ
enlargement,	 ﾠhowever,	 ﾠremains	 ﾠoutside	 ﾠthe	 ﾠscope	 ﾠof	 ﾠthis	 ﾠobligation.	 ﾠThis	 ﾠ
apparent	 ﾠlimit	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠobligation	 ﾠto	 ﾠconsult	 ﾠis	 ﾠwithout	 ﾠprejudice	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠgeneral	 ﾠ
obligation	 ﾠof	 ﾠconsultation	 ﾠenshrined	 ﾠin	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ3(2)	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠDecision.	 ﾠGiven	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
EEAS	 ﾠis	 ﾠconceived	 ﾠas	 ﾠan	 ﾠ“institution”	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpurpose	 ﾠof	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ8,	 ﾠone	 ﾠmay	 ﾠ
indeed	 ﾠconsider	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠobligation	 ﾠof	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ13(2)	 ﾠTEU	 ﾠcould	 ﾠapply	 ﾠmutatis	 ﾠ
mutandis.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
  In	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsame	 ﾠvein,	 ﾠparagraph	 ﾠ3	 ﾠputs	 ﾠa	 ﾠcircumscribed	 ﾠobligation	 ﾠof	 ﾠinitiative	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
shoulders	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠHigh	 ﾠRepresentative:	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠs/he	 ﾠwho	 ﾠshall	 ﾠconsult	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdesignated	 ﾠ
Commissioners;	 ﾠnot	 ﾠthe	 ﾠother	 ﾠway	 ﾠaround.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
  The	 ﾠfinal	 ﾠword	 ﾠon	 ﾠdrawing	 ﾠup	 ﾠthe	 ﾠestimates,	 ﾠhowever,	 ﾠis	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠ
Commission.	 ﾠAfter	 ﾠall,	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ8(4)	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠDecision	 ﾠprescribes	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCommission	 ﾠ
consolidates	 ﾠthose	 ﾠestimates	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠdraft	 ﾠbudget,	 ﾠ“which	 ﾠmay	 ﾠcontain	 ﾠdifferent	 ﾠ
estimates”;	 ﾠand	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCommission	 ﾠ“may	 ﾠamend	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdraft	 ﾠbudget	 ﾠas	 ﾠprovided	 ﾠ
for	 ﾠin	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ314(2)	 ﾠTFEU”.	 ﾠAs	 ﾠsuch,	 ﾠparagraph	 ﾠ4	 ﾠechoes	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprocedure	 ﾠof	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ
314(1)	 ﾠTFEU:	 ﾠ“(…)	 ﾠeach	 ﾠinstitution	 ﾠshall,	 ﾠbefore	 ﾠ1	 ﾠJuly,	 ﾠdraw	 ﾠup	 ﾠestimates	 ﾠof	 ﾠits	 ﾠ
expenditure	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfollowing	 ﾠfinancial	 ﾠyear.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠCommission	 ﾠshall	 ﾠconsolidate	 ﾠ
these	 ﾠestimates	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠdraft	 ﾠbudget,	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠmay	 ﾠcontain	 ﾠdifferent	 ﾠestimates”.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
168	 ﾠSee	 ﾠrecital	 ﾠ15	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpreamble	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠDecision.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
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 ﾠof	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  In	 ﾠorder	 ﾠto	 ﾠensure	 ﾠbudgetary	 ﾠtransparency	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠarea	 ﾠof	 ﾠexternal	 ﾠaction	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
Union,	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ8(5)	 ﾠtasks	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCommission	 ﾠto	 ﾠtransmit	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ“budgetary	 ﾠ
authority”,	 ﾠi.e.	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠParliament,	 ﾠtogether	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdraft	 ﾠgeneral	 ﾠbudget	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEU,	 ﾠa	 ﾠworking	 ﾠdocument	 ﾠpresenting,	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠcomprehensive	 ﾠway,	 ﾠall	 ﾠ
expenditure	 ﾠrelated	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠexternal	 ﾠaction	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠUnion.	 ﾠArguably,	 ﾠthis	 ﾠtask	 ﾠis	 ﾠ
best	 ﾠexecuted	 ﾠif	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCommission	 ﾠengages	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠHigh	 ﾠRepresentative	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
consultation	 ﾠcalled	 ﾠfor	 ﾠin	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ8(3).	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
(iv)  Discharge	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
  Finally,	 ﾠregarded	 ﾠas	 ﾠan	 ﾠinstitution	 ﾠfor	 ﾠbudgetary	 ﾠpurposes,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠis	 ﾠsubject	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠprocedures	 ﾠregarding	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdischarge,	 ﾠas	 ﾠprovided	 ﾠfor	 ﾠin	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ319	 ﾠTFEU	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
in	 ﾠArticles	 ﾠ145	 ﾠto	 ﾠ147	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠFinancial	 ﾠRegulation.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠthis	 ﾠcontext,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠHigh	 ﾠ
Representative	 ﾠ(or	 ﾠdelegated	 ﾠofficers	 ﾠwithin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS)	 ﾠwill	 ﾠprovide	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠ
Parliament	 ﾠwith	 ﾠall	 ﾠnecessary	 ﾠsupport	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠexercise	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlatter’s	 ﾠright	 ﾠas	 ﾠ
discharge	 ﾠauthority.
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 ﾠThe	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠis	 ﾠthus	 ﾠrequired	 ﾠto	 ﾠprovide,	 ﾠas	 ﾠappropriate,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
additional	 ﾠnecessary	 ﾠinformation,	 ﾠincluding	 ﾠthrough	 ﾠattendance	 ﾠat	 ﾠmeetings	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠrelevant	 ﾠbodies.	 ﾠAs	 ﾠnoted	 ﾠabove,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEP	 ﾠhas	 ﾠthus	 ﾠsome	 ﾠsway	 ﾠover	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
administrative	 ﾠbudget	 ﾠimplementation	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠService.	 ﾠ
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 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ8(6)	 ﾠstates	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ“(…)	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠis	 ﾠobliged	 ﾠto	 ﾠfully	 ﾠcooperate	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠinstitutions	 ﾠinvolved	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠdischarge	 ﾠprocedure	 ﾠ(…)”.	 ﾠ	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ARTICLE	 ﾠ9	 ﾠ
External	 ﾠaction	 ﾠinstruments	 ﾠand	 ﾠprogramming
∗	 ﾠ
1.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠmanagement	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠUnion’s	 ﾠexternal	 ﾠcooperation	 ﾠprogrammes	 ﾠis	 ﾠunder	 ﾠthe	 ﾠresponsibility	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
Commission	 ﾠ without	 ﾠ prejudice	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ respective	 ﾠ roles	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ Commission	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ EEAS	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ
programming	 ﾠas	 ﾠset	 ﾠout	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfollowing	 ﾠparagraphs.	 ﾠ
2.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠHigh	 ﾠRepresentative	 ﾠshall	 ﾠensure	 ﾠoverall	 ﾠpolitical	 ﾠcoordination	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠUnion’s	 ﾠexternal	 ﾠaction,	 ﾠ
ensuring	 ﾠthe	 ﾠunity,	 ﾠconsistency	 ﾠand	 ﾠeffectiveness	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠUnion’s	 ﾠexternal	 ﾠaction,	 ﾠin	 ﾠparticular	 ﾠthrough	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠfollowing	 ﾠexternal	 ﾠassistance	 ﾠinstruments:	 ﾠ
—	 ﾠthe	 ﾠDevelopment	 ﾠCooperation	 ﾠInstrument	 ﾠ,	 ﾠ
—	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠDevelopment	 ﾠFund	 ﾠ,	 ﾠ
—	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠInstrument	 ﾠfor	 ﾠDemocracy	 ﾠand	 ﾠHuman	 ﾠRights	 ﾠ,	 ﾠ
—	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠNeighbourhood	 ﾠand	 ﾠPartnership	 ﾠInstrument	 ﾠ,	 ﾠ
—	 ﾠthe	 ﾠInstrument	 ﾠfor	 ﾠCooperation	 ﾠwith	 ﾠIndustrialised	 ﾠCountries	 ﾠ,	 ﾠ
—	 ﾠthe	 ﾠInstrument	 ﾠfor	 ﾠNuclear	 ﾠSafety	 ﾠCooperation	 ﾠ,	 ﾠ
—	 ﾠthe	 ﾠInstrument	 ﾠfor	 ﾠStability,	 ﾠregarding	 ﾠthe	 ﾠassistance	 ﾠprovided	 ﾠfor	 ﾠin	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ4	 ﾠof	 ﾠRegulation	 ﾠ(EC)	 ﾠNo	 ﾠ
1717/2006.	 ﾠ
3.	 ﾠ In	 ﾠ particular,	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ EEAS	 ﾠ shall	 ﾠ contribute	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ programming	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ management	 ﾠ cycle	 ﾠ for	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ
instruments	 ﾠ referred	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ paragraph	 ﾠ 2,	 ﾠ on	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ basis	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ policy	 ﾠ objectives	 ﾠ set	 ﾠ out	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ those	 ﾠ
instruments.	 ﾠ It	 ﾠ shall	 ﾠ have	 ﾠ responsibility	 ﾠ for	 ﾠ preparing	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ following	 ﾠ decisions	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ Commission	 ﾠ
regarding	 ﾠthe	 ﾠstrategic,	 ﾠmultiannual	 ﾠsteps	 ﾠwithin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprogramming	 ﾠcycle:	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
(i)	 ﾠ country	 ﾠ allocations	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ determine	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ global	 ﾠ financial	 ﾠ envelope	 ﾠ for	 ﾠ each	 ﾠ region,	 ﾠ subject	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ
indicative	 ﾠbreakdown	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmultiannual	 ﾠfinancial	 ﾠframework.	 ﾠWithin	 ﾠeach	 ﾠregion,	 ﾠa	 ﾠproportion	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
funding	 ﾠwill	 ﾠbe	 ﾠreserved	 ﾠfor	 ﾠregional	 ﾠprogrammes;	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
(ii)	 ﾠcountry	 ﾠand	 ﾠregional	 ﾠstrategic	 ﾠpapers;	 ﾠ
(iii)	 ﾠnational	 ﾠand	 ﾠregional	 ﾠindicative	 ﾠprogrammes.	 ﾠ
In	 ﾠ accordance	 ﾠ with	 ﾠ Article	 ﾠ 3,	 ﾠ throughout	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ whole	 ﾠ cycle	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ programming,	 ﾠ planning	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ
implementation	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠinstruments	 ﾠreferred	 ﾠto	 ﾠin	 ﾠparagraph	 ﾠ2,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠHigh	 ﾠRepresentative	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠ
shall	 ﾠwork	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrelevant	 ﾠmembers	 ﾠand	 ﾠservices	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCommission	 ﾠwithout	 ﾠprejudice	 ﾠto	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ1(3).	 ﾠ
All	 ﾠproposals	 ﾠfor	 ﾠdecisions	 ﾠwill	 ﾠbe	 ﾠprepared	 ﾠby	 ﾠfollowing	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCommission’s	 ﾠprocedures	 ﾠand	 ﾠwill	 ﾠbe	 ﾠ
submitted	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCommission	 ﾠfor	 ﾠadoption.	 ﾠ
4.	 ﾠWith	 ﾠregard	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠDevelopment	 ﾠFund	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠDevelopment	 ﾠCooperation	 ﾠInstrument,	 ﾠany	 ﾠ
proposals,	 ﾠ including	 ﾠ those	 ﾠ for	 ﾠ changes	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ basic	 ﾠ regulations	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ programming	 ﾠ documents	 ﾠ
referred	 ﾠto	 ﾠin	 ﾠparagraph	 ﾠ3,	 ﾠshall	 ﾠbe	 ﾠprepared	 ﾠjointly	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrelevant	 ﾠservices	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠand	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
Commission	 ﾠunder	 ﾠthe	 ﾠresponsibility	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCommissioner	 ﾠresponsible	 ﾠfor	 ﾠDevelopment	 ﾠPolicy	 ﾠand	 ﾠshall	 ﾠ
be	 ﾠ submitted	 ﾠ jointly	 ﾠ with	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ High	 ﾠ Representative	 ﾠ for	 ﾠ adoption	 ﾠ by	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ Commission.	 ﾠ Thematic	 ﾠ
programmes,	 ﾠother	 ﾠthan	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠInstrument	 ﾠfor	 ﾠDemocracy	 ﾠand	 ﾠHuman	 ﾠRights,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠInstrument	 ﾠ
for	 ﾠNuclear	 ﾠSafety	 ﾠCooperation	 ﾠand	 ﾠthat	 ﾠpart	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠInstrument	 ﾠfor	 ﾠStability	 ﾠreferred	 ﾠto	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠseventh	 ﾠ
indent	 ﾠof	 ﾠparagraph	 ﾠ2,	 ﾠshall	 ﾠbe	 ﾠprepared	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠappropriate	 ﾠCommission	 ﾠservice	 ﾠunder	 ﾠthe	 ﾠguidance	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠCommissioner	 ﾠresponsible	 ﾠfor	 ﾠDevelopment	 ﾠPolicy	 ﾠand	 ﾠpresented	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCollege	 ﾠof	 ﾠCommissioners	 ﾠ
in	 ﾠagreement	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠHigh	 ﾠRepresentative	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠother	 ﾠrelevant	 ﾠCommissioners.	 ﾠ
5.	 ﾠWith	 ﾠregard	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠNeighbourhood	 ﾠand	 ﾠPartnership	 ﾠInstrument,	 ﾠany	 ﾠproposals,	 ﾠincluding	 ﾠ
those	 ﾠfor	 ﾠchanges	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbasic	 ﾠregulations	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprogramming	 ﾠdocuments	 ﾠreferred	 ﾠto	 ﾠin	 ﾠparagraph	 ﾠ
3,	 ﾠshall	 ﾠbe	 ﾠprepared	 ﾠjointly	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrelevant	 ﾠservices	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠand	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCommission	 ﾠunder	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
responsibility	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCommissioner	 ﾠresponsible	 ﾠfor	 ﾠNeighbourhood	 ﾠPolicy	 ﾠand	 ﾠshall	 ﾠbe	 ﾠsubmitted	 ﾠjointly	 ﾠ
with	 ﾠthe	 ﾠHigh	 ﾠRepresentative	 ﾠfor	 ﾠadoption	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCommission.	 ﾠ
6.	 ﾠActions	 ﾠundertaken	 ﾠunder:	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCFSP	 ﾠbudget;	 ﾠthe	 ﾠInstrument	 ﾠfor	 ﾠStability	 ﾠother	 ﾠthan	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpart	 ﾠreferred	 ﾠ
to	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠseventh	 ﾠindent	 ﾠof	 ﾠparagraph	 ﾠ2;	 ﾠthe	 ﾠInstrument	 ﾠfor	 ﾠCooperation	 ﾠwith	 ﾠIndustrialised	 ﾠCountries;	 ﾠ
communication	 ﾠand	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠDiplomacy	 ﾠactions,	 ﾠand	 ﾠelection	 ﾠobservation	 ﾠmissions,	 ﾠshall	 ﾠbe	 ﾠunder	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
responsibility	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ High	 ﾠ Representative/the	 ﾠ EEAS.	 ﾠ The	 ﾠ Commission	 ﾠ shall	 ﾠ be	 ﾠ responsible	 ﾠ for	 ﾠ their	 ﾠ
financial	 ﾠimplementation	 ﾠunder	 ﾠthe	 ﾠauthority	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠHigh	 ﾠRepresentative	 ﾠin	 ﾠhis/her	 ﾠcapacity	 ﾠas	 ﾠVice-ﾭ‐
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 ﾠ	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∗	 ﾠFootnote	 ﾠreferences	 ﾠhave	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠsuppressed	 ﾠhere	 ﾠbut	 ﾠare	 ﾠincluded	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdiscussion	 ﾠbelow.	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President	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCommission.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠCommission	 ﾠdepartment	 ﾠresponsible	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthis	 ﾠimplementation	 ﾠshall	 ﾠ
be	 ﾠco-ﾭ‐located	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
Article	 ﾠ9	 ﾠregulates	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprogramming	 ﾠof	 ﾠexternal	 ﾠaction	 ﾠinstruments.	 ﾠIt	 ﾠconcerns	 ﾠonly	 ﾠ
procedural	 ﾠissues,	 ﾠnot	 ﾠpolicy	 ﾠissues.	 ﾠWhereas	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmanagement	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEU’s	 ﾠexternal	 ﾠ
cooperation	 ﾠprogrammes	 ﾠremains	 ﾠunder	 ﾠthe	 ﾠresponsibility	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCommission,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
HR	 ﾠis	 ﾠunder	 ﾠa	 ﾠparticular	 ﾠobligation	 ﾠto	 ﾠavail	 ﾠhimself	 ﾠof	 ﾠthese	 ﾠinstruments	 ﾠso	 ﾠas	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
ensure	 ﾠthe	 ﾠoverall	 ﾠpolitical	 ﾠcoordination,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠunity,	 ﾠconsistency	 ﾠand	 ﾠeffectiveness	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠ Union’s	 ﾠ external	 ﾠ action	 ﾠ (Section	 ﾠ 1).	 ﾠ In	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ adoption	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ external	 ﾠ action	 ﾠ
instruments	 ﾠ(Section	 ﾠ2),	 ﾠinter-ﾭ‐service	 ﾠcooperation	 ﾠis	 ﾠcrucial	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprogramming	 ﾠcycle	 ﾠ
in	 ﾠ order	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ achieve	 ﾠ policy	 ﾠ coherence	 ﾠ (Section	 ﾠ 3).	 ﾠ Unlike	 ﾠ Articles	 ﾠ 3	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ 5	 ﾠ EEAS	 ﾠ
Decision,	 ﾠ Article	 ﾠ 9	 ﾠ does	 ﾠ not	 ﾠ extend	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ evaluation	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ external	 ﾠ assistance	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ
financial	 ﾠ responsibility,	 ﾠ but	 ﾠ these	 ﾠ issues	 ﾠ have	 ﾠ been	 ﾠ foreseen	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ subsequently	 ﾠ
adopted	 ﾠinter-ﾭ‐service	 ﾠ“Working	 ﾠArrangements”	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCommission	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
EEAS	 ﾠ(Section	 ﾠ4).	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
1.  Shared	 ﾠresponsibilities	 ﾠand	 ﾠobjectives	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
  The	 ﾠreference	 ﾠin	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ27(3)	 ﾠTEU	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠshould	 ﾠcomprise	 ﾠofficials	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠ
“relevant	 ﾠdepartments”	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCommission	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠGeneral	 ﾠSecretariat	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
Council,	 ﾠas	 ﾠwell	 ﾠas	 ﾠdiplomats	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmember	 ﾠstates,	 ﾠcarried	 ﾠthe	 ﾠobvious	 ﾠ
implication	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠorganisation	 ﾠand	 ﾠstructures	 ﾠfor	 ﾠdevelopment	 ﾠcooperation	 ﾠ
would	 ﾠbe	 ﾠinfluenced	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠemergence	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠparticular,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpotential	 ﾠ
disappearance	 ﾠof	 ﾠmost	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCommission’s	 ﾠDG	 ﾠRelex	 ﾠand	 ﾠDG	 ﾠDev
171	 ﾠmeant	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ
many	 ﾠquestions	 ﾠpertaining	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmanagement,	 ﾠprogramming	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
implementation	 ﾠof	 ﾠexternal	 ﾠaction	 ﾠinstruments	 ﾠwould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtable.
172	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
  Yet,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnegotiations	 ﾠleading	 ﾠup	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠadoption	 ﾠof	 ﾠ2010	 ﾠCouncil	 ﾠDecision	 ﾠdid	 ﾠnot	 ﾠ
have	 ﾠas	 ﾠgreat	 ﾠan	 ﾠeffect	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdivision	 ﾠof	 ﾠexternal	 ﾠcompetences	 ﾠas	 ﾠproposed	 ﾠby	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	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 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	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 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
171	 ﾠSee	 ﾠCouncil	 ﾠDecision	 ﾠ2010/427/EU	 ﾠof	 ﾠ26	 ﾠJuly	 ﾠ2010	 ﾠestablishing	 ﾠthe	 ﾠorganisation	 ﾠand	 ﾠfunctioning	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠExternal	 ﾠAction	 ﾠService,	 ﾠOJ	 ﾠ2010	 ﾠL	 ﾠ201/30,	 ﾠANNEX,	 ﾠDepartments	 ﾠand	 ﾠfunctions	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠ
transferred	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS,	 ﾠ2.	 ﾠCommission	 ﾠ(including	 ﾠDelegations):	 ﾠ“All	 ﾠstaff	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdepartments	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
functions	 ﾠlisted	 ﾠbelow	 ﾠshall	 ﾠbe	 ﾠtransferred	 ﾠen	 ﾠbloc	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS,	 ﾠexcept	 ﾠfor	 ﾠa	 ﾠlimited	 ﾠnumber	 ﾠof	 ﾠstaff	 ﾠ
mentioned	 ﾠbelow	 ﾠas	 ﾠexceptions:	 ﾠ(…)	 ﾠDG	 ﾠRELEX.	 ﾠExceptions:	 ﾠStaff	 ﾠresponsible	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmanagement	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
financial	 ﾠinstruments.	 ﾠ(…)	 ﾠExternal	 ﾠService.	 ﾠExceptions:	 ﾠStaff	 ﾠresponsible	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠimplementation	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
financial	 ﾠinstruments.	 ﾠ(…)	 ﾠDG	 ﾠDEV.	 ﾠUnit	 ﾠCI	 ﾠ(ACP	 ﾠI:	 ﾠAid	 ﾠprogramming	 ﾠand	 ﾠmanagement):	 ﾠStaff	 ﾠ
responsible	 ﾠfor	 ﾠprogramming.”	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
172	 ﾠSee	 ﾠD.	 ﾠDuke	 ﾠand	 ﾠS.	 ﾠBlockmans,	 ﾠ“The	 ﾠLisbon	 ﾠTreaty	 ﾠstipulations	 ﾠon	 ﾠDevelopment	 ﾠCooperation	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠCouncil	 ﾠDecision	 ﾠof	 ﾠ25	 ﾠMarch	 ﾠ2010	 ﾠ(Draft)	 ﾠestablishing	 ﾠthe	 ﾠorganisation	 ﾠand	 ﾠfunctioning	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
European	 ﾠExternal	 ﾠAction	 ﾠService”,	 ﾠEIPA	 ﾠWorking	 ﾠPaper	 ﾠ2010/1.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 76	 ﾠ
some	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠparties	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdiscussion.	 ﾠThis	 ﾠapplies	 ﾠto	 ﾠboth	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ“Tasks”	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
EEAS	 ﾠ(Article	 ﾠ2),	 ﾠin	 ﾠgeneral,	 ﾠand	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠspecific	 ﾠprovisions	 ﾠon	 ﾠ“External	 ﾠaction	 ﾠ
instruments	 ﾠand	 ﾠprogramming”	 ﾠ(Article	 ﾠ9).
173	 ﾠ	 ﾠThese	 ﾠprovisions	 ﾠchanged	 ﾠonly	 ﾠ
slightly,	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsense	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrespective	 ﾠroles	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCommission	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠHR/VP	 ﾠ
were	 ﾠarticulated	 ﾠmore	 ﾠclearly	 ﾠthan	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠHR/VP’s	 ﾠproposal	 ﾠof	 ﾠMarch	 ﾠ2010.
174	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
  In	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcontext	 ﾠof	 ﾠ(business)	 ﾠadministration,	 ﾠ“management”	 ﾠis	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprocess	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
dealing	 ﾠwith	 ﾠor	 ﾠcontrolling	 ﾠthings	 ﾠor	 ﾠpeople;	 ﾠthe	 ﾠresponsibility	 ﾠfor	 ﾠand	 ﾠcontrol	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
a	 ﾠcompany	 ﾠor	 ﾠorganisation.	 ﾠManagement	 ﾠin	 ﾠall	 ﾠbusiness	 ﾠand	 ﾠorganisational	 ﾠ
activities	 ﾠis	 ﾠthe	 ﾠact	 ﾠof	 ﾠgetting	 ﾠpeople	 ﾠtogether	 ﾠto	 ﾠaccomplish	 ﾠdesired	 ﾠgoals	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
objectives	 ﾠusing	 ﾠavailable	 ﾠresources	 ﾠefficiently	 ﾠand	 ﾠeffectively.	 ﾠManagement	 ﾠ
comprises	 ﾠdesigning,	 ﾠplanning,	 ﾠorganising,	 ﾠstaffing,	 ﾠleading	 ﾠor	 ﾠdirecting,	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
controlling	 ﾠan	 ﾠorganisation	 ﾠ(a	 ﾠgroup	 ﾠof	 ﾠone	 ﾠor	 ﾠmore	 ﾠpeople	 ﾠor	 ﾠentities)	 ﾠor	 ﾠeffort	 ﾠ
for	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpurpose	 ﾠof	 ﾠaccomplishing	 ﾠa	 ﾠgoal.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
  According	 ﾠto	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ9(1),	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmanagement	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEU’s	 ﾠexternal	 ﾠcooperation	 ﾠ
programmes	 ﾠis	 ﾠ“under”	 ﾠthe	 ﾠresponsibility	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCommission	 ﾠ“without	 ﾠprejudice	 ﾠ
to	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrespective	 ﾠroles	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCommission	 ﾠand	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠin	 ﾠprogramming”.	 ﾠ
Thus,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCommission	 ﾠretains	 ﾠoverall	 ﾠresponsibility	 ﾠfor	 ﾠdealing	 ﾠwith	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
controlling	 ﾠthe	 ﾠUnion’s	 ﾠexternal	 ﾠcooperation	 ﾠprogrammes,	 ﾠwhereas	 ﾠit	 ﾠshares	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
role	 ﾠof	 ﾠ“programming”,	 ﾠi.e.	 ﾠdesigning,	 ﾠscheduling,	 ﾠor	 ﾠplanning	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEU’s	 ﾠexternal	 ﾠ
cooperation	 ﾠprogrammes	 ﾠ(only	 ﾠan	 ﾠelement	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠwider	 ﾠconcept	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
“management”),	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠshort,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbasic	 ﾠprescript,	 ﾠnamely	 ﾠthat	 ﾠduring	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠwhole	 ﾠprocess	 ﾠof	 ﾠplanning	 ﾠand	 ﾠimplementation	 ﾠboth	 ﾠparts	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
organisation	 ﾠshould	 ﾠwork	 ﾠtogether	 ﾠand	 ﾠthat	 ﾠall	 ﾠproposals	 ﾠfor	 ﾠdecision	 ﾠhave	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠ
prepared	 ﾠthrough	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCommission	 ﾠprocedures	 ﾠand	 ﾠsubmitted	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
Commission	 ﾠ(Article	 ﾠ9(3)),	 ﾠhas	 ﾠremained	 ﾠunchanged.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
  In	 ﾠcomparison	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠHR/VP’s	 ﾠproposal	 ﾠof	 ﾠMarch	 ﾠ2010,	 ﾠCouncil	 ﾠDecision	 ﾠ
2010/427/EU	 ﾠlays	 ﾠdown	 ﾠmore	 ﾠclearly	 ﾠthe	 ﾠobligation	 ﾠ(“shall”)	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠHR	 ﾠto	 ﾠensure	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠoverall	 ﾠpolitical	 ﾠcoordination,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠunity,	 ﾠconsistency	 ﾠand	 ﾠeffectiveness	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
Union’s	 ﾠexternal	 ﾠaction.	 ﾠAs	 ﾠsuch,	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ9	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠDecision	 ﾠoffers	 ﾠan	 ﾠelaboration	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠobligation	 ﾠcontained	 ﾠin	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ21(3)	 ﾠTEU:	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠimplementation	 ﾠof	 ﾠthis	 ﾠ
obligation,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠHR	 ﾠshall	 ﾠavail	 ﾠhimself	 ﾠ“in	 ﾠparticular”	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠexternal	 ﾠassistance	 ﾠ
instruments	 ﾠlisted	 ﾠin	 ﾠparagraph	 ﾠ2.	 ﾠArguably,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠobligation	 ﾠof	 ﾠensuring	 ﾠ“overall	 ﾠ
political	 ﾠcoordination”	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠHR	 ﾠ–	 ﾠnot	 ﾠthe	 ﾠVP	 ﾠ–	 ﾠis	 ﾠsuperimposed	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
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 ﾠ	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 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
173	 ﾠCompare	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ9	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠDecision	 ﾠto	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ8	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠHR/VP’s	 ﾠproposal	 ﾠof	 ﾠ25	 ﾠMarch	 ﾠ2010.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
174	 ﾠSee	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEP’s	 ﾠAmendments	 ﾠ131	 ﾠ(on	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrole	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCommission)	 ﾠand	 ﾠ132	 ﾠ(on	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrole	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠHR/VP),	 ﾠ
in	 ﾠAmendments	 ﾠ76	 ﾠ–	 ﾠ143	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCommittee	 ﾠon	 ﾠForeign	 ﾠAffairs	 ﾠof	 ﾠ1	 ﾠJuly	 ﾠ2010	 ﾠ(document	 ﾠ
2010/0816(NLE)).	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 77	 ﾠ




  The	 ﾠfirst	 ﾠphrase	 ﾠof	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ9(2)	 ﾠis	 ﾠalmost	 ﾠidentical	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠformulation	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
second	 ﾠsentence	 ﾠof	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ26(2)	 ﾠTEU
176	 ﾠbut	 ﾠshould	 ﾠnot	 ﾠbe	 ﾠseen	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠlexspecialis	 ﾠ
thereof.	 ﾠAfter	 ﾠall,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprimary	 ﾠobject	 ﾠof	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ26(2)	 ﾠTEU	 ﾠis	 ﾠhow	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCFSP	 ﾠis	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠ
put	 ﾠinto	 ﾠeffect.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠscope	 ﾠof	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ9(2)	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠDecision	 ﾠis	 ﾠbroader	 ﾠas	 ﾠit	 ﾠrefers	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠUnion’s	 ﾠexternal	 ﾠaction	 ﾠwrit	 ﾠlarge.	 ﾠNeither	 ﾠis	 ﾠthere	 ﾠa	 ﾠlink	 ﾠwith	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ26(3)	 ﾠ
TEU,	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠdeals	 ﾠwith	 ﾠUnion	 ﾠresources,	 ﾠas	 ﾠEU	 ﾠexternal	 ﾠassistance	 ﾠinstruments	 ﾠ
pertaining	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCFSP	 ﾠare	 ﾠdealt	 ﾠwith	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ9(6)	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠDecision.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
  In	 ﾠits	 ﾠcontribution	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠUnion’s	 ﾠexternal	 ﾠcooperation	 ﾠprogrammes,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠis	 ﾠ
expected	 ﾠto	 ﾠwork	 ﾠtowards	 ﾠensuring	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprogrammes	 ﾠfulfil	 ﾠthe	 ﾠobjectives	 ﾠfor	 ﾠ
external	 ﾠaction	 ﾠas	 ﾠset	 ﾠout	 ﾠin	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ21	 ﾠTEU,	 ﾠin	 ﾠparticular	 ﾠin	 ﾠparagraph	 ﾠ(2)(d)	 ﾠ
thereof,
177	 ﾠand	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthey	 ﾠrespect	 ﾠthe	 ﾠobjectives	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠUnion’s	 ﾠdevelopment	 ﾠ
policy	 ﾠin	 ﾠline	 ﾠwith	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ208	 ﾠTFEU.
178	 ﾠIn	 ﾠthis	 ﾠcontext,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠshould	 ﾠalso	 ﾠ
promote	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfulfilment	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠobjectives	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ“European	 ﾠConsensus	 ﾠon	 ﾠ
Development”
179	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ“European	 ﾠConsensus	 ﾠon	 ﾠHumanitarian	 ﾠAid”.
180	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
2.  Instrumentarium	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
  The	 ﾠHR	 ﾠis	 ﾠunder	 ﾠa	 ﾠlegal	 ﾠobligation	 ﾠto	 ﾠensure	 ﾠoverall	 ﾠpolitical	 ﾠcoordination	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
Union’s	 ﾠexternal	 ﾠaction	 ﾠso	 ﾠas	 ﾠto	 ﾠmeet	 ﾠhis	 ﾠTreaty	 ﾠobligation	 ﾠto	 ﾠensure	 ﾠthe	 ﾠunity,	 ﾠ
consistency	 ﾠand	 ﾠeffectiveness	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠUnion’s	 ﾠexternal	 ﾠaction,	 ﾠin	 ﾠparticular	 ﾠby	 ﾠ
coordinating	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfollowing	 ﾠexternal	 ﾠassistance	 ﾠinstruments	 ﾠlisted	 ﾠin	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ9(2):	 ﾠ
−  the	 ﾠDevelopment	 ﾠCooperation	 ﾠInstrument	 ﾠ(DCI)
181,	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
175	 ﾠSee	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdiscussion	 ﾠunder	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ2(1)	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠDecision,	 ﾠabove.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
176“The	 ﾠCouncil	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠHigh	 ﾠRepresentative	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠUnion	 ﾠfor	 ﾠForeign	 ﾠAffairs	 ﾠand	 ﾠSecurity	 ﾠPolicy	 ﾠshall	 ﾠ
ensure	 ﾠthe	 ﾠunity,	 ﾠconsistency	 ﾠand	 ﾠeffectiveness	 ﾠof	 ﾠaction	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠUnion”.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
177	 ﾠ“[F]oster	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsustainable	 ﾠeconomic,	 ﾠsocial	 ﾠand	 ﾠenvironmental	 ﾠdevelopment	 ﾠof	 ﾠdeveloping	 ﾠ
countries,	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprimary	 ﾠaim	 ﾠof	 ﾠeradicating	 ﾠpoverty”.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
178	 ﾠSee	 ﾠRecital	 ﾠ4	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠPreamble	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠDecision.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
179OJ	 ﾠ2006	 ﾠC	 ﾠ46/1.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
180	 ﾠCommunication	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCommission	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠParliament	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCouncil	 ﾠ—	 ﾠTowards	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
European	 ﾠConsensus	 ﾠon	 ﾠHumanitarian	 ﾠAid	 ﾠ(COM(2007)	 ﾠ317	 ﾠfinal,	 ﾠnot	 ﾠpublished	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠOfficial	 ﾠJournal.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
181	 ﾠRegulation	 ﾠ(EC)	 ﾠNo	 ﾠ1905/2006	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠParliament	 ﾠand	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCouncil	 ﾠof	 ﾠ18	 ﾠDecember	 ﾠ
2006	 ﾠestablishing	 ﾠa	 ﾠfinancing	 ﾠinstrument	 ﾠfor	 ﾠdevelopment	 ﾠcooperation,	 ﾠOJ	 ﾠ2006	 ﾠL	 ﾠ378/41.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 78	 ﾠ
−  the	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠDevelopment	 ﾠFund	 ﾠ(EDF)
182,	 ﾠ
−  the	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠInstrument	 ﾠfor	 ﾠDemocracy	 ﾠand	 ﾠHuman	 ﾠRights	 ﾠ(EIDHR)
183,	 ﾠ
−  the	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠNeighbourhood	 ﾠand	 ﾠPartnership	 ﾠInstrument	 ﾠ(ENPI)
184,	 ﾠ
−  the	 ﾠInstrument	 ﾠfor	 ﾠCooperation	 ﾠwith	 ﾠIndustrialised	 ﾠCountries	 ﾠ(ICI)
185,	 ﾠ
−  the	 ﾠInstrument	 ﾠfor	 ﾠNuclear	 ﾠSafety	 ﾠCooperation	 ﾠ(NSCI)
186,	 ﾠ
−  the	 ﾠInstrument	 ﾠfor	 ﾠStability,	 ﾠregarding	 ﾠthe	 ﾠassistance	 ﾠprovided	 ﾠfor	 ﾠin	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ
4	 ﾠof	 ﾠRegulation	 ﾠ(EC)	 ﾠNo	 ﾠ1717/2006	 ﾠ(IfS).
187	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
  Humanitarian	 ﾠassistance,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠInstrument	 ﾠfor	 ﾠPre-ﾭ‐accession	 ﾠAssistance	 ﾠ(IPA)
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 ﾠ
and	 ﾠfinancial	 ﾠassistance	 ﾠto	 ﾠnon-ﾭ‐European	 ﾠOverseas	 ﾠCountries	 ﾠand	 ﾠTerritories	 ﾠ
(OCTs)	 ﾠare	 ﾠnot	 ﾠcovered	 ﾠby	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ9	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠDecision.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠprogramming	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
management	 ﾠof	 ﾠthese	 ﾠinstruments	 ﾠare	 ﾠunified	 ﾠand	 ﾠwill	 ﾠcontinue	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠmanaged	 ﾠ
by	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCommission,	 ﾠunder	 ﾠthe	 ﾠresponsibility	 ﾠof	 ﾠDG	 ﾠECHO,	 ﾠDG	 ﾠELARG,	 ﾠand	 ﾠDG	 ﾠ
DEVCO	 ﾠrespectively.	 ﾠNevertheless,	 ﾠDG	 ﾠECHO	 ﾠand	 ﾠDG	 ﾠELARG	 ﾠwill	 ﾠconsult	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠ
on	 ﾠstrategic	 ﾠpriorities	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠpreparing	 ﾠthe	 ﾠMultiannual	 ﾠFinancial	 ﾠFramework	 ﾠfor	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
182	 ﾠCouncil	 ﾠRegulation	 ﾠNo	 ﾠ5	 ﾠlaying	 ﾠdown	 ﾠrules	 ﾠrelating	 ﾠto	 ﾠcalls	 ﾠfor	 ﾠand	 ﾠtransfers	 ﾠof	 ﾠfinancial	 ﾠ
contributions,	 ﾠbudgetary	 ﾠarrangements	 ﾠand	 ﾠadministration	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠresources	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠDevelopment	 ﾠFund	 ﾠ
for	 ﾠthe	 ﾠOverseas	 ﾠCountries	 ﾠand	 ﾠTerritories,	 ﾠOJ	 ﾠ1958	 ﾠL	 ﾠ681/58.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
183	 ﾠRegulation	 ﾠ(EC)	 ﾠNo	 ﾠ1889/2006	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠParliament	 ﾠand	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCouncil	 ﾠof	 ﾠ20	 ﾠDecember	 ﾠ
2006	 ﾠon	 ﾠestablishing	 ﾠa	 ﾠfinancing	 ﾠinstrument	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpromotion	 ﾠof	 ﾠdemocracy	 ﾠand	 ﾠhuman	 ﾠrights	 ﾠ
worldwide,	 ﾠOJ	 ﾠ2006	 ﾠL	 ﾠ386/1.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
184	 ﾠRegulation	 ﾠ(EC)	 ﾠNo	 ﾠ1638/2006	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠParliament	 ﾠand	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCouncil	 ﾠof	 ﾠ24	 ﾠOctober	 ﾠ2006	 ﾠ
laying	 ﾠdown	 ﾠgeneral	 ﾠprovisions	 ﾠestablishing	 ﾠa	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠNeighbourhood	 ﾠand	 ﾠPartnership	 ﾠInstrument,	 ﾠ
OJ	 ﾠ2006	 ﾠL	 ﾠ310/1.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
185	 ﾠCouncil	 ﾠRegulation	 ﾠ(EC)	 ﾠNo	 ﾠ382/2001	 ﾠof	 ﾠ26	 ﾠFebruary	 ﾠ2001	 ﾠconcerning	 ﾠthe	 ﾠimplementation	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
projects	 ﾠpromoting	 ﾠcooperation	 ﾠand	 ﾠcommercial	 ﾠrelations	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠUnion	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
industrialised	 ﾠcountries	 ﾠof	 ﾠNorth	 ﾠAmerica,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠFar	 ﾠEast	 ﾠand	 ﾠAustralasia,	 ﾠOJ	 ﾠ2001	 ﾠL	 ﾠ57/10.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
186Council	 ﾠRegulation	 ﾠ(Euratom)	 ﾠNo	 ﾠ300/2007	 ﾠof	 ﾠ19	 ﾠFebruary	 ﾠ2007	 ﾠestablishing	 ﾠan	 ﾠInstrument	 ﾠfor	 ﾠ
Nuclear	 ﾠSafety	 ﾠCooperation,	 ﾠOJ	 ﾠ2007	 ﾠL	 ﾠ81/1.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
187	 ﾠRegulation	 ﾠ(EC)	 ﾠNo	 ﾠ1717/2006	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠParliament	 ﾠand	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCouncil	 ﾠof	 ﾠ15	 ﾠNovember	 ﾠ
2006	 ﾠestablishing	 ﾠan	 ﾠInstrument	 ﾠfor	 ﾠStability,	 ﾠOJ	 ﾠ2006	 ﾠL	 ﾠ327/1.	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ9(2)	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠDecision	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠnot	 ﾠ
pertain	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpolitical	 ﾠcoordination	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠHR	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠit	 ﾠconcerns	 ﾠassistance	 ﾠin	 ﾠresponse	 ﾠto	 ﾠsituations	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
crisis	 ﾠor	 ﾠemerging	 ﾠcrisis.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠprovision	 ﾠonly	 ﾠrelates	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠHR’s	 ﾠpolitical	 ﾠcoordination	 ﾠof	 ﾠassistance	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠcontext	 ﾠof	 ﾠ“stable	 ﾠconditions”	 ﾠfor	 ﾠcooperation,	 ﾠi.e.	 ﾠassistance	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpursuit	 ﾠof	 ﾠstrengthening	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
capacity	 ﾠof	 ﾠlaw	 ﾠenforcement	 ﾠand	 ﾠjudicial	 ﾠand	 ﾠcivil	 ﾠauthorities	 ﾠinvolved	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfight	 ﾠagainst	 ﾠterrorism	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠorganised	 ﾠcrime,	 ﾠincluding	 ﾠillicit	 ﾠtrafficking	 ﾠof	 ﾠpeople,	 ﾠdrugs,	 ﾠfirearms	 ﾠand	 ﾠexplosive	 ﾠmaterials	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
in	 ﾠthe	 ﾠeffective	 ﾠcontrol	 ﾠof	 ﾠillegal	 ﾠtrade	 ﾠand	 ﾠtransit;	 ﾠsupport	 ﾠfor	 ﾠmeasures	 ﾠto	 ﾠaddress	 ﾠthreats	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
international	 ﾠtransport,	 ﾠenergy	 ﾠoperations	 ﾠand	 ﾠcritical	 ﾠinfrastructure,	 ﾠincluding	 ﾠpassenger	 ﾠand	 ﾠfreight	 ﾠ
traffic	 ﾠand	 ﾠenergy	 ﾠdistribution;	 ﾠcontributing	 ﾠto	 ﾠensuring	 ﾠan	 ﾠadequate	 ﾠresponse	 ﾠto	 ﾠsudden	 ﾠmajor	 ﾠ
threats	 ﾠto	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠhealth,	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠas	 ﾠepidemics	 ﾠwith	 ﾠa	 ﾠpotential	 ﾠtransnational	 ﾠimpact;	 ﾠsupport	 ﾠfor	 ﾠrisk	 ﾠ
mitigation	 ﾠand	 ﾠpreparedness	 ﾠrelating	 ﾠto	 ﾠchemical,	 ﾠbiological,	 ﾠradiological	 ﾠand	 ﾠnuclear	 ﾠmaterials	 ﾠor	 ﾠ
agents;	 ﾠsupport	 ﾠfor	 ﾠpre-ﾭ‐	 ﾠand	 ﾠpost-ﾭ‐crisis	 ﾠcapacity	 ﾠbuilding.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
188Council	 ﾠRegulation	 ﾠ(EC)	 ﾠNo	 ﾠ1085/2006	 ﾠof	 ﾠ17	 ﾠJuly	 ﾠ2006	 ﾠestablishing	 ﾠan	 ﾠInstrument	 ﾠfor	 ﾠPre-ﾭ‐Accession	 ﾠ
Assistance	 ﾠ(IPA),	 ﾠOJ	 ﾠ2006	 ﾠL	 ﾠ210/82.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 79	 ﾠ




  The	 ﾠCommission	 ﾠSecretariat	 ﾠGeneral	 ﾠand	 ﾠDG	 ﾠBUDG	 ﾠare	 ﾠresponsible	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
preparation	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠMultiannual	 ﾠFinancial	 ﾠFramework	 ﾠpost-ﾭ‐2013,	 ﾠin	 ﾠclose	 ﾠ
cooperation	 ﾠwith	 ﾠrelevant	 ﾠservices	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCommission	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠthis	 ﾠ
context,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrelevant	 ﾠCommission	 ﾠservices	 ﾠhave	 ﾠto	 ﾠensure	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
coordinated	 ﾠposition	 ﾠin	 ﾠrelation	 ﾠto	 ﾠany	 ﾠexternal	 ﾠrelations	 ﾠinstruments.	 ﾠThis	 ﾠalso	 ﾠ
relates	 ﾠto	 ﾠchanges	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbasic	 ﾠregulations	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprogramming	 ﾠdocuments	 ﾠ
referred	 ﾠto	 ﾠin	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ9(3)	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠDecision,	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠwill	 ﾠhave	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠprepared	 ﾠjointly	 ﾠ
by	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrelevant	 ﾠservices	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠand	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCommission:	 ﾠunder	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
responsibility	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCommissioner	 ﾠfor	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠNeighbourhood	 ﾠPolicy	 ﾠinsofar	 ﾠ
as	 ﾠthe	 ﾠENPI	 ﾠis	 ﾠconcerned	 ﾠ(Article	 ﾠ9(5),	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCommissioner	 ﾠresponsible	 ﾠfor	 ﾠ
Development	 ﾠPolicy	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEDF	 ﾠand	 ﾠDCI	 ﾠ(Article	 ﾠ9(4)).	 ﾠAccording	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlast	 ﾠ
paragraph	 ﾠof	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ9(3)	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdecisions	 ﾠshall	 ﾠbe	 ﾠsubmitted	 ﾠjointly,	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
HR/VP,	 ﾠfor	 ﾠadoption	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCommission.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
  In	 ﾠview	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnext	 ﾠMulti-ﾭ‐annual	 ﾠFinancial	 ﾠFramework	 ﾠ(2014-ﾭ‐2020),	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ9(2)	 ﾠ
will	 ﾠneed	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠamended	 ﾠto	 ﾠtake	 ﾠaccount	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnew	 ﾠgeneration	 ﾠof	 ﾠinstruments,	 ﾠ
including	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrenamed	 ﾠ“European	 ﾠNeighbourhood	 ﾠInstrument”	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
“Partnership	 ﾠInstrumentfor	 ﾠcooperation	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthird	 ﾠcountries”.
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 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
3.  Inter-ﾭ‐service	 ﾠcooperation	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprogramming	 ﾠcycle	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
  According	 ﾠto	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ9(3),	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠis	 ﾠunder	 ﾠa	 ﾠlegal	 ﾠobligation	 ﾠ(“shall”)	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
contribute	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprogramming	 ﾠand	 ﾠmanagement	 ﾠcycle	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠinstruments	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	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189SEC(2012)48,	 ﾠRef.	 ﾠAres(2012)41133	 ﾠ-ﾭ‐	 ﾠ13/01/2012,	 ﾠpara.	 ﾠ3.13	 ﾠ(ECHO).For	 ﾠIPA,	 ﾠsee	 ﾠpara.	 ﾠ3.12:	 ﾠ
“Planning	 ﾠand	 ﾠprogramming	 ﾠof	 ﾠpre-ﾭ‐accession	 ﾠassistance	 ﾠis	 ﾠunder	 ﾠthe	 ﾠresponsibility	 ﾠof	 ﾠDG	 ﾠ
ELARG/REGIO/EMPL/AGRI	 ﾠas	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcase	 ﾠmay	 ﾠbe.	 ﾠStrategic	 ﾠand	 ﾠmulti-ﾭ‐annual	 ﾠplanning	 ﾠdocuments	 ﾠwill	 ﾠbe	 ﾠ
prepared	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlead	 ﾠservice	 ﾠof	 ﾠDG	 ﾠELARG,	 ﾠor	 ﾠDG	 ﾠREGIO/EMPL/AGRI	 ﾠas	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcase	 ﾠmay	 ﾠbe.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠ
Commission	 ﾠstaff	 ﾠin	 ﾠDelegations	 ﾠwill	 ﾠbe	 ﾠclosely	 ﾠassociated	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpreparation	 ﾠof	 ﾠprogrammes	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
projects	 ﾠincluding:	 ﾠneeds	 ﾠassessments,	 ﾠproject	 ﾠidentification,	 ﾠconsultation	 ﾠwith	 ﾠlocal	 ﾠstakeholders,	 ﾠ
donors	 ﾠand	 ﾠEU	 ﾠMember	 ﾠStates.	 ﾠ(…)	 ﾠAs	 ﾠregards	 ﾠdecentralised	 ﾠmanagement,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠresponsibility	 ﾠfor	 ﾠ
conferral	 ﾠof	 ﾠmanagement	 ﾠpowers	 ﾠrests	 ﾠwith	 ﾠDG	 ﾠELARG/EMPL/REGIO/AGRI.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠEU	 ﾠDelegations	 ﾠwill	 ﾠbe	 ﾠ
responsible	 ﾠfor	 ﾠmonitoring	 ﾠthe	 ﾠimplementation	 ﾠof	 ﾠdecentralised	 ﾠmanagement	 ﾠin	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠcountry	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
responsibility.	 ﾠDG	 ﾠELARG	 ﾠwill	 ﾠcoordinate	 ﾠwith	 ﾠDG	 ﾠREGIO,	 ﾠEMPL	 ﾠand	 ﾠAGRI	 ﾠas	 ﾠregards	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcomponents	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠpre-ﾭ‐accession	 ﾠassistance	 ﾠof	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠresponsibility,	 ﾠwith	 ﾠa	 ﾠview	 ﾠto	 ﾠensure	 ﾠharmonised	 ﾠand	 ﾠconsistent	 ﾠ
approaches	 ﾠand	 ﾠinstructions	 ﾠissued	 ﾠto	 ﾠDelegations.”	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
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 ﾠSee	 ﾠJoint	 ﾠCommunication	 ﾠ“Global	 ﾠEurope:	 ﾠa	 ﾠnew	 ﾠapproach	 ﾠto	 ﾠfinancing	 ﾠEU	 ﾠexternal	 ﾠaction”,	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
COM(2011)	 ﾠ865	 ﾠfinal,	 ﾠBrussels,	 ﾠ7.12.2011;	 ﾠand	 ﾠForeign	 ﾠAffairs	 ﾠCouncil,	 ﾠPress	 ﾠRelease	 ﾠ11688/12,	 ﾠ
PRESSE	 ﾠ282,	 ﾠ25	 ﾠJune	 ﾠ2012.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 80	 ﾠ
referred	 ﾠto	 ﾠin	 ﾠparagraph	 ﾠ2.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠdoing	 ﾠso,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠService	 ﾠshall	 ﾠuse	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpolicy	 ﾠobjectives	 ﾠ
set	 ﾠout	 ﾠin	 ﾠthose	 ﾠinstruments	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠbasis	 ﾠfor	 ﾠits	 ﾠcontribution.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
  In	 ﾠparticular,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠresponsibility	 ﾠhas	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠbestowed	 ﾠupon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠto	 ﾠprepare	 ﾠ
Commission	 ﾠdecisions	 ﾠconcerning	 ﾠstrategic,	 ﾠmultiannual	 ﾠsteps	 ﾠwithin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
programming	 ﾠcycle,	 ﾠon	 ﾠthree	 ﾠparticular	 ﾠcounts:	 ﾠ“(i)	 ﾠcountry	 ﾠallocations	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
determine	 ﾠthe	 ﾠglobal	 ﾠfinancial	 ﾠenvelope	 ﾠfor	 ﾠeach	 ﾠregion,	 ﾠsubject	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠindicative	 ﾠ
breakdown	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmultiannual	 ﾠfinancial	 ﾠframework.	 ﾠWithin	 ﾠeach	 ﾠregion,	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
proportion	 ﾠof	 ﾠfunding	 ﾠwill	 ﾠbe	 ﾠreserved	 ﾠfor	 ﾠregional	 ﾠprogrammes;	 ﾠ(ii)	 ﾠcountry	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
regional	 ﾠstrategic	 ﾠpapers;	 ﾠ(iii)	 ﾠnational	 ﾠand	 ﾠregional	 ﾠindicative	 ﾠprogrammes”.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
  Throughout	 ﾠthe	 ﾠentire	 ﾠcycle	 ﾠof	 ﾠprogramming,	 ﾠplanning	 ﾠand	 ﾠimplementation	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠinstruments	 ﾠreferred	 ﾠto	 ﾠin	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ9(2),	 ﾠthe	 ﾠHigh	 ﾠRepresentative	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠ
are	 ﾠunder	 ﾠa	 ﾠlegally	 ﾠbinding	 ﾠobligation	 ﾠ(“shall”)	 ﾠto	 ﾠwork	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrelevant	 ﾠ
members	 ﾠand	 ﾠservices	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCommission,
191	 ﾠwithout	 ﾠprejudice	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfact	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠis	 ﾠplaced	 ﾠunder	 ﾠthe	 ﾠauthority	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠHigh	 ﾠRepresentative.
192	 ﾠAs	 ﾠsuch,	 ﾠ
Article	 ﾠ9(3)	 ﾠprovides	 ﾠa	 ﾠlexspecialis	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠduty	 ﾠof	 ﾠsincere	 ﾠcooperation	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠEU	 ﾠinstitutions.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
  The	 ﾠimplementation	 ﾠof	 ﾠthis	 ﾠparticular	 ﾠstrand	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠobligation	 ﾠhas	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠspelled	 ﾠ
out	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ“Working	 ﾠArrangements	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠCommission	 ﾠservices	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
European	 ﾠExternal	 ﾠAction	 ﾠService	 ﾠ(EEAS)	 ﾠin	 ﾠrelation	 ﾠto	 ﾠexternal	 ﾠrelations	 ﾠissues”	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠ13	 ﾠJanuary	 ﾠ2012.
193	 ﾠThat	 ﾠdocument	 ﾠprovides,	 ﾠinter	 ﾠalia,	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCommission	 ﾠ
services	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠ“will	 ﾠperform	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠrespective	 ﾠtasks	 ﾠthroughout	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
programming	 ﾠand	 ﾠimplementation	 ﾠcycle	 ﾠin	 ﾠfull	 ﾠtransparency,	 ﾠinforming	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
consulting	 ﾠeach	 ﾠother,	 ﾠsufficiently	 ﾠin	 ﾠadvance,	 ﾠon	 ﾠinitiatives	 ﾠor	 ﾠannouncements	 ﾠ
that	 ﾠcould	 ﾠhave	 ﾠan	 ﾠimpact	 ﾠon	 ﾠeach	 ﾠother’s	 ﾠareas	 ﾠof	 ﾠresponsibility.	 ﾠThis	 ﾠincludes	 ﾠ
an	 ﾠexchange	 ﾠof	 ﾠinformation	 ﾠon	 ﾠpreparation	 ﾠof	 ﾠpolicy	 ﾠand	 ﾠprogramme	 ﾠdocuments	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠboth	 ﾠa	 ﾠformal	 ﾠand	 ﾠinformal	 ﾠnature.	 ﾠIt	 ﾠrelates	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrepresentation	 ﾠof	 ﾠEU	 ﾠ
positions	 ﾠvis-ﾭ‐à-ﾭ‐vis	 ﾠrecipient	 ﾠcountries	 ﾠor	 ﾠother	 ﾠdonors	 ﾠand	 ﾠrelated	 ﾠreporting	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
feedback.”
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191	 ﾠSee	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdiscussion	 ﾠunder	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ3	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠDecision,	 ﾠabove.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
192	 ﾠSee	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdiscussion	 ﾠunder	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ1(3)	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠDecision,	 ﾠabove.	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193SEC(2012)48,	 ﾠRef.	 ﾠAres(2012)41133	 ﾠ-ﾭ‐	 ﾠ13/01/2012.	 ﾠAs	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcontext	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdiscussion	 ﾠof	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ3	 ﾠ
EEAS	 ﾠDecision,	 ﾠabove,	 ﾠ	 ﾠone	 ﾠmay	 ﾠagain	 ﾠwonder	 ﾠabout	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlegal	 ﾠnature	 ﾠand	 ﾠjusticiability	 ﾠof	 ﾠthese	 ﾠ
“Working	 ﾠarrangements”.	 ﾠSee,	 ﾠin	 ﾠthis	 ﾠrespect,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCourt’s	 ﾠjudgment	 ﾠin	 ﾠcase	 ﾠC-ﾭ‐25/94,	 ﾠCommission	 ﾠv.	 ﾠ
Council	 ﾠ(FAO),	 ﾠ[1996]	 ﾠECR	 ﾠI-ﾭ‐1469,	 ﾠparagraph	 ﾠ49:	 ﾠ“[T]he	 ﾠArrangement	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCouncil	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
Commission	 ﾠrepresents	 ﾠfulfilment	 ﾠof	 ﾠthat	 ﾠduty	 ﾠof	 ﾠcooperation	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCommunity	 ﾠand	 ﾠits	 ﾠ
Member	 ﾠStates	 ﾠwithin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠFAO.	 ﾠIt	 ﾠis	 ﾠclear,	 ﾠmoreover,	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠterms	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠArrangement,	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
two	 ﾠinstitutions	 ﾠintended	 ﾠto	 ﾠenter	 ﾠinto	 ﾠa	 ﾠbinding	 ﾠcommitment	 ﾠtowards	 ﾠeach	 ﾠother.”	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 81	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
  As	 ﾠnoted	 ﾠabove,	 ﾠall	 ﾠproposals	 ﾠfor	 ﾠdecisions	 ﾠconcerning	 ﾠstrategic,	 ﾠmultiannual	 ﾠ
steps	 ﾠwithin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprogramming	 ﾠcycle	 ﾠhave	 ﾠto	 ﾠ(“shall”)	 ﾠbe	 ﾠprepared	 ﾠjointly	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
relevant	 ﾠservices	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠand	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCommission,	 ﾠby	 ﾠfollowing	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
Commission’s	 ﾠprocedures,	 ﾠand	 ﾠwill	 ﾠbe	 ﾠsubmitted	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCommission	 ﾠfor	 ﾠ
adoption:	 ﾠunder	 ﾠthe	 ﾠauthority	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCommissioner	 ﾠresponsible	 ﾠfor	 ﾠ
Neighbourhood	 ﾠPolicy	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠENPI	 ﾠ(Article	 ﾠ9(5)),	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCommissioner	 ﾠ
responsible	 ﾠfor	 ﾠDevelopment	 ﾠPolicy	 ﾠfor	 ﾠEDF	 ﾠand	 ﾠDCI	 ﾠ(Article	 ﾠ9(4),	 ﾠfirst	 ﾠsentence).	 ﾠ




  Thematic	 ﾠprogrammes	 ﾠ“shall	 ﾠbe	 ﾠprepared	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠappropriate	 ﾠCommission	 ﾠ
service	 ﾠunder	 ﾠthe	 ﾠguidance	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCommissioner	 ﾠresponsible	 ﾠfor	 ﾠDevelopment	 ﾠ
Policy	 ﾠand	 ﾠpresented	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCollege	 ﾠof	 ﾠCommissioners	 ﾠin	 ﾠagreement	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
High	 ﾠRepresentative	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠother	 ﾠrelevant	 ﾠCommissioners”	 ﾠ(Article	 ﾠ9(4),	 ﾠ
second	 ﾠsentence).	 ﾠIn	 ﾠthis	 ﾠrespect,	 ﾠtwo	 ﾠobservations	 ﾠcan	 ﾠbe	 ﾠmade.	 ﾠFirst,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
Commissioner	 ﾠfor	 ﾠDevelopment	 ﾠhas	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠgiven	 ﾠan	 ﾠelevated	 ﾠstatus	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠit	 ﾠ
comes	 ﾠto	 ﾠpreparing	 ﾠthematic	 ﾠprogrammes.
196	 ﾠSecond,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠobligation	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠnot	 ﾠ
apply	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpreparation	 ﾠof	 ﾠthematic	 ﾠprogrammes	 ﾠunder	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEIDHR	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
NSCI,
197	 ﾠand	 ﾠthat	 ﾠpart	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠIfS	 ﾠreferred	 ﾠto	 ﾠin	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ9(2).
198	 ﾠBecause	 ﾠthe	 ﾠENPI	 ﾠis	 ﾠ
covered	 ﾠby	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ9(5),	 ﾠand	 ﾠbecause	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ9(6)	 ﾠcovers	 ﾠactions	 ﾠundertaken	 ﾠ
under	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCFSP	 ﾠbudget,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpart	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠIfS	 ﾠother	 ﾠthan	 ﾠthat	 ﾠreferred	 ﾠto	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
paragraph	 ﾠ2,
199	 ﾠthe	 ﾠICI,
200	 ﾠpress,	 ﾠcommunication	 ﾠand	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠdiplomacy	 ﾠactions,
201	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠEIDHR	 ﾠelection	 ﾠobservation	 ﾠmissions	 ﾠ(EOM),
202	 ﾠone	 ﾠcan	 ﾠreason	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
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 ﾠRef.	 ﾠAres(2012)41133	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 ﾠ13/01/2012,	 ﾠpara.	 ﾠ3.4.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
196	 ﾠSee	 ﾠExplanatory	 ﾠMemorandum,	 ﾠCouncil	 ﾠDecision	 ﾠEstablishing	 ﾠthe	 ﾠorganisation	 ﾠand	 ﾠfunctioning	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠExternal	 ﾠAction	 ﾠService,	 ﾠ25	 ﾠMarch	 ﾠ2010:	 ﾠ“horizontal	 ﾠCommunications	 ﾠon	 ﾠDevelopment	 ﾠ
Policy	 ﾠwill	 ﾠbe	 ﾠprepared	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrelevant	 ﾠCommission	 ﾠservices	 ﾠunder	 ﾠthe	 ﾠguidance	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCommissioner	 ﾠ
for	 ﾠDevelopment,	 ﾠand	 ﾠpresented	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCommission	 ﾠin	 ﾠassociation	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrelevant	 ﾠVice-ﾭ‐Presidents	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠCommissioners.”	 ﾠ
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 ﾠFor	 ﾠspecifics	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠinter-ﾭ‐service	 ﾠcooperation,	 ﾠsee	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ“Working	 ﾠArrangements”,	 ﾠSEC(2012)48,	 ﾠRef.	 ﾠ
Ares(2012)41133	 ﾠ-ﾭ‐	 ﾠ13/01/2012,	 ﾠpara.	 ﾠ3.5.	 ﾠ
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199SEC(2012)48,	 ﾠRef.	 ﾠAres(2012)41133	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 ﾠ13/01/2012,	 ﾠpara.	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contrariothat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprovision	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsecond	 ﾠsentence	 ﾠof	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ9(4)	 ﾠonly	 ﾠapplies	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠpreparation	 ﾠof	 ﾠthematic	 ﾠprogrammes	 ﾠunder	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEDF	 ﾠand	 ﾠDCI.	 ﾠArguably,	 ﾠthis	 ﾠ
is	 ﾠa	 ﾠrather	 ﾠcumbersome	 ﾠway	 ﾠof	 ﾠlegal	 ﾠdrafting.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
  The	 ﾠHigh	 ﾠRepresentative,	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠacts	 ﾠin	 ﾠsupport	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠHR,	 ﾠare	 ﾠ
endowed	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠresponsibility	 ﾠfor	 ﾠactions	 ﾠundertaken	 ﾠunder	 ﾠthe	 ﾠabove-ﾭ‐
mentioned	 ﾠheadings	 ﾠin	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ9(6).	 ﾠArguably,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠphrase	 ﾠ“actions	 ﾠundertaken”	 ﾠ
goes	 ﾠbeyond	 ﾠthe	 ﾠscope	 ﾠof	 ﾠpreparatory	 ﾠactions	 ﾠreferred	 ﾠto	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpreceding	 ﾠthree	 ﾠ
paragraphs,	 ﾠi.e.	 ﾠactions	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠstrategic	 ﾠnature,	 ﾠpertaining	 ﾠto	 ﾠmultiannual	 ﾠsteps	 ﾠ
within	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprogramming	 ﾠcycle.	 ﾠYet,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠresponsibility	 ﾠfor	 ﾠactions	 ﾠreferred	 ﾠto	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
paragraph	 ﾠ6	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠnot	 ﾠencompass	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfinancial	 ﾠimplementation	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCFSP	 ﾠ
budget,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠIfS	 ﾠ(other	 ﾠthan	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpart	 ﾠreferred	 ﾠto	 ﾠin	 ﾠparagraph	 ﾠ2),	 ﾠthe	 ﾠICI,	 ﾠ
communication	 ﾠand	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠdiplomacy	 ﾠactions,	 ﾠand	 ﾠelection	 ﾠobservation	 ﾠ
missions.	 ﾠIt	 ﾠis	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCommission	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠis	 ﾠresponsible	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthis	 ﾠaspect,	 ﾠalbeit	 ﾠ	 ﾠ–	 ﾠ
usefully	 ﾠ	 ﾠ–	 ﾠunder	 ﾠthe	 ﾠauthority	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfirst	 ﾠVice-ﾭ‐President	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCommission.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠ
Commission	 ﾠdepartment	 ﾠresponsible	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthis	 ﾠimplementation,	 ﾠi.e.	 ﾠthe	 ﾠForeign	 ﾠ
Policy	 ﾠInstruments	 ﾠService	 ﾠ(FPI),	 ﾠis	 ﾠco-ﾭ‐located	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
  According	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ“Working	 ﾠArrangements”	 ﾠon	 ﾠinter-ﾭ‐service	 ﾠcooperation	 ﾠ
between	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCommission	 ﾠservices	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS,	 ﾠ“[p]roposals	 ﾠfor	 ﾠCFSP	 ﾠactions	 ﾠ
are	 ﾠdiscussed	 ﾠin	 ﾠrelevant	 ﾠCouncil	 ﾠworking	 ﾠparties	 ﾠ(thematic	 ﾠor	 ﾠgeographic	 ﾠ
working	 ﾠgroups	 ﾠor,	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcase	 ﾠof	 ﾠcivilian	 ﾠCSDP	 ﾠmissions,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCommittee	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
Civilian	 ﾠaspects	 ﾠof	 ﾠcrisis	 ﾠmanagement	 ﾠCIVCOM).	 ﾠAs	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCommission	 ﾠ
representative	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrelevant	 ﾠCouncil	 ﾠWorking	 ﾠParties	 ﾠ(Relex	 ﾠCounsellors	 ﾠor,	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠcase	 ﾠof	 ﾠCSDP	 ﾠmissions,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCommittee	 ﾠfor	 ﾠcivilian	 ﾠaspects	 ﾠof	 ﾠcrisis	 ﾠ
management),	 ﾠthe	 ﾠForeign	 ﾠPolicy	 ﾠInstrument	 ﾠService	 ﾠis	 ﾠconsulted	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠ
from	 ﾠan	 ﾠearly	 ﾠstage	 ﾠand	 ﾠfully	 ﾠinvolved	 ﾠin	 ﾠdiscussions	 ﾠon	 ﾠpossible	 ﾠCFSP	 ﾠactions.	 ﾠ
After	 ﾠpolitical	 ﾠagreement	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠPolitical	 ﾠand	 ﾠSecurity	 ﾠCommittee	 ﾠto	 ﾠlaunch	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
CFSP	 ﾠaction,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠFPI	 ﾠprepares	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnecessary	 ﾠbudgetary	 ﾠimpact	 ﾠstatement	 ﾠfor	 ﾠ
each	 ﾠCFSP	 ﾠaction	 ﾠ(containing	 ﾠan	 ﾠestimate	 ﾠof	 ﾠits	 ﾠcosts),	 ﾠin	 ﾠconsultation	 ﾠwith	 ﾠ
relevant	 ﾠCommission	 ﾠservices	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠRelex	 ﾠCounsellors’	 ﾠworking	 ﾠ
party	 ﾠendorses	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbudget	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠaction.	 ﾠOnce	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCouncil	 ﾠadopts	 ﾠa	 ﾠCFSP	 ﾠaction	 ﾠ
under	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ28	 ﾠTEU,	 ﾠthis	 ﾠserves	 ﾠas	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbasic	 ﾠact	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbasis	 ﾠof	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠthe	 ﾠFPI	 ﾠ
prepares	 ﾠa	 ﾠFinancing	 ﾠDecision	 ﾠon	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠit	 ﾠconsults	 ﾠrelevant	 ﾠCommission	 ﾠservices	 ﾠ
through	 ﾠaccelerated	 ﾠand	 ﾠrestricted	 ﾠinter-ﾭ‐service	 ﾠconsultation.	 ﾠGiven	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnature	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠthese	 ﾠproposals,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠHR/VP	 ﾠhas	 ﾠan	 ﾠempowerment	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCommission,	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
Vice-ﾭ‐President,	 ﾠto	 ﾠadopt	 ﾠthese	 ﾠCommission	 ﾠFinancing	 ﾠDecisions.	 ﾠThis	 ﾠmay	 ﾠbe	 ﾠ
delegated	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠDirector	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠFPI.	 ﾠFPI	 ﾠimplements	 ﾠthese	 ﾠFinancing	 ﾠDecisions.	 ﾠ
Civilian	 ﾠCSDP	 ﾠmissions	 ﾠdeployed	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠground	 ﾠas	 ﾠwell	 ﾠas	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠCivilian	 ﾠPlanning	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠConduct	 ﾠCapability	 ﾠ(CPCC)	 ﾠmay	 ﾠbe	 ﾠrequested	 ﾠto	 ﾠprovide	 ﾠtechnical	 ﾠadvice,	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 83	 ﾠ
throughout	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprogramming	 ﾠcycle,	 ﾠand	 ﾠon	 ﾠtopics	 ﾠthat	 ﾠfall	 ﾠwithin	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠmandate	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠrealm	 ﾠof	 ﾠexpertise”.
203	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
4.  Evaluation	 ﾠof	 ﾠexternal	 ﾠassistance	 ﾠand	 ﾠfinancial	 ﾠresponsibility	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
  The	 ﾠevaluation	 ﾠof	 ﾠexternal	 ﾠassistance	 ﾠand	 ﾠfinancial	 ﾠresponsibility	 ﾠare	 ﾠtopics	 ﾠ
which	 ﾠare	 ﾠnot	 ﾠcovered	 ﾠby	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ9	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠDecision	 ﾠbut	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠget	 ﾠspecial	 ﾠattention	 ﾠ
in	 ﾠthe	 ﾠinter-ﾭ‐service	 ﾠ“Working	 ﾠArrangements”.
204	 ﾠ	 ﾠThese	 ﾠarrangements	 ﾠprescribe	 ﾠ
that	 ﾠDGs	 ﾠDEVCO,	 ﾠELARG,	 ﾠECHO	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠFPI	 ﾠare	 ﾠresponsible	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠevaluation	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
external	 ﾠassistance	 ﾠunder	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEU	 ﾠinstruments	 ﾠin	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠareas	 ﾠof	 ﾠresponsibility,
205	 ﾠ




  The	 ﾠevaluation	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠresults	 ﾠof	 ﾠcountry,	 ﾠregional	 ﾠand	 ﾠsectoral	 ﾠpolicies,	 ﾠ
programmes	 ﾠand	 ﾠprogramming	 ﾠperformance	 ﾠis	 ﾠconducted	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠevaluation	 ﾠunit	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠDG	 ﾠDEVCO	 ﾠor	 ﾠDG	 ﾠELARG.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠCommission	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠhave	 ﾠagreed	 ﾠthat	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠ
up	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠso-ﾭ‐called	 ﾠ“Group	 ﾠof	 ﾠExternal	 ﾠRelations	 ﾠCommissioners”	 ﾠto	 ﾠmonitor	 ﾠits	 ﾠ
work	 ﾠthrough	 ﾠregular	 ﾠreports	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrelevant	 ﾠCommissioner.	 ﾠArguably,	 ﾠthis	 ﾠ
Group’s	 ﾠmandate,	 ﾠcovering	 ﾠthe	 ﾠchain	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠprogramming	 ﾠto	 ﾠimplementation,	 ﾠ
allows	 ﾠa	 ﾠcomprehensive	 ﾠview	 ﾠof	 ﾠEU	 ﾠcooperation	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠsector	 ﾠor	 ﾠwith	 ﾠa	 ﾠcountry.	 ﾠTo	 ﾠ
ensure	 ﾠcoherence	 ﾠon	 ﾠall	 ﾠlevels,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ“Working	 ﾠArrangements”	 ﾠforesee	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
evaluation	 ﾠunit	 ﾠis	 ﾠalso	 ﾠthe	 ﾠservice	 ﾠresponsible	 ﾠfor	 ﾠevaluation	 ﾠmethodology.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠ
reports	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠevaluations	 ﾠof	 ﾠcountry,	 ﾠregional	 ﾠand	 ﾠsectoral	 ﾠpolicies,	 ﾠprogrammes	 ﾠ
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206	 ﾠIbid.,para.	 ﾠ3.16.	 ﾠSee	 ﾠalso	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdiscussion	 ﾠunder	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ8	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠDecision.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠthe	 ﾠformer,	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠprovided	 ﾠ
that	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ“EEAS	 ﾠshall	 ﾠsupport	 ﾠCommission	 ﾠefforts	 ﾠto	 ﾠexercise	 ﾠits	 ﾠresponsibility	 ﾠfor	 ﾠensuring	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlegality	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠcorrectness	 ﾠof	 ﾠits	 ﾠoperations	 ﾠand	 ﾠsound	 ﾠfinancial	 ﾠmanagement.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠparticular,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠshall	 ﾠ
refrain	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠtaking	 ﾠany	 ﾠmeasure,	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠas	 ﾠgiving	 ﾠinstructions	 ﾠto	 ﾠcontractors	 ﾠor	 ﾠimplementing	 ﾠbodies,	 ﾠ
on	 ﾠissues	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠfall	 ﾠunder	 ﾠCommission	 ﾠcompetence,	 ﾠin	 ﾠparticular	 ﾠthose	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠcould	 ﾠhave	 ﾠfinancial	 ﾠ





1.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠHigh	 ﾠRepresentative	 ﾠshall,	 ﾠafter	 ﾠconsulting	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCommittee	 ﾠreferred	 ﾠto	 ﾠin	 ﾠpoint	 ﾠ3	 ﾠof	 ﾠSection	 ﾠI	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
Part	 ﾠII	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠAnnex	 ﾠto	 ﾠCouncil	 ﾠDecision	 ﾠ2001/264/EC	 ﾠof	 ﾠ19	 ﾠMarch	 ﾠ2001	 ﾠadopting	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCouncil’s	 ﾠsecurity	 ﾠ
regulations,	 ﾠdecide	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsecurity	 ﾠrules	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠand	 ﾠtake	 ﾠall	 ﾠappropriate	 ﾠmeasures	 ﾠin	 ﾠorder	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
ensure	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠmanages	 ﾠeffectively	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrisks	 ﾠto	 ﾠits	 ﾠstaff,	 ﾠphysical	 ﾠassets	 ﾠand	 ﾠinformation,	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
that	 ﾠit	 ﾠfulfils	 ﾠits	 ﾠduty	 ﾠof	 ﾠcare	 ﾠand	 ﾠresponsibilities	 ﾠin	 ﾠthis	 ﾠregard.	 ﾠSuch	 ﾠrules	 ﾠshall	 ﾠapply	 ﾠto	 ﾠall	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠstaff,	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠall	 ﾠstaff	 ﾠin	 ﾠUnion	 ﾠDelegations,	 ﾠregardless	 ﾠof	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠadministrative	 ﾠstatus	 ﾠor	 ﾠorigin.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
2.	 ﾠPending	 ﾠthe	 ﾠDecision	 ﾠreferred	 ﾠto	 ﾠin	 ﾠparagraph	 ﾠ1:	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
—	 ﾠwith	 ﾠregard	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprotection	 ﾠof	 ﾠclassified	 ﾠinformation,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠshall	 ﾠapply	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsecurity	 ﾠmeasures	 ﾠ
set	 ﾠout	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠAnnex	 ﾠto	 ﾠDecision	 ﾠ2001/264/EC,	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
—	 ﾠwith	 ﾠregard	 ﾠto	 ﾠother	 ﾠaspects	 ﾠof	 ﾠsecurity,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠshall	 ﾠapply	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCommission’s	 ﾠProvisions	 ﾠon	 ﾠ
Security,	 ﾠas	 ﾠset	 ﾠout	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrelevant	 ﾠAnnex	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠRules	 ﾠof	 ﾠProcedure	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCommission.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
3.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠshall	 ﾠhave	 ﾠa	 ﾠdepartment	 ﾠresponsible	 ﾠfor	 ﾠsecurity	 ﾠmatters,	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠshall	 ﾠbe	 ﾠassisted	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
relevant	 ﾠservices	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠMember	 ﾠStates.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
4.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠHigh	 ﾠRepresentative	 ﾠshall	 ﾠtake	 ﾠany	 ﾠmeasure	 ﾠnecessary	 ﾠin	 ﾠorder	 ﾠto	 ﾠimplement	 ﾠsecurity	 ﾠrules	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠEEAS,	 ﾠin	 ﾠparticular	 ﾠas	 ﾠregards	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprotection	 ﾠof	 ﾠclassified	 ﾠinformation	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmeasures	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠ
taken	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠevent	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠfailure	 ﾠby	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠstaff	 ﾠto	 ﾠcomply	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsecurity	 ﾠrules.	 ﾠFor	 ﾠthat	 ﾠpurpose,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
EEAS	 ﾠshall	 ﾠseek	 ﾠadvice	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠSecurity	 ﾠOffice	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠGeneral	 ﾠSecretariat	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCouncil,	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
relevant	 ﾠservices	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCommission	 ﾠand	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrelevant	 ﾠservices	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠMember	 ﾠStates.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
Article	 ﾠ10	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠDecision	 ﾠis	 ﾠsimply	 ﾠentitled	 ﾠ“security”,	 ﾠthat	 ﾠis,	 ﾠsecurity	 ﾠrules	 ﾠas	 ﾠ
they	 ﾠrelates	 ﾠto	 ﾠboth	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprotection	 ﾠof	 ﾠclassified	 ﾠinformation	 ﾠand	 ﾠ(all)	 ﾠother	 ﾠaspects	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
security	 ﾠwithin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS,	 ﾠapplied	 ﾠto	 ﾠall	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠstaff	 ﾠas	 ﾠwell	 ﾠas	 ﾠall	 ﾠstaff	 ﾠin	 ﾠUnion	 ﾠ
Delegations.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠsecurity	 ﾠrules	 ﾠraise	 ﾠat	 ﾠleast	 ﾠthree	 ﾠimportant	 ﾠquestions:	 ﾠfirst,	 ﾠ
whether	 ﾠthese	 ﾠrules	 ﾠconstitute	 ﾠa	 ﾠspecific	 ﾠpart	 ﾠof	 ﾠan	 ﾠEU-ﾭ‐wide	 ﾠsecurity	 ﾠframework	 ﾠ
(Section	 ﾠ1);	 ﾠsecond,	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠthey	 ﾠamount	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbest	 ﾠstandards	 ﾠin	 ﾠdiplomatic	 ﾠ
security	 ﾠ(Section	 ﾠ2)	 ﾠand	 ﾠthird,	 ﾠhow	 ﾠthey	 ﾠrelate	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnew	 ﾠCouncil	 ﾠrules	 ﾠon	 ﾠclassified	 ﾠ
information	 ﾠ(Section	 ﾠ3).	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
1.	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠsecurity	 ﾠrules:	 ﾠa	 ﾠspecific	 ﾠpart	 ﾠof	 ﾠan	 ﾠEU-ﾭ‐wide	 ﾠsecurity	 ﾠframework?	 ﾠ
  When	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠstarted	 ﾠoperating	 ﾠon	 ﾠ1	 ﾠJanuary	 ﾠ2011	 ﾠprovision	 ﾠwas	 ﾠmade	 ﾠfor	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠfact	 ﾠthat	 ﾠit	 ﾠwould	 ﾠnot	 ﾠby	 ﾠthen	 ﾠhave	 ﾠadopted	 ﾠits	 ﾠown	 ﾠsecurity	 ﾠrules	 ﾠand	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ
their	 ﾠfull	 ﾠadoption	 ﾠby	 ﾠthis	 ﾠ‘functionally	 ﾠautonomous’	 ﾠbody	 ﾠmight	 ﾠtake	 ﾠsome	 ﾠ
time.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmeantime,	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ10(2)	 ﾠexplicitly	 ﾠprovided	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠexisting	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
∗	 ﾠFootnote	 ﾠreferences	 ﾠhave	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠsuppressed	 ﾠhere	 ﾠbut	 ﾠare	 ﾠincluded	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdiscussion	 ﾠbelow.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 85	 ﾠ
Council	 ﾠrules	 ﾠ(at	 ﾠthat	 ﾠtime,	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠ2001)
207	 ﾠwould	 ﾠapply	 ﾠwith	 ﾠregard	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
protection	 ﾠof	 ﾠclassified	 ﾠinformation	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠexisting	 ﾠCommission	 ﾠrules	 ﾠ(also	 ﾠ
from	 ﾠ2001)
208	 ﾠwould	 ﾠapply	 ﾠwith	 ﾠregard	 ﾠto	 ﾠ“other	 ﾠaspects	 ﾠof	 ﾠsecurity”.	 ﾠFrom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
way	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠpresented	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠDecision	 ﾠthis	 ﾠseems	 ﾠlike	 ﾠa	 ﾠneat	 ﾠdivision;	 ﾠin	 ﾠfact	 ﾠit	 ﾠ
is	 ﾠnot.	 ﾠBoth	 ﾠmeasures	 ﾠcontain	 ﾠthe	 ﾠgeneral	 ﾠsecurity	 ﾠrules	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtwo	 ﾠrespective	 ﾠ
institutions,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCouncil	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCommission,	 ﾠand	 ﾠoverlap	 ﾠto	 ﾠa	 ﾠconsiderable	 ﾠ
extent.	 ﾠFrom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmanner	 ﾠin	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ10(2)	 ﾠis	 ﾠphrased	 ﾠit	 ﾠseems	 ﾠthat	 ﾠonly	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠCouncil	 ﾠrules	 ﾠapply	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprotection	 ﾠof	 ﾠclassified	 ﾠinformation	 ﾠas	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
only	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCommission	 ﾠrules	 ﾠto	 ﾠ(all)	 ﾠ“other	 ﾠaspects	 ﾠof	 ﾠsecurity”.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
  This	 ﾠpotentially	 ﾠunclear	 ﾠsituation	 ﾠdid	 ﾠnot	 ﾠlast	 ﾠfor	 ﾠlong	 ﾠbecause	 ﾠon	 ﾠ15	 ﾠJune	 ﾠ2011	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠformally	 ﾠadopted	 ﾠits	 ﾠown	 ﾠsecurity	 ﾠrules	 ﾠas	 ﾠexplicitly	 ﾠenvisaged	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
Article	 ﾠ10(1).
209	 ﾠThe	 ﾠdecision	 ﾠlays	 ﾠdown	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrules	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsafety	 ﾠand	 ﾠsecurity	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠand	 ﾠestablishes	 ﾠthe	 ﾠgeneral	 ﾠregulatory	 ﾠframework	 ﾠfor	 ﾠmanaging	 ﾠ
effectively	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrisks	 ﾠto	 ﾠstaff,	 ﾠphysical	 ﾠassets	 ﾠand	 ﾠinformation,	 ﾠand	 ﾠfor	 ﾠfulfilling	 ﾠ
its	 ﾠduty	 ﾠof	 ﾠcare.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠsecurity	 ﾠrules	 ﾠare	 ﾠconsidered	 ﾠequivalent	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
security	 ﾠrules	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCommission	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ2011	 ﾠsecurity	 ﾠregulations	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
Council.
210	 ﾠThey	 ﾠreplace	 ﾠthe	 ﾠapplication	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCommission	 ﾠrules	 ﾠwith	 ﾠregard	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠorganisation	 ﾠof	 ﾠsecurity	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠallocation	 ﾠof	 ﾠsecurity	 ﾠtasks	 ﾠ
within	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠstructures.
211	 ﾠThey	 ﾠdo	 ﾠnot,	 ﾠhowever,	 ﾠcover	 ﾠ“the	 ﾠprotection	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
classified	 ﾠinformation”	 ﾠas	 ﾠsuch.	 ﾠSince	 ﾠthe	 ﾠHigh	 ﾠRepresentative	 ﾠhas	 ﾠnot	 ﾠyet	 ﾠ
adopted	 ﾠspecific	 ﾠrules	 ﾠin	 ﾠthis	 ﾠregard	 ﾠwithin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCouncil	 ﾠrules	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
classification	 ﾠof	 ﾠdocuments	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCouncil	 ﾠsecurity	 ﾠregulation	 ﾠare	 ﾠstill	 ﾠ
applicable.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
  By	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtime	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠadopted	 ﾠits	 ﾠown	 ﾠsecurity	 ﾠrules,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCouncil	 ﾠhad	 ﾠadopted	 ﾠ
general	 ﾠnew	 ﾠsecurity	 ﾠrules	 ﾠ(in	 ﾠMarch	 ﾠ2011)	 ﾠand	 ﾠprovision	 ﾠcould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠmade	 ﾠfor	 ﾠ
these	 ﾠrules	 ﾠto	 ﾠapply	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprotection	 ﾠof	 ﾠclassified	 ﾠinformation	 ﾠwithin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS,	 ﾠ
until	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmoment	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠHigh	 ﾠRepresentative	 ﾠadopts	 ﾠspecific	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠrules	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
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 ﾠAnnex	 ﾠto	 ﾠCouncil	 ﾠDecision	 ﾠ2001/264/ECof	 ﾠ19	 ﾠMarch	 ﾠ2001	 ﾠadopting	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCouncil's	 ﾠsecurity	 ﾠ
regulations,	 ﾠOJ	 ﾠ2001	 ﾠL	 ﾠ101/	 ﾠ1.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
208	 ﾠAnnex	 ﾠto	 ﾠRules	 ﾠof	 ﾠProcedure	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCommission	 ﾠ[C(2000)	 ﾠ3614],	 ﾠOJ	 ﾠ2000	 ﾠL	 ﾠ308/26.	 ﾠSee	 ﾠalso	 ﾠ
Commission	 ﾠDecision	 ﾠ2001/844/EC,	 ﾠECSC,	 ﾠEuratom	 ﾠof	 ﾠ29	 ﾠNovember	 ﾠ2001	 ﾠamending	 ﾠits	 ﾠinternal	 ﾠRules	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠProcedure,	 ﾠOJ	 ﾠ2001	 ﾠL317/1.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
209	 ﾠDecision	 ﾠ2011/C	 ﾠ304/05	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠHigh	 ﾠRepresentative	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠUnion	 ﾠfor	 ﾠForeign	 ﾠAffairs	 ﾠand	 ﾠSecurity	 ﾠ
Policy	 ﾠof	 ﾠ15	 ﾠJune	 ﾠ2011	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsecurity	 ﾠrules	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠExternal	 ﾠAction	 ﾠService,	 ﾠOJ	 ﾠ2011	 ﾠC	 ﾠ304/7	 ﾠ
(hereinafter:	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠsecurity	 ﾠrules).	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
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 ﾠAnnex	 ﾠto	 ﾠCouncil	 ﾠDecision	 ﾠ2011/292/EUof	 ﾠ31	 ﾠMarch	 ﾠ2011	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsecurity	 ﾠrules	 ﾠfor	 ﾠprotecting	 ﾠEU	 ﾠ
classified	 ﾠinformation,	 ﾠOJ	 ﾠ2011	 ﾠL	 ﾠ141/17.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
211Recital	 ﾠ6	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠsecurity	 ﾠrules.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 86	 ﾠ
this	 ﾠregard.	 ﾠThose	 ﾠrules	 ﾠmust	 ﾠin	 ﾠany	 ﾠevent	 ﾠbe	 ﾠequivalent	 ﾠto	 ﾠthose	 ﾠset	 ﾠout	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
Council	 ﾠrules.
212	 ﾠThe	 ﾠ2011	 ﾠCouncil	 ﾠsecurity	 ﾠrules	 ﾠthemselves	 ﾠprovide	 ﾠfor	 ﾠa	 ﾠwide-ﾭ‐
reaching	 ﾠsystem	 ﾠof	 ﾠequivalence	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCouncil	 ﾠrules	 ﾠamong	 ﾠa	 ﾠwide	 ﾠvariety	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
institutions	 ﾠ(the	 ﾠCommission	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠParliament)	 ﾠas	 ﾠwell	 ﾠas	 ﾠagencies	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠbodies	 ﾠor	 ﾠoffices	 ﾠ(in	 ﾠany	 ﾠevent	 ﾠthese	 ﾠinclude	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS,	 ﾠEuropol,	 ﾠEurojust	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠothers)	 ﾠas	 ﾠwell	 ﾠas	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmember	 ﾠstates.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠsecurity	 ﾠrules	 ﾠexplicitly	 ﾠaim	 ﾠ
to	 ﾠ“achieve	 ﾠa	 ﾠmore	 ﾠcoherent,	 ﾠcomprehensive	 ﾠgeneral	 ﾠframework	 ﾠwithin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
European	 ﾠUnion	 ﾠfor	 ﾠprotecting	 ﾠclassified	 ﾠinformation,	 ﾠbuilding	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCouncil	 ﾠ
security	 ﾠrules	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCommission	 ﾠsecurity	 ﾠprovisions”.
213	 ﾠThe	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠsecurity	 ﾠ
rules	 ﾠexemplify	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnature	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠcentral	 ﾠpolicy	 ﾠhub	 ﾠthat	 ﾠoffers	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
point	 ﾠof	 ﾠcontact	 ﾠand	 ﾠchannel	 ﾠof	 ﾠcoordination	 ﾠand	 ﾠcooperation	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠ
national	 ﾠand	 ﾠEU	 ﾠactors,	 ﾠrather	 ﾠthan	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠpurely	 ﾠautonomous	 ﾠEU	 ﾠagency	 ﾠor	 ﾠ
body.
214	 ﾠIt	 ﾠcomprises	 ﾠCommission	 ﾠand	 ﾠCouncil	 ﾠofficials	 ﾠas	 ﾠwell	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠmeaningful	 ﾠ
presence	 ﾠof	 ﾠnationals	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠall	 ﾠmember	 ﾠstates	 ﾠand	 ﾠaims	 ﾠto	 ﾠoffer	 ﾠan	 ﾠ
environment	 ﾠin	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠnational	 ﾠdiplomatic	 ﾠand	 ﾠintelligence	 ﾠservices	 ﾠare	 ﾠwilling	 ﾠ
to	 ﾠshare	 ﾠand	 ﾠexchange	 ﾠvaluable	 ﾠand	 ﾠsensitive	 ﾠinformation.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
  The	 ﾠCouncil’s	 ﾠexplicit	 ﾠstrategy,	 ﾠreflected	 ﾠin	 ﾠits	 ﾠdecision,	 ﾠis	 ﾠto	 ﾠobtain	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
necessary	 ﾠcommitment	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCommission,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmember	 ﾠstates,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠother	 ﾠ
EU	 ﾠinstitutions,	 ﾠagencies,	 ﾠbodies	 ﾠand	 ﾠoffices,	 ﾠto	 ﾠcomply	 ﾠwith	 ﾠits	 ﾠrules	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
standards	 ﾠin	 ﾠorder	 ﾠto	 ﾠprotect	 ﾠthe	 ﾠinterests	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠUnion	 ﾠand	 ﾠits	 ﾠmember	 ﾠstates
.	 ﾠ
Several	 ﾠdeclarations	 ﾠappended	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCouncil	 ﾠDecision	 ﾠmake	 ﾠthis	 ﾠperfectly	 ﾠ
clear.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠparticular,	 ﾠ“the	 ﾠCouncil	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCommission	 ﾠconsider	 ﾠthat	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠ
respective	 ﾠsecurity	 ﾠrules,	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠAgreement	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠthe	 ﾠMember	 ﾠStates,	 ﾠ
meeting	 ﾠwithin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCouncil,	 ﾠregarding	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprotection	 ﾠof	 ﾠclassified	 ﾠinformation	 ﾠ
exchanged	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠinterests	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠUnion,	 ﾠtogether	 ﾠconstitute	 ﾠa	 ﾠmore	 ﾠ
comprehensive	 ﾠand	 ﾠcoherent	 ﾠgeneral	 ﾠframework	 ﾠwithin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠUnion	 ﾠ
for	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprotection	 ﾠof	 ﾠclassified	 ﾠinformation	 ﾠoriginating	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠMember	 ﾠStates,	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
institutions	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠUnion	 ﾠor	 ﾠin	 ﾠEU	 ﾠagencies,	 ﾠbodies	 ﾠor	 ﾠoffices,	 ﾠor	 ﾠ
received	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthird	 ﾠStates	 ﾠor	 ﾠinternational	 ﾠorganisations.”
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 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ3(1)	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	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212	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ3(1)	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠsecurity	 ﾠrules.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
213Recital	 ﾠ3	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠsecurity	 ﾠrules.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
214	 ﾠSee	 ﾠdicussion	 ﾠunder	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ3	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠDecision,	 ﾠabove.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
215	 ﾠDeclaration	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCouncil	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCommission	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprotection	 ﾠand	 ﾠhandling	 ﾠof	 ﾠclassified	 ﾠ
information,	 ﾠCouncil	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠUnion,	 ﾠAddendum	 ﾠto	 ﾠNote	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠAntici	 ﾠGroup	 ﾠto	 ﾠCOREPER	 ﾠ/	 ﾠ
Council	 ﾠon	 ﾠCouncil	 ﾠDecision	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsecurity	 ﾠrules	 ﾠfor	 ﾠprotecting	 ﾠEU	 ﾠclassified	 ﾠinformation	 ﾠ-ﾭ‐	 ﾠDraft	 ﾠ
declarations	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCouncil	 ﾠminutes,	 ﾠ8054/11	 ﾠADD	 ﾠ1,	 ﾠBrussels,	 ﾠ23	 ﾠMarch	 ﾠ2011,	 ﾠavailable	 ﾠat	 ﾠ
<http://www.statewatch.org/news/2011/mar/eu-ﾭ‐council-ﾭ‐classified-ﾭ‐information-ﾭ‐8054-ﾭ‐add1-ﾭ‐11.pdf>	 ﾠ
(last	 ﾠvisited	 ﾠ31	 ﾠJanuary	 ﾠ2013)	 ﾠ(hereinafter:Declaration	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCouncil	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCommission	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
protection	 ﾠand	 ﾠhandling	 ﾠof	 ﾠclassified	 ﾠinformation).	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 87	 ﾠ
EEAS	 ﾠsecurity	 ﾠrules	 ﾠspecifically	 ﾠrequires	 ﾠthe	 ﾠHigh	 ﾠRepresentative	 ﾠto	 ﾠadopt	 ﾠrules	 ﾠ
for	 ﾠprotecting	 ﾠclassified	 ﾠinformation	 ﾠthat	 ﾠare	 ﾠ“equivalent”	 ﾠto	 ﾠthose	 ﾠset	 ﾠout	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
Council	 ﾠDecision	 ﾠ2011/292/EU.	 ﾠYet	 ﾠthe	 ﾠHigh	 ﾠRepresentative	 ﾠhas	 ﾠnot	 ﾠ(yet)	 ﾠdone	 ﾠ
so	 ﾠand	 ﾠat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtime	 ﾠof	 ﾠwriting	 ﾠ(early	 ﾠ2013)	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠunderstood	 ﾠthat	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠstill	 ﾠbeing	 ﾠ
worked	 ﾠon	 ﾠand	 ﾠmay	 ﾠhave	 ﾠsome	 ﾠsupplementary	 ﾠelements	 ﾠ(in	 ﾠparticular	 ﾠ
emphasis	 ﾠon	 ﾠsupport	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠservices	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmember	 ﾠstates).
216	 ﾠThe	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot	 ﾠ
alone	 ﾠin	 ﾠnot	 ﾠ(yet)	 ﾠhaving	 ﾠadopted	 ﾠspecific	 ﾠrules	 ﾠon	 ﾠclassified	 ﾠinformation	 ﾠ
equivalent	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnew	 ﾠrules	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCouncil;	 ﾠit	 ﾠseems	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCommission	 ﾠhas	 ﾠ
not	 ﾠyet	 ﾠdone	 ﾠso	 ﾠeither	 ﾠdespite	 ﾠbeing	 ﾠ“committed”	 ﾠto	 ﾠapplying	 ﾠequivalent	 ﾠ
security	 ﾠstandards	 ﾠfor	 ﾠprotecting	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠUnion	 ﾠClassified	 ﾠInformation	 ﾠ
(hereinafter:	 ﾠEUCI).	 ﾠSubsequent	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠadoption	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCouncil	 ﾠsecurity	 ﾠrules	 ﾠat	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠend	 ﾠof	 ﾠMarch	 ﾠ2011,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠintention	 ﾠwas	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCommission	 ﾠwould	 ﾠadopt	 ﾠ
new	 ﾠsecurity	 ﾠrules	 ﾠtoo,	 ﾠexplicitly	 ﾠmodelled	 ﾠon	 ﾠthose	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCouncil,	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠ
would	 ﾠthen	 ﾠbe	 ﾠincluded	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠnew	 ﾠannex	 ﾠto	 ﾠits	 ﾠrules	 ﾠof	 ﾠprocedure.	 ﾠThis	 ﾠis	 ﾠin	 ﾠline	 ﾠ
with	 ﾠits	 ﾠearlier	 ﾠpractice	 ﾠsince	 ﾠ2001	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠit	 ﾠsystematically	 ﾠmodified	 ﾠits	 ﾠown	 ﾠ
rules	 ﾠin	 ﾠparallel	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthose	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCouncil.	 ﾠIt	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot	 ﾠclear	 ﾠwhy	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCommission	 ﾠ
has	 ﾠnot	 ﾠnow	 ﾠformally	 ﾠdone	 ﾠso.	 ﾠExplicit	 ﾠprovision	 ﾠwas	 ﾠmade	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtwo	 ﾠ
institutions	 ﾠto	 ﾠconsult	 ﾠone	 ﾠanother	 ﾠin	 ﾠadvance	 ﾠof	 ﾠany	 ﾠfurther	 ﾠmodification	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
their	 ﾠrespective	 ﾠsecurity	 ﾠrules.
217	 ﾠSeveral	 ﾠagencies	 ﾠhad	 ﾠin	 ﾠfact	 ﾠalready	 ﾠmade	 ﾠ
their	 ﾠown	 ﾠprovision	 ﾠfor	 ﾠrules	 ﾠof	 ﾠconfidentiality	 ﾠin	 ﾠadvance	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnew	 ﾠCouncil	 ﾠ
security	 ﾠrules.
218	 ﾠThe	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠcame	 ﾠalong	 ﾠafterwards.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
  EU	 ﾠagencies	 ﾠgenerally	 ﾠhave	 ﾠwell-ﾭ‐established	 ﾠbilateral	 ﾠinformation-ﾭ‐sharing	 ﾠ
relationships	 ﾠwith	 ﾠeach	 ﾠother.	 ﾠInformation-ﾭ‐sharing	 ﾠmore	 ﾠgenerally	 ﾠserves	 ﾠnot	 ﾠ
only	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpurposes	 ﾠof	 ﾠpriority-ﾭ‐setting	 ﾠand	 ﾠpolicy-ﾭ‐making,	 ﾠalbeit	 ﾠin	 ﾠan	 ﾠ
unstructured	 ﾠmanner,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠalso	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpurposes	 ﾠof	 ﾠpractical	 ﾠoperational	 ﾠ
implementation.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠis	 ﾠembedded	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠmuch	 ﾠbroader	 ﾠvision	 ﾠand	 ﾠpractice	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠinstitutional	 ﾠunity.	 ﾠIt	 ﾠalso	 ﾠsupports	 ﾠthose	 ﾠsatellite	 ﾠbodies	 ﾠthat	 ﾠnow	 ﾠfall	 ﾠunder	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠauthority	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠHigh	 ﾠRepresentative	 ﾠ(viz.	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠDefence	 ﾠAgency,	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠUnion	 ﾠSatellite	 ﾠCentre,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠUnion	 ﾠInstitute	 ﾠfor	 ﾠSecurity	 ﾠ
Studies	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠSecurity	 ﾠand	 ﾠDefence	 ﾠCollege).	 ﾠ
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216	 ﾠThe	 ﾠonly	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠinformation	 ﾠis	 ﾠin	 ﾠparagraph	 ﾠ36	 ﾠof	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠExternal	 ﾠAction	 ﾠService,	 ﾠReport	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
High	 ﾠRepresentative	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠParliament,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCouncil	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCommission,	 ﾠ22	 ﾠDecember	 ﾠ
2011,	 ﾠavailable	 ﾠat:	 ﾠ
<http://www.eeas.europa.eu/images/top_stories/2011_eeas_report_cor_+_formatting.pdf>	 ﾠ(last	 ﾠ
visited	 ﾠ31	 ﾠJanuary	 ﾠ2013).	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
217	 ﾠDeclaration	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCouncil	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCommission	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprotection	 ﾠand	 ﾠhandling	 ﾠof	 ﾠclassified	 ﾠ
information,	 ﾠcited	 ﾠabove.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
218	 ﾠSee,	 ﾠe.g.,	 ﾠRules	 ﾠof	 ﾠProcedure	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠProcessing	 ﾠand	 ﾠProtection	 ﾠof	 ﾠPersonal	 ﾠData	 ﾠat	 ﾠEurojust	 ﾠ(Text	 ﾠ
adopted	 ﾠunanimously	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcollege	 ﾠof	 ﾠEurojust	 ﾠduring	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmeeting	 ﾠof	 ﾠ21	 ﾠOctober	 ﾠ2004	 ﾠand	 ﾠapproved	 ﾠ
by	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCouncil	 ﾠon	 ﾠ24	 ﾠFebruary	 ﾠ2005)	 ﾠOJ	 ﾠ2005	 ﾠC	 ﾠ68/1.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 88	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
  EU	 ﾠINTCEN,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠacronym	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠUnion	 ﾠIntelligence	 ﾠAnalysis	 ﾠCentre,	 ﾠ
acts	 ﾠas	 ﾠthe	 ﾠintelligence	 ﾠhub	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS.
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 ﾠIn	 ﾠ2011,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠSituation	 ﾠCentre	 ﾠ
(SitCen),	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠwas	 ﾠlocated	 ﾠwithin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCouncil	 ﾠof	 ﾠMinisters,	 ﾠwas	 ﾠrenamed	 ﾠas	 ﾠ
EU	 ﾠINTCEN	 ﾠand	 ﾠstructurally	 ﾠintegrated	 ﾠwithin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS.	 ﾠEU	 ﾠINTCEN	 ﾠproduces	 ﾠall	 ﾠ
source	 ﾠintelligence	 ﾠassessments	 ﾠaimed	 ﾠto	 ﾠprovide	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCouncil	 ﾠwith	 ﾠhigh	 ﾠquality	 ﾠ
information	 ﾠon	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠsecurity.	 ﾠTraditionally,	 ﾠSitCen	 ﾠcovered	 ﾠboth	 ﾠexternal	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
internal	 ﾠsecurity	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfact	 ﾠthat	 ﾠEU	 ﾠINTCEN	 ﾠis	 ﾠnow	 ﾠpart	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠmeans	 ﾠ
that	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlatter	 ﾠis	 ﾠgradually	 ﾠbecoming	 ﾠa	 ﾠmore	 ﾠrobust	 ﾠand	 ﾠcentral	 ﾠelement	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
EU’s	 ﾠinternal-ﾭ‐external	 ﾠsecurity	 ﾠnexus.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠEU	 ﾠINTCEN	 ﾠis	 ﾠfurther	 ﾠpart	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
Single	 ﾠIntelligence	 ﾠAnalysis	 ﾠCapacity	 ﾠ(SIAC),	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠcombines	 ﾠcivilian	 ﾠintelligence	 ﾠ
(EU	 ﾠINTCEN)	 ﾠand	 ﾠmilitary	 ﾠintelligence	 ﾠ(EUMS	 ﾠINT	 ﾠDIR).	 ﾠThe	 ﾠEEAS,	 ﾠlike	 ﾠcertain	 ﾠ
other	 ﾠEU	 ﾠagencies	 ﾠ(Europol,	 ﾠFrontex),	 ﾠmust	 ﾠbe	 ﾠdistinguished	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠintelligence	 ﾠ
agencies	 ﾠat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlevel	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmember	 ﾠstates	 ﾠthemselves	 ﾠsince	 ﾠnone	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEU	 ﾠ
actors	 ﾠhave	 ﾠ“special	 ﾠpowers”	 ﾠto	 ﾠcollect	 ﾠinformation,	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠas	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpowers	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
intercept	 ﾠcommunications,	 ﾠconduct	 ﾠcovert	 ﾠsurveillance,	 ﾠuse	 ﾠsecret	 ﾠinformants,	 ﾠ
etc.	 ﾠNonetheless,	 ﾠa	 ﾠvery	 ﾠimportant	 ﾠsimilarity	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠnational	 ﾠintelligence	 ﾠ
agencies	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEU	 ﾠactors,	 ﾠincluding	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS,	 ﾠis	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthey	 ﾠreceive,	 ﾠproduce	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠdisseminate	 ﾠinformation,	 ﾠincluding	 ﾠpersonal	 ﾠdata	 ﾠand	 ﾠclassified	 ﾠ
information.	 ﾠThey	 ﾠanalyse	 ﾠand	 ﾠdisseminate	 ﾠinformation	 ﾠ–	 ﾠon	 ﾠthreats	 ﾠto	 ﾠinternal	 ﾠ
security	 ﾠor	 ﾠother	 ﾠinterests	 ﾠ–	 ﾠto	 ﾠa	 ﾠbroad	 ﾠvariety	 ﾠof	 ﾠactors,	 ﾠincluding	 ﾠpolicy-ﾭ‐	 ﾠ
makers	 ﾠandother	 ﾠexecutive	 ﾠbodies.	 ﾠThey	 ﾠperform	 ﾠthese	 ﾠfunctions	 ﾠboth	 ﾠwithin	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠterritory	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEU	 ﾠand	 ﾠin	 ﾠits	 ﾠrelations	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthird	 ﾠcountries	 ﾠand	 ﾠinternational	 ﾠ
organisations.
220	 ﾠInternational	 ﾠagreements	 ﾠconcerning	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprotection	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
classified	 ﾠinformation,	 ﾠconcluded	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠthe	 ﾠUnion	 ﾠand	 ﾠthird	 ﾠparties,	 ﾠare	 ﾠ
applicable	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠis	 ﾠin	 ﾠfact	 ﾠlisted	 ﾠas	 ﾠone	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠentities	 ﾠthat	 ﾠform	 ﾠ
“the	 ﾠEU”.
221	 ﾠIt	 ﾠcan	 ﾠbe	 ﾠexpected	 ﾠthat	 ﾠin	 ﾠfuture	 ﾠagreements	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠthe	 ﾠUnion	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠthird	 ﾠcountries	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsecurity	 ﾠof	 ﾠclassified	 ﾠinformation,	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠare	 ﾠ
negotiated	 ﾠunder	 ﾠthe	 ﾠauthority	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠHigh	 ﾠRepresentative,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠwill	 ﾠbe	 ﾠby	 ﾠ
default	 ﾠincluded	 ﾠas	 ﾠone	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEU	 ﾠentities	 ﾠto	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠthe	 ﾠagreement	 ﾠapplies.
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219	 ﾠIt	 ﾠproduces	 ﾠaround	 ﾠ200	 ﾠstrategic	 ﾠsituation	 ﾠassessment	 ﾠand	 ﾠaround	 ﾠ50	 ﾠspecial	 ﾠreports	 ﾠand	 ﾠbriefings	 ﾠ
[Joint	 ﾠanswer	 ﾠgiven	 ﾠby	 ﾠHigh	 ﾠRepresentative/Vice-ﾭ‐President	 ﾠAshton	 ﾠon	 ﾠbehalf	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCommission	 ﾠon	 ﾠ16	 ﾠ
August	 ﾠ2012	 ﾠin	 ﾠreply	 ﾠto	 ﾠwritten	 ﾠparliamentary	 ﾠquestions	 ﾠ:	 ﾠE-ﾭ‐006018/12	 ﾠ,	 ﾠE-ﾭ‐006020/12].	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
220Wils	 ﾠand	 ﾠVermeulen,	 ﾠ“Parliamentary	 ﾠOversight	 ﾠof	 ﾠSecurity	 ﾠand	 ﾠIntelligence	 ﾠAgencies	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
European	 ﾠUnion,”	 ﾠStudy	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠParliament,	 ﾠDirectorate	 ﾠGeneral	 ﾠfor	 ﾠInternal	 ﾠPolicies	 ﾠ(2011).	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
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 ﾠSee	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ3	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠAgreement	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠthe	 ﾠOrganisation	 ﾠfor	 ﾠJoint	 ﾠArmament	 ﾠCooperation	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
European	 ﾠUnion	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprotection	 ﾠof	 ﾠclassified	 ﾠinformation,	 ﾠOJ	 ﾠ2012,	 ﾠL	 ﾠ229/2.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
222	 ﾠUp	 ﾠto	 ﾠnow,	 ﾠthere	 ﾠare	 ﾠ12	 ﾠEU	 ﾠ"Security	 ﾠof	 ﾠInformation	 ﾠAgreements"	 ﾠin	 ﾠplace,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfirst	 ﾠwas	 ﾠsigned	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
2003.	 ﾠOthers	 ﾠare	 ﾠbeing	 ﾠnegotiated.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠtwo	 ﾠmost	 ﾠrecent	 ﾠones	 ﾠwere	 ﾠconcluded	 ﾠwith	 ﾠAustralia	 ﾠ(13	 ﾠ
January	 ﾠ2010)	 ﾠand	 ﾠRussia	 ﾠ(1	 ﾠJune	 ﾠ2010)	 ﾠbefore	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠwas	 ﾠcreated.As	 ﾠshown	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprevious	 ﾠ
footnote,	 ﾠthere	 ﾠare	 ﾠpermanent	 ﾠsecurity	 ﾠagreements	 ﾠwith	 ﾠother	 ﾠinternational	 ﾠorganisations	 ﾠ(3	 ﾠand	 ﾠ1	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 89	 ﾠ
2.	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠsecurity	 ﾠrules:	 ﾠbest	 ﾠstandards	 ﾠin	 ﾠdiplomatic	 ﾠsecurity?	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
  Article	 ﾠ1	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠsecurity	 ﾠrules	 ﾠprovides	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthey	 ﾠapply	 ﾠto	 ﾠall	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠstaff,	 ﾠ
including	 ﾠofficials	 ﾠand	 ﾠother	 ﾠservants,	 ﾠseconded	 ﾠnational	 ﾠexperts	 ﾠand	 ﾠlocal	 ﾠ
agents,	 ﾠand	 ﾠto	 ﾠall	 ﾠstaff	 ﾠin	 ﾠEU	 ﾠDelegations.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠHigh	 ﾠRepresentative	 ﾠensures	 ﾠ
consistency	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠapplication	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsecurity	 ﾠrules,	 ﾠincluding	 ﾠsecurity	 ﾠ
inspections	 ﾠ(Article	 ﾠ11).	 ﾠS/he	 ﾠadopts	 ﾠmore	 ﾠdetailed	 ﾠmeasures	 ﾠfor	 ﾠ
implementation	 ﾠon	 ﾠrecommendation	 ﾠby	 ﾠa	 ﾠSecurity	 ﾠCommittee	 ﾠ(Article	 ﾠ9(6))	 ﾠ
composed	 ﾠof	 ﾠnational	 ﾠexperts	 ﾠand	 ﾠrepresentatives	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠGeneral	 ﾠSecretariat	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCouncil	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCommission.	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ2	 ﾠenvisages	 ﾠthat	 ﾠsecurity	 ﾠrisks	 ﾠ
shall	 ﾠbe	 ﾠmanaged	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠprocess	 ﾠand	 ﾠ“in	 ﾠline	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠconcept	 ﾠof	 ﾠdefence	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
depth”.	 ﾠThis	 ﾠapproach	 ﾠto	 ﾠsecurity	 ﾠrisk	 ﾠmanagement	 ﾠadopts	 ﾠclassic	 ﾠ“best	 ﾠ
practices’	 ﾠstrategies	 ﾠcommon	 ﾠin	 ﾠhighly	 ﾠnetworked	 ﾠand	 ﾠtechnologically	 ﾠdriven	 ﾠ
environments.	 ﾠFor	 ﾠclassified	 ﾠinformation	 ﾠsecurity	 ﾠmanagement	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠprocess	 ﾠ
means	 ﾠthat	 ﾠit	 ﾠshall	 ﾠbe	 ﾠprotected	 ﾠ‘throughout	 ﾠits	 ﾠlife	 ﾠcycle”.	 ﾠAs	 ﾠwe	 ﾠhave	 ﾠseen	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠhas	 ﾠnot	 ﾠyet	 ﾠadopted	 ﾠits	 ﾠown	 ﾠrules	 ﾠfor	 ﾠprotecting	 ﾠclassified	 ﾠ
information	 ﾠequivalent	 ﾠto	 ﾠthose	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCouncil.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠCouncil’s	 ﾠ2011	 ﾠsecurity	 ﾠ
rules	 ﾠapply	 ﾠbeyond	 ﾠCFSP	 ﾠto	 ﾠall	 ﾠinformation	 ﾠclassified	 ﾠ“in	 ﾠthe	 ﾠinterests	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
Union”.	 ﾠThis	 ﾠnow	 ﾠseems	 ﾠto	 ﾠ	 ﾠapply	 ﾠalso	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS,	 ﾠwhose	 ﾠwork	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot	 ﾠlimited	 ﾠ
to	 ﾠforeign	 ﾠand	 ﾠsecurity	 ﾠpolicy	 ﾠbut	 ﾠcovers	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ“overall	 ﾠpolitical	 ﾠcoordination	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠUnion’s	 ﾠexternal	 ﾠaction”	 ﾠincluding,	 ﾠfor	 ﾠinstance,	 ﾠdevelopment	 ﾠ
cooperation,	 ﾠneighbourhood	 ﾠand	 ﾠpartnership	 ﾠpolicy,	 ﾠcooperation	 ﾠwith	 ﾠ
industrialised	 ﾠcountries,	 ﾠand	 ﾠnuclear	 ﾠsafety	 ﾠcooperation.
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 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
  Article	 ﾠ4	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠsecurity	 ﾠrules	 ﾠaddresses	 ﾠphysical	 ﾠsecurity	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
protection	 ﾠof	 ﾠclassified	 ﾠinformation,	 ﾠas	 ﾠwell	 ﾠas	 ﾠstaff	 ﾠand	 ﾠvisitors.	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ5	 ﾠ
deals	 ﾠwith	 ﾠpersonnel	 ﾠsecurity	 ﾠclearance,	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠis	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcommon	 ﾠterm	 ﾠfor	 ﾠ
eligibility	 ﾠfor	 ﾠaccess	 ﾠto	 ﾠclassified	 ﾠinformation.	 ﾠSecurity	 ﾠclearance	 ﾠis	 ﾠrequired	 ﾠ
for	 ﾠaccess	 ﾠto	 ﾠ“TRÈS	 ﾠSECRET/TOP	 ﾠSECRET”,	 ﾠ“SECRET”	 ﾠor	 ﾠ“CONFIDENTIEL”	 ﾠtexts,	 ﾠ
in	 ﾠaccordance	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠgeneral	 ﾠEU	 ﾠrules.
224	 ﾠIt	 ﾠis	 ﾠgranted	 ﾠonly	 ﾠto	 ﾠthose	 ﾠfor	 ﾠ
whom	 ﾠan	 ﾠappropriate	 ﾠpersonnel	 ﾠsecurity	 ﾠbackground	 ﾠinvestigation	 ﾠhas	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠ
completed	 ﾠby	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠhome	 ﾠcountry's	 ﾠintelligence	 ﾠservice.	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ6	 ﾠspecifically	 ﾠ
addresses	 ﾠsecurity	 ﾠof	 ﾠcommunication	 ﾠand	 ﾠinformation	 ﾠsystems	 ﾠand	 ﾠsets	 ﾠout	 ﾠ
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under	 ﾠnegotiation)	 ﾠas	 ﾠwell	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠpermanent	 ﾠadministrative	 ﾠarrangement	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠUN,	 ﾠallowing	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
exchange	 ﾠof	 ﾠEUCI	 ﾠclassified	 ﾠat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ‘restricted’	 ﾠlevel	 ﾠonly.	 ﾠSee,	 ﾠCouncil	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠUnion,	 ﾠNote	 ﾠ
from	 ﾠGeneral	 ﾠSecretariat	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCouncil	 ﾠto	 ﾠDelegations,	 ﾠExchange	 ﾠof	 ﾠEUCI	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthird	 ﾠstates	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
international	 ﾠorganisations,	 ﾠ12619/11,	 ﾠBrussels,	 ﾠ7	 ﾠJuly	 ﾠ2011.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
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 ﾠSee	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ9(2)	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠDecision	 ﾠand	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ3(1)	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠsecurity	 ﾠrules.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
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 ﾠSee	 ﾠalso	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdiscussion	 ﾠunder	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ11	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠDecision,	 ﾠbelow.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 90	 ﾠ
requirements	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrules	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprotection	 ﾠof	 ﾠclassified	 ﾠinformation
225	 ﾠwill	 ﾠ
have	 ﾠto	 ﾠmeet.	 ﾠThese	 ﾠrules	 ﾠwill	 ﾠfurther	 ﾠhave	 ﾠto	 ﾠprovide	 ﾠfor	 ﾠsecurity	 ﾠawareness	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠtraining
226	 ﾠand	 ﾠfor	 ﾠconsequences	 ﾠof	 ﾠsecurity	 ﾠbreaches.
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  A	 ﾠManaging	 ﾠDirectorate	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠissues	 ﾠof	 ﾠadministration,	 ﾠpersonnel,	 ﾠbudget,	 ﾠ
security	 ﾠand	 ﾠinformation	 ﾠsystems	 ﾠand	 ﾠcommunications	 ﾠoperating	 ﾠwithin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
EEAS	 ﾠis	 ﾠmanaged	 ﾠby	 ﾠPatrick	 ﾠChild	 ﾠunder	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsupervision	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠChief	 ﾠ
Operating	 ﾠOfficer,	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠshall	 ﾠensure	 ﾠthat	 ﾠappropriate	 ﾠphysical	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
organisational	 ﾠmeasures	 ﾠare	 ﾠin	 ﾠplace	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsecurity	 ﾠand	 ﾠsafety	 ﾠof	 ﾠstaff	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
visitors,	 ﾠphysical	 ﾠassets	 ﾠand	 ﾠinformation	 ﾠin	 ﾠall	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠpremises.
228	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  Article	 ﾠ9	 ﾠsets	 ﾠout	 ﾠthe	 ﾠorganisation	 ﾠof	 ﾠsecurity	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS,	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠis	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
responsibility	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠSecurity	 ﾠDirectorate	 ﾠ(Article	 ﾠ9(4)).	 ﾠIn	 ﾠaddition	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
internal	 ﾠSecurity	 ﾠDirectorate	 ﾠ(MDR	 ﾠB	 ﾠ–	 ﾠSecurity	 ﾠ–	 ﾠDirector:	 ﾠFransPotuyt),	 ﾠ
which	 ﾠconsists	 ﾠof	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠofficials	 ﾠand	 ﾠis	 ﾠat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdisposal	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠHigh	 ﾠ
Representative,	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ9(6)	 ﾠestablishes	 ﾠa	 ﾠSecurity	 ﾠCommittee,	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠis	 ﾠ
composed	 ﾠof	 ﾠnational	 ﾠexperts	 ﾠand	 ﾠrepresentatives	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠGeneral	 ﾠSecretariat	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCouncil	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCommission.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠSecurity	 ﾠCommittee	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot	 ﾠformally	 ﾠ
part	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbureaucracy	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠagain	 ﾠexemplifies	 ﾠEEAS’	 ﾠintention	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
institutionalise	 ﾠclose	 ﾠcooperation	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠmember	 ﾠstates,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCouncil	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠCommission.	 ﾠIt	 ﾠmakes	 ﾠrecommendations	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠHigh	 ﾠRepresentative	 ﾠon	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠimplementation	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsecurity	 ﾠrules	 ﾠ(Article	 ﾠ1(6))	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠHigh	 ﾠ
Representative	 ﾠ“shall	 ﾠseek	 ﾠits	 ﾠadvice”	 ﾠon	 ﾠany	 ﾠsecurity	 ﾠmatter	 ﾠ(Article	 ﾠ9(6)).	 ﾠA	 ﾠ




  Article	 ﾠ10	 ﾠdeals	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsecurity	 ﾠof	 ﾠCSDP	 ﾠmissions	 ﾠand	 ﾠEU	 ﾠSpecial	 ﾠ
Representatives.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠresponsibility	 ﾠlies	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠhead	 ﾠof	 ﾠmission	 ﾠor	 ﾠspecial	 ﾠ
representative	 ﾠpursuant	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrules	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdecision	 ﾠestablishing	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmission.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
225	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ3(1)	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠsecurity	 ﾠrules.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
226	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ7	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠsecurity	 ﾠrules.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
227	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ8	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠsecurity	 ﾠrules.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
228Article	 ﾠ9(3)	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠsecurity	 ﾠrules.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
229	 ﾠParagraph	 ﾠ36	 ﾠof	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠExternal	 ﾠAction	 ﾠService,	 ﾠReport	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠHigh	 ﾠRepresentative	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
European	 ﾠParliament,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCouncil	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCommission,	 ﾠ22	 ﾠDecember	 ﾠ2011,	 ﾠavailable	 ﾠat:	 ﾠ
<http://www.eeas.europa.eu/images/top_stories/2011_eeas_report_cor_+_formatting.pdf>	 ﾠ(last	 ﾠ
visited	 ﾠ31	 ﾠJanuary	 ﾠ2013).	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 91	 ﾠ
  Article	 ﾠ10(3)	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠDecision	 ﾠstipulates	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcompetent	 ﾠservices	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠmember	 ﾠstates	 ﾠshall	 ﾠassist	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠSecurity	 ﾠDirectorate.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠcontrast	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
some	 ﾠtypes	 ﾠof	 ﾠcooperation	 ﾠset	 ﾠout	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠDecision,	 ﾠthis	 ﾠassistance	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot	 ﾠ
reciprocal.
230The	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠSecurity	 ﾠDirectorate	 ﾠcooperates	 ﾠvery	 ﾠclosely	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
relevant	 ﾠservices	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCouncil	 ﾠSecretariat	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCommission.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
  Article	 ﾠ10(4)	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠDecision	 ﾠmandates	 ﾠthe	 ﾠHigh	 ﾠRepresentative	 ﾠto	 ﾠtake	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠnecessary	 ﾠmeasures	 ﾠto	 ﾠprotect	 ﾠclassified	 ﾠinformation.	 ﾠIt	 ﾠshould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠread	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
combination	 ﾠwith	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ3(1)	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠsecurity	 ﾠrules	 ﾠ(see	 ﾠabove).	 ﾠThe	 ﾠ
continuing	 ﾠabsence	 ﾠof	 ﾠspecific	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠrules	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprotection	 ﾠof	 ﾠEUCI	 ﾠshould	 ﾠ
not	 ﾠdistract	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠhigh	 ﾠrelevance	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠinformation	 ﾠcreated	 ﾠand	 ﾠshared	 ﾠ
by	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠUnion’s	 ﾠoverall	 ﾠuse	 ﾠand	 ﾠprotection	 ﾠof	 ﾠEUCI.	 ﾠMost	 ﾠclassified	 ﾠ
documents	 ﾠrelate	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCommon	 ﾠForeign	 ﾠand	 ﾠSecurity	 ﾠPolicy
231	 ﾠand	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
significant	 ﾠnumber	 ﾠare	 ﾠreceived	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCouncil	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCommission	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
EEAS.	 ﾠFurthermore,	 ﾠCouncil	 ﾠdocuments	 ﾠare	 ﾠin	 ﾠprinciple	 ﾠdistributed	 ﾠto	 ﾠall	 ﾠ
members	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCouncil,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCommission	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠand	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠrelevant	 ﾠ
administrative	 ﾠservices,	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠhave	 ﾠto	 ﾠensure	 ﾠthat	 ﾠaccess	 ﾠis	 ﾠgranted	 ﾠonly	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
individuals	 ﾠwith	 ﾠa	 ﾠneed	 ﾠto	 ﾠknow	 ﾠand	 ﾠsecurity	 ﾠclearance	 ﾠif	 ﾠappropriate.	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ
10(4)	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠDecision	 ﾠis	 ﾠanother	 ﾠexample	 ﾠof	 ﾠhow	 ﾠmuch	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠis	 ﾠ
located	 ﾠequidistant	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCommission,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCouncil	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmember	 ﾠ
states:	 ﾠ“the	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠshall	 ﾠseek	 ﾠadvice	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠSecurity	 ﾠOffice	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠGeneral	 ﾠ
Secretariat	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCouncil,	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrelevant	 ﾠservices	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCommission	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
from	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrelevant	 ﾠservices	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠMember	 ﾠStates.”	 ﾠMoreover,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfuture	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠ
rules	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprotection	 ﾠof	 ﾠEUCI	 ﾠcan	 ﾠbe	 ﾠexpected	 ﾠto	 ﾠapply	 ﾠto	 ﾠUnion	 ﾠ
delegations	 ﾠand	 ﾠmissions.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
3.	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠapplication	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCouncil’s	 ﾠrules	 ﾠon	 ﾠEUCI:	 ﾠequivalence	 ﾠwith	 ﾠpitfalls?	 ﾠ
  The	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠDecision	 ﾠstill	 ﾠrefers	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ2001	 ﾠsecurity	 ﾠrules	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCouncil.	 ﾠ
However,	 ﾠas	 ﾠwe	 ﾠhave	 ﾠalready	 ﾠseen	 ﾠabove,	 ﾠafter	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠwas	 ﾠestablished	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
operational,	 ﾠin	 ﾠMarch	 ﾠ2011	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCouncil	 ﾠadopted	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnext	 ﾠgeneration	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
security	 ﾠrules	 ﾠand	 ﾠformally	 ﾠintroduced	 ﾠEUCI.	 ﾠThese	 ﾠnew	 ﾠsecurity	 ﾠrules	 ﾠare	 ﾠ
much	 ﾠmore	 ﾠfar	 ﾠreaching	 ﾠin	 ﾠterms	 ﾠof	 ﾠscope	 ﾠand	 ﾠbreadth	 ﾠof	 ﾠapplication	 ﾠthan	 ﾠ
their	 ﾠ2001	 ﾠcounterpart.	 ﾠFrom	 ﾠ2011	 ﾠthe	 ﾠjustifications	 ﾠfor	 ﾠclassifying	 ﾠ
documents	 ﾠinclude	 ﾠin	 ﾠgeneral	 ﾠterms	 ﾠ“the	 ﾠinterests	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠUnion”	 ﾠas	 ﾠ
well	 ﾠas	 ﾠthose	 ﾠof	 ﾠ“one	 ﾠor	 ﾠmore	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠMember	 ﾠStates”.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠEU	 ﾠnow	 ﾠhas	 ﾠ
marked	 ﾠout	 ﾠa	 ﾠclassification	 ﾠsystem	 ﾠthat	 ﾠapplies	 ﾠacross	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbroad	 ﾠspectrum	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
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 ﾠSee	 ﾠdiscussion	 ﾠunder	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ3	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠDecision,	 ﾠabove.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
231	 ﾠGeneral	 ﾠSecretariat	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCouncil,	 ﾠReply	 ﾠto	 ﾠWritten	 ﾠQuestion	 ﾠE-ﾭ‐004374/2012	 ﾠput	 ﾠby	 ﾠMartin	 ﾠ
Ehrenhauser	 ﾠ(NI),	 ﾠDoc.	 ﾠ10684/12	 ﾠPE-ﾭ‐QE	 ﾠ226,	 ﾠ4	 ﾠJune	 ﾠ2012.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 92	 ﾠ
all	 ﾠits	 ﾠactivities	 ﾠwith	 ﾠno	 ﾠspecial	 ﾠmention	 ﾠor	 ﾠposition	 ﾠgiven	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCFSP	 ﾠ
anymore.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠadoption	 ﾠof	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠspecific	 ﾠrules	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprotection	 ﾠof	 ﾠclassified	 ﾠ
information
232	 ﾠare	 ﾠrequired	 ﾠunder	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprinciple	 ﾠof	 ﾠequivalence	 ﾠto	 ﾠreflect	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
new	 ﾠCouncil	 ﾠsecurity	 ﾠrules	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠ2011.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠany	 ﾠevent,	 ﾠthey	 ﾠnow	 ﾠapply	 ﾠfully	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠcontext.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
  A	 ﾠbalancing	 ﾠexercise	 ﾠneeds	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠperformed	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠthe	 ﾠinterests	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEU	 ﾠ
or	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpolicy	 ﾠarea	 ﾠin	 ﾠsecrecy	 ﾠand	 ﾠ	 ﾠthe	 ﾠneed	 ﾠfor	 ﾠclassification	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
interests	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠin	 ﾠtransparency.	 ﾠBut	 ﾠno	 ﾠprovision	 ﾠis	 ﾠmade	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthis	 ﾠ
balancing	 ﾠexercise	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠcarried	 ﾠout	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠperson	 ﾠdeciding	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
classification	 ﾠstatus	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠparticular	 ﾠdocument.	 ﾠBecause	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠway	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
classification	 ﾠsystem	 ﾠworks,	 ﾠthis	 ﾠperson	 ﾠwill	 ﾠnot	 ﾠonly	 ﾠbe	 ﾠan	 ﾠEU	 ﾠofficial	 ﾠbut	 ﾠcan	 ﾠ
also	 ﾠbe	 ﾠan	 ﾠofficial	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠmember	 ﾠstate	 ﾠor	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠthird	 ﾠstate	 ﾠor	 ﾠof	 ﾠanother	 ﾠ
international	 ﾠorganisation.	 ﾠThis	 ﾠis	 ﾠdue	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprinciple	 ﾠof	 ﾠoriginator	 ﾠcontrol.	 ﾠ
This	 ﾠprinciple,	 ﾠabbreviated	 ﾠas	 ﾠORCON,	 ﾠis	 ﾠdeeply	 ﾠinterwoven	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEU	 ﾠ
classification	 ﾠrules	 ﾠand	 ﾠmeans	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠoriginator	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠdocument,	 ﾠeven	 ﾠif	 ﾠ
circulated	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEU	 ﾠcontext,	 ﾠretains	 ﾠcontrol	 ﾠover	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠhappens	 ﾠto	 ﾠits	 ﾠ
classification	 ﾠstatus.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠprinciple	 ﾠof	 ﾠoriginator	 ﾠcontrol	 ﾠallows	 ﾠoriginating	 ﾠ
governments	 ﾠor	 ﾠagencies/institutions	 ﾠto	 ﾠretain	 ﾠcontrol	 ﾠover	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
declassification	 ﾠof	 ﾠinformation	 ﾠ(if	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠclassified)	 ﾠor	 ﾠits	 ﾠrelease	 ﾠto	 ﾠnon-ﾭ‐	 ﾠ
governmental	 ﾠparties	 ﾠ(if	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot).	 ﾠThe	 ﾠORCON	 ﾠrule	 ﾠthus	 ﾠeliminates	 ﾠthe	 ﾠability	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠstates/agencies/international	 ﾠorganisations	 ﾠto	 ﾠmake	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠown	 ﾠjudgments	 ﾠ
about	 ﾠthe	 ﾠwisdom	 ﾠof	 ﾠreleasing	 ﾠshared	 ﾠinformation.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠrequirement	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
consult	 ﾠthe	 ﾠauthor	 ﾠ(the	 ﾠoriginator)	 ﾠbefore	 ﾠgranting	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠaccess	 ﾠor	 ﾠ
declassifying	 ﾠis	 ﾠdeeply	 ﾠembedded	 ﾠwithin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCouncil’s	 ﾠrules	 ﾠbut	 ﾠalso	 ﾠfeatures	 ﾠ
in	 ﾠseveral	 ﾠplaces	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠaccess	 ﾠto	 ﾠdocuments	 ﾠlegislation	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠ2001.
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 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
  Moreover,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprinciple	 ﾠof	 ﾠderivative	 ﾠclassification	 ﾠmeans	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠperson	 ﾠ
classifying	 ﾠa	 ﾠnew	 ﾠdocument	 ﾠwho	 ﾠextracts	 ﾠparts	 ﾠ	 ﾠof	 ﾠan	 ﾠold	 ﾠclassified	 ﾠdocument	 ﾠ
(from	 ﾠwhatever	 ﾠsource)	 ﾠfor	 ﾠuse	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠnew	 ﾠdocument	 ﾠwill	 ﾠgenerally	 ﾠclassify	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
new	 ﾠdocument	 ﾠat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠhighest	 ﾠlevel	 ﾠof	 ﾠclassification	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠold	 ﾠdocument,	 ﾠ
irrespective	 ﾠof	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠthe	 ﾠparticular	 ﾠpiece	 ﾠof	 ﾠinformation	 ﾠre-ﾭ‐used	 ﾠactually	 ﾠ
justifies	 ﾠthat.	 ﾠBoth	 ﾠthese	 ﾠpractices	 ﾠcan	 ﾠlead	 ﾠto	 ﾠover-ﾭ‐classification,	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠ
means	 ﾠessentially	 ﾠunnecessary	 ﾠclassification	 ﾠor	 ﾠunnecessarily	 ﾠhigh	 ﾠ
classification,	 ﾠto	 ﾠan	 ﾠaccumulated	 ﾠculture	 ﾠof	 ﾠsecrecy	 ﾠwithin	 ﾠa	 ﾠbureaucracy.	 ﾠAs	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠyet,	 ﾠthere	 ﾠis	 ﾠ	 ﾠno	 ﾠinformation	 ﾠavailable	 ﾠ	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠdomain	 ﾠas	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
232	 ﾠSee	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ3(1)	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠsecurity	 ﾠrules.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
233	 ﾠSee,	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ4(4)	 ﾠand	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ9(3)	 ﾠof	 ﾠRegulation	 ﾠ(EC)	 ﾠNo	 ﾠ1049/2001	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠParliament	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCouncil	 ﾠof	 ﾠ30	 ﾠMay	 ﾠ2001	 ﾠregarding	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠaccess	 ﾠto	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠParliament,	 ﾠCouncil	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
Commission	 ﾠdocuments,	 ﾠOJ	 ﾠ2001	 ﾠL	 ﾠ145/43.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 93	 ﾠ
numbers	 ﾠof	 ﾠclassified	 ﾠdocuments	 ﾠcreated	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠnor	 ﾠreceived	 ﾠby	 ﾠit	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠ
other	 ﾠ(internal	 ﾠand	 ﾠexternal)	 ﾠsources,	 ﾠnor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdegree	 ﾠof	 ﾠits	 ﾠclassified	 ﾠ
information	 ﾠsharing.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
  The	 ﾠmain	 ﾠpitfalls	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsystem	 ﾠof	 ﾠinformation	 ﾠsharing	 ﾠof	 ﾠclassified	 ﾠ
information	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEU	 ﾠcontext	 ﾠcan	 ﾠbe	 ﾠsummarised	 ﾠas	 ﾠfollows.	 ﾠFirst	 ﾠof	 ﾠall,	 ﾠ
information	 ﾠsharing	 ﾠand	 ﾠexchange	 ﾠcan	 ﾠonly	 ﾠgo	 ﾠas	 ﾠfar	 ﾠas	 ﾠmember	 ﾠstates	 ﾠallow	 ﾠ
it	 ﾠto	 ﾠgo.	 ﾠAgencies,	 ﾠincluding	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS,	 ﾠhave	 ﾠlimited	 ﾠpowers	 ﾠto	 ﾠmake	 ﾠmember	 ﾠ
states,	 ﾠas	 ﾠwell	 ﾠas	 ﾠother	 ﾠactors,	 ﾠshare	 ﾠinformation	 ﾠand	 ﾠexperience	 ﾠdifficulties	 ﾠ
in	 ﾠobtaining	 ﾠsufficient	 ﾠinformation.
234	 ﾠThe	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠmay	 ﾠbe	 ﾠcomparatively	 ﾠ
advantaged	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfact	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ“at	 ﾠleast	 ﾠone-ﾭ‐third”	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠstaff	 ﾠdirectly	 ﾠ
comes	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmember	 ﾠstates.
235	 ﾠA	 ﾠpilot	 ﾠproject	 ﾠfor	 ﾠlocal	 ﾠexchange	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
classified	 ﾠinformation	 ﾠis	 ﾠbeing	 ﾠdeveloped	 ﾠin	 ﾠcooperation	 ﾠwith	 ﾠmember	 ﾠstates.	 ﾠ
For	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnew	 ﾠsystem	 ﾠto	 ﾠbecome	 ﾠoperational	 ﾠsecurity	 ﾠapprovals	 ﾠat	 ﾠnational	 ﾠ
level	 ﾠwill	 ﾠhave	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠput	 ﾠin	 ﾠplace.
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 ﾠ
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  Secondly,	 ﾠin	 ﾠmany	 ﾠcases	 ﾠsensitive	 ﾠinformation	 ﾠcannot	 ﾠbe	 ﾠshared	 ﾠamong	 ﾠ
agencies.	 ﾠMember	 ﾠstates	 ﾠor	 ﾠother	 ﾠ(international)	 ﾠactors	 ﾠremain	 ﾠ“owners”	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠinformation	 ﾠand	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠonly	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpermission	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠoriginator	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthis	 ﾠ
information	 ﾠcan	 ﾠbe	 ﾠshared.	 ﾠClassification	 ﾠand	 ﾠdeclassification	 ﾠare	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
monopoly	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrespective	 ﾠinstitutions	 ﾠand	 ﾠbodies.	 ﾠUntil	 ﾠvery	 ﾠrecently	 ﾠthere	 ﾠ
was	 ﾠno	 ﾠprocedure	 ﾠ–	 ﾠor	 ﾠpractice	 ﾠ–	 ﾠof	 ﾠ“declassification”.	 ﾠNow	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCouncil	 ﾠhas	 ﾠ
issued	 ﾠguidelines	 ﾠin	 ﾠthis	 ﾠregard	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfirst	 ﾠ“declassification”	 ﾠdecisions	 ﾠare	 ﾠ
emerging.
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 ﾠThe	 ﾠguidelines	 ﾠapply	 ﾠmutatis	 ﾠmutandis	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
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 ﾠSee	 ﾠalso,	 ﾠHouse	 ﾠof	 ﾠLords,	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠUnion	 ﾠCommittee,	 ﾠ“Europol:	 ﾠcoordinating	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfight	 ﾠagainst	 ﾠ
serious	 ﾠand	 ﾠorganised	 ﾠcrime’,	 ﾠ29th	 ﾠReport	 ﾠof	 ﾠSession	 ﾠ2007-ﾭ‐08,	 ﾠReport	 ﾠwith	 ﾠEvidence,	 ﾠpublished	 ﾠ12	 ﾠ
November	 ﾠ2008;	 ﾠM.	 ﾠBusuioc,	 ﾠD.	 ﾠCurtin	 ﾠand	 ﾠM.	 ﾠGroenleer,	 ﾠ“Agency	 ﾠgrowth	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠautonomy	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
accountability:	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠPolice	 ﾠOffice	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠ‘living	 ﾠinstitution’”	 ﾠ(2011)	 ﾠ18	 ﾠ Journal	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ European	 ﾠ
Public	 ﾠPolicy,	 ﾠ848-ﾭ‐867	 ﾠand	 ﾠM.	 ﾠBusuioc,	 ﾠM.	 ﾠGroenleer	 ﾠand	 ﾠJ.	 ﾠTrondal	 ﾠ(eds.),	 ﾠThe	 ﾠagency	 ﾠphenomenon	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠ European	 ﾠ Union:	 ﾠ Emergence,	 ﾠ institutionalisation	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ everyday	 ﾠ decision-ﾭ‐making	 ﾠ
(Manchester:	 ﾠ	 ﾠManchester	 ﾠUniversity	 ﾠPress,	 ﾠ2012).	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
235Article	 ﾠ6(9)	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠDecision.	 ﾠ
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 ﾠParagraph	 ﾠ19	 ﾠof	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠExternal	 ﾠAction	 ﾠService,	 ﾠReport	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠHigh	 ﾠRepresentative	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
European	 ﾠParliament,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCouncil	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCommission,	 ﾠ22	 ﾠDecember	 ﾠ2011,	 ﾠavailable	 ﾠat:	 ﾠ
<http://www.eeas.europa.eu/images/top_stories/2011_eeas_report_cor_+_formatting.pdf>	 ﾠ(last	 ﾠ
visited	 ﾠ31	 ﾠJanuary	 ﾠ2013).	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
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 ﾠCouncil	 ﾠNote	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠSecurity	 ﾠCommittee,	 ﾠGuidelines	 ﾠon	 ﾠdowngrading	 ﾠand	 ﾠdeclassifying	 ﾠCouncil	 ﾠ
documents,	 ﾠBrussels,	 ﾠ2	 ﾠSeptember	 ﾠ2011,	 ﾠavailable	 ﾠat	 ﾠ
<http://www.statewatch.org/news/2011/nov/eu-ﾭ‐council-ﾭ‐sec-ﾭ‐cttee-ﾭ‐declassifying-ﾭ‐docs-ﾭ‐md-ﾭ‐36-ﾭ‐11.pdf>	 ﾠ
(last	 ﾠvisited	 ﾠ31	 ﾠJanuary	 ﾠ2013).	 ﾠ
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 ﾠ
  Information	 ﾠis	 ﾠshared	 ﾠamong	 ﾠmany	 ﾠsources	 ﾠ(national	 ﾠand	 ﾠsupranational;	 ﾠ
internal	 ﾠand	 ﾠexternal;	 ﾠprivate	 ﾠand	 ﾠpublic)	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠinformation	 ﾠthus	 ﾠshared	 ﾠ
tends	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠa	 ﾠcommingling	 ﾠof	 ﾠboth	 ﾠinternal	 ﾠand	 ﾠexternal	 ﾠsecurity	 ﾠaspects.	 ﾠ
What	 ﾠis	 ﾠmore,	 ﾠhow	 ﾠexactly	 ﾠand	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠinformation	 ﾠis	 ﾠbeing	 ﾠutilised	 ﾠand	 ﾠin	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠ
manner	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot	 ﾠat	 ﾠall	 ﾠstraightforward	 ﾠand	 ﾠserves	 ﾠa	 ﾠvariety	 ﾠof	 ﾠdifferent	 ﾠ
purposes,	 ﾠranging	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠpriority-ﾭ‐setting	 ﾠand	 ﾠpolicy-ﾭ‐making	 ﾠto	 ﾠactual	 ﾠ
operational	 ﾠimplementation.	 ﾠThere	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠcertain	 ﾠlevel	 ﾠof	 ﾠdislocation	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
operational	 ﾠfunction	 ﾠof	 ﾠinformation,	 ﾠaffected	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠoverall	 ﾠfragmentation	 ﾠ
characteristic	 ﾠof	 ﾠthis	 ﾠarea,	 ﾠmore	 ﾠbroadly.	 ﾠUltimately,	 ﾠit	 ﾠmakes	 ﾠit	 ﾠimpossible	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
independently	 ﾠverify/check	 ﾠthe	 ﾠreliability	 ﾠof	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠinformation.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠproblem	 ﾠis	 ﾠ
compounded	 ﾠat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEU	 ﾠlevel	 ﾠbecause	 ﾠthe	 ﾠissue	 ﾠof	 ﾠsecurity	 ﾠand	 ﾠclassification	 ﾠ
rules	 ﾠis	 ﾠregulated	 ﾠpurely	 ﾠat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlevel	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠinternal	 ﾠorganisation	 ﾠrules	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
individual	 ﾠinstitutions.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
  The	 ﾠabsence	 ﾠof	 ﾠoverall	 ﾠexternal	 ﾠmechanisms	 ﾠacting	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠcheck	 ﾠover	 ﾠa	 ﾠgrowing	 ﾠ
body	 ﾠof	 ﾠ“secret”	 ﾠinformation	 ﾠis	 ﾠhighly	 ﾠproblematic	 ﾠat	 ﾠ	 ﾠEU	 ﾠlevel,	 ﾠgiven	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
growing	 ﾠscope	 ﾠfor	 ﾠsecrecy	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlikelihood	 ﾠof	 ﾠover-ﾭ‐classification	 ﾠthat	 ﾠflow	 ﾠ
from	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbenefits	 ﾠthat	 ﾠcan	 ﾠbe	 ﾠderived	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠuse	 ﾠof	 ﾠsecrecy	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
principles	 ﾠof	 ﾠoriginator	 ﾠcontrol	 ﾠand	 ﾠderivative	 ﾠclassification.
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 ﾠA	 ﾠnew	 ﾠexternal	 ﾠ
mechanism	 ﾠthat	 ﾠis	 ﾠunder	 ﾠdevelopment	 ﾠin	 ﾠthis	 ﾠregard	 ﾠis	 ﾠthe	 ﾠongoing	 ﾠ
negotiation	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠParliament	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠspecific	 ﾠinter-ﾭ‐
institutional	 ﾠagreement	 ﾠto	 ﾠenable	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠto	 ﾠgive	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEP	 ﾠaccess	 ﾠto	 ﾠclassified	 ﾠ
information.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠeffect,	 ﾠthis	 ﾠis	 ﾠpart	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠwider	 ﾠstrategy	 ﾠto	 ﾠengage	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEP	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
security	 ﾠactor	 ﾠalongside	 ﾠthe	 ﾠother	 ﾠEU	 ﾠsecurity	 ﾠactors,	 ﾠand	 ﾠmay	 ﾠreduce	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
ability	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEP	 ﾠto	 ﾠperform	 ﾠits	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠaccountability	 ﾠfunction	 ﾠfully	 ﾠand	 ﾠwith	 ﾠ
publicity.	 ﾠ
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 ﾠ	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 ﾠSee	 ﾠalso	 ﾠD.	 ﾠCurtin,	 ﾠ“Top	 ﾠSecret	 ﾠEurope,”	 ﾠinaugural	 ﾠlecture,	 ﾠUniversity	 ﾠof	 ﾠAmsterdam,	 ﾠ2011,	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ
attempts	 ﾠto	 ﾠlaunch	 ﾠa	 ﾠbroader	 ﾠdebate.	 ﾠAvailable	 ﾠat	 ﾠ<http://oratiereeks.nl/upload/pdf/PDF-ﾭ‐




Access	 ﾠto	 ﾠdocuments,	 ﾠarchives	 ﾠand	 ﾠprotection
∗	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
1.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠshall	 ﾠapply	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrules	 ﾠlaid	 ﾠdown	 ﾠin	 ﾠRegulation	 ﾠ(EC)	 ﾠ1049/2001	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠParliament	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCouncil	 ﾠof	 ﾠ30	 ﾠMay	 ﾠ2001	 ﾠregarding	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠaccess	 ﾠto	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠParliament,	 ﾠCouncil	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
Commission	 ﾠdocuments.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠHigh	 ﾠRepresentative	 ﾠshall	 ﾠdecide	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠimplementing	 ﾠrules	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
2.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠExecutive	 ﾠSecretary-ﾭ‐General	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠshall	 ﾠorganise	 ﾠthe	 ﾠarchives	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠservice.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠrelevant	 ﾠ
archives	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdepartments	 ﾠtransferred	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠGeneral	 ﾠSecretariat	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCouncil	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
Commission	 ﾠshall	 ﾠbe	 ﾠtransferred	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
3.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠshall	 ﾠprotect	 ﾠindividuals	 ﾠwith	 ﾠregard	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprocessing	 ﾠof	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠpersonal	 ﾠdata	 ﾠin	 ﾠaccordance	 ﾠ
with	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrules	 ﾠlaid	 ﾠdown	 ﾠin	 ﾠRegulation	 ﾠ(EC)	 ﾠNo	 ﾠ45/2001	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠParliament	 ﾠand	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCouncil	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠ18	 ﾠDecember	 ﾠ2000	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprotection	 ﾠof	 ﾠindividuals	 ﾠwith	 ﾠregard	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprocessing	 ﾠof	 ﾠpersonal	 ﾠdata	 ﾠ
by	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCommunity	 ﾠinstitutions	 ﾠand	 ﾠbodies	 ﾠand	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfree	 ﾠmovement	 ﾠof	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠdata.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠHigh	 ﾠ
Representative	 ﾠshall	 ﾠdecide	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠimplementing	 ﾠrules	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
Article	 ﾠ11	 ﾠrelates	 ﾠto	 ﾠaccess	 ﾠto	 ﾠdocuments,	 ﾠarchives	 ﾠand	 ﾠdata	 ﾠprotection.	 ﾠAs	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ
11(2)	 ﾠregarding	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠarchives	 ﾠappears	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠrather	 ﾠself-ﾭ‐explanatory,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
following	 ﾠfocuses	 ﾠon	 ﾠaccess	 ﾠto	 ﾠdocuments	 ﾠand	 ﾠdata	 ﾠprotection	 ﾠonly.	 ﾠFirst,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
application	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprinciple	 ﾠof	 ﾠtransparency	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠwill	 ﾠbe	 ﾠanalysed	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbasis	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠthe	 ﾠapplicable	 ﾠdecision	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠHigh	 ﾠRepresentative	 ﾠand	 ﾠof	 ﾠexisting	 ﾠpractice	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
case-ﾭ‐law	 ﾠon	 ﾠaccess	 ﾠto	 ﾠdocuments	 ﾠcontaining	 ﾠinformation	 ﾠregarding	 ﾠforeign	 ﾠpolicy	 ﾠ
matters,	 ﾠmainly	 ﾠwith	 ﾠrespect	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠapplication	 ﾠof	 ﾠRegulation	 ﾠ1049/2001	 ﾠ(section	 ﾠ1).	 ﾠ
Second,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠapplication	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprinciple	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprotection	 ﾠof	 ﾠpersonal	 ﾠdata	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
EEAS	 ﾠwill	 ﾠbe	 ﾠanalysed	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbasis	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠapplicable	 ﾠdecision	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠHigh	 ﾠ
Representative	 ﾠand	 ﾠexisting	 ﾠcase	 ﾠlaw	 ﾠand	 ﾠpractice	 ﾠon	 ﾠpersonal	 ﾠdata	 ﾠprotection,	 ﾠ
mainly	 ﾠregarding	 ﾠRegulation	 ﾠ45/2001,	 ﾠand	 ﾠsome	 ﾠreflections	 ﾠwill	 ﾠbe	 ﾠoffered	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
difficult	 ﾠbalancing	 ﾠact	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠthose	 ﾠtwo	 ﾠprinciples	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlight	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠ
Court	 ﾠof	 ﾠJustice’s	 ﾠjudgment	 ﾠin	 ﾠBavarian	 ﾠLager	 ﾠ(section	 ﾠ2).	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
1. The	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprinciple	 ﾠof	 ﾠtransparency	 ﾠ
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  Article	 ﾠ11(1)	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠDecision	 ﾠprovides	 ﾠfor	 ﾠRegulation	 ﾠ(EC)	 ﾠ1049/2001	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠParliament	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCouncil	 ﾠregarding	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠaccess	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
European	 ﾠParliament,	 ﾠCouncil	 ﾠand	 ﾠCommission	 ﾠdocuments
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∗	 ﾠFootnote	 ﾠreferences	 ﾠhave	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠsuppressed	 ﾠhere	 ﾠbut	 ﾠare	 ﾠincluded	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdiscussion	 ﾠbelow.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
239	 ﾠOJ	 ﾠ2001	 ﾠL145/43.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 96	 ﾠ
EEAS.
240	 ﾠRecital	 ﾠ7	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpreamble	 ﾠto	 ﾠthat	 ﾠRegulation	 ﾠfurther	 ﾠnotes	 ﾠthat	 ﾠit	 ﾠ
applies	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCFSP.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
  Article	 ﾠ4(1)(a)	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠRegulation	 ﾠdetermines	 ﾠthat	 ﾠinstitutions	 ﾠare	 ﾠto	 ﾠrefuse	 ﾠ
access	 ﾠto	 ﾠa	 ﾠdocument	 ﾠwhere	 ﾠdisclosure	 ﾠwould	 ﾠundermine	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprotection	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠinterest	 ﾠas	 ﾠregards	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠsecurity,	 ﾠdefence	 ﾠand	 ﾠmilitary	 ﾠmatters,	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠinternational	 ﾠrelations,	 ﾠas	 ﾠwell	 ﾠas	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfinancial,	 ﾠmonetary	 ﾠor	 ﾠeconomic	 ﾠ
policy	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠUnion	 ﾠor	 ﾠa	 ﾠmember	 ﾠstate.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
  Documents	 ﾠaffecting	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠsecurity,	 ﾠdefence	 ﾠand	 ﾠmilitary	 ﾠmatters	 ﾠalso	 ﾠ
constitute	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcategory	 ﾠof	 ﾠ“sensitive	 ﾠdocuments”.	 ﾠThese	 ﾠoriginate	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
institutions	 ﾠor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠagencies	 ﾠestablished	 ﾠby	 ﾠthem,	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠmember	 ﾠstates,	 ﾠthird	 ﾠ
countries	 ﾠor	 ﾠinternational	 ﾠorganisations,	 ﾠand	 ﾠare	 ﾠclassified	 ﾠas	 ﾠ“TRÈS	 ﾠ
SECRET/TOP	 ﾠSECRET”,	 ﾠ“SECRET”	 ﾠor	 ﾠ“CONFIDENTIEL”	 ﾠin	 ﾠaccordance	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
rules	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠinstitution	 ﾠconcerned.
241	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
  The	 ﾠRegulation	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠnot	 ﾠcontain	 ﾠany	 ﾠspecific	 ﾠconditions	 ﾠor	 ﾠlimitations	 ﾠ
applicable	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠaccess	 ﾠto	 ﾠdocuments	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsphere	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCFSP,	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠ
can	 ﾠbe	 ﾠfound	 ﾠin	 ﾠother	 ﾠdocuments,	 ﾠnotably	 ﾠin	 ﾠCouncil	 ﾠDecision	 ﾠ2011/292/EU	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠ31	 ﾠMarch	 ﾠ2011	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsecurity	 ﾠrules	 ﾠfor	 ﾠprotecting	 ﾠEU	 ﾠclassified	 ﾠ
information.
242	 ﾠIt	 ﾠwas	 ﾠnoted	 ﾠearlier	 ﾠthat	 ﾠpending	 ﾠthe	 ﾠadoption	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠHigh	 ﾠ
Representative	 ﾠof	 ﾠequivalent	 ﾠrules	 ﾠfor	 ﾠprotecting	 ﾠclassified	 ﾠinformation,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
EEAS	 ﾠis	 ﾠto	 ﾠapply	 ﾠmutatis	 ﾠmutandis	 ﾠthose	 ﾠsecurity	 ﾠrules	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCouncil,	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
High	 ﾠRepresentative	 ﾠis	 ﾠto	 ﾠtake	 ﾠall	 ﾠnecessary	 ﾠmeasures	 ﾠto	 ﾠimplement	 ﾠthose	 ﾠ
rules	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS.
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 ﾠNevertheless,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCommission	 ﾠhas	 ﾠsuggested	 ﾠthat	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ3	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠRegulation	 ﾠshould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠamended	 ﾠ
to	 ﾠinclude	 ﾠa	 ﾠpoint	 ﾠ3,	 ﾠdefining	 ﾠ‘institutions’	 ﾠas	 ﾠ“institutions,	 ﾠbodies,	 ﾠoffices	 ﾠand	 ﾠagencies	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
European	 ﾠUnion,	 ﾠincluding	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠExternal	 ﾠAction	 ﾠService”:	 ﾠProposal	 ﾠfor	 ﾠa	 ﾠRegulation	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
European	 ﾠParliament	 ﾠand	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCouncil	 ﾠamending	 ﾠRegulation	 ﾠ(EC)	 ﾠNo	 ﾠ1049/2001	 ﾠregarding	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠ
access	 ﾠto	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠParliament,	 ﾠCouncil	 ﾠand	 ﾠCommission	 ﾠdocuments,	 ﾠCOM(2011)	 ﾠ137	 ﾠfinal,	 ﾠ5.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
241Article	 ﾠ9(1)	 ﾠof	 ﾠRegulation	 ﾠ(EC)	 ﾠ1049/2001.	 ﾠSee	 ﾠalso	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdiscussion	 ﾠunder	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ10	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠDecision,	 ﾠ
above.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
242	 ﾠOJ	 ﾠ2011	 ﾠL141/17.	 ﾠThat	 ﾠdecision	 ﾠrepealed	 ﾠand	 ﾠreplaced	 ﾠCouncil	 ﾠDecision	 ﾠ2001/264/EC	 ﾠof	 ﾠ19	 ﾠMarch	 ﾠ
2001	 ﾠadopting	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCouncil's	 ﾠsecurity	 ﾠregulations,	 ﾠOJ	 ﾠ2001	 ﾠL101/1,	 ﾠas	 ﾠlast	 ﾠamended	 ﾠby	 ﾠCouncil	 ﾠDecision	 ﾠ
2007/438/EC	 ﾠof	 ﾠ18	 ﾠJune	 ﾠ2007	 ﾠamending	 ﾠDecision	 ﾠ2001/264/EC	 ﾠadopting	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCouncil’s	 ﾠsecurity	 ﾠ
regulations,	 ﾠOJ	 ﾠ2007	 ﾠL164/24.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
243	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ3(1)	 ﾠof	 ﾠDecision	 ﾠ2011/C	 ﾠ304/05	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠHigh	 ﾠRepresentative	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠUnion	 ﾠfor	 ﾠForeign	 ﾠAffairs	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠSecurity	 ﾠPolicy	 ﾠof	 ﾠ15	 ﾠJune	 ﾠ2011	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsecurity	 ﾠrules	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠExternal	 ﾠAction	 ﾠService,	 ﾠOJ	 ﾠ
2011	 ﾠC	 ﾠ304/7.	 ﾠSee	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdiscussion	 ﾠunder	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ10	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠDecision,	 ﾠabove.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 97	 ﾠ
  On	 ﾠ19	 ﾠJuly	 ﾠ2011,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠHigh	 ﾠRepresentative	 ﾠadopted	 ﾠDecision	 ﾠ2011/C	 ﾠ243/08	 ﾠ
on	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrules	 ﾠregarding	 ﾠaccess	 ﾠto	 ﾠdocuments.
244	 ﾠIn	 ﾠaccordance	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ
Decision,	 ﾠany	 ﾠcitizen	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠUnion	 ﾠor	 ﾠany	 ﾠnatural	 ﾠor	 ﾠlegal	 ﾠperson	 ﾠresiding	 ﾠor	 ﾠ
having	 ﾠits	 ﾠregistered	 ﾠoffice	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠmember	 ﾠstate,	 ﾠis	 ﾠto	 ﾠhave	 ﾠa	 ﾠright	 ﾠof	 ﾠaccess	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
EEAS	 ﾠdocuments	 ﾠaccording	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprinciples,	 ﾠconditions	 ﾠand	 ﾠlimits	 ﾠlaid	 ﾠdown	 ﾠ
in	 ﾠRegulation	 ﾠ(EC)	 ﾠ1049/2001	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠspecific	 ﾠprovisions	 ﾠlaid	 ﾠdown	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
Decision.	 ﾠThis	 ﾠright	 ﾠof	 ﾠaccess	 ﾠconcerns	 ﾠdocuments	 ﾠheld	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS,	 ﾠnamely,	 ﾠ
documents	 ﾠdrawn	 ﾠup	 ﾠor	 ﾠreceived	 ﾠby	 ﾠit	 ﾠand	 ﾠin	 ﾠits	 ﾠpossession.
245	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
  The	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠCourt	 ﾠof	 ﾠJustice	 ﾠappears	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠrestrained	 ﾠin	 ﾠits	 ﾠreview	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
decisions	 ﾠof	 ﾠinstitutions	 ﾠrefusing	 ﾠaccess	 ﾠto	 ﾠdocuments	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbasis	 ﾠof	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠ
interest.	 ﾠSee,	 ﾠfor	 ﾠexample,	 ﾠSison:	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
o  the	 ﾠCouncil	 ﾠmust	 ﾠbe	 ﾠrecognised	 ﾠas	 ﾠ“enjoying	 ﾠa	 ﾠwide	 ﾠdiscretion	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
purpose	 ﾠof	 ﾠdetermining	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdisclosure	 ﾠof	 ﾠdocuments	 ﾠrelating	 ﾠ
to	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfields	 ﾠcovered	 ﾠby	 ﾠthose	 ﾠexceptions	 ﾠcould	 ﾠundermine	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠ
interest”;	 ﾠand	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
o  “the	 ﾠCommunity	 ﾠCourt’s	 ﾠreview	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlegality	 ﾠof	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠa	 ﾠdecision	 ﾠmust	 ﾠ
therefore	 ﾠbe	 ﾠlimited	 ﾠto	 ﾠverifying	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprocedural	 ﾠrules	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
duty	 ﾠto	 ﾠstate	 ﾠreasons	 ﾠhave	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠcomplied	 ﾠwith,	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfacts	 ﾠ
have	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠaccurately	 ﾠstated,	 ﾠand	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠthere	 ﾠhas	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠa	 ﾠmanifest	 ﾠ
error	 ﾠof	 ﾠassessment	 ﾠor	 ﾠa	 ﾠmisuse	 ﾠof	 ﾠpowers”.
246	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
  The	 ﾠGeneral	 ﾠCourt	 ﾠtoo	 ﾠhas	 ﾠby	 ﾠand	 ﾠlarge	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠdeferential	 ﾠand	 ﾠrestrained	 ﾠin	 ﾠits	 ﾠ
review	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠreliance	 ﾠon	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ4(1)(a)	 ﾠby	 ﾠother	 ﾠinstitutions.
247More	 ﾠ
recently,	 ﾠhowever,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠGeneral	 ﾠCourt	 ﾠhas	 ﾠappeared	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠwilling	 ﾠto	 ﾠconduct	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
very	 ﾠthorough	 ﾠreview.
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 ﾠA	 ﾠnotable	 ﾠexample	 ﾠin	 ﾠthat	 ﾠregard	 ﾠis	 ﾠthe	 ﾠIn	 ﾠ‘t	 ﾠVeld	 ﾠ
case,	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠconcerned	 ﾠan	 ﾠopinion	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCouncil’s	 ﾠLegal	 ﾠService,	 ﾠissued	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
context	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠadoption	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCouncil	 ﾠdecision	 ﾠauthorising	 ﾠthe	 ﾠopening	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
negotiations,	 ﾠon	 ﾠbehalf	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEU,	 ﾠfor	 ﾠan	 ﾠinternational	 ﾠagreement	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠ
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244	 ﾠDecision	 ﾠ2011/C	 ﾠ243/08	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠHigh	 ﾠRepresentative	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠUnion	 ﾠfor	 ﾠForeign	 ﾠAffairs	 ﾠand	 ﾠSecurity	 ﾠ
Policy	 ﾠof	 ﾠ19	 ﾠJuly	 ﾠ2011	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrules	 ﾠregarding	 ﾠaccess	 ﾠto	 ﾠdocuments,	 ﾠOJ	 ﾠ2011	 ﾠC	 ﾠ243/16.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
245Article	 ﾠ1(1)	 ﾠof	 ﾠDecision	 ﾠ2011/C	 ﾠ243/08.	 ﾠAny	 ﾠnatural	 ﾠor	 ﾠlegal	 ﾠperson	 ﾠnot	 ﾠresiding,	 ﾠor	 ﾠnot	 ﾠhaving	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠ
registered	 ﾠoffice,	 ﾠin	 ﾠone	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmember	 ﾠstates	 ﾠis	 ﾠto	 ﾠenjoy	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsame	 ﾠright	 ﾠof	 ﾠaccess	 ﾠto	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠdocuments,	 ﾠ
subject	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsame	 ﾠprinciples,	 ﾠconditions	 ﾠand	 ﾠlimits,	 ﾠand	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsame	 ﾠterms,	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠexception	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠright	 ﾠto	 ﾠmake	 ﾠa	 ﾠcomplaint	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠOmbudsman	 ﾠ(Article	 ﾠ1(2)).	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
246	 ﾠCase	 ﾠC-ﾭ‐266/05	 ﾠP	 ﾠSisonv	 ﾠCouncil	 ﾠ[2007]	 ﾠECR	 ﾠI-ﾭ‐1233,	 ﾠparagraphs	 ﾠ33–34.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
247	 ﾠSee,	 ﾠfor	 ﾠexample,	 ﾠCase	 ﾠT-ﾭ‐264/04	 ﾠWWF	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠPolicy	 ﾠProgramme	 ﾠv	 ﾠCouncil	 ﾠ[2007]	 ﾠECR	 ﾠII-ﾭ‐911.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
248	 ﾠSee,	 ﾠfor	 ﾠexample,	 ﾠCase	 ﾠT-ﾭ‐59/09	 ﾠGermany	 ﾠv	 ﾠCommission	 ﾠ[2012]	 ﾠECR	 ﾠII-ﾭ‐0000;	 ﾠCase	 ﾠT-ﾭ‐465/09	 ﾠIvan	 ﾠ
Jurašinović	 ﾠv	 ﾠCouncil,	 ﾠjudgment	 ﾠof	 ﾠ14	 ﾠFebruary	 ﾠ2012,	 ﾠnyr;	 ﾠand	 ﾠCase	 ﾠT-ﾭ‐63/10	 ﾠIvan	 ﾠJurašinović	 ﾠv	 ﾠCouncil	 ﾠ
judgment	 ﾠof	 ﾠ3	 ﾠOctober	 ﾠ2012,	 ﾠnyr.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 98	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠEU	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠUSA	 ﾠin	 ﾠorder	 ﾠto	 ﾠmake	 ﾠavailable	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠUS	 ﾠTreasury	 ﾠ
Department	 ﾠfinancial	 ﾠmessaging	 ﾠdata	 ﾠto	 ﾠprevent	 ﾠand	 ﾠcombat	 ﾠterrorism	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
terrorist	 ﾠfinancing.	 ﾠThat	 ﾠopinion	 ﾠwas,	 ﾠin	 ﾠessence,	 ﾠconcerned	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlegal	 ﾠ
basis	 ﾠof	 ﾠthat	 ﾠdecision	 ﾠand	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrespective	 ﾠcompetences	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEU	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
then	 ﾠEC:
249	 ﾠ
o  since	 ﾠthe	 ﾠchoice	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlegal	 ﾠbasis	 ﾠrests	 ﾠon	 ﾠobjective	 ﾠfactors	 ﾠand	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠ
not	 ﾠfall	 ﾠwithin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdiscretion	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠinstitution,	 ﾠany	 ﾠdivergence	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
opinions	 ﾠon	 ﾠthat	 ﾠsubject	 ﾠcould	 ﾠnot	 ﾠbe	 ﾠequated	 ﾠwith	 ﾠa	 ﾠdifference	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
opinion	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠthe	 ﾠinstitutions	 ﾠas	 ﾠto	 ﾠmatters	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠrelate	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
substance	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠagreement.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
o  the	 ﾠmere	 ﾠfear	 ﾠof	 ﾠdisclosing	 ﾠa	 ﾠdisagreement	 ﾠwithin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠinstitutions	 ﾠ
regarding	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlegal	 ﾠbasis	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠdecision	 ﾠauthorising	 ﾠthe	 ﾠopening	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
negotiations	 ﾠon	 ﾠbehalf	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEU	 ﾠwas	 ﾠnot	 ﾠa	 ﾠsufficient	 ﾠbasis	 ﾠfor	 ﾠ
concluding	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprotected	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠinterest	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfield	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
international	 ﾠrelations	 ﾠmay	 ﾠbe	 ﾠundermined.
250	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
o  with	 ﾠthe	 ﾠexception	 ﾠof	 ﾠthose	 ﾠelements	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrequested	 ﾠdocument	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ
concern	 ﾠthe	 ﾠspecific	 ﾠcontent	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠenvisaged	 ﾠagreement	 ﾠor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
negotiating	 ﾠdirectives,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCouncil	 ﾠhad	 ﾠnot	 ﾠshown	 ﾠhow,	 ﾠspecifically	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠactually,	 ﾠwider	 ﾠaccess	 ﾠto	 ﾠthat	 ﾠdocument	 ﾠwould	 ﾠhave	 ﾠundermined	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠinterest	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfield	 ﾠof	 ﾠinternational	 ﾠrelations,	 ﾠand	 ﾠpartially	 ﾠ
annulled	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcontested	 ﾠdecision	 ﾠof	 ﾠrefusal	 ﾠof	 ﾠaccess.
251	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
o  the	 ﾠCouncil	 ﾠcould	 ﾠtherefore	 ﾠnot	 ﾠreasonably	 ﾠrely	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠgeneral	 ﾠ
consideration	 ﾠthat	 ﾠa	 ﾠthreat	 ﾠto	 ﾠa	 ﾠprotected	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠinterest	 ﾠmay	 ﾠbe	 ﾠ
presumed	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠsensitive	 ﾠarea,	 ﾠin	 ﾠparticular	 ﾠconcerning	 ﾠlegal	 ﾠadvice	 ﾠ




o  “the	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠinterest	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtransparency	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdecision-ﾭ‐making	 ﾠ
process	 ﾠwould	 ﾠbecome	 ﾠmeaningless	 ﾠif,	 ﾠas	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCommission	 ﾠproposes,	 ﾠit	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
249Case	 ﾠT-ﾭ‐529/09	 ﾠIn	 ﾠ't	 ﾠVeld	 ﾠv	 ﾠCouncil,	 ﾠjudgment	 ﾠof	 ﾠ4	 ﾠMay	 ﾠ2012,	 ﾠnyr,	 ﾠpara	 ﾠ26.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠCouncil’s	 ﾠappeal	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠjudgment	 ﾠis	 ﾠcurrently	 ﾠpending	 ﾠbefore	 ﾠthe	 ﾠECJ:	 ﾠCase	 ﾠC-ﾭ‐350/12	 ﾠP	 ﾠCouncil	 ﾠv	 ﾠ	 ﾠIn	 ﾠ't	 ﾠVeld.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
250In	 ﾠ't	 ﾠVeld,	 ﾠparagraphs	 ﾠ47-ﾭ‐50.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
251In	 ﾠ't	 ﾠVeld,	 ﾠparagraphs	 ﾠ57-ﾭ‐60.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
252In	 ﾠ't	 ﾠVeld,	 ﾠparagraphs	 ﾠ71-ﾭ‐74.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 99	 ﾠ
were	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠtaken	 ﾠinto	 ﾠaccount	 ﾠonly	 ﾠin	 ﾠthose	 ﾠcases	 ﾠwhere	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdecision-ﾭ‐
making	 ﾠprocess	 ﾠhas	 ﾠcome	 ﾠto	 ﾠan	 ﾠend”.
253	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
2.  The	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠand	 ﾠdata	 ﾠprotection	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
•  Regulation	 ﾠ(EC)	 ﾠ45/2001
254	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠnot	 ﾠcover	 ﾠactivities	 ﾠthat	 ﾠwholly	 ﾠfall	 ﾠwithin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
scope	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCFSP.	 ﾠNevertheless,	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ3(1),	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠprovides	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
Regulation	 ﾠis	 ﾠto	 ﾠapply	 ﾠ“to	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprocessing	 ﾠof	 ﾠpersonal	 ﾠdata	 ﾠby	 ﾠall	 ﾠCommunity	 ﾠ
institutions	 ﾠand	 ﾠbodies	 ﾠinsofar	 ﾠas	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠprocessing	 ﾠis	 ﾠcarried	 ﾠout	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
exercise	 ﾠof	 ﾠactivities	 ﾠall	 ﾠor	 ﾠpart	 ﾠof	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠfall	 ﾠwithin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠscope	 ﾠof	 ﾠCommunity	 ﾠ
law”,
255	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠseem	 ﾠto	 ﾠimply	 ﾠthat	 ﾠactivities	 ﾠthat	 ﾠare	 ﾠonly	 ﾠpartly	 ﾠwithin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCFSP	 ﾠ
are	 ﾠcovered	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠRegulation.	 ﾠAt	 ﾠany	 ﾠrate,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠstatus	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠright	 ﾠto	 ﾠdata	 ﾠ
protection	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠfundamental	 ﾠright	 ﾠenshrined	 ﾠin	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ8	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCharter	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
Fundamental	 ﾠRights	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEU	 ﾠimplies	 ﾠthat	 ﾠit	 ﾠapplies	 ﾠthroughout	 ﾠthe	 ﾠUnion	 ﾠ
legal	 ﾠorder,	 ﾠincluding	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCFSP.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
•  On	 ﾠ8	 ﾠDecember	 ﾠ2011,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠHigh	 ﾠRepresentative	 ﾠadopted	 ﾠa	 ﾠdecision	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
rules	 ﾠregarding	 ﾠdata	 ﾠprotection,
256	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠlays	 ﾠdown	 ﾠthe	 ﾠimplementing	 ﾠrules	 ﾠ
concerning	 ﾠRegulation	 ﾠ(EC)	 ﾠ45/2001	 ﾠas	 ﾠregards	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS.
257	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
  Regulation	 ﾠ(EC)	 ﾠ45/2001	 ﾠcontains	 ﾠno	 ﾠreference	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpossibility	 ﾠof	 ﾠdisclosure	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠpersonal	 ﾠdata	 ﾠfor	 ﾠreasons	 ﾠof	 ﾠtransparency.	 ﾠConversely,	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ4(1)(b)	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
Regulation	 ﾠ(EC)	 ﾠ1049/2001	 ﾠprovides	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠinstitutions	 ﾠare	 ﾠto	 ﾠrefuse	 ﾠaccess	 ﾠ
to	 ﾠa	 ﾠdocument	 ﾠwhere	 ﾠdisclosure	 ﾠwould	 ﾠundermine	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprotection	 ﾠof	 ﾠ“privacy	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠthe	 ﾠintegrity	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠindividual,	 ﾠin	 ﾠparticular	 ﾠin	 ﾠaccordance	 ﾠwith	 ﾠ
Community	 ﾠlegislation	 ﾠregarding	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprotection	 ﾠof	 ﾠpersonal	 ﾠdata”.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
  The	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠCourt	 ﾠof	 ﾠJustice	 ﾠhad	 ﾠthe	 ﾠchance	 ﾠto	 ﾠclarify	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrelationship	 ﾠ
between	 ﾠRegulation	 ﾠ(EC)	 ﾠ45/2001	 ﾠand	 ﾠRegulation	 ﾠ(EC)	 ﾠ1049/2001	 ﾠin	 ﾠBavarian	 ﾠ
Lager.	 ﾠThat	 ﾠcase	 ﾠconcerned	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCommission’s	 ﾠdecision	 ﾠto	 ﾠreject,	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbasis	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
253In	 ﾠ't	 ﾠVeld,	 ﾠparagraphs	 ﾠ100-ﾭ‐101.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
254	 ﾠRegulation	 ﾠ(EC)	 ﾠNo	 ﾠ45/2001	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠParliament	 ﾠand	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCouncil	 ﾠof	 ﾠ18	 ﾠDecember	 ﾠ2000	 ﾠ
on	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprotection	 ﾠof	 ﾠindividuals	 ﾠwith	 ﾠregard	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprocessing	 ﾠof	 ﾠpersonal	 ﾠdata	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCommunity	 ﾠ
institutions	 ﾠand	 ﾠbodies	 ﾠand	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfree	 ﾠmovement	 ﾠof	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠdata,	 ﾠOJ	 ﾠ2001	 ﾠL	 ﾠ8/1.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
255	 ﾠEmphasis	 ﾠadded.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
256	 ﾠDecision	 ﾠ2012/C	 ﾠ308/07	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠHigh	 ﾠRepresentative	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠUnion	 ﾠfor	 ﾠForeign	 ﾠAffairs	 ﾠand	 ﾠSecurity	 ﾠ
Policy	 ﾠof	 ﾠ8	 ﾠDecember	 ﾠ2011	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrules	 ﾠregarding	 ﾠdata	 ﾠprotection,	 ﾠOJ	 ﾠ2012	 ﾠC	 ﾠ308/8.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
257	 ﾠPursuant	 ﾠto	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ24(8)	 ﾠof	 ﾠRegulation	 ﾠ(EC)	 ﾠ45/2001,	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠprovides	 ﾠfor	 ﾠfurther	 ﾠimplementing	 ﾠ
rules	 ﾠconcerning	 ﾠthe	 ﾠData	 ﾠProtection	 ﾠOfficer	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠadopted	 ﾠby	 ﾠeach	 ﾠCommunity	 ﾠinstitution	 ﾠor	 ﾠbody.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 100	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ4(1)(b)	 ﾠof	 ﾠRegulation	 ﾠ(EC)	 ﾠ1049/2001,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrequest	 ﾠby	 ﾠBavarian	 ﾠLager	 ﾠ
for	 ﾠaccess	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfull	 ﾠminutes	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠmeeting	 ﾠof	 ﾠ11	 ﾠOctober	 ﾠ1996,	 ﾠafter	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠCommission	 ﾠwithdrew	 ﾠa	 ﾠprocedure	 ﾠfor	 ﾠfailure	 ﾠto	 ﾠfulfill	 ﾠobligations	 ﾠ
brought	 ﾠagainst	 ﾠthe	 ﾠUnited	 ﾠKingdom	 ﾠregarding	 ﾠa	 ﾠmeasure	 ﾠhaving	 ﾠequivalent	 ﾠ
effect	 ﾠto	 ﾠa	 ﾠquantitative	 ﾠrestriction	 ﾠon	 ﾠimports	 ﾠof	 ﾠbeer	 ﾠcontrary	 ﾠto	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠis	 ﾠnow	 ﾠ
Article	 ﾠ34	 ﾠTFEU:	 ﾠ
o  by	 ﾠlimiting	 ﾠthe	 ﾠapplication	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠexception	 ﾠunder	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ4(1)(b)	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
situations	 ﾠin	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprivacy	 ﾠor	 ﾠ	 ﾠintegrity	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠindividual	 ﾠwould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠ
infringed	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpurposes	 ﾠof	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ8	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠECHR	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcase	 ﾠlaw	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠCourt	 ﾠof	 ﾠHuman	 ﾠRights,	 ﾠwithout	 ﾠtaking	 ﾠinto	 ﾠaccount	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
legislation	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠUnion	 ﾠconcerning	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprotection	 ﾠof	 ﾠpersonal	 ﾠdata,	 ﾠ
particularly	 ﾠRegulation	 ﾠ(EC)	 ﾠ45/2001,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠGeneral	 ﾠCourt	 ﾠhad	 ﾠ
disregarded	 ﾠthe	 ﾠwording	 ﾠof	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ4(1)(b),	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠis	 ﾠ“an	 ﾠindivisible	 ﾠ
provision	 ﾠand	 ﾠrequires	 ﾠthat	 ﾠany	 ﾠundermining	 ﾠof	 ﾠprivacy	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
integrity	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠindividual	 ﾠmust	 ﾠalways	 ﾠbe	 ﾠexamined	 ﾠand	 ﾠassessed	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
conformity	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlegislation	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠUnion	 ﾠconcerning	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprotection	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠpersonal	 ﾠdata,	 ﾠand	 ﾠin	 ﾠparticular	 ﾠwith	 ﾠRegulation	 ﾠNo	 ﾠ45/2001”.
258	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
o  where	 ﾠa	 ﾠrequest	 ﾠbased	 ﾠon	 ﾠRegulation	 ﾠ(EC)	 ﾠ1049/2001	 ﾠseeks	 ﾠto	 ﾠobtain	 ﾠ
access	 ﾠto	 ﾠdocuments	 ﾠincluding	 ﾠpersonal	 ﾠdata,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprovisions	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
Regulation	 ﾠ(EC)	 ﾠ45/2001	 ﾠbecome	 ﾠapplicable	 ﾠin	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠentirety.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
o  By	 ﾠrequiring	 ﾠthat,	 ﾠin	 ﾠrespect	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfive	 ﾠpersons	 ﾠpresent	 ﾠat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
meeting	 ﾠwho	 ﾠhad	 ﾠnot	 ﾠgiven	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠexpress	 ﾠconsent	 ﾠto	 ﾠdisclosure,	 ﾠ
Bavarian	 ﾠLager	 ﾠestablish	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnecessity	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthose	 ﾠpersonal	 ﾠdata	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠ
transferred,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCommission	 ﾠcomplied	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprovisions	 ﾠof	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ
8(b)	 ﾠof	 ﾠRegulation	 ﾠ(EC).	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
258	 ﾠCase	 ﾠC-ﾭ‐28/08	 ﾠP	 ﾠCommission	 ﾠv	 ﾠBavarian	 ﾠLager	 ﾠ[2010]	 ﾠECR	 ﾠI-ﾭ‐6055,	 ﾠparagraphs	 ﾠ57-ﾭ‐59.	 ﾠ





1.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠGeneral	 ﾠSecretariat	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCouncil	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrelevant	 ﾠCommission	 ﾠservices	 ﾠshall	 ﾠtake	 ﾠall	 ﾠ
necessary	 ﾠmeasures	 ﾠso	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtransfers	 ﾠreferred	 ﾠto	 ﾠin	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ7	 ﾠcan	 ﾠbe	 ﾠaccompanied	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
transfers	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCouncil	 ﾠand	 ﾠCommission	 ﾠbuildings	 ﾠnecessary	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfunctioning	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS.	 ﾠ
2.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠterms	 ﾠon	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠimmovable	 ﾠproperty	 ﾠis	 ﾠmade	 ﾠavailable	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠcentral	 ﾠadministration	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠUnion	 ﾠDelegations	 ﾠshall	 ﾠbe	 ﾠdecided	 ﾠon	 ﾠjointly	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠHigh	 ﾠRepresentative	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
General	 ﾠSecretariat	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCouncil	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCommission,	 ﾠas	 ﾠappropriate.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
It	 ﾠ was	 ﾠ not	 ﾠ only	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ personnel	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ relevant	 ﾠ Council	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ Commission	 ﾠ
departments	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ were	 ﾠ transferred	 ﾠ
259	 ﾠbut	 ﾠ also	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ buildings	 ﾠ required	 ﾠ for	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ
functioning	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS.	 ﾠAs	 ﾠwith	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ7,	 ﾠto	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠit	 ﾠrefers,	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ12	 ﾠdeals	 ﾠwith	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠtransitional	 ﾠarrangements	 ﾠthat	 ﾠwere	 ﾠneeded	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthis	 ﾠtransfer	 ﾠof	 ﾠimmovable	 ﾠ
property.	 ﾠBringing	 ﾠtogether	 ﾠstaff	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠeight	 ﾠdifferent	 ﾠbuildings	 ﾠin	 ﾠBrussels	 ﾠwas	 ﾠ
one	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfirst	 ﾠpriorities	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠHR/VP.
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 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
Article	 ﾠ12(2)	 ﾠrefers	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠterms	 ﾠon	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠimmovable	 ﾠproperty	 ﾠwas	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠmade	 ﾠ
available	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠcentral	 ﾠadministration	 ﾠand	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠUnion	 ﾠDelegations:	 ﾠthese	 ﾠ
had	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠdecided	 ﾠon	 ﾠjointly	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠHR/VP	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠGeneral	 ﾠSecretariat	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
Council	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCommission,	 ﾠas	 ﾠappropriate.	 ﾠIndeed,	 ﾠat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtime	 ﾠthe	 ﾠDecision	 ﾠwas	 ﾠ
adopted,	 ﾠa	 ﾠfinal	 ﾠarrangement	 ﾠhad	 ﾠnot	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠmade.	 ﾠOriginally,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠexpectation	 ﾠwas	 ﾠ
that	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠwould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠbased	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCommission’s	 ﾠCharlemagne	 ﾠbuilding	 ﾠbut	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
building	 ﾠwas	 ﾠthought	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠtoo	 ﾠsmall	 ﾠand	 ﾠwould	 ﾠtake	 ﾠtoo	 ﾠlong	 ﾠto	 ﾠrenovate.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠ
HR/VP	 ﾠpreferred	 ﾠto	 ﾠrent	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCouncil’s	 ﾠLex	 ﾠbuilding	 ﾠbut	 ﾠwas	 ﾠrebuffed.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠOctober	 ﾠ
2010	 ﾠshe	 ﾠchose	 ﾠthe	 ﾠAxa/triangle	 ﾠbuilding.
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 ﾠ
Is	 ﾠit	 ﾠworth	 ﾠmentioning,	 ﾠin	 ﾠpassing,	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ“functioning	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS”	 ﾠincluded	 ﾠ
those	 ﾠspecific	 ﾠtasks	 ﾠfalling	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcrisis	 ﾠmanagement	 ﾠbodies
262	 ﾠwhich,	 ﾠdue	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
nature	 ﾠof	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠtasks,	 ﾠrequire	 ﾠa	 ﾠspecific	 ﾠsecurity	 ﾠenvironment.	 ﾠAs	 ﾠa	 ﾠconsequence,	 ﾠ
they	 ﾠwere	 ﾠnot	 ﾠtransferred	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnew	 ﾠpremises	 ﾠreferred	 ﾠto	 ﾠabove.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
259	 ﾠSee	 ﾠcommentary	 ﾠof	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ7,	 ﾠabove.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
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 ﾠHouse	 ﾠof	 ﾠLords	 ﾠSelect	 ﾠCommittee	 ﾠon	 ﾠThe	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠUnion,	 ﾠEvidence	 ﾠSession	 ﾠwith	 ﾠBaroness	 ﾠAshton	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠ Upholland,	 ﾠ High	 ﾠ Representative	 ﾠ for	 ﾠ Foreign	 ﾠ Affairs	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ Security	 ﾠ Policy,	 ﾠ Vice	 ﾠ President	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ
European	 ﾠCommission,	 ﾠUnited	 ﾠKingdom,14	 ﾠJune	 ﾠ2011,	 ﾠp.	 ﾠ8.	 ﾠ
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 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ4(3)	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠDecision.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 102	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 ﾠ	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 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
ARTICLE	 ﾠ13	 ﾠ
Final	 ﾠand	 ﾠgeneral	 ﾠprovisions	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
1.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠHigh	 ﾠRepresentative,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCouncil,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCommission	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠMember	 ﾠStates	 ﾠshall	 ﾠbe	 ﾠresponsible	 ﾠ
for	 ﾠimplementing	 ﾠthis	 ﾠDecision	 ﾠand	 ﾠshall	 ﾠtake	 ﾠall	 ﾠmeasures	 ﾠnecessary	 ﾠin	 ﾠfurtherance	 ﾠthereof.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
2.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠHigh	 ﾠRepresentative	 ﾠshall	 ﾠsubmit	 ﾠa	 ﾠreport	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠParliament,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCouncil	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
Commission	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfunctioning	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠend	 ﾠof	 ﾠ2011.	 ﾠThat	 ﾠreport	 ﾠshall,	 ﾠin	 ﾠparticular,	 ﾠcover	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠimplementation	 ﾠof	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ5(3)	 ﾠand	 ﾠ(10)	 ﾠand	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ9.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
3.	 ﾠBy	 ﾠmid-ﾭ‐2013,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠHigh	 ﾠRepresentative	 ﾠshall	 ﾠprovide	 ﾠa	 ﾠreview	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠorganisation	 ﾠand	 ﾠfunctioning	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠEEAS,	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠwill	 ﾠcover	 ﾠinter	 ﾠalia	 ﾠthe	 ﾠimplementation	 ﾠof	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ6(6),	 ﾠ(8)	 ﾠand	 ﾠ(11).	 ﾠThe	 ﾠreview	 ﾠshall,	 ﾠif	 ﾠ
necessary,	 ﾠbe	 ﾠaccompanied	 ﾠby	 ﾠappropriate	 ﾠproposals	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrevision	 ﾠof	 ﾠthis	 ﾠDecision.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠthat	 ﾠcase,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
Council	 ﾠshall,	 ﾠin	 ﾠaccordance	 ﾠwith	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ27(3)	 ﾠTEU,	 ﾠrevise	 ﾠthis	 ﾠDecision	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlight	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠreview	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
beginning	 ﾠof	 ﾠ2014.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
4.	 ﾠThis	 ﾠDecision	 ﾠshall	 ﾠenter	 ﾠinto	 ﾠforce	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdate	 ﾠof	 ﾠits	 ﾠadoption.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠprovisions	 ﾠon	 ﾠfinancial	 ﾠ
management	 ﾠand	 ﾠrecruitment	 ﾠshall	 ﾠtake	 ﾠeffect	 ﾠonce	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnecessary	 ﾠamendments	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠStaff	 ﾠ
Regulations,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCEOS	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠFinancial	 ﾠRegulation,	 ﾠas	 ﾠwell	 ﾠas	 ﾠthe	 ﾠamending	 ﾠbudget,	 ﾠhave	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠ
adopted.	 ﾠTo	 ﾠensure	 ﾠa	 ﾠsmooth	 ﾠtransition,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠHigh	 ﾠRepresentative,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠGeneral	 ﾠSecretariat	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
Council	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCommission	 ﾠshall	 ﾠenter	 ﾠinto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnecessary	 ﾠarrangements,	 ﾠand	 ﾠthey	 ﾠshall	 ﾠundertake	 ﾠ
consultations	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠMember	 ﾠStates.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
5.	 ﾠWithin	 ﾠone	 ﾠmonth	 ﾠafter	 ﾠthe	 ﾠentry	 ﾠinto	 ﾠforce	 ﾠof	 ﾠthis	 ﾠDecision,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠHigh	 ﾠRepresentative	 ﾠshall	 ﾠsubmit	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠCommission	 ﾠan	 ﾠestimate	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrevenue	 ﾠand	 ﾠexpenditure	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS,	 ﾠincluding	 ﾠan	 ﾠestablishment	 ﾠ
plan,	 ﾠin	 ﾠorder	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCommission	 ﾠto	 ﾠpresent	 ﾠa	 ﾠdraft	 ﾠamending	 ﾠbudget.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
6.	 ﾠThis	 ﾠDecision	 ﾠshall	 ﾠbe	 ﾠpublished	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠOfficial	 ﾠJournal	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠUnion.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠlast	 ﾠarticle	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠDecision	 ﾠhas	 ﾠa	 ﾠtwofold	 ﾠfunction:	 ﾠfirst,	 ﾠit	 ﾠidentifies	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
steps	 ﾠneeded,	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠactors	 ﾠresponsible	 ﾠfor	 ﾠimplementing	 ﾠthe	 ﾠDecision	 ﾠ(Section	 ﾠ1)	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠsecond,	 ﾠit	 ﾠcalls	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlatter’s	 ﾠreview	 ﾠand	 ﾠopens	 ﾠthe	 ﾠway	 ﾠfor	 ﾠits	 ﾠadaptation,	 ﾠ“if	 ﾠ
necessary”	 ﾠ(Section	 ﾠ2).	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
1.	 ﾠImplementing	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠDecision	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
  Paragraph	 ﾠ4	 ﾠof	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ13	 ﾠforesees	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠDecision	 ﾠenters	 ﾠinto	 ﾠforce	 ﾠon	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠday	 ﾠof	 ﾠits	 ﾠadoption.	 ﾠFull	 ﾠimplementation	 ﾠnevertheless	 ﾠrequired	 ﾠseveral	 ﾠ
preliminary	 ﾠsteps,	 ﾠmost	 ﾠnotably	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrevision	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠStaff	 ﾠand	 ﾠFinancial	 ﾠ
Regulations.
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 ﾠMoreover,	 ﾠin	 ﾠline	 ﾠwith	 ﾠparagraph	 ﾠ5	 ﾠ(and	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ8(4)),	 ﾠthe	 ﾠHR	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
263Regulation	 ﾠ(EU,	 ﾠEURATOM)	 ﾠNo	 ﾠ1080/2010	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠParliament	 ﾠand	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCouncil	 ﾠof	 ﾠ24	 ﾠ
November	 ﾠ2010	 ﾠamending	 ﾠthe	 ﾠStaff	 ﾠRegulations	 ﾠof	 ﾠOfficials	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠCommunities	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
Conditions	 ﾠof	 ﾠEmployment	 ﾠof	 ﾠOther	 ﾠServants	 ﾠof	 ﾠthose	 ﾠCommunities,	 ﾠOJ	 ﾠ2010	 ﾠL	 ﾠ311/1Regulations	 ﾠ(EU,	 ﾠ
EURATOM)	 ﾠNo	 ﾠ1081/2010	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠParliament	 ﾠand	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCouncil	 ﾠof	 ﾠ24	 ﾠNovember	 ﾠ2010	 ﾠ
amending	 ﾠCouncil	 ﾠRegulation	 ﾠ(EC,	 ﾠEuratom)	 ﾠNo	 ﾠ1605/2002	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠFinancial	 ﾠRegulation	 ﾠapplicable	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠgeneral	 ﾠbudget	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠCommunities,	 ﾠas	 ﾠregards	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠExternal	 ﾠAction	 ﾠService,	 ﾠOJ	 ﾠ
2010	 ﾠL	 ﾠ311/9.	 ﾠSee	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdiscussions	 ﾠunder	 ﾠArticles	 ﾠ6	 ﾠand	 ﾠ8	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠDecision,	 ﾠabove.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 104	 ﾠ
submitted	 ﾠan	 ﾠestimate	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrevenue	 ﾠand	 ﾠexpenditure	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠService	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
Commission,	 ﾠso	 ﾠas	 ﾠto	 ﾠmodify	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEU	 ﾠbudget	 ﾠand	 ﾠto	 ﾠprovide	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠwith	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
start-ﾭ‐up	 ﾠbudget	 ﾠ(paragraph	 ﾠ5).
264	 ﾠThe	 ﾠrequired	 ﾠtransitional	 ﾠarrangements	 ﾠ
were	 ﾠthus	 ﾠentered	 ﾠinto,	 ﾠwhile	 ﾠthe	 ﾠabove-ﾭ‐mentioned	 ﾠRegulations	 ﾠwere	 ﾠduly	 ﾠ
amended,	 ﾠall	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠapproval	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠParliament.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠcompletion	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠfinal	 ﾠnegotiations	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠDecision	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠadoption	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠthree	 ﾠ
flanking	 ﾠmeasures	 ﾠin	 ﾠbarely	 ﾠsix	 ﾠmonths’	 ﾠtime	 ﾠtriggered	 ﾠone	 ﾠinsider	 ﾠto	 ﾠcall	 ﾠit	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
“Guinness	 ﾠrecord	 ﾠfor	 ﾠspeed”.
265	 ﾠBut,	 ﾠas	 ﾠnoted	 ﾠabove,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠspeedy	 ﾠcompromise	 ﾠ
has	 ﾠcome	 ﾠat	 ﾠa	 ﾠprice:	 ﾠEU	 ﾠinstitutions	 ﾠand	 ﾠmember	 ﾠstates	 ﾠmade	 ﾠsure	 ﾠto	 ﾠkeep	 ﾠ
their	 ﾠinfluence	 ﾠover	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnew	 ﾠService.
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 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
  Paragraph	 ﾠ1	 ﾠof	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ13	 ﾠstipulates	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠimplementation	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠ
Decision	 ﾠis	 ﾠthe	 ﾠresponsibility	 ﾠnot	 ﾠonly	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠHigh	 ﾠRepresentative,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠalso	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠCommission,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCouncil	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmember	 ﾠstates;	 ﾠeach	 ﾠof	 ﾠthem	 ﾠbeing	 ﾠ
bound	 ﾠto	 ﾠtake	 ﾠall	 ﾠnecessary	 ﾠmeasures	 ﾠto	 ﾠthat	 ﾠeffect.	 ﾠThat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCommission,	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠCouncil	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmember	 ﾠstates	 ﾠshould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠmentioned	 ﾠin	 ﾠthis	 ﾠlist	 ﾠis	 ﾠ
unsurprising.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠorganisation	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfunctioning	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠwere	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
outset	 ﾠconditional	 ﾠupon	 ﾠeach	 ﾠof	 ﾠthese	 ﾠactors	 ﾠtaking	 ﾠa	 ﾠwhole	 ﾠseries	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
practical	 ﾠsteps,	 ﾠe.g.	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtransfer	 ﾠof	 ﾠstaff	 ﾠ(Article	 ﾠ7)	 ﾠand	 ﾠbuildings	 ﾠ(Article	 ﾠ
12),	 ﾠas	 ﾠwell	 ﾠas	 ﾠthe	 ﾠadditional	 ﾠmeasures	 ﾠevoked	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprevious	 ﾠparagraph.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
  What	 ﾠis	 ﾠremarkable,	 ﾠhowever,	 ﾠis	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠParliament	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot	 ﾠ
explicitly	 ﾠincluded	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlist	 ﾠof	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ13(1).	 ﾠNot	 ﾠso	 ﾠmuch	 ﾠbecause	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
Parliament	 ﾠhad	 ﾠthe	 ﾠright	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠconsulted	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprocess	 ﾠof	 ﾠadoption	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
Council	 ﾠDecision	 ﾠ(as	 ﾠper	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ27(3)	 ﾠTEU),	 ﾠbut	 ﾠmore	 ﾠin	 ﾠview	 ﾠof	 ﾠits	 ﾠessential	 ﾠ
role	 ﾠin	 ﾠallowing	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfull	 ﾠimplementation	 ﾠthereof.	 ﾠIt	 ﾠis	 ﾠrecalled	 ﾠthat	 ﾠneither	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠstaff	 ﾠprovisions,	 ﾠnor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbudget-ﾭ‐related	 ﾠarticles	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠDecision	 ﾠ
could	 ﾠenter	 ﾠinto	 ﾠforce	 ﾠwithout	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpreliminary	 ﾠconsent	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠParliament.	 ﾠ
Moreover,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠParliament’s	 ﾠbudgetary	 ﾠpowers	 ﾠentail	 ﾠa	 ﾠsignificant	 ﾠinfluence	 ﾠ
on	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfinancial	 ﾠassets	 ﾠand	 ﾠthus	 ﾠoperational	 ﾠcapability	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠService.
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 ﾠ
Including	 ﾠthe	 ﾠParliament	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlist	 ﾠof	 ﾠactors	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264European	 ﾠParliament	 ﾠresolution	 ﾠof	 ﾠ20	 ﾠOctober	 ﾠ2010	 ﾠon	 ﾠCouncil's	 ﾠposition	 ﾠon	 ﾠDraft	 ﾠamending	 ﾠ
budget	 ﾠNo	 ﾠ6/2010	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠUnion	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfinancial	 ﾠyear	 ﾠ2010,	 ﾠSection	 ﾠII	 ﾠ-ﾭ‐	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠCouncil	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠCouncil;	 ﾠSection	 ﾠIII	 ﾠ-ﾭ‐	 ﾠCommission;	 ﾠSection	 ﾠX	 ﾠ-ﾭ‐	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠExternal	 ﾠAction	 ﾠService	 ﾠ(13475/2010	 ﾠ–	 ﾠC7-ﾭ‐
0262/2010	 ﾠ–	 ﾠ2010/2094(BUD)).	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
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 ﾠP.	 ﾠSkytteChristoffersen,	 ﾠ“A	 ﾠGuinness	 ﾠRecord	 ﾠfor	 ﾠSpeed”,	 ﾠin	 ﾠE.	 ﾠDrieskens	 ﾠand	 ﾠL.	 ﾠVan	 ﾠSchaik	 ﾠ(eds.),	 ﾠ
“The	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠExternal	 ﾠAction	 ﾠService:	 ﾠPreparing	 ﾠfor	 ﾠSuccess”,	 ﾠ1	 ﾠClingendael	 ﾠPaper	 ﾠ(2010).	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
266	 ﾠSee	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdiscussion	 ﾠunder	 ﾠArticles	 ﾠ2,	 ﾠ7,	 ﾠ8	 ﾠand	 ﾠ12	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠDecision,	 ﾠabove.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
267	 ﾠSee	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdiscussion	 ﾠunder	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ8	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠDecision,	 ﾠabove.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 105	 ﾠ
EEAS	 ﾠDecision	 ﾠwould	 ﾠnot	 ﾠonly	 ﾠhave	 ﾠreflected	 ﾠthe	 ﾠreality,	 ﾠit	 ﾠcould	 ﾠalso	 ﾠhave	 ﾠ
increased	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsense	 ﾠof	 ﾠownership	 ﾠand	 ﾠthus	 ﾠof	 ﾠcommitment	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠParliament	 ﾠ
towards	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsmooth	 ﾠfunctioning	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠService.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
  Indeed,	 ﾠin	 ﾠemphasising	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠactors	 ﾠresponsible	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠDecision’s	 ﾠ
implementation	 ﾠ“shall	 ﾠtake	 ﾠall	 ﾠmeasures	 ﾠnecessary	 ﾠin	 ﾠfurtherance	 ﾠthereof”,	 ﾠ
Article	 ﾠ13(1)	 ﾠestablishes	 ﾠan	 ﾠobligation	 ﾠof	 ﾠgood	 ﾠfaith,	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠechoes	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
provisions	 ﾠof	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ3	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠDecision	 ﾠon	 ﾠcooperation.	 ﾠIncluded	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠCFSP	 ﾠact,	 ﾠ
such	 ﾠan	 ﾠobligation	 ﾠis	 ﾠadmittedly	 ﾠlimited	 ﾠin	 ﾠits	 ﾠnormative	 ﾠeffects,	 ﾠin	 ﾠview	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
non-ﾭ‐contamination	 ﾠprinciple	 ﾠof	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ40(1)	 ﾠTEU,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdeclarations	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
Lisbon	 ﾠTreaty	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlimited	 ﾠjurisdiction	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠCourt	 ﾠof	 ﾠJustice	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
this	 ﾠarea,	 ﾠas	 ﾠevoked	 ﾠearlier.
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 ﾠHowever,	 ﾠas	 ﾠit	 ﾠarguably	 ﾠencapsulates	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
principle	 ﾠof	 ﾠsincere	 ﾠcooperation	 ﾠenshrined	 ﾠin	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ4(3)	 ﾠTEU	 ﾠand	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ
13(2)	 ﾠTEU,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠobligation	 ﾠreferred	 ﾠto	 ﾠin	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ13(1)	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot	 ﾠas	 ﾠtoothless	 ﾠas	 ﾠit	 ﾠ
might	 ﾠinitially	 ﾠlook.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
2.	 ﾠReviewing	 ﾠthe	 ﾠimplementation	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠDecision	 ﾠ
  Given	 ﾠthe	 ﾠoriginality	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEU	 ﾠinstitutional	 ﾠlandscape,	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
ambiguity	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprovisions	 ﾠgoverning	 ﾠits	 ﾠorganisation	 ﾠand	 ﾠfunctioning,	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠ
unsurprising	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmonitoring	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠDecision’s	 ﾠimplementation,	 ﾠand	 ﾠits	 ﾠ
possible	 ﾠrevision,	 ﾠwere	 ﾠdeemed	 ﾠnecessary.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
  Thus,	 ﾠparagraph	 ﾠ2	 ﾠenvisages	 ﾠthat	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠend	 ﾠof	 ﾠ2011,	 ﾠjust	 ﾠa	 ﾠyear	 ﾠafter	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
EEAS	 ﾠactually	 ﾠbegan	 ﾠoperating	 ﾠ(see	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ7(1)	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠDecision),	 ﾠthe	 ﾠHR	 ﾠhad	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
submit	 ﾠa	 ﾠreport	 ﾠon	 ﾠits	 ﾠfunctioning,	 ﾠwith	 ﾠa	 ﾠparticular	 ﾠfocus	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsensitive	 ﾠ
provisions	 ﾠon	 ﾠHR	 ﾠand	 ﾠCommission’	 ﾠinstructions	 ﾠto	 ﾠHeads	 ﾠof	 ﾠDelegations,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
role	 ﾠof	 ﾠEU	 ﾠdelegations	 ﾠin	 ﾠconsular	 ﾠprotection	 ﾠof	 ﾠUnion’s	 ﾠcitizens,	 ﾠand	 ﾠexternal	 ﾠ
action	 ﾠinstruments	 ﾠprogramming.	 ﾠThis	 ﾠreport	 ﾠwas	 ﾠsubmitted	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠ
Parliament,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCouncil	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCommission	 ﾠon	 ﾠ22	 ﾠDecember	 ﾠ2011.
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 ﾠSee	 ﾠdiscussion	 ﾠunder	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ3	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠDecision,	 ﾠabove.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
269EEAS,	 ﾠReport	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠHigh	 ﾠRepresentative	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠParliament,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCouncil	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
Commission,	 ﾠ22	 ﾠDecember	 ﾠ2011,	 ﾠmade	 ﾠavailable	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠon	 ﾠ5	 ﾠJanuary	 ﾠ2012.	 ﾠSee	 ﾠalso	 ﾠ“Remarks	 ﾠ
by	 ﾠHigh	 ﾠRepresentative	 ﾠCatherine	 ﾠAshton	 ﾠat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠAFET	 ﾠCommittee	 ﾠin	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠParliament	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
Strasbourg,	 ﾠ12	 ﾠDecember	 ﾠ2011”,	 ﾠPress	 ﾠrelease	 ﾠA	 ﾠ511/11,	 ﾠBrussels,	 ﾠ13	 ﾠDecember	 ﾠ2011;	 ﾠand	 ﾠ“Speech	 ﾠ
by	 ﾠHigh	 ﾠRepresentative	 ﾠCatherine	 ﾠAshton	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCommon	 ﾠSecurity	 ﾠand	 ﾠDefence	 ﾠPolicy	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
European	 ﾠParliament	 ﾠin	 ﾠStrasbourg”,	 ﾠPress	 ﾠrelease	 ﾠA	 ﾠ512/11,	 ﾠBrussels,	 ﾠ13	 ﾠDecember	 ﾠ2011.	 ﾠFor	 ﾠ
analysis	 ﾠand	 ﾠrecommendations,	 ﾠsee	 ﾠS.	 ﾠBlockmans,	 ﾠ“Fit	 ﾠfor	 ﾠPurpose?	 ﾠThe	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠExternal	 ﾠAction	 ﾠ
Service	 ﾠOne	 ﾠYear	 ﾠOn”,	 ﾠOXFAM	 ﾠBriefing	 ﾠPaper	 ﾠ159,	 ﾠ23	 ﾠJanuary	 ﾠ2012;	 ﾠand	 ﾠS.	 ﾠBlockmans,	 ﾠ“The	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠone	 ﾠ
year	 ﾠon:	 ﾠfirst	 ﾠsigns	 ﾠof	 ﾠstrengths	 ﾠand	 ﾠweaknesses”,	 ﾠCLEER	 ﾠWorking	 ﾠPaper	 ﾠ2012/2.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 106	 ﾠ
  More	 ﾠgenerally,	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ13(3)	 ﾠforesees	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠorganisation	 ﾠand	 ﾠfunctioning	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠthe	 ﾠService	 ﾠshould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠreviewed	 ﾠby	 ﾠmid-ﾭ‐2013.	 ﾠSuch	 ﾠa	 ﾠReview,	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠis	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
basis	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcurrent	 ﾠexercise,	 ﾠis	 ﾠto	 ﾠcover,	 ﾠnotably,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS’	 ﾠcomposition	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
recruitment,	 ﾠin	 ﾠparticular	 ﾠthe	 ﾠgeographical	 ﾠand	 ﾠgender	 ﾠbalance	 ﾠof	 ﾠits	 ﾠstaff,	 ﾠas	 ﾠ
well	 ﾠas	 ﾠmember	 ﾠstates’	 ﾠrepresentation	 ﾠtherein,	 ﾠand	 ﾠformulate	 ﾠproposals	 ﾠfor	 ﾠ
correcting	 ﾠpossible	 ﾠimbalances	 ﾠ(Article	 ﾠ6(6)).
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 ﾠThe	 ﾠsame	 ﾠparagraph	 ﾠadds	 ﾠ
that	 ﾠthe	 ﾠReview	 ﾠshall	 ﾠinclude,	 ﾠ“if	 ﾠnecessary”,	 ﾠappropriate	 ﾠproposals	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
revision	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠDecision.	 ﾠSuch	 ﾠrevision	 ﾠwould	 ﾠthen	 ﾠtake	 ﾠplace	 ﾠ“by	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
beginning	 ﾠof	 ﾠ2014”,	 ﾠthrough	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprocedure	 ﾠused	 ﾠfor	 ﾠits	 ﾠadoption,	 ﾠnamely	 ﾠ
Article	 ﾠ27(3)	 ﾠTEU.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
  While	 ﾠthe	 ﾠreview	 ﾠprocess	 ﾠis	 ﾠunderway,	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠunclear	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠa	 ﾠfully-ﾭ‐fledged	 ﾠ
revision	 ﾠwill	 ﾠbe	 ﾠproposed.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠprotracted	 ﾠnegotiations	 ﾠresulting	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
demanding	 ﾠprocedural	 ﾠrequirements	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠadoption	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠDecision,	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsignificant	 ﾠrole	 ﾠplayed	 ﾠtherein	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠParliament,	 ﾠmay	 ﾠwell	 ﾠ
dissuade	 ﾠcertain	 ﾠmember	 ﾠstates	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠa	 ﾠrevision.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠtemptation	 ﾠmight	 ﾠ
be	 ﾠto	 ﾠlimit	 ﾠthe	 ﾠreview	 ﾠprocess	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠformulation	 ﾠof	 ﾠrecommendations	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠ
might	 ﾠbecome	 ﾠeffective	 ﾠ“à	 ﾠdroit	 ﾠconstant”,	 ﾠi.e.	 ﾠby	 ﾠusing	 ﾠthe	 ﾠinterpretative	 ﾠ
room	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠexisting	 ﾠprovisions	 ﾠwithout	 ﾠamending	 ﾠCouncil	 ﾠDecision	 ﾠ
2010/427/EU.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
  In	 ﾠlight	 ﾠof	 ﾠthis	 ﾠcommentary,	 ﾠand	 ﾠconsidering	 ﾠimplementation	 ﾠto	 ﾠdate,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
second	 ﾠEEAS	 ﾠ2.0	 ﾠpublication	 ﾠintends	 ﾠto	 ﾠassess	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠinterpretative	 ﾠ
room	 ﾠexists	 ﾠto	 ﾠaccommodate	 ﾠchanges	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠorganisation	 ﾠand	 ﾠfunctioning	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠEEAS,	 ﾠto	 ﾠformulate	 ﾠrecommendations	 ﾠaccordingly	 ﾠand/or	 ﾠto	 ﾠmake	 ﾠ
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 ﾠSee	 ﾠS.	 ﾠDuke	 ﾠand	 ﾠS.	 ﾠLange,	 ﾠ“Achieving	 ﾠGeographical	 ﾠand	 ﾠGender	 ﾠBalance	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠExternal	 ﾠ
Action	 ﾠService”,	 ﾠStudy	 ﾠfor	 ﾠDirectorate-ﾭ‐General	 ﾠfor	 ﾠExternal	 ﾠrelations	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠUnion,	 ﾠDirectorate	 ﾠB,	 ﾠ
Policy	 ﾠDepartment,	 ﾠEP/EXPO/B/AET/2012/02,	 ﾠBrussels,	 ﾠ2013.	 ﾠ